Author: Vilson Blloshmi           This paper advances a clear claim: successive emigration & youth emigration waves have  contributed to the increasing electoral support of Albania’s Socialist ruling party. The  mechanism runs through electorate composition (older at home), turnout depression in  youth-heavy areas, and selective mobilization of diaspora-origin voters. A key empirical  puzzle is why diaspora-origin voting appears to favour incumbents (~61%) despite exit  motives rooted in domestic shortcomings.   This study will examine how demographic change, especially youth emigration,  influences elections in Albania and why both resident voters and diaspora-origin voters  often support the ruling Socialist Party. Photo: pixabay/wal_172619 Context and Background   Albania’s age structure and migration balance have shifted markedly, while election  observation repeatedly flags barriers that disproportionately burden younger voters,  information gaps, procedural frictions, and low institutional trust. These trends intersect  with party organization and media environments to sustain large majorities alongside  uneven participation. Levitsky & Way use “competitive authoritarianism” to describe  regimes where formal democratic institutions exist and opposition can compete, but the  contest is systematically skewed because incumbents abuse state power, so elections are  real, yet not fully free and fair. Such regimes are competitive, in that democratic  institutions are not merely a façade: opposition parties use them to seriously contest for power; but they are authoritarian in that opposition forces are handicapped by a highly  uneven—and sometimes dangerous—playing field. Competition is thus real but unfair.1In their framework, the key test is an uneven playing field across major battles (elections,  media, and the state bureaucracy), where rules are applied selectively and public  resources are used to entrench the governing party.   Applied to Albania after the Socialist Party’s historic May 11, 2025 win (83/140 seats)  with 53.3% of the vote, the outcome alone doesn’t “prove” competitive authoritarianism  because landslides can happen in democracies too. But the conditions reported around the  election align with Levitsky & Way’s warning signs: international observers and major  outlets pointed to misuse of public resources, uneven media coverage, and allegations of  pressure and intimidation, all classic mechanisms that can keep elections competitive  while making them unfair.  OSCE&ODIHR stated that: The ruling party benefitted from  widespread use of administrative resources during the campaign, creating an undue  advantage of incumbency. There were also numerous allegations of pressure on voters,  especially public employees. Further, the electoral legislation and its narrow  interpretation by the election administration did not prevent abusive practices.2  So the strongest argument is that Albania shows competitive-authoritarian tendencies:  opposition parties exist and contest power, yet repeated dominant victories are reinforced  by a state environment where incumbents appear to enjoy structural advantages such as  resources, visibility or influence over institutions that weaken the possibility of genuine  alternation. If these patterns persist, especially around media pluralism, enforcement  against vote-buying and pressure, and institutional independence Levitsky & Way’s label  becomes more applicable, not because the opposition is banned, but because competition  remains meaningful while the field stays tilted.   Albanian Electoral System   The Parliament of the Republic of Albania consists of 140 members of parliament, who  are elected for a 4-year term. The electoral system for the Assembly is a proportional  representation system with multi-member electoral districts. For parliamentary elections,  each electoral district corresponds to the administrative-territorial division of the qark (county). The total number of electoral districts is 12, and the number of parliamentary  mandates per district ranges from 3 seats in Kukës County to 37 seats in Tirana County.  Local government elections are held to elect 61 mayors and 1,603 members of municipal  councils across the country. Mayors and municipal council members are directly elected  for a 4-year term.  For local elections, the electoral district corresponds to the administrative-territorial division of the municipality. Mayors are elected through a  majoritarian system, while municipal council members are elected through a proportional  system with closed lists. The number of municipal council seats in each municipality is  determined based on population and ranges from 15 to 61 mandates. Council mandates  are allocated among parties and coalitions using the d’Hondt method, while the  distribution of seats among parties within a coalition is done using the Saint-Lague  method.   Freedom of movement or running from a reality?   As of every time a government official, member of council of ministers, members of  parliament from the Socialist Party, or expert supporting the government argues why  Albanians are leaving the country at such massive and vast numbers they tend to reduce  the importance of such a topic. The Prime Minister Rama states several times that youth  emigration is a normal outcome of freedom of movement and individual choice, not a  national tragedy. He argues that people have the right to test life abroad, and that  portraying emigration as “the worst thing” is, in his view, an exaggerated political/media narrative.  He also claims emigration has brought benefits to Albania (skills, experience,  broader culture), and suggests the public debate becomes distorted because today  everything is amplified “online.” In meetings with young people, he doubles down on3 the idea that if someone believes there is no future in Albania, they should be free to try  leaving, but he insists that the “no future” claim is wrong, and that simple wage  comparisons ignore living costs abroad.  Rama argues that emigration should be treated 4 as a normal, long-running (“historical”) phenomenon tied to freedom of movement, and  says the public debate in Albania often turns into hyperbole rather than a calm discussion  based on facts.Rama even points to comparisons like 2017, when around 39,905 people  left Albania versus 50,000 from EU-member Croatia, to claim the narrative is often  exaggerated. From the other hand the emigration of youth and young people in the last5 decade are unimaginable. 1 milion Albanians have left the country during last 16 years according to Eurostat cited by Monitor.al6  From 2008 to 2024 about one million Albanian citizens received a first-time residence  permit in a European Union country, according to Eurostat data. This increase, from  around 97,780 permits in 2008 to nearly one million by 2024, shows a continuous and  accelerating wave of people leaving Albania for the EU. These emigrants now represent a  large share of the country’s working-age population, and the true number would be even  higher if Albanians who moved to non-EU destinations such as the United Kingdom, the  United States or Canada were also included. The figures point to a major demographic  shift that is slowly changing the profile of those who remain in the country.  Albania  showed the highest annual expatriation rate of nationals to OECD countries in 2023 (22  per 1 000 inhabitants). Romania (13), Bulgaria (12), Bosnia and Herzegovina (11) and  Cuba (11) were the other countries with two-digit figures. The reasons behind this trend 7 are linked to economic difficulties, limited job opportunities, high informality in the  labour market and the lack of long-term security for many young people. Family8 reunification and chances for better education also play an important role.  As emigration  becomes widespread, its effects on Albania’s social and political life are becoming more visible, including a shrinking workforce, loss of skilled professionals, an ageing  population and new electoral dynamics. The scale of the exodus shows that this is not  only a demographic issue but a deeper structural change with serious implications for the  country’s future.  Emigrant Share of Total Population, Albania second after Bulgaria with 41.9% and  projections show that the decline might go to 15.8% by the end of 2050.9  "Southeastern Europe is experiencing one of the sharpest depopulations in the world, led  by Bulgaria, whose population is projected to drop nearly one-quarter by 2050. The most  significant factor behind this trend is migration to Western Europe, which has remained  widespread since the post-communist and post-conflict transition periods of the 1990s  and 2000s. For example, half the total population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 42  percent in Albania reside abroad, often in Western Europe."10  The demographic picture may be bleakest in Bulgaria, which is on course to face the  world’s highest single-country depopulation rate over the next 30 years, according to the  United Nations Population Division. Yet Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,  Albania, and Romania are not far behind, each expecting declines of 15 percent or more  over the next three decades (see Projections). This phenomenon is occurring even as the  world’s population is expected to increase by 2 billion people, to 9.7 billion in 2050.11  Elections and turnout - is it a deadlock?   The Socialist Party won the general elections in coalition with another left wing party  "Socialist Movement for Integration on 2013 to never lose it up to date. After the first  term in coalition with SMI, on the 2017 elections and onwards the Socialist Party won  the elections and the majority in the Parliament as a sole party. In this section we will see  how the turnout percentages changed through years and if the voters taking part in the  general election declined or not.   Youth Voting trends   In Albania, the Youth Study points to a downward tendency in youth turnout. The share  of eligible young respondents who say they voted in the last parliamentary elections fell  from 76.8% in 2018 to 73.8% in 2024, while those who did not vote rose from 23.2% to  26.2%. The change is not dramatic, but it signals a clear direction: a gradual erosion of12 electoral participation among young Albanians, even as voting remains the most common  form of political involvement.   This decline looks even more significant when placed next to the broader engagement  profile. In other words, as youth turnout shows signs of slipping, there is not a strong  “backup” of other participation channels to compensate. The overall picture is of a  generation that is becoming more distant from politics beyond election day, which risks  turning a small drop in turnout today into deeper disengagement over time unless trust,  representation, and everyday relevance of politics improve.   General elections 25 april 2021   General elections of 2021 were held in a tense political climate as one person was  assassinated during the last days of electoral campaign The turnout resulted to be13 46.33%. The official turnout data from the 2021 Albanian general elections shows  significant variation across the twelve qarqe, with overall participation remaining  relatively low at the national level. Out of 3,588,869 registered voters, only 1,662,274  cast a ballot, producing a nationwide turnout of 46.33 percent. Female participation was  slightly lower, with 799,094 women voting out of 1,776,128 registered female voters, or  44.99 percent.   Tirana recorded the highest number of voters, with 484,769 people participating,  representing a turnout of 53.24 percent. Its female turnout rate was similarly strong at  52.01 percent. Dibër also stood above the national average with a participation rate of  52.68 percent, and women in this district voted at an even higher rate of 53.44 percent.  Other districts that approached or exceeded the 50 percent threshold include Kukës, with  49.25 percent turnout, and Korçë, which reached 46.14 percent.  By contrast, several regions displayed markedly lower participation. Vlorë recorded the weakest turnout in the  country at just 33.56 percent, with women voting at an even lower rate of 31.67 percent.  Gjirokastër also reported low engagement, with only 38.85 percent of voters and 37.31  percent of women casting ballots. Shkodër and Durrës likewise fell below the national  average, standing at 41.86 percent and 44.96 percent respectively. Most districts showed  turnout levels in the mid-40 percent range, such as Berat at 44.20 percent, Lezhë at 44.08  percent, Fier at 45.35 percent, and Elbasan at 47.86 percent. In nearly all regions, female  turnout lagged slightly behind male turnout, though the gap varied by district. Overall,  the 2021 elections confirmed persistent patterns of low participation, strong regional  disparities, and noticeable gender differences. These dynamics are essential for  understanding electoral behavior and for linking turnout patterns to broader demographic  shifts, including youth emigration and population decline.   The OSCE/ODIHR final report on the 2021 Albanian elections stated that voters were  offered a genuine choice of candidates, campaigns took place freely, and fundamental  rights were generally respected. However, the mission also identified several structural  issues that created an uneven playing field. The ruling party benefited from its influence  over local administrations and the misuse of state resources, while the overall campaign  environment was affected by widespread allegations of vote-buying. Media coverage14 was heavily unbalanced in favour of incumbents, with frequent overlap between  government activities and party messaging, which further strengthened the ruling party’s  advantage.   Despite the Central Election Commission administering the process in an organized and  transparent manner, long-standing systemic problems remained unresolved. These  included weak oversight of campaign financing, concerns about personal data protection,  and legislative gaps that allow continued political manipulation. In response to these  issues, OSCE/ODIHR issued twenty-three recommendations aimed at improving the  integrity of future elections, with emphasis on securing the secrecy of the vote,  strengthening investigations into vote-buying, protecting citizens’ data, and ensuring fair  and independent media conditions for all contestants.   Last General elections 2025 - an electoral anomaly?   The official turnout figures show that participation in the most recent elections varied  widely across Albania’s twelve districts. Out of more than 3.46 million registered voters  nationwide, around 1.46 million cast a ballot, giving a general turnout rate of 42.25  percent. Tirana recorded the highest number of voters, with more than 450,000 people  participating and a turnout rate of 49.29 percent.  Dibër also performed strongly with  49.07 percent turnout, followed by Kukës at 45.56 percent. In contrast, Vlorë had the  lowest participation in the country, where only 30.40 percent of registered voters took  part. Shkodër and Gjirokastër also reported lower engagement, at 36.81 percent and 35.81  percent respectively. Most other districts, including Berat, Lezhë, Korçë, Fier and  Elbasan, remained in the low-forties range.   A comparison of the two election cycles shows a noticeable decline in voter participation  across almost all districts. In the 2021 general elections, national turnout stood at 46.33  percent, with over 1.66 million voters participating. By contrast, in the later election the  nationwide turnout fell to 42.25 percent, with about 1.46 million voters casting a ballot.  This means participation dropped by more than four percentage points overall. Several  districts that performed strongly in 2021, such as Korçë, Elbasan, Fier and Lezhë,  recorded lower turnout in the more recent vote. Vlorë remained the weakest both times,  but its turnout decreased even further, moving from 33.56 percent in 2021 to only 30.40  percent. Shkodër and Gjirokastër also showed continued low engagement, confirming a  wider pattern of regional stagnation and decline.   Voting trends of Serbian diaspora   The dynamics of diaspora voting offer a revealing lens through which to examine how  formally competitive elections can be subtly re-engineered in favor of incumbents. In line  with Levitsky and Way’s framework, both Albania and Serbia illustrate how electoral  openness can coexist with increasingly uneven playing fields shaped by participation  patterns and organizational power. Dr. Dejan Bursać’s answers are useful because they  point to a shared pattern Albania and Serbia can display in Levitsky & Way’s terms:  elections remain formally open and opposition parties still run, yet incumbents can  steadily stack the odds in their favor by shaping participation and building durable  political machines. In Serbia, he recalls that 10–15 years ago diaspora voting was tiny  (around 10,000 voters) and the bulk of those votes tended to go to liberal, pro-European  parties. Later, once voting procedures became simpler and more accessible, diaspora  turnout reportedly rose (around 30,000 about a decade ago), and the balance shifted  today, he says, most diaspora votes go to the ruling party.   Bursać offers two explanations that map onto Levitsky & Way’s “uneven playing field”  logic. First, he links the new pro-government diaspora pattern to who participates:  working-class, older, and less-qualified emigrants are described as more likely to back  incumbents, often because they value stability, patronage, or tangible benefits. Second, he  highlights a transnational party infrastructure: the SNS’s organizational networks, he  argues, are well-funded and active even in neighboring countries and diaspora hubs,  which can mobilize turnout and preference formation at scale. The combination of  expanded access + targeted mobilization capacity can flip diaspora outcomes without needing to ban opponents, exactly the type of mechanism that keeps elections  “competitive” but structurally advantages incumbents.   Migration benefits the authorities Despite the clear decline in turnout between the two elections, the evidence shows that  demographic change itself is a key driver of lower participation and that this shift helps  explain the outcome. In the most recent election, the party secured 83 mandates and  53.29 percent of the vote, a level of dominance which is contradictory when facing huge  demographic drain. Youth emigration reduces the size of the most turnout-volatile  segment of the electorate and weakens the social networks that typically pull young  voters into politics. As a result, the electorate that remains is older, more settled, and  more likely to vote regularly. In other words, turnout falls not only because of “political  apathy,” but because the country’s demographic structure is changing: fewer young  people are physically present, and those who stay are a shrinking share of the voting-age  population.   The patterns in youth preferences and voting habits analyzed fit this logic: many young  citizens do not vote because they see limited personal payoff from participation, feel  underrepresented by party offerings, and increasingly treat migration as the main strategy  for improving life chances. "Exit” over “voice”. Among those who do vote, choices tend  to be shaped less by long-term partisan loyalty and more by short-term calculations like  stability, access, and perceived effectiveness, while clientelistic or mobilization networks  can further tilt participation toward groups that are easier to reach and motivate. Taken  together, youth emigration and youth disengagement do not just lower turnout; they  change who turns out by producing an electorate that is narrower and more predictable  and thus, making it easier for an incumbent with strong organizational reach to maintain  and even deepen dominance despite a shrinking overall voter pool.   For Albania, this creates a useful comparative hypothesis: the Socialist Party’s dominant  result can be interpreted not simply as popularity, but as potentially reinforced by  incumbent-friendly mobilization channels (party networks, patronage linkages,  messaging capacity, and administrative leverage) that operate at home and, possibly,  through diaspora voting procedures and outreach. The comparative punchline is not  “Albania = Serbia,” but that both cases may show how incumbents in hybrid regimes can  convert expanding participation (including diaspora voting) into dominance, while  maintaining the outward form of pluralist competition, one of Levitsky & Way’s core  signatures of competitive authoritarianism. 

Author: Skye Warner-Mackintosh Centrally located on Kneza Miloša Street is the ruins of the former Yugoslav Generalštab building. Coming to the city for the first time in February 2023, it was the first thing I noticed upon arriving at the main train station. The building towers over you, occupying both sides of the street, and you are engulfed in the symbolic history of Yugoslavia and the contemporary struggle for a unanimous Serbian identity. The symbolic meanings of the building are not immediately apparent; you are invited to create your own meaning from the ruins before you. Unlike other remnants of the NATO bombing, such as the RTS bombing site, the Generalštab is impossible to miss; it is not subtle and located right in the heart of Belgrade.  Photo: Gavrilo Andrić Furthermore, the remains of the Generalštab building are a unique example of the maintenance of architectural ruins. Often, post-conflict reconstruction takes place as a prelude to identity reformation and healing (Ortiz and Córdoba, 2023). The question of what to do with buildings in the aftermath of conflict is often dealt with promptly, and buildings are often restored to their original historic design, preserved as ruins (although this is uncommon), or removed completely. The post-war period of reconstruction across Europe saw many German cities rebuild, with historically significant buildings either being preserved (and used as a museum or monument) or removed and rebuilt. Thus, for many places, rebuilding and commemoration are essential aspects of national bonding in post-conflict reconciliation, and this rebuilding is crucial in the healing process (Ejdus, 2017: 25).  Therefore, the Generalštab has “spontaneously grown into an inseparable part of the Belgrade cityscape and a de facto national monument of defiance and victimhood” (Ejdus, 2017: 36). It is laden with unambiguous meaning and, therefore, has been a crucial site of Serbian national-identity formation, specifically for people living in Belgrade, following the dissolution of Yugoslavia and remains to this day a highly controversial and puzzling symbolic urban space. This essay will critically examine the role of victimhood in Serbian national identity formation following the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 and subsequent ethnic-conflicts across the Western Balkans. Using the Generalštab as an example, this essay analyses three central ‘readings’ of the building as advocated by Bădescu (2019): victimhood, injustice and resistance. Here, I make the distinction between state and societal victimhood, ultimately arguing that the building is a key signifier of the Serbian state's geopolitical and mnemonic identity, yet also highlights growing resentment and resistance to this regime.  Historic Background  On the 25th of June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ). This marked the end of a union of South Slavs that had spanned over much of the 20th century. The success of Yugoslavia is widely debated amongst historians, although there is consensus that, throughout the period of 1936-1990, it was relatively stable. The dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, therefore, was relatively surprising and, although many authors could have predicted an ‘inevitable’ collapse, the violent and bloody nature of the aftermath of the collapse was quite unpredictable.  As discussed by Jovic (2001), the successive wars across the Western Balkans have numerous explanations, and it is impossible to pinpoint one ‘simple’ reason for the bloodshed that followed the dissolution. Whilst economic, socio-cultural, and political arguments have all been widely debated, it is clear that there was brewing discontent in the region throughout the 70s and 80s and Yugoslavia was largely tied to Tito. Therefore, following his death in 1980, the dissolution was not a matter of ‘if’ but, rather, ‘when’. It is impossible to give nuance to every argument on the dissolution of Yugoslavia when this essay’s purpose is to focus on the contemporary implications of these national dilemmas; however, it is important to understand the historical context that gave rise to different nationalist ideologies that dictated the nature of the breakup. However, for many historians, the question is not why Yugoslavia broke up, but, rather, why Yugoslavia broke up in the way that it did. With years of bloodshed and ethnic conflict, ending in 1999 with the NATO bombing of Belgrade. The brutal aftermath of the dissolution of Yugoslavia has been greatly influential in shaping contemporary national identities in the Western Balkans. With ethnic conflict spreading across the region following the dissolution and 100,000 lives lost, the scars of the 90s remain etched in the memories of people across the region, making it difficult to separate national identity from the collective memories of the 1990s. Thus, understanding the widespread bloodshed and victimhood of every ethnicity in the Western Balkans is important and gives insight into the contemporary geopolitical dynamics of the region.  Theoretical Background  Memory Assmann (2011) explores the relationship between the past and the self, arguing that the self would not exist without memories of the past. Here, “the human self is built from the stuff of time” (ibid.,15); we are products of stories, food, family histories, monuments, buildings and much more. Unlike traditional scholars of memory, Assmann argues that memory can often transgress the individual mind and can be promoted through inanimate objects (ibid.,17). Here, he makes the distinction between communicative and cultural memory. Whilst cultural memory is a collective preservation of the past (often through relics, monuments and symbols), communicative memory is much more subjective, often residing in the mundane tapestry of individual everyday life (ibid.,17). The city, therefore, is a site of both memory functions: in Belgrade, for example, one could walk through the city and reflect on the symbolism of the the Generalštab as a site of national bonding, whilst simultaneously reflecting individual symbolic histories interwoven in the urban fabric of the city.  Bădescu (2019: 183) notes that “cities have long been arenas of political struggle”, Belgrade is no different. It has been at the centre of many historical events and empires, and has often been a city of conquest. Until the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Belgrade was the capital city of the republic and, therefore, a vessel of Yugoslav identity formation and nation-building. As such, Yugoslav territorial bonding was fixed in Belgrade, with Tito residing in the socialist heart of New Belgrade (Abram, 2014).  Bădescu (2016; 2019) emphasises the active role of the city in constructing collective and cultural memories, as such, urban space becomes “a mediator for translating historic events into memory” and, within this, monuments are ‘selective aids’ in this process. Here, memory intersects with political experiences of urban space and a range of different actors are involved in interpreting sites of memory to make national symbolic meaning. Bernhard and Kubik (2014) refer to this as a ‘memory regime’ in which political elites, state institutions and civil society compete in defining historical interpretations as a strategy of legitimisation. As will be discussed later, the Generalštab building is symbolic of this power struggle, where different actors compete to assign a collective meaning to the building, either as a symbol of Western/NATO aggression, Serbian resilience, civil resistance or Yugonostalgia. Since 2014, when Vucic was elected, memory politics are ‘back’ in Serbia (Vukpalaj, 2025), representing a regime shift in how the 90s are commemorated and remembered in communicative and cultural memory.  Victimhood Another central tenet that has anchored Serbian and wider post-Yugoslav national identity formation has been victimhood. Chouliaraki (2020: 8) defines victimhood as “a structure of affective communication that is deeply grounded in the past”. Thus, it marks an intersection of the past and present and requires subjective interpretation alongside political meaning-making to be useful. Hronešová (2025) states that victimhood has a strong unifying function and is often used to consolidate national identities and state narratives. Victimhood is, therefore, ontological and is defined based on a binary opposition of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This relational capacity of victimhood is particularly relevant in the Balkans, where there are different and competing experiences and interpretations of victimhood and history. Vukpalaj (2025) notes that victimhood can be mobilised by the state to achieve political aims and narratives. Specifically, narratives of Serbian victimhood, dating as far back as 1389, are used contempoaraily to justify the non-recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, particularly following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.  Moreover, victimhood is often top-down and state-led (Hronešová, 2025). Here, victimhood has a strong unifying function that can be monopolised by so-called memory regimes to serve the political elite. The pain and stories of the vulnerable can, therefore, be manipulated, creating an ‘ontological narrative framework’ that provides a basis for foreign policy, militarisation and the definition of the enemy. Hronešová explores how this has manifested in Serbia through so-called ‘strategic victimhood’.  The concept of ‘strategic victimhood’ illustrates how elites propagate narratives of historical injustice and foreign hostility to mobilise a national identity based on a sense of collective suffering. Here, historical injustice is woven into the consolidation of national identity, particularly in relatively stable post-conflict societies, and the ‘us-them’ divide is solidified in policy. Moreover, elites can specifically harness the character of ‘victim’ through the notion of ‘hijacked victimhood’ (Hronešová and Kreiss, 2024). Hijacked victimhood is defined as a political strategy where already powerful groups or leaders claim victim status. Here, the typical narrative of victimhood is inverted to defend or expand their power, often by portraying themselves as oppressed by marginalised groups they then demonise, using this perceived threat to justify aggression, policies, or violence. However, as will be discussed later, there is a uniquely emancipatory potential within victimhood, which can be used to consolidate grievance against the elite and illuminate top-down memory regimes.  Identity that contrasts Western values As discussed above, victimhood is often something that is ‘hijacked’ by political actors, anchoring national identity and translating history into new ontic narratives. The Generalštab represents a disputed site of national bonding, a site that is “craving unambiguous meaning” (Ejdus, 2017: 36). As a building, it is experienced subjectively by passersby, but it has also been mobilised by politicians and the state as a site of victimhood since Vučić came to power. In the aftermath of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the topic of the 90s was mostly ignored by politicians, with conversations often dating back to WW2, or even further back to Ottoman and Habsburg occupation. It was only in 2014, when Vučić came to power, that victimhood from the NATO bombing began to reemerge into official state narratives, marking a political decision to mobilise victimhood. As argued by Ejdus (2017: 31), the building remains there in ruin because it is there to satisfy Serbia’s ontological security needs. It represents a “defiant and brave nation” and, through this, becomes a “de facto national monument of defiance and victimhood”.  Thus, the Generalštab not only defines a new Serbian national identity, it also defines what this identity is not. It starkly contrasts Serbian identity with Western values, imbuing a sense of victimhood and struggle, which then determines foreign policy outcomes.  A key way this has been achieved is through the involvement of the Serbian Orthodox church in commemoration. Although viewed as a ‘neutral vessel’ in Serbian politics, the Church has become increasingly influential, enjoying the highest levels of public trust intergenerationally and becoming one of the largest investors in Serbia (Marinović, 2025). As argued by Edina Bećirović, the Serbian Orthodox Church has become an important tool in state-driven narratives of a Greater Serbian project, providing “legitimacy under the guise of spirituality” (Marinović, 2025). Although the influence of the Church is a different conversation, this has had particular implications in the commemoration of the 1999 NATO bombings, and the Church has played a key role in discussions regarding the future of the Generalštab building. As stated by Patriarch Irinej, “those ruins which are located in the centre of Belgrade should never be repaired. Let there be a testimony of our time, a testimony of [the destruction brought by] cultured Europe, testimony of democratic Europe that cared about freedom and democracy” (found in Bădescu, 2019). Thus, the Church deems the existence of the ruins as a crucial component of national identity formation in opposition to Europe. The example of the SOC demonstrates how victimhood has been integrated as part of Serbian religious identity, which is inherently interlinked with new national identities. The existence of the building signifies resistance to Europeanism and represents a new Serbian national identity where historical memory is interpreted by the Church and the state.  However, the framing of historical narratives of victimhood can also be mobilised for political gain. Vukpalaj (2025) argues that memory and victimhood can be used to justify foreign policy goals, and the existence of the Generalštab ruins can be used to negotiate new geopolitical relations for Serbia. In November 2025, the Serbian government passed a ‘lex specialis’ that allowed the redevelopment of the Generalštab building. This was a somewhat surprising shift in official memory rhetoric that has largely promoted the preservation of the ruins to promote a Serbian identity forged in victimhood, as discussed above.  However, the government's lease of the building to Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law, who proposed to build luxury hotels and ‘Trump Towers’, showed a political divergence. However, some argue that this lease is geopolitically relevant, mobilising victimhood to improve Serbia’s political relations with a new right-wing administration in the US. Moreover, the framing of the bombing has been useful in developing closer ties with Russia and China, which historically opposed the bombing. Thus, victimhood has been hijacked to re-route Serbia’s political position in the international arena, yet there are areas of contention and resistance within these narratives, which will be discussed below.  Bottom-up  However, the ambiguous meaning of the building has also made it a site of public resistance where victimhood is interpreted differently. Here, the building's ontic meaning shifts from symbolic of European aggression and Serbian might to symbolic of a rich Yugoslav history and, more importantly, of continued government divergence from the desires of Serbian citizens.  The architectural community of Belgrade have been a constant advocate for the reconstruction of the Generalštab to its original design. Importantly, the Generalštab was constructed as an ontic space in the 1960s as a symbol of Yugoslav unity against fascism. It was supposed to represent “features of a defiant and brave nation” (Ejdus, 2017) and is argued to be Serbia’s greatest feat of Socialist modernism, being architect Nikola Dobrović’s ‘magnum opus’. Thus, the alternatives of either destroying the building, leasing it, or keeping it in ruin all oppose the dramatic symbolism of Yugoslav unity that the building represents.  Heritage watchdog DOCOMOMO stated that the destruction and lease of the building would be “erasure of a European masterpiece of modernist architecture and a symbol of Yugoslavia and Serbia’s post-war identity and creativity” (Docomomo, 2025). Furthermore, the decision would damage the relationship between Serbia and the European Union, which goes against 33% of the general public's support for integration. This shows that contemporary critical Serbian national identities often oppose state-led narratives, with parts of the population advocating for the country to embrace the original purpose and design of the building. In response to the government leasing the building to Jared Kushner, there were a series of protests outside the Generalštab building in 2025, led by the Student Blockade, uniting all people opposed to the lease under a ‘We are the Wall Protest’. Here, the argument was that history and memory cannot be erased by administrative measures or special laws passed urgently. Thus, the people stood unified against top-down narratives of victimhood and memory, calling for collective memories to reimagine Serbian identity through the preservation of these ruins.  Finally, the Generalštab is a site of intergenerational resistance and represents resistance against the inequality created by the regime. For many, the symbolism is confusing and upsetting. Victimhood is still deployed here, but in more of a subtle way. As Bădescu (2019) argues, the Generalštab building represents a Western campaign against Belgrade that was paradoxical and unjust because the city also had the highest concentration of opposition to Milošević’s regime. Therefore, the building is symbolic of a historic regime that was somewhat opposed in the 90s, and acts as a reminder of this regime. However, whilst Serbian victimhood is still mostly operationalised in opposition to the West, the younger generation also feel a victimhood towards the regime itself. Hronešová (2025) examined victimhood in Serbian youth who had no experiences/direct memories of the 90s, finding that young people in Serbia feel that they are victims of the system more than they are victims of a concrete period in time. As one student stated: “We are victims of corruption rather than of wars” (Hronešová, 2025: 541). Despite this, they still emphasised the political elements of this. Serbia is seen as both a victim of domestic corruption and unjust international positioning, which is perhaps a legacy of the 90s. However, this example of positive victimhood has been mobilised throughout the student movements where, since 2024, students have become driving forces in fighting against top-down narratives of Serbian national identity, showing an optimism and promise for the future of national-identity where the memories and narratives can be made sense of in a rational way. Here, the Generalštab is representative of a new Serbia, led by a generation that is somewhat detached from the ontic reality of the 90s, that does not exist simply in opposition to the West, but also opposes hijacked narratives of victimhood that seek to exploit national-identity to pursue regimes of corruption.  Generalštab still remains This essay has traced a historical evolution of Serbian national identity in relation to different victimhood narratives in contemporary Serbia. The Generalštab is widely agreed to be an ontic space symbolic of multiple ambiguous meanings, and this has demonstrated how these meanings are mobilised by different actors to achieve different goals. On one hand, it is symbolic of European and Western aggression against Serbia; its existence is a promise to a new Serbian national identity that is defined in opposition to the West, and it is a monument dedicated to defiance and victimhood. On the other hand, it is symbolic of Yugoslav identity and modernism, a European architectural wonder, and the current regime’s decision to collaborate with the American right-wing on a redevelopment of the space marks a betrayal of this past. Thus, it is a site of national re-bonding, where people can be encouraged to imagine different realities, harness creativity and resilience to corruption.  However, one thing is clear: the Generalštab still remains, on Kneza Miloša Street, untouched. Everyday when people walk past new identities are constructed, different ideas of victimhood are projected, and different meanings are assigned to the ruin. It remains an important ontic site for the Serbian state, and the ambiguity of the building makes it somewhat impossible to imagine any future projects. Despite this, it is a crucial example in understanding how victimhood has framed national identity historically and contemporarily. Bibliography  Abram, M. (2014). Building the Capital City of the Peoples of Yugoslavia: Representations of Socialist Yugoslavism in.... Politička misao, [online] 51(5), pp.36–57. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349537039_Building_the_Capital_City_of_the_People s_of_Yugoslavia_Representations_of_Socialist_Yugoslavism_in_Belgrade [Accessed 2 Feb. 2026].  Assmann, J. (2008). Communicative and Cultural Memory. 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The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. European Journal of Social Theory, 4(1), pp.101–120. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310122225037.  Marinović, M. (2025). The Church as a Political Actor in the Western Balkans. [online] Centre for Civic Education. Available at: https://cgo-cce.org/en/2025/06/22/the-church-as-a-political-actor-in-the-western-balkans/ [Accessed 2 Feb. 2026].  Ortiz, C. and Córdoba, O.G. (2023). Territorial healing: A spatial spiral weaving transformative reparation. Planning Theory, [online] 23(2), pp.110–130. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/14730952231181129.  Vukpalaj, A. (2025). From Memory Politics to Mnemonic Diplomacy: Serbia’s Strategic Use of the 1999 NATO Bombing to Challenge Kosovo’s Statehood before and after Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine. Comparative Southeast European Studies, 73(3), pp.261–290. doi:https://doi.org/10.1515/soeu-2025-0044.

Author: Janka Júlia Csepregi  A review of the rich scholarly literature on the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars of the  1990s published over the past few decades shows that the so-called “Kosovo question” often  appears as a framing element in interpretations that, rightly so, approach the process of  dissolution from a transnational and holistic perspective. Namely, the situation of Kosovo is  typically discussed in the introductory sections where different scholars outline the dire  situation unfolding from the complex crisis of the 1980s in Yugoslavia and the nationalist  mobilization fueled by Milošević, which first escalated in Kosovo. As accounts follow the course of events and the development of armed conflicts and wars in the independent republics,  it is not until 1998 that Kosovo returns to the narrative, as the „last in the line of conflicts” to  be solved following the dissolution (see e.g. Baker 2015; Sundhaussen 2014).  Photo: Unsplash/Xhiliana Nevertheless, the marginalization of the question of Kosovo in the 1990s is not only a  phenomenon in scholarly interpretations. In fact, the situation in Kosovo was sidelined and  largely neglected for a period in contemporary international discourse concerning developments  in Yugoslavia, too. Although the human rights issue in Kosovo was in the center of both  domestic and international attention during the economic and political crisis unfolding in the  1980s in Yugoslavia, armed conflict first escalated in the breakaway republics claiming  independence, and the question of Kosovo remained marginalized until the late 1990s.   Reason for the collapse of Yugoslavia  Scholarly explanations of the dissolution of Yugoslavia can be broadly  grouped into several strands that emerged from the early 1990s onward (Dragović-Soso 2007).  The first body of arguments focused on longue durée causes of ethnic conflict. Be it the  essentialist vision of “ancient hatred” among the “Balkan people,” promoted already during the  Balkan Wars in the West, the highly contested theory of the clash of civilizations, or approaches  of historical geography depicting Yugoslavia as a peripheral space shaped by former  multinational empires, these explanations view the multinational and multiconfessional  character of Yugoslavia as the main source of therefore unavoidable conflict.  Similarly, another  group of historians highlights the failure of the ideology of “Yugoslavism” to integrate  inherently incompatible identities, most notably those of the two biggest state-building nations,  the Serbs and the Croats. Whether attributed to Serbian hegemonism or Croatian and Slovenian  separatism, interpretations focusing on the legacy of the first Yugoslav state portray the  multinational state as an impossible idea doomed to failure.   Shifting the focus from the roots of violence to the process of disintegration, a third body of  scholarship examines the evolution of socialist Yugoslavia, with particular attention to the 1974  Constitution and the confederalization of the constitutional system. These institutionalist  explanations emphasize how deep economic and political crises contested the socialist legacy  and eventually led to state collapse, while leaving unanswered the question of whether political  reinvention could have prevented it. More recent and now widespread approaches reject the  predetermined nature of the collapse and instead stress the responsibility and agency of political  and intellectual elites in promoting tensions and inducing fear, primarily through state controlled media.  Without denying the significance of the systemic crisis that delegitimized  socialism, scholars argue that it was the active dissemination of nationalist ideologies and hatred  by elites that made disintegration inevitable, generating influential debates on elite-led versus  grassroots dynamics and the processes of national mobilization. In contrast with these  perspectives, scholars have also turned toward international factors, such as the role of  international financial institutions or Western recognition policies in the early 1990s, with debates over the timing, extent, and moral value of international intervention continuing to  shape both academic interpretations and the legacy of the 1990s wars.   Methodological nationalism and transitional perspective In the past few years, the academic scholarship on Yugoslavia’s dissolution has increasingly  been accused of essentializing the Yugoslav case and „reading history backwards”. This  phenomenon does not only concern the „nationalizing” historiography of post-Yugoslav nation  states that tendentially relies on a research agenda aimed at normalizing the successor states  „backwards” and projecting its current reality back in history (called methodological  nationalism).  On the contrary, this methodological bias is also characteristic of international  scholarship that until the present day has viewed the country’s dissolution „shaped by its end”,  focusing on developments in Socialist Yugoslavia leading to its failure while neglecting  evidence that suggests the opposite. In fact, this is also reflected in the general direction of this  research, namely in the large number of works that focus on the ethnic nature of the conflict, in  contrast to the common Yugoslav topoi that characterized historiography before the breakup  (Bieber 2016:1–3). This approach therefore suggests a turn in new research directions such as  e.g. a shift from political history to the Yugoslav Lebenswelt or a focus on the ’havenots’ rather  than the ’haves’ of Yugoslav society in order to understand the existing social inequalities that  could play a role in inidividuals’ response to nationalist mobilization (Archer 2016; Galijaš  2016).   By applying a  transnational perspective, the essay understands developments in Kosovo as an integral part of  the broader process of Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the unfolding armed conflicts, which are  treated as neither predetermined nor inevitable. Consequently, in order to avoid the trap of  “reading history backwards,” the discussion concentrates on the initial phase of the conflict  rather than on its more frequently analyzed escalation.   The evolution of the international attitude towards the Kosovo issue  Although Kosovo was initially perceived as a fundamental issue in the context of Yugoslavia’s  dissolution, after the recognition of the Western republics it was excluded from the peace  process and viewed as an internal matter of Serbia by the international community. How can  one explain the neglection of the Kosovo issue in the early 1990s? In the following I will argue  that the international assessment and handling of the Kosovo issue was overshadowed by  the unfolding conflict in the Western republics and was therefore primarily dependent on  the intentions concerning Yugoslavia’s survival.   Firstly, observing the evolution of the international attitude towards the Kosovo question, it  seems that it was only in the foreground of international attention as long as Western powers  were insisting on the preservation of Yugoslavia. Early American and European initiatives,  including sanctions imposed on the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia (such as the arms embargo), formed part of a broader strategy aimed at preserving Yugoslavia and treating  Kosovo as a core issue to be resolved within the framework of the Yugoslav state (Bellamy  2002:18). However, the realisation that Yugoslavia could not be held together eventually led to  the recognition of the member republics that declared their independence and therefore worked  as a self-fulfilling prophecy, giving international legitimation for the breakup. Consequently, as  Kosovo did not gain such recognition, it was no longer treated as a constituent part of  Yugoslavia but an internal matter for Serbia, thus losing legal grounds for international  engagement and what is more, becoming a victim of sanctions imposed at Serbia (Bellamy  2002:13, 16). In this way, with the abandonment of Yugoslavia's survival, the settlement of the  Kosovo issue was also removed from the agenda, which is well symbolized by the fact that  Rugova's 1991 letter to Lord Carrington advocating Kosovo's independence remained  completely unanswered (Bellamy 2002:26).   Secondly, when it comes to the handling of the Kosovo issue, namely the marginalization and  delayed involvement in the resolution of the situation of Kosovo Albanians, was significantly  influenced by the development of conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This can  be observed at different stages of the process of Yugoslavia’s dissolution. First of all, this  interrelation already played a role in the non-recognition of Kosovo.  Delayed escalation of the conflict Even though until 1989 it  was a constituent part of the SFRY with legally defined borders layed down in the constitution,  Kosovo did not gain international recognition together with other republics, one of the main  reason of which was the Western powers’ fear of creating a precedent and thus legitimizing the  claims of Serbs in Croatia and BiH (Bellamy 2002:24–26). However, this was not the only  occasion when the issue in Kosovo was neglected in favor of the resolution of other, seemingly larger-scale conflicts.  After a short period of limited international engagement in Kosovo  characterised by the presence of the CSCE Mission of Long Duration and the ICFY, in their  efforts to win Milosević over to Bosnia's cause, the international powers withdrew even this  low level of their presence from Kosovo, thereby handing it over to Serbian autocracy (Bellamy  2002:65). Although peace in Bosnia was ultimately achieved and appears to have been worth  the cost, it remains uncertain whether “sacrificing” Kosovo—and thereby postponing its  resolution on the international agenda—ultimately contributed to the strengthening of the  radical wing of the Albanian movement and to the delayed escalation of the conflict.   In the context of the Kosovo conflict, both academic literature and public discourse often  mention that a key factor in the involvement of international forces on such a scale (NATO  airstrike) was the ’Bosnia syndrome’, i.e. the ‘never again’ conviction following the traumatic  experience of the Bosnian war (Bellamy 2002:69).  However, as can be seen from the above,  even in the early stages of the conflict, the international handling of the Kosovo issue depended  largely on events in other member states, rather than on internal political power relations and  the extent of Serbian political repression. As we shall see below, this considerably limited the  scope of the Albanian movement and greatly influenced the form and dynamics of the  resistance.   The dynamics of the resistance in Kosovo   The multifaceted crisis that unfolded in Yugoslavia following Tito's death first erupted in  Kosovo, where the malfunctions of the socio-economic system had already led to protests as  early as in 1981. Although the protests can be interpreted as manifestations of the particularly  acute consequences of economic and demographic transformation in Kosovo – then the poorest  and most underdeveloped region in Yugoslavia –, by this time the unequal political and  economic representation of ethnic groups had led to growing tensions and thus the 1981 riots  were framed around the discourse of nationality policy and constitutional reform (Pula  2004:801–803). This trend continued to strengthen throughout the 1980s, so that by the 1989  two completely separate and isolated political blocs had emerged in Kosovo, divided along  ethnic lines at both the institutional and social levels: the Serbian nationalizing regime, which  mobilized against the 'Albanization' of Kosovo, and the Albanian national secessionist  movement organizing against Serbian repression (Pula 2004:807).   In the wake of the dissolution of the federal state, despite the particularly dire political and  economic situation of Kosovo, Kosovo Albanians opted for non-violent resistance and started to build a parallel state rather than opening a new front against Serbia following the example of  the Western republics. Even though the claim to independence was articulated as early as in  1991, it was only after the wars in BiH and Croatia ended that the UÇK and the support for  armed resistance gained momentum in Kosovo, leading to armed conflict and the contested  NATO intervention in 1998–1999. The first half of the 1990s in Kosovo was thus marked by  the formation of a grassroots nonviolent resistance movement and the emergence of a parallel  system, which received less attention in academic literature in light of the bloodshed that  followed.   It is assumed that both the social and institutional frame of the conflict and the emerging  Albanian resistance can be rooted in the institutional structures and political identities inherited  from the Yugoslav system (Pula 2004:797–798, 818). The segregated political and social  frameworks that characterized the relation between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo throughout  the 1990s were results of the institutionalization of political repression organized by the state,  excluding Albanians from the decision-making process and thereby forcing them to develop  parallel structures.  In addition, the educational and cultural institutions together with the public  service system that was established and coordinated by the Democratic League of Kosovo  (LDK) parallel to the one provided by the state were all in a sense, sucessors of the earlier  existing autonomy-era institutions being resilient to political repression.  Nevertheless, it is clear  that the relative success of the Albanian movement was largely thanks to the political  opportunities created by the international environment, primarily through the liberalization  following the collapse of state socialist systems in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, similarly to  the political transformation in Eastern bloc countries, the dynamics and chances of political  movements were tied to international support, regardless of internal potential and the extent of  popular support. It seems therefore that it was partly the lack of international recognition that  led to the failure of non-violent resistance. In the following I argue that the marginalization of  the Kosovo question by the international community limited the chances of a peaceful  resolution and in the long run contributed to violent escalation.   Parallel state As I argued above, the international recognition of the Western republics led to the  marginalization of the Kosovo issue in the international discourse, treated as an internal matter  of the Serbian republic. However, in the long term, the recognition of the newly independent  republics and Kosovo's marginalization actually strengthened the separatist aspirations  of the Kosovo Albanians rather than consolidating them.  Even though the Albanian  delegates of the provincial assembly in Kosovo already proclamied their claim for sovereignty in July 1990, this was not yet a shared initiative with the leading organization of the Albanian  movement (LDK) at the time. It was only later and due to the growing political opression by  the Serb state that the formal institutions in Kosovo and the Albanian movement joined forces  and set the common goal of independence. In fact, the main demand of the Albanian movement  in Kosovo even as late as May 1991 was only the republician status and the reversal of Serbia’s  constitutional reforms. Yet by the summer of 1991, with the breakup of Yugoslavia becoming a  realistic scenario, the LDK made the independence of Kosovo as its main political objective,  which gained popular legitimation by the referendum held in September 1991 (Pula 2004:806).   The Kosovar Albanians’ claim for self-determination was then engraved in the Kaçanik  constitution amended in October 1991 by the regional Assembly, laying down the groundwork  for the legitimate claim of independence and the basis of the parallel state of the 1990s. This  process was further escalated and in a sense concluded with the EC and later US recognition of  the independent republics, setting off an irreversible domino effect whereby the Albanian  movement, fearing even greater Serbian oppression without the constitutional framework of  Yugoslavia and counting on Western intervention, could no longer back down from its demand  for independence (Pula 2004:816).   Recognising of Kosovo Although the demand for independence was no longer challenged, the non-violent movement  organized under Rugova's leadership in the 1990s nevertheless prevented violent escalation and  maintained the possibility of a peaceful resolution, a chance that was dismissed by the  international community. In other words, the lack of international (both political and  economic) support for the parallel state and the missed opportunity to negotiate with  Rugova eventually undermined the LDK’s legitimacy and reduced the popularity of its  strategy of nonviolent resistance, contributing to the rise of the UÇK. On one hand, the  sanctions imposed on Kosovo through Serbia, along with Kosovo’s exclusion from the  negotiations, further intensified tensions between local Serbian and Albanian communities amid  the ongoing economic and political crisis (Bellamy 2002:24–26).  Furthermore, the region's  economic decline further increased dissatisfaction, thereby boosting support for more radical  forces. On the other hand, it seems that the international community missed a core opportunity  for a peaceful settlement by failing to use their diplomatic leverage to negotiate and reach an  agreement with the more consolidated wing of the Albanian movement led by Rugova.   The nonviolent resistance led by the LDK operated on the basis of the principle of peaceful  coexistence, which, in addition to monitoring and documenting cases of human rights  violations, paid particular attention to preventing and sanctioning radical and violent forms of Albanian resistance, avoiding confrontations with the Serbian police. Even though the early  1990s were marked by public demonstrations, strikes, and guerrilla attacks in Kosovo, by 1992  the parallel state had taken institutional shape and gained broad popular support, marginalizing  the position of clandestine groups and therefore the public support for armed resistance.  In any  case, the earlier disbandment of Kosovo’s Territorial Defense force and the removal of ethnic  Albanians from the police units have heavily hampered the organization of a full-blown armed  resistance, which, even more so in the absence of Rugova's political will to establish a defense  force, remained off the agenda. Although Rugova's system was subject to criticism both within  the LDK and among its opponents, e.g. within the student movement, partly learning from the  political culture of peaceful transitions in Central Eastern Europe and partly in recognition of  the given circumstances, the system of non-violent resistance enjoyed widespread support and  was reinforced by the 1992 elections, completing the institutional framework of the parallel  state (Pula 2004:808–812, 816–817; Hetemi 2020:212–214.)   Although Rugova’s parallel system was firmly institutionalised and rooted in broad popular  support, its credibility was gradually eroded by the absence of progress concerning Kosovo’s  independent status and its international recognition, especially in light of the peace negotiations  in Dayton.  The international society missed the opportunity to engage with or include Rugova  in diplomatic processes, which weakened the appeal of his nonviolent strategy among Kosovo  Albanians and had led to his growing political marginalisation after 1995. This sustained non engagement, coupled with the implicit acceptance of Serbia’s claim over Kosovo, created space  for more radical actors such as the UÇK to gain popular support after Dayton (Bellamy  2002:65–66; Sundhaussen 2014:368–369). Consequently, the emergence of armed resistance  was not simply the result of internal dynamics but was closely linked to international policies  reshaping the political landscape in Kosovo.   Missed opportunity Even though it is clear that the escalation of conflict in Kosovo in 1998–1999 was not solely  determined by international factors, in my essay I attempted to show how the prospects for a  peaceful resolution were profoundly altered by the broader context of Yugoslavia’s dissolution  and the selective recognition policies of the early 1990s. The international community’s  marginalization of the Kosovo issue—its delayed engagement and failure to negotiate with the  more consolidated and nonviolent wing of the Albanian movement led by Rugova—represents  a critical missed opportunity to prevent escalation on the diplomatic level.  By turning away from Kosovo, international powers did not resolve the conflict but merely postponed it,  reducing the likelihood of a peaceful resolution and indirectly contributing to the later rise of  armed resistance.   As shown, the developments in Kosovo were deeply intertwined with both the dynamics of the  Yugoslav wars in Croatia and Bosnia and the international handling of those crises and the  Kosovo issue was subordinated to wider regional calculations rather than addressed on its own  terms. Just as the “Bosnia syndrome” prompted NATO intervention during the escalation in  Kosovo, the hope of securing peace in Dayton had earlier shaped the international approach to  the Kosovo issue, and it was precisely this, i.e. Kosovo’s exclusion from the peace negotiations  that undermined Rugova’s legitimacy and contributed to the radicalization of the Albanian  movement. This interdependence underscores the necessity of analyzing the dissolution of  Yugoslavia and the related conflicts as a single, interrelated process.   Literature Archer, Rory. “Social Inequalities and the Study of Yugoslavia’s Dissolution.” In Debating theEnd of Yugoslavia, edited by Florian Bieber, Armina Galijaš, and Rory Archer, 135–151.Oxton/New York: Routledge, 2016.Baker, Catherine. The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2015.Bellamy, Alex J. “Kosovo and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia.” In Kosovo and InternationalSociety, edited by Alex J. Bellamy, 16–36. 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Author: Iva Kojić  The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s was far more than a local tragedy; it tore apart an intricately linked society and economy overnight. As new borders rose and political agreements hardened, ordinary people were left stranded within fragile new economies, unable to compete with the wider world. For the truck driver waiting endless hours at the Batrovci border, or the student from Bitola whose diploma is worthless in Belgrade, the breakup replaced old certainties with lost futures. For more than two decades, influential academic and policy voices have described reintegration as a set of assignments dictated by the EU’s Berlin Process, treating the Western Balkans as passive recipients and ignoring the region’s powerful, internal need for a homegrown recovery. Illustration photo. Retrieved from Pexels (www.pexels.com) The Berlin Process offers a clear roadmap, while the Open Balkan Initiative appears, at least on paper, to be a more nimble, practical answer to real-life needs. Of course, both are complicated by local politicians' ambitions. In the end, the best way forward is to blend the strengths of both: keep the high standards of the Berlin Process, but add the local ownership and flexibility of Open Balkan, so that these projects actually make a difference for regular people living under their shadow Theoretical Framework and the Live Reality At the heart of the argument for regional integration lies David Mitrany’s functionalist theory. Mitrany posited that technical and social needs (energy distribution, transport logistics, public health) naturally ignore political borders and force cooperation out of sheer necessity (Alexandrescu, 2007, 29) . In the post-Yugoslav context, this theory suggests that the shared power grids, railways, and supply chains left behind by the common state act as a silent pull, drawing the successor states back into a web of international activities. But the real work of regionalism cannot just be explained by academic theories. Mitrany's ideas help set the stage, but when you look at what is actually happening in the Balkans, things are much messier. While functionalism suggests cooperation emerges from practical necessity, critics argue that it overlooks complex socio-political realities and power dynamics. The Open Balkan initiative, for example, is not just a response to practical needs. It is also shaped by the ambitions of political leaders. Many of these same leaders have, at home, let the rule of law slide and often put showmanship ahead of actually solving problems. Similarly, other integration theories, such as neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism, might offer insights into how political actors and state interests play crucial roles in integration efforts. Thus, although theories hold that working together on practical issues should lead to political peace, in reality, these efforts are often hijacked for political gain. There is a real grassroots desire for reintegration, but the tools used to get there are often twisted to serve political survival. To truly judge these efforts, we must examine how political leaders use (and sometimes misuse) these theories, sometimes helping people, sometimes just helping themselves. Academic models are helpful, but right now, it is the politicians at the wheel, steering through a landscape full of old tensions and personal power plays. The Berlin Process: The Outsourced Assignment Launched in 2014, the Berlin Process was intended to revitalize regional cooperation through high-level summits and the creation of a Common Regional Market. Its greatest strength and its most significant contribution to the lives of regular people is its inclusivity. It involves all six regional partners, ensuring regional integration remains aligned with the EU's strict standards and legal principles. This inclusivity is a vital democratic safeguard, as it prevents the “island” effect where certain states are left behind due to political exclusion. In practical terms, the Berlin Process has produced tangible, humanized successes that improve daily life, such as the “Roam Like at Home” agreement, which has significantly lowered communication costs for millions of people traveling for work or family across the divided region. By eliminating roaming charges, the process has moved the region one step closer to the standards of the EU’s internal market (Mitrovic 2025, 10). However, a deeper critique reveals that the Berlin Process often feels like an outsourced project managed by a distant bureaucracy. For the regular citizen, its results are often trapped in administrative stagnation or slowed by complex ratification processes across six different parliaments. As Kamberi (2021, 60) notes, the prospect of the EU joining now seems “too distant and uncertain”, leading to a loss of faith in reforms that feel like a never-ending series of homework assignments given by Brussels. The Open Balkan Initiative: Agility, Ego, and the Practical Reality In contrast, the Open Balkan initiative is a locally led project born of a perceived revolt against the status quo. Its greatest strength is its agility. By focusing on low-hanging fruit, it has achieved practical successes where the Berlin Process has historically struggled (Xhoxhaj 2024, 7). The 2024 Labor Market Access Agreement is the primary example of this practical work: it allows a citizen of North Macedonia to work in Serbia or Albania without the humiliating and expensive ordeal of obtaining a work permit (Mitrovic 2025, 8). This is a direct response to the brain drain crisis hollowing out the region. However, the Open Balkan initiative is also flawed, mainly because it excludes Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which risks further splitting the region. And, just like with other regional efforts, we cannot remain blind to the politicians in charge. Citizens worry that this initiative is a front, giving political leaders a bigger stage and more power, even as the rule of law back home deteriorates. Some critics even warn that it could end up putting Serbia at the forefront, mainly benefiting big companies and politicians instead of everyday people trying to get by. However, proponents of Open Balkan argue that the initiative prioritizes regional economic collaboration, aiming to bring tangible benefits quickly to those who need it the most. They assert that by simplifying labor mobility and reducing trade barriers, the initiative addresses real economic needs and can set a precedent for broader regional inclusion in the future. Bridging the Gap through Practical Reintegration The positive aspects inherent in both the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan initiative must be synthesized to move beyond political spectacle and toward a genuine improvement in the lives of regular people. Within the Berlin Process, the region must preserve the high standards of the EU acquis and ensure total regional inclusivity within the WB6. In the Open Balkan, the synthesis must foster a sense of regional ownership. The bridge between these two models lies in the Staged Accession model. This framework suggests the EU should stop treating the Balkans as a binary “in or out” choice and instead offer early, functional access to the Single Market as a reward for specific regional cooperation successes (Mitrovic 2025, 19). For the citizen, a synthesis of these models would move from grand declaration to practical work. For example, moving beyond simple roaming agreements to a unified regional energy grid and digital market might allow Balkan tech startups to scale regionally before competing globally, thereby fulfilling the need for a shared economic space that remains physically dependent on common infrastructure. Another example could be expanding the labor mobility protocols of the Open Balkan to the entire WB6 within the legitimate framework of the Berlin Process. This would ensure that a nurse from Sarajevo or a programmer from Pristina can move as easily as their counterparts in the Trio, while still benefiting from the legal protections and safety standards guaranteed by EU alignment. This is where the real work happens. It is not found in high-level summits but in regional harmonization that makes the border invisible to the person crossing it. By utilizing the political speed of the Open Balkan to fulfill the institutional promises of the Berlin Process, the region might finally begin to heal in a way that serves the people. Moving Beyond the Homework Assignment The reintegration of the post-Yugoslav space is a structural necessity- a response to the unsustainable fragmentations of the 1990s. While academic theories provide a useful map, they cannot account for the practical difficulty of navigating the political egos and catastrophic track records of regional elites who often use these platforms for domestic promotion. The disintegration of Yugoslavia created a rupture that cannot be healed by an outsourced project alone. It requires a reintegration that is both technically sound and locally owned. Ultimately, the promise of regional stability is in moving beyond the political theater of leaders and toward genuine technical cooperation that serves the citizens. Regionalism is not a homework assignment for Brussels. Rather, it is a survival strategy for the people of the Balkans. The promise of either model is hollow if it does not address the ten-hour wait at the border or the unrecognized diploma. By reclaiming regional ownership and synthesizing the practical successes of both models, the successor states can finally make the borders breathable again. Reintegration should not be a decision for politicians. Instead, it is a mandate dictated by geography and the shared needs of a population that refuses to be defined solely by its borders. Bibliography Alexandrescu, Mihai. 2007. “David Mitrany: From Federalism to Functionalism.” Transylvanian Review 16 (1): 19-33. Popoviciu, Adrian-Claudiu. 2010. “David Mitrany and Functionalism: The Beginnings of Functionalism”. Revista Romana de Geografie Politica 12, (1): 162-172 Jelisavac Trosic, Sanja, and Mitko Arnaudov. 2023. “What are the Realistic Capabilities of the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan Initiative?” Review of International Affairs 74 (1187): 59-85. Kamberi, Donika. 2021. “Open Balkan vs. Berlin Process- Same, Same but Different” Freedom: Journal for Peacebuilding and Transcultural Communication 2 (3/4): 60-71. Jelisavac Trošić, Sanja, and Mitko Arnaudov. "Open Balkans - Between Economic Opportunities and Political Reality." (2023). Mitrovic, Sava. 2025. Regional Cooperation Initiatives in the Western Balkans: Improving Countries’ Preparedness for Staged Accession to the European Union. Belgrade: European Policy Centre (CEP). Xhoxhaj, Veton. 2024. “Assessing Western Balkans Regional Integration Efforts: A Comparative Study of the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan Initiative". Multidisciplinary Science Journal 7: 2025248. Mitrany, David. 1975. The Functional Theory of Politics. London: Martin Robertson for the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Author: Danica Janković  This paper will analyse the religious teaching in Serbian high schools as a case study through which broader problems of contemporary teaching are identified such as the weak interactivity and low motivation (Institute for Educational Research 2023). These issues reflect a wider pattern in modern education where teaching often remains teacher-centered and students are passive participants in their own learning  process.The purpose is to show the role of the teacher as a guide who leads students to independent thought through questioning and coming to their own conclusions which would be connected to the class and the material they were supposed to cover. Photo: Unsplash/Vidar Nordli-Mathisen Through literature analysis, comparison, and a case study of selected religious education lessons in a Serbian high school, the paper demonstrates how a teacher can recreate lessons not by providing direct answers, but by guiding students to discover concepts themselves. This approach aligns with broader educational goals such as autonomy, critical thinking, and value-based learning, making it applicable beyond religious education and relevant across various subjects. During the period between 2021-2022 the online classes were carried out in two different high schools in Niš, Serbia, by the professor Ivica Živković during the years 2021-2022 which he conducted using the Socratic Majeutic method. This is the case study this paper will be focusing on.  This paper argues that the Socratic (maieutic) method -teaching through guided  questioning- offers one of the most effective pedagogical approaches for engaging students in reflective, meaningful learning. For example, during the period between 2021-2022 the Religious education classes were carried out online in two different high schools in Niš, Serbia, by the professor Ivica Živković which he conducted using the Socratic Majeutic method. Student Milica Marković responded to the professor in the google classroom, and at the end of the school year, a book was published in the form of dialogue between them that was created during their classes. Using this example I demonstrate how this method addresses key problems in contemporary teaching: lack of student engagement, insufficient critical thinking, and limited relevance of content.  In many educational systems, including the Serbian one, teaching remains largely teacher-centered, emphasizing memorization and passive reception of knowledge. This creates an unconscious barrier between teachers and students, further discouraging active participation and curiosity. Religious education, as a relatively new yet controversial subject, reflects these broader pedagogical issues such as lessons often relying on narration rather than exploration.  Within this context, reintroducing the Socratic approach represents an opportunity to reimagine the teacher’s role as a facilitator of thought. Improving the quality of religious education is not only pedagogically important but also socially significant. When students are taught to reflect and understand religion critically, they are less likely to adopt simplified or politicized interpretations of faith. Strengthening teaching methods in this subject contributes to fostering tolerance, empathy, and intercultural understanding.  Main arguments:  Religious education should be conducted using the Socratic method and similar interactive approaches applied by Professor Živković.  ● This approach replaces passive memorization with dialogue and guided questioning, allowing students to actively construct their understanding instead of only repeating given information.  ● Such teaching practices positively influence students by increasing their engagement, motivation, and participation.  ● When lessons are structured around questions rather than lectures, students become co-creators of knowledge, which strengthens their critical thinking and sense of autonomy in learning.  ● This pedagogical model also benefits the broader community by promoting a more informed and reflective understanding of religion.  By fostering dialogue and empathy, it helps prevent the political misuse of religious ideas for spreading intolerance or hatred, encouraging instead the authentic ethical and humanistic values of faith.  The teacher as a questioner – recreating knowledge rather than transmitting it Exploration of how questions can replace explanations, encouraging students to reconstruct meaning through guided inquiry (examples of how this could work within religious topics).  How questioning leads to reflection and critical engagement – Analysis of the shift from rote learning to reflective thinking; examples of how guided dialogue fosters personal connection and moral reasoning. Model proposal: Applying the Socratic method across subjects – Practical implications: how a questioning-based approach could improve not only religious education but teaching practices in general; steps for implementation and teacher training.  By examining religious education through the lens of the Socratic method, this paper shows that meaningful teaching depends not on the amount of information transmitted, but on the teacher’s ability to guide students toward independent thought. When applied to religious education, this approach transforms the classroom into a space of dialogue and critical reflection, helping students actively engage with ideas rather than passively accept them. Such methods not only improve student motivation and understanding but also strengthen the broader social role of education—encouraging tolerance, empathy, and resistance to the political misuse of religion. The teacher who questions rather than instructs does not merely convey knowledge, but cultivates reflective individuals capable of forming their own moral and intellectual judgments, which makes this model valuable far beyond the subject of religious education itself.  Students just repeat the information Contemporary education across many countries faces problems that significantly complicate the learning process. Those problems are often not taken into account as they are highly normalised in today's teaching practices. Amongst the most common problems that appear in the classroom are the low motivation of the students, limited interactivity and a highly teacher-centered environment where the students are passive participants. These patterns are documented in recent pedagogical research, including work conducted in Serbia, where the Institute for Educational Research (2023) describes that students frequently experience lessons as passive and disconnected from their own reasoning processes. Instead of being encouraged to think, question, and explore ideas, students often remain silent observers while teachers hand over pre packaged information. Paulo Freire (1970) describes this approach as a “banking model” of education in which knowledge is treated as a deposit made by the teacher and given to the students, rather than as something that is co-constructed through dialogue and critical inquiry.  Against this backdrop, this paper explores the potential of the Socratic maieutic method as an alternative pedagogical model for education. Rather than relying on repetition and the transmission of pre defined information, the Socratic method gives an emphasis to questioning, dialogue, and the guided development of ideas, encouraging students to make their own understanding through critical inquiry. This approach positions the teacher as a facilitator of learning, rather than a transmitter of knowledge (Plato, trans. 1997; Vlastos, 1991).  The paper investigates this method through a case study of religious education classes conducted online by Professor Ivica Živković in two high schools in Niš, Serbia, during the 2021–2022 school year. These classes conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, resulted in a year-long written dialogue between the teacher  and student Milica Marković, later published as the book A to samo Bog zna (2022). This case presents an important example of a student-driven learning in a Serbian high school.  New (old) practices in education In recent years, educational systems in many countries, especially in the European Union and the United States have been going through notable reforms and transformations as a reaction to technological, social, and economic pressures and changes. For example, the OECD’s Trends Shaping Education 2025 report brings out how global forces such as digitalisation, societal change and the COVID-19 pandemic are reshaping policies and practices in education across OECD member countries, driving changes in how learning, teaching, and assessment are conceived and delivered (OECD, 2025).  At the same time, a great deal of national reforms in the U.S. have focused on expanded learning time, curriculum redesign and adaptation to emerging technologies as part of broader efforts to improve educational outcomes and equity (e.g., expanded learning initiatives in the U.S.). Yet still so many classrooms carry on in keeping traditional models of teaching and learning. Teacher centred pedagogy traditionally prioritises the transmission of knowledge over the development of skills, values, and independent reasoning. John Dewey’s theory of education critiques such approaches, arguing that learning turns out most effectively through active participation, experience, and reflective thinking, instead of passive reception of information (Dewey, 1938). Similarly, critical pedagogy emphasises that education should foster learners’ capacity for critical reasoning and meaningful engagement with knowledge, rather than positioning students as passive recipients (Freire, 1970). From this theoretical perspective, teacher centred instruction is not adequate for contemporary students who require active engagement in order to understand complex concepts and apply knowledge to real life contexts  A 2023 study by the Institute for Educational Research highlights that Serbian high school students often describe classes as monotonous and lacking meaningful interaction. When lessons rely heavily on memorization, students struggle to understand the material and its significance. As a consequence students during the classes exhibit low motivation, limited curiosity, and minimal participation.  Majeutics Socratic method emphasizes a shift from the teacher as a transmitter of knowledge to the teacher as a facilitator.The facilitators role is to guide students to analyse,  reconstruct knowledge and come to the answers on their own rather than providing them. This encourages learners to form arguments, draw conclusions and actually connect to the material.(Plato, trans. 1997; Vlastos, 1991).  In the context of religious education, facilitation is especially crucial, as teaching about religion requires sensitivity to students' diverse beliefs and experiences and emphasises dialogue, interpretation, and reflective understanding, rather than the transmission of fixed doctrinal knowledge (Jackson, 2004). A facilitator-oriented approach can help learners explore questions of meaning, morality, and identity.  The Socratic maieutic method emphasizes drawing out knowledge through questions. As Wilberding (2019) explains, the method involves strategic questioning that leads students to uncover ideas themselves rather than passively receiving them. Maieutics (from the Greek word for “midwifery”) suggests that the teacher assists students in “giving birth” to their own understanding.  Key characteristics of the Socratic method include:  ● open-ended questions, ● dialogical interaction,  ● reflection with self-correction,  ● the development of personal meaning.  Religious education, when taught through memorization risks reducing theological and ethical concepts to surface-level information. The Socratic method offers an alternative by encouraging students to question, interpret, and reflect, it supports:  ●independent moral reasoning,  ● empathy and tolerance,  ● deeper understanding of religious texts,  ● critical examination of personal and societal beliefs.  Critical thinking Given the growing concerns regarding the politicisation of religion in contemporary societies, facilitative and dialogical pedagogical models are not only academically beneficial but also socially significant. Scholars argue that when religious education is reduced to the transmission of fixed or ideologically framed interpretations, it can reinforce polarisation and limit students’ capacity for critical reflection (Casanova, 2011). In contrast, dialogical approaches to religious education such as facilitation established on questioning and interpretation, promote critical engagement, tolerance, and the ability to tell apart personal belief from political manipulation of religion (Jackson, 2004; UNESCO, 2019). From this perspective, such pedagogical models contribute to the development of reflective and socially responsible citizens capable of engaging with religious diversity in pluralistic societies.  The findings are compared to typical teacher-centered practices in Serbian religious education to highlight key differences and pedagogical implications. Empirical research on attitudes toward religious instruction in Serbia indicates that the existing confessional model, which tends to prioritise content transmission, has limitations in addressing religious diversity and meaningful engagement with material, pointing to pedagogical gaps in current practice (Šuvaković et al., 2023).  Furthermore, comparative research in religious education literature identifies a clear distinction between traditional teacher-centred/content-centred approaches and more constructivist, student-centred models that actively involve learners in meaning-making processes (Religious Education in Transition, 2024). These differences underscore how teacher-centred practices may limit opportunities for critical thinking and deeper understanding, in contrast to approaches that emphasise learner engagement and dialogue  The online lessons were fundamentally dialogical. Professor Živković rarely provided direct explanations; instead, he formed and asked a series of interconnected questions designed to guide the student toward discovering the underlying concepts. Responses were written, allowing time for reflection. Each question built upon the previous one, creating a developmental sequence that led the student toward deeper understanding.  The Socratic method in these lessons relied on several types of questions: ● Descriptive questions (“What do you think this parable suggests?”) ● Analytical questions (“Why do you believe this interpretation makes sense?”)  ● Reflective questions (“How does this relate to your own experience or values?”)  Rather than correcting the student the teacher asked further questions that guided her toward answers. Even when her thoughts on the subject didn't quite meet his beliefs he didn't imply she was wrong but rather accepted her understanding and offered his own, making a safe environment for the student to come to the conclusion on her own. The dialogue demonstrates a high level of engagement. The student’s responses grew more complex over time, also increased her motivation and comfort with reflective reasoning. The written format also encouraged clarity, structure, and introspection and gave her the time to think through her answer, highlighting how questioning can stimulate deep learning even in an online environment.  The case study directly addresses the problems outlined in the introduction. Unlike traditional classes where students are passive recipients of transmitted knowledge, critical and progressive educational theories argue that such passivity limits meaningful learning and critical engagement (Freire, 1970; Dewey, 1938). The Socratic method transforms them into active participants. The method appeals to curiosity rather than external pressure and so the engagement increases. The student is not merely listening but thinking, constructing, articulating, and defending ideas. A questioning-centered approach benefits subjects such as philosophy, sociology, literature, history, and even science. Any discipline that requires reasoning can be enriched by dialogical and reflective learning, which encourages learners to engage actively with ideas rather than receive them passively. Educational theorists argue that dialogic teaching promotes deep understanding, critical thinking, and the ability to articulate and justify one’s own views (Alexander, 2008; Mercer, 2000).  One of the most significant social implications of this method is its contribution to social cohesion and democratic citizenship. Research suggests that when students are taught to think critically about religion and other contested topics, they are less likely to accept oversimplified or politicised narratives and more likely to develop nuanced, empathetic, and informed perspectives (UNESCO, 2015; Osler & Starkey, 2005). In multicultural societies, dialogical learning has been linked to the strengthening of democratic values, reduction of prejudice, and increased intercultural understanding, as students learn to respect difference, engage in reasoned dialogue, and consider diverse viewpoints (Banks, 2008; UNESCO, 2015).  Implementation To implement a dialogical and facilitative pedagogical model there are some conditions that must be met, as suggested by educational theory and research.  Teachers' classes that are focused on questioning and dialogical techniques are essential, since the efficiency of the Socratic and dialogical approach depends mostly on teachers’ ability to guide discussion rather than transmit information. Studies on dialogic teaching emphasise that teachers must be explicitly trained to use questioning strategies that promote reasoning and reflection (Alexander, 2008; Mercer, 2000).  Curriculum adjustment is necessary in order to create space for dialogue and inquiry instead of pure memorisation. Dewey (1938) argues that meaningful learning requires time for reflection and interaction with ideas, which cannot occur in inflexible, content-heavy curricula focused solely on fact based reproduction.  Assessment practices must be reformed to value reflection and critical thinking rather than simple reproduction of information. Research in classroom assessment demonstrates that learning is enhanced when evaluation focuses on students’ reasoning processes, self-reflection, and understanding rather than on memorisation alone (Black & Wiliam, 1998).  This paper has demonstrated that the Socratic maieutic method offers a powerful and necessary response to the pedagogical challenges currently present in Serbian high schools. Through a detailed analysis of a real classroom example it demonstrates that questioning centered teaching crucially improves student engagement, enhances critical thinking, and deepens the internalization of religious and ethical concepts.  In conclusion, the findings of this paper indicate that religious education due to its ethical and existential nature, is better understood if it uses dialogical and facilitative pedagogical approaches. The analysis demonstrates that when students are encouraged to think critically rather than memorise content, they are more likely to develop mature perspectives on religion. These findings suggest that such educational practices extend beyond academic outcomes and provide to broader societal goals such as the development of a more reflective and cohesive community.  Furthermore, this study concludes that the teacher who guides inquiry rather than deliver pre determined answers strengthens both the deeper academic understanding but also the development of independent and critically minded students. From this perspective, pedagogical transformation emerges as essential for education systems devoted to preparing students for complex moral decision making, democratic participation, and responsible engagement in pluralistic societies. Bibliography  Wilberding, Erick. Socratic Methods in the Classroom: Encouraging Critical Thinking and Problem Solving Through Dialogue. New York: Routledge, 2019. Taylor & Francis+1  Ivica Živković, Milica Marković,“A to samo Bog zna” Serbia, Niš 2022.  Lalić-Vučetić, Nataša, Biljana Bodroški Spariosu, and Zvonimir Komar, editors. Motivation in Education: Challenges and Different Perspectives in Research. Institute for Educational Research, Belgrade, Serbia; Institute of Instructional and School Development, Alpen-Adria University of Klagenfurt, Austria; Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb, Croatia, 2023.  Koplston, Frederick Charles. History of PhylosophyI: Grecee and Belgrade. Belgrade: BIGZ, 1988  Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Continuum.

Članak možeš pročitati na srpskom jeziku ovde. What happens when the state decides what history should look like? And what kind of future does that produce? Illustration photo. Retrieved from Pexels (www.pexels.com) In recent months, debates around new textbook policies have once again opened an old and uncomfortable question: who controls knowledge, and with what purpose? While presented as administrative or educational reforms, these policies are rarely neutral. They often signal something deeper: an attempt to reshape collective memory and identity, and ultimately, the political imagination of a society. At first glance, centralized control over textbooks might seem like a matter of efficiency or quality assurance. Governments argue that a unified narrative ensures coherence in education systems. But history teaches us to be cautious. When states monopolize the production of knowledge, education stops being a space for critical thinking and becomes a tool for ideological reproduction. And this is not a new phenomenon. What Does History Teach Us? Throughout the 20th century, authoritarian and nationalist regimes have repeatedly turned to education as a means of consolidating power. In Nazi Germany, textbooks were systematically rewritten to promote racial ideology and justify expansionist politics. Similarly, in the Soviet Union, historical narratives were continuously revised to align with the ruling party’s shifting political line, often erasing inconvenient truths and individuals from public memory. In both cases, education was not about learning, it was about obedience. Closer to our own time, we see similar patterns emerging in parts of Europe. One of the most relevant contemporary examples is Hungary. Over the past decade, the Hungarian government has introduced increasingly centralized control over educational content, including the nationalization of textbook publishing. New curricula have emphasized nationalist interpretations of history, reduced space for critical perspectives, and promoted a homogeneous vision of identity. The consequences are not abstract. Researchers, educators, and civil society organizations have pointed out that these changes contribute to the normalization of exclusionary narratives. Historical complexity is flattened. Minority perspectives are marginalized or erased. And perhaps most concerningly, young people are socialized into seeing the world through a lens of “us versus them.” Education, in this context, becomes a subtle but powerful vehicle for producing distrust, resentment, and even hostility toward others. Why the Debate on Textbooks Is Never Just About Textbooks? In societies with fragile democratic institutions, control over education can easily become control over thought. When only one version of history is allowed, critical engagement is replaced by passive acceptance. Students are not encouraged to ask questions, they are taught what to think. And once that happens, the very foundation of democratic culture begins to erode. The Western Balkans, with its complex histories and unresolved tensions, is particularly vulnerable to such dynamics. We know from experience how competing national narratives can fuel division and conflict. Precisely because of this, education should be the space where multiple perspectives are explored, where difficult questions are asked, and where empathy is cultivated. Introducing tightly controlled, state-approved textbooks that privilege a single narrative risks undoing these efforts. It risks reproducing the very patterns that have historically led to exclusion, polarization, and violence. Is There an Alternative? The recent introduction of so-called “nationally significant textbooks” in Serbia has sparked serious concern among educators, researchers, and civil society organizations. Among them, the Critical Education Centre (CKO) has submitted a set of formal objections during the public consultation process — objections that were ultimately not accepted. This is not just a procedural issue. It is a political one. What is the problem? At the core of the reform is a simple but dangerous idea: that certain school subjects, especially language, history, and arts and culture, should serve the purpose of strengthening national identity and cohesion. This idea is veery troubling as a concept, but even more so in practice. CKO, in its official submission, warned that this approach represents a “securitization of education”, a shift in which textbooks are no longer treated as pedagogical tools, but as instruments of national policy. This framing matters, because once education becomes tied to “national security,” it becomes much harder to question it. Criticism is no longer seen as part of democratic debate, but as a (national) threat. What CKO is Warning About? CKO’s objections go beyond general concerns. They point to very concrete risks embedded in the law itself: Political control over knowledge productionBy privileging “national interest” as a criterion, the law opens space for selecting authors based on ideological alignment rather than academic quality. Erasure of plural perspectivesIn subjects like history and culture, a single “official” narrative risks excluding minority voices and alternative interpretations. Weakening of democratic procedureThe fact that objections submitted during public consultation were not meaningfully incorporated raises serious questions about transparency and participation. These are not abstract fears. They are grounded in both historical experience and contemporary research. Education or indoctrination? The key question is not whether national identity should be part of education. It always is, in some form. The real question is: who defines this identity, and whose voices are excluded in the process? CKO’s intervention reminds us that education policy is never neutral. It reflects political choices and those choices shape future generations. Ignoring expert and civil society input is not just bad governance. It is a warning sign. Because once education becomes a closed system, controlled from the top, it stops producing critical citizens — and starts producing obedient ones. You can read the full set of comments submitted by CKO here.You can read the paper published by CKO researchers on the risks of this law here.