In Focus
How Did a Fight Against Corruption Become a Struggle Over Education? — Chronology of Pressure
Compiled by Adriana Zaharijević & Jana Krstić In late 2024, a tragedy shook Serbia — the collapse of a newly renovated railway station in Novi Sad claimed 16 lives, exposing deep layers of state negligence for its citizens and soaring levels of corruption. What began as mourning soon transformed into one of the most widespread civic uprisings in Serbia’s recent history. Led by students, joined by educators, workers, and citizens across the country, the movement challenged not just a single government failure but the broader erosion of democratic institutions. This timeline offers a structured account of the unfolding events, focusing on the regime's violent retaliation against the Serbian educational system. Photo by Hristina Zdravkovic From Mourning to Mobilization Nov 22, 2024 – Silent vigils blocking the roads in honour of the Novi Sad victims. The vigils were announced to the authorities. In front of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts, those gathered were attacked by the passers-by, some of whom were identified as the officials of the ruling party, SNS. Nov 25, 2024 – The students of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts occupied the faculty building in protest, to be successively joined by four other faculties (University of Belgrade) and the Faculty of Philosophy (University of Novi Sad). Dec 25, 2024 – 84 public faculties and one private faculty are blocked (74% of all Serbian faculties). At the same time, 73 secondary schools, i.e. 14%, are occupied by their pupils. These numbers would grow. Mid-December – All public faculties (but one, Orthodox Theological Faculty) gave their public support to the four students’ demands. Dec 20, 2024 – The Ministry of Education abruptly shortened the first school semester in order to prevent the school teachers, already in legal strike, from joining the blockades. Pupils remained in schools until the end of term. Due to the Ministry’s executive order, the first semester was not graded. Student marshals at the protest, sourced from https://protesti.pics The Months of Uprising – January and February 2025 Jan 20, 2025 – The second school semester was supposed to begin. It didn’t. At the beginning of March, approximately 500 schools across Serbia were in blockade, while around 400 continued with legal strike (15,500 teachers in blockade, 9,000 in strike; 70–80% schools in some form of work stoppage). In parallel, various social sectors – medical and agricultural workers, the Bar Association and the Association of Engineers, post office workers, cab drivers, actors, and pensioners – joined the blockades or initiated strikes. Jan 21 – The Rector of the University of Belgrade addressed the parliamentary Committee for Education and Science and stated that "the University of Belgrade gives its full support to the students", citing the support of a huge majority of professors. Rebellious and Free University platforms of professors and researchers began to connect and organize. Teachers formed their informal associations – PULS, Udružena prosveta Srbije – and those platforms began to collaborate. Student marshals leading the protest, sourced from https://protesti.pics The Days Prior to the Sound Cannon (March 15) March 4 – The salary of education workers was reduced between 50 and 100 percent; in some cases, high school teachers were paid only 2,191 RSD (less than 20 EUR), in others 12,000 RSD. An informal group of IT experts invited citizens to join the "Solidarity for Education" network and donate to help educators. The network is still in operation. March 7 – A group of 30 young people, presenting themselves as ‘the students who want to study’ or ‘Students 2.0’, set up tents in front of the president’s office in Pioneers Park. In the following days leading to the major gathering on March 15, the ‘Students 2.0’ were joined by SNS members and affiliates, and then by suspicious characters, many of whom have an established criminal record. The park area was soon fully occupied, fenced, and additionally shielded by 150 tractors without licence plates. The encampment is still in place. March 9 – Commenting on the large protest scheduled for 15 March, the President said he expected the opposition to "organize great violence" at the rally in Belgrade and that "everyone who participates in it will be arrested". This marked the beginning of a long line of threats to participants and organizers – still labelled as the ‘opposition’ funded by foreign money, despite the fact that the students openly and consistently refrained from supporting opposition parties. March 13 – At a press conference two days earlier, the University of Belgrade rector emphasized that the students, who organized the gathering, want a peaceful and dignified protest, stressing that the conflicts, announced for days by government-controlled media, are not part of the students’ plans. March 15 – The largest gathering in the capital, with more than 300,000 people in the street. The gathering was interrupted by the alleged deployment of LRAD (long-range acoustic device) on peaceful protesters during 15 minutes of silence for the victims of the Novi Sad collapse. The Ministry of Internal Affairs denied the allegations despite footage of the incident, as did the President, who called for the prosecution of those ‘lying’ and ‘spreading disinformation’. Tractors in front of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, positioned ahead of the announced student protest on March 15. Sourced from https://protesti.pics Serbian Academia at the Helm of the "Coloured Revolution" Since December, the regime unsuccessfully sought to single out the ‘leaders’ of the students protests. Before March 15, the opposition was still defined as the main culprit behind the blockades. March 18 – In a TV interview, the President commented: "Faculty professors who do nothing, except participate in blockades, will get potatoes. Tomorrow, I think… They will get nothing." March 24 – The Ministry of Education of the technical government, caretaker government issued regulation 5/35, which effectively reduced the professors’ salaries to 12.5% of what they earned before. March 25 – The Ministry of Education has launched inspection supervision of faculties across Serbia, widely seen as yet another form of pressure on higher education institutions. March 28 – The rector of the University of Belgrade was turned into state enemy no. 1, ‘the face of evil’ (Minister in the technical government). March 31 – The dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš was stabbed by a passer-by at a protest. April 1 – The dean of the Faculty of Economy in Belgrade was summoned to the police. April 18 – The rector of the University of Belgrade was summoned to the police on charges of abuse of official authority (sued by the ‘Students 2.0’). The Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy welcomes students at the protest in Niš. Sourced from https://protesti.pics The Effects of Potato Regulation 5/35 University professors are no longer paid for 20 hours of teaching and 20 hours of research per week, since the ratio was changed to 35 to 5 in favour of teaching. As there are no classes, professors receive only 12.5 percent of their salary, or, according to some reports, about 20,000 dinars (170 EUR) per month. Financial Violence Against University Professors – The drastic cut in research hours has subjected university professors to severe financial hardship, endangering their basic livelihoods. Collapse of the Accreditation System – Scientific and artistic research is essential for accreditation and quality assurance of university programs. With the new decree, this capacity is undermined. Jeopardising Engagement in Projects – With only 5 hours allocated to research, professors are unable to participate in or apply for most European projects, severely limiting international academic cooperation. Weakening Career Prospects – The decree severely hinders career advancement, as promotions are based on research output now nearly impossible under these conditions. Student cyclists in France, sourced from https://protesti.pics (Unanswered) Appeals of the Serbian Academics March 4 – 80 researchers holding EU research grants in Serbia sent a joint letter to the European Commission calling on it to help tackle corruption in the country. The Commission acknowledged receiving the letter but has neither replied nor commented. March 20 – An Open Appeal for international academic support for Serbian students and professors was signed by around 4,500 academics in less than a week. March 26 – 470 deans, professors, assistants and other employees of the University of Belgrade submitted an initiative to the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of the Regulation. March 31 – The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts demanded the withdrawal of the Regulation. April 17 – The academic community appealed to the new Prime Minister, a professor of medicine, to withdraw the Regulation. And many more... Protest in Niš on March 1, sourced from https://protesti.pics Where Are We Now? Students’ demands remain unmet. Primary and then secondary schools gradually resumed classes in late April and May. The government’s ambition appears to be to quell the blockades without a clear plan for how or when the school year will end. Many teachers are threatened with dismissal – or already dismissed. The new Ministry of Education is dubbed the "Ministry of Revenge". Several faculties have entered legal strike; most remain in blockade; a few now teach asynchronously online. All faculties are exposed to non-payment of funds for material costs, fines, inspections, and reduced budgets. The illegal reduction of professors' salaries has entered its third month. There are frequent threats to cancel the funding of state universities. Strategy: divide et impera. At a rally in Niš on May 17, the president claimed young people were misled by social media and manipulative professors, to whom he said: "they will not get money until they start doing their work." A new Bill on Higher Education, announced recently, has sparked fears that it will further repress universities and significantly reduce academic autonomy. Protest in Belgrade on March 15, sourced from https://protesti.pics What Should We Do? This is a moment for concrete solidarity. The Serbian academic community now stands as the last bulwark against a rising wave of authoritarian repression. Colleagues around the world must use every platform – from faculty senates to social media – to denounce the crackdown. Academic associations should call on European and global bodies to condition funding on respect for university autonomy. In classrooms and at conferences, professors should spotlight Serbia’s struggle and keep it in the global conversation. Most importantly, we must stand with the students and professors who have placed themselves on the front lines of this fight. Their call for transparency, accountability, and independent education is not just Serbia’s cause – it is a defense of values cherished by academics everywhere. The world’s scholars cannot look away. The protection of knowledge and democracy depends on it.
Color Revolution between Protests and Media Narratives
How the term “color revolution” is misused in Serbian pro-government media to delegitimize student protests Author: Luka Murišić, PhD student of History at the University of Belgrade Railway station incident in Novi Sad deeply influenced public discourse in Serbia. Question of responsibility very quickly emerged as priority topic in media and allegations for corruption and non-transparent construction deals resulted in public outcry for prosecution of all officials responsible for death of sixteen people. Students’ protests which are still ongoing since December 2024 showed that government and politicians are not willing to respond on public calls and to fulfill demands. The media as a unique image of one society at a specific time reveals the dichotomy in reports and attitudes towards the protests and its participants. Some media related to government officials tended to report on protests in an unprofessional manner, followed by various etiquettes of political and historical connotations. This paper will try to shed light on one aspect of the negative presentation in issue of the usage of the term “colored revolution”. This research is based on news articles containing term “color revolution” and academic articles addressing the topic of protests at the end of the second and the beginning of the third millennium. Also, I used the articles from media outlets with critical attitude towards the policy of Serbian Progressive party. Sourced from https://protesti.pics What Exactly Is a “Color Revolution”? This particular question ought to reveal what is actually a “color revolution” and what is the meaning of the term. Understanding original meaning and insight in academic papers dealing with various examples of civic protests is essential for analysis and this article in general. Political and social changes in former socialist countries produced various consequences, where one of them is political instability. Collapse of Soviet Union and socialist regimes did not mean immediate democratization of state apparatus and society in general but left enough space for rise of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. Democratization therefore was not an instant outcome of the processes at the end of the twentieth and at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Change of governments, followed by elections and non-violent protests which aim was a democratization of society are called “color revolutions”. Peculiar name does not refer to their outcome, but to the symbol or color protesters had used. As different articles show, the most referred examples of these “revolutions” are from Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004, 2014). Mentioned term also comprises events in other cases such as Slovakia (1998), Kyrgyzstan (2005) and unsuccessful examples in cases of Russia and Belarus. Key characteristic in all mentioned cases is a non-violent protests. Semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes, in which elections are marked with various scandals and breachment of laws, create setting for the adoption of “electoral model” of protests, where citizens tend to defend their victory on elections and protect the voting results. Nonetheless, this model is often seen as appropriate due to its non-violent character. However, the studies reveal that “revolutions” are not happening following the identical pattern, neither they must be successful. Various cases show that success of the protests lies in multiple factors which, even though they are similar in all cases, are not key for accomplishment. Factors such as unity of oppositional parties, massive and non-violent protests, participation of youth movements and elections may not be decisive. Scholars and protest experience emphasize the importance of country’s economic situation, its position in international relations, government reliance on coercion apparatus as equally important for outcome of the protests. Examples from Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia clearly show the importance of the mentioned factors. While in Serbian case difficult economic situation and losses in war campaigns gave impetus for protests, in case of Ukraine’s Orange revolution (2004) and Revolution of Dignity (2014) war and economic situation were not relevant factors. Still, the Georgian and Serbian case stress the importance of country's relations to its neighbors and attitude of important police and security officials towards the current government. Demonstrations against Shevardnadze and Milošević more relied on mass mobilization of citizens and united political opposition with common leader, while in Ukrainian examples the same cannot be confirmed. However, three cases have similarities regarding the participation of youth movements, financial and logistical support for protesters and civil society organizations, and the role of oppositional, independent media. Moreover, it is evident that protesters from different countries used similar methods, keeping in mind that they were empirically proven to be successful, and activists and organizations maintained their mutual international connections. Photo by Jana Krstic, editorial board of Balkan Talks How the Term “Color Revolution” Is Used in Serbian Media Various newspapers and media outlets took part in the media campaign of labelling the students as “foreign mercenaries” and their struggle as “colored revolution”, but despite that, it must be examined how media used the mentioned term and what eventually they wanted to emphasize. Moreover, it is important to see how pro-government politicians understand the term “colored revolution” and on what they are alluding to while using the term. For this purpose, I analyzed 64 news articles from two daily online newspapers with pro-government stances, Večernje Novosti and Kurir. Used articles can be found under tag “obojena revolucija” and they are posted in period between January to May 2025. In all of them, “color revolution” is mentioned in either title or text itself. The articles show that term is mentioned at least once, very often can be seen only in headlines. Government politicians, including most notable ones such as president, prime minister and ministers used this term to describe the events on the streets. Their statements are marked with a call for attention, in which they tend to label protests as something dangerous and destructive. The development of a specific attitude towards the “color revolution” during a period of time can be traced. During the selected period, the attitude in statements varied from acknowledging potential threat to expression of victory. Both statements could be seen during the same month or short time period. Moreover, statements about “color revolution” also come from foreign politicians and state officials. The given statements are different depending on the actual real-time context. Politicians insist in statements that every big gathering of citizens is an attempt of color revolution and consequently that it will not bring any change. That was the case with protest on 15th of March which was labeled as the attempt of “color revolution”. Articles from this period show some typical notions in the regime’s attitude towards the mentioned term. For government representatives, the color revolution is always sponsored by external factors, acting through non-governmental organizations such as USAID or NED. External factors finance the oppositional parties and non-governmental organizations, and sponsor professional media. Protests follow clear patterns which are practiced in countries where protests have already taken place. Methods of civil disobedience are trained with the assistance of civil society organizations, who are seen as elements of foreign influence. “Revolution”, as we can conclude from statements, cannot bring any positive change. Revolution has a negative connotation and directly implies negative consequences such as poverty, instability and loss of national sovereignty on society and state in general. Statements show that “color revolutions” lead countries into poverty and destabilization. The rhetorics of government officials often tends to picture protests as backlash to development of Serbian economy and society in general. For them, the only consequence of “revolution” is “weak Serbia on its knees”. Students and citizens therefore are being manipulated and tricked while taking part in the destruction of their country. The revolution implies the usage of violence. In particular, the relation between protests in Eastern Europe and the whole government narrative of “color revolutions” can be followed. As something completely negative, the same can be related for Orange revolution and Revolution of Dignity which happened in Ukraine. Through the lens of these articles, there is a monolithic, black-white image of these events. They are externally supported, they had only negative consequences on Ukraine, they were represented as unwanted scenario of the protests. Ukraine is seen as geopolitical playground and unstable country. Also, these events represent a pattern for protests which will be used in Serbian case. The Political Context in Serbia Protests are inseparable from the social and political context in which they took place. Context is marked with the rule of Serbian Progressive party and its impacts on Serbian society in general. The canopy disaster was a strong impetus for protests and wider expression of popular dissatisfaction with the regime. Experts and analysts very often refer to Serbia as stabilitocracy, where the country and society lay somewhere in between democracy and autocracy, and European Union and Russia. Specific political background is shaped by clientelism, suspension of ordinary politics, undermined system of separation of power, and permanent campaign mode of ruling party. The past decade since 2012 was marked with democratic backsliding which severely impacted professional journalism and media rights. Moreover, various individuals who criticized the politics of government and Serbian Progressive Party have been object of media campaign of disinformation and abuse. The rule of Serbian Progressive party was also marked with historical revisionism used for propaganda purposes. Regime officials and intellectuals tended to promote revised, black-white image of the past, especially of the twentieth century. Sourced from https://protesti.pics Media Spin and Delegitimization of Student Protests In context of protests, pro-government media developed various media spins in their reports on students’ protests. Journalists already identified more than ten different media spins used to put off responsibility from the government for railway station disaster and to legitimize their media campaign against protests. Having that in mind, it is not unusual to see that students’ protests are followed with accusations from pro-government media of ongoing “colored revolution”. News outlets and media in general became instruments of political struggle for power and repression. The mentioned term is used to discredit the students and civil protests, but also to drive other citizens away from protests and therefore to suppress any kind of dissonant voice. Ultimately, the idea of ongoing “color revolution” is nothing more than a product from pro-government media, who are prone to lead negative media campaigns against any political actor who seems oppositional. News articles referring to the “colored revolution” including statements of politicians and analysts reveal how members of the ruling party perceive civic protests in general and how the term itself reflects peculiar moral and ideological values. Labeled as threat, “revolution” is seen as negative, moreover, the statements reveal that “revolution” is an attack on personality of the president and in general an attack on the Serbian country and nation. Consequently, the politicians from regime have moral obligation to protect Serbia by suppressing the dissonant voices. The protests are nothing more than expression for need for power, while demands represent paravane. For regime which legitimacy is being questioned, the popular voice of dissent is expected to be named as “color revolution”. As it was explained earlier, this accusation is an attempt to regain support and evade responsibility for corruption. Is the Threat Real? Mass protests led by students cannot be understood as “color revolution” at all. Their length (the protests began in December 2024, and they are still ongoing), student’s call for parliamentary elections and mass gatherings in combination with small protests around Serbia very clearly stand out from all protests who can be described as “revolution”. Even the initial four demands are something different from the events which happened in Ukraine and Georgia. Also, the whole political setting in Serbia is different from the circumstances which have led to fall of Milošević in 2000. While there is a non-democratic regime, there is no united political opposition in the country and no common candidate to replace the current regime. Political parties are fragmented on a series of questions, where one of which is support and attitude for student protests. Simultaneously, the students are declining any offer for cooperation with political parties, at the same time introducing local assemblies (zborovi) as a new method of social organization. Ultimately, it is debatable whether there is any international support for protests. While Russian politicians perceive the protests in the same manner as the government, European officials, even though acknowledging the civic need for effective institutions and rule of law in Serbia, remain reluctant to openly place on either of two sides and therefore still give recognition to the current regime. Conclusion: A Manufactured Narrative To conclude, narrative on the ongoing “color revolution” is part of the regime’s media campaign to discredit the protests and preserve its status while pointing to the danger of the national interests. The mentioned term is used to create false narratives about protests and to completely discredit the students. Media reports filled with historical connotations also must provide moral and historical legitimacy for government’s actions. At the same time, students and young people are represented as manipulated and instrumentalized. Articles show that examples from recent Ukrainian history - Orange revolution (2004) and Revolution of Dignity (2014) are used as scarecrow to mobilize citizens against ongoing protests and discredit the leaders of oppositional parties and students. In that sense, colored revolution, no matter when and where it happened, is seen as danger for any country and society and brings violent change of government, infiltration of foreign elements and their intelligence activity and ultimately the collapse of society. Protests are always followed with activities of foreign intelligence services, which represent one-sided narrative on complex historical events. At the same time, students were labeled and connected with historical figures and events which have negative connotation in revised history of the twentieth century in Serbia. The diversity of politicians and public figures whose statements about ongoing revolution are used in research must provide a sense of genuity and warn public opinion on potential threats.
From Kyiv to the Balkans: How a Museum Opened My Eyes to Shared Wartime Childhoods
Author: Vladyslava Oliinyk What do a child in Sarajevo in the 1990s and a child in Ukraine today have in common? A historian and student shares how moderating an exhibition at the Museum of War Childhood in Kyiv sparked a personal and academic journey into Balkan history, empathy, and the power of cultural memory. This blog reflects on how museums can connect past and present across borders—and how stories of childhood in wartime can bring people and nations closer together. Last summer, I had the unique opportunity to moderate a temporary exhibition at the Museum of War Childhood in Kyiv. Although the exhibition was managed by the museum’s Ukrainian branch, moderators like myself had to familiarize ourselves with the institution’s origins in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Museum of War Childhood is a relatively young institution—its permanent exhibition opened only in 2017—but its conceptual depth is striking. The idea behind the museum lies in the tension between the uniqueness and universality of growing up during wartime, as first explored in the book War Childhood by Bosnian entrepreneur and author Jasminko Halilović. Halilović transformed his personal experiences as a child during the Bosnian War (1992–1995) into a literary work and, eventually, a cultural institution. Photo by Oliinyk Vladyslava As a historian, I was familiar with the basic chronology and causes of the Bosnian War, but I had never examined the conflict on a micro level. During my undergraduate studies, my focus was on the history of visual art in Victorian Britain, and I gave little attention to Central or Eastern Europe. It wasn’t until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that I felt a personal urgency to understand the region’s post-Soviet transitions and the independence movements of neighboring countries. The complex and often painful recent history of the Balkans earned my deep respect, but at first, I struggled to see how our experiences were connected. Encountering the Museum of War Childhood changed that. I began to recognize parallels between the Russian-Ukrainian war and the Bosnian conflict—especially in how children navigate trauma, displacement, and interrupted childhoods during wartime. The museum made these connections tangible, offering a space where individual stories speak across national and temporal boundaries. Photo by Oliinyk Vladyslava In my growing curiosity about the Balkans, I chose to join a Central European University specifically because it offered a course on Balkan Studies. Ukrainian universities also offer Central and Eastern European studies, but I realized that to truly understand the region, I needed to learn from the people who live there. Who can speak more vividly about the intricacies of student protests in Serbia than those participating in them? Who can reflect more truthfully on the Bosnian war than those who lived through it? Through my studies and encounters, these questions are finding meaningful answers. My experience taught me how cultural institutions, like museums, can provide powerful tools for rethinking war, trauma, and identity. Today’s museums can connect the histories of different nations, revealing shared tragedies and common challenges—particularly for children navigating the chaos of war. This renewed focus on the experiences of minors has led me to new research interests and opened a new chapter of European history I had never expected to engage with so deeply. Museums, I’ve learned, can simultaneously build bridges and highlight difference—and in doing so, they provide a space where empathy, inquiry, and healing can coexist. Photo by Oliinyk Vladyslava Photo by Oliinyk Vladyslava
Stories
Discursive Veto. How Kosovo and Historical Narratives Enable Serbia to Maneuver Between East and West?
Author: Daria Vorobiova Serbia in the modern geopolitical situation is perceived as a country caught between two fires: the West and the East. Its indicative neutrality, not associating itself with any global organization and acting as a "third party," is telling. In reality, this political ambivalence has calculated mechanisms used by statesmen to preserve their political position and policy of "securing funding without additional obligations," while in return manipulating public opinion. Illustration photo. Retrieved from Pexels (www.pexels.com) Neither to the West, nor to the East Looking at survey results on the political preferences of Serbs reveals a deeply divided population: for instance, a telling example is the 2023 WFD survey. It showed that 43% of Serbs believe they should rely on Russia in international relations, and only 25.8% of respondents stated they should rely on the European Union. Also notable is the question of whether Serbia belongs to the West or the East: 42% of respondents answered that Serbia is not part of either, while the same proportion answered logically about belonging to the West or the East. Serbian society is extremely fragmented in its political preferences: this problem leads to a general instability of civic engagement in politics, as without consensus among the sides, it is impossible to exert strong civic influence on the political life of the state as a whole [1]. How much does the state influence the political preferences of Serbs? Following data from the same survey, it is evident that 59.2% of respondents note that they view political information about events in Serbia through television. The state exerts sufficient influence on television, considering channels like RTS, RTV Pink, Happy TV, which are known for publishing information deliberately portrayed in a light favorable to the state. Under such conditions, the question arises – if a large number of citizens receive such information, can their political preferences be genuinely logical and justified? [2] Also, television programs have been observed deliberately portraying the EU in a bad light, while Russia is presented in the moral image of a fraternal state. The key problem with this presentation of information is the excessive moralization of "good" Russia and "bad" European Union. Typically, this moral assessment is based solely on subjectivity, in no way appealing to rational reflections on the benefits of such "friendship" for Serbia [3]. And it is precisely the "moral" justification, as well as the "moral boundaries of the permissible," that allow Serbian politicians to maintain their position for as long as possible, instilling in citizens an unstable pluralism of opinions to weaken their civic stance. The problem of "moralizing" politics as a key factor of ambivalence This appeal to everything moral begins with historical origins and serves as the foundation for forming nationalist narratives. The narratives consist of three components: the "victim question," the "pride question," and the main unifying factor, the moral discursive veto point. By combining these components, it becomes possible to manipulate public opinion, set the boundaries of discourse to slow down potential civic activity, and at the necessary moment say: "here is the boundary you must not cross." The "victim question" is characterized by a moral appeal to grievance, primarily towards the West, which in the narratives is viewed as a military aggressor (following the events of 1999) protecting Kosovo (which is a sacred question of the origin of statehood), and also as an economic usurper (the European Union as an economic organization where, upon accession, Serbia would lose its informal independence). An image of an enemy is created, but also an image of a savior, a potential "fraternal state" that can selflessly help Serbia escape crude dependence on the "humiliating" West. Russia occupies this role, but in the case of investments and their positive influence, China can also be considered. The "pride question" is characterized by a centuries-long history of battles (for example, the Battle of Kosovo) and the preservation of the nation and its culture during long periods of statelessness. This factor is supposed to act as a unifying force ("we have only ourselves, and no one will help us except us") and one that reduces the factor of destabilization, since there are "enemies" against which Serbia must be ready to act as a united front in case of danger. The unifying factor is the Kosovo question – less as a territorial issue and more as a discursive veto point: it marks the limit beyond which reform, recognition, or alignment becomes politically illegible. Since many reforms for EU accession and funding require normalization of relations with Kosovo and its recognition as a separate state, Serbian politicians (for example, Aleksandar Vučić) support the aforementioned narratives precisely on this issue. A. Vučić's speech on 04.11.2025 in Brussels: «Neću da priznam Kosovo da bismo ušli u EU» ("I will not recognize Kosovo so that we enter the EU") [4]; In an address to the people of Kosovo: «ne postoji „dobro rešenje kosovskog problema za Srbe“ i da ga nikada neće biti» ("there is no 'good solution to the Kosovo problem for Serbs' and there never will be"), «Srbi bili najstradalniji narod na Kosovu» ("Serbs were the most suffering people in Kosovo") [5]; speech at the Palace of Serbia: «Vučić je rekao da je Kosovo (...) našom zemljom u skladu sa Ustavom Republike Srbije i Poveljom Ujedinjenih nacija i Rezolucijom 12.44» ("Vučić said that Kosovo (...) is our land in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and the Charter of the United Nations and Resolution 1244") [6]. These three factors help form a stable national narrative, which allows simultaneously maintaining the image of the EU as an "enemy" while preserving active economic relations. Naturally, it is assumed that when using this funding as outlined in the documentation, Serbia should join the European Union after meeting all conditions. Is such a policy feasible? Active neutrality Serbia's neutrality is not an absence of policy but its active form, maintained by state elites through media propaganda, fragmenting Serbian society and helping to brake at the right moments and shift the blame to the "enemy," not to Serbia. The European Commission has noted that Serbia is moving too slowly in implementing necessary reforms, especially those related to freedom of speech, eliminating corruption, and normalizing relations with Kosovo [7]. The question of slowness also became important in cases where the EU itself delayed necessary payments to Serbia, demanding additional guarantees that the funds would be spent in the intended direction [8]. Such neutrality helps Serbian political elites navigate relations with the European Union: maintaining the possibility of obtaining economic and political resources while keeping a political distance from it, simultaneously shifting responsibility for the stagnation of reforms onto "enemies" and unsolvable historical traumas inflicted by these same "enemies." The price of this strategy is the weakness of fragmented civic pressure, the slowdown of necessary reforms, and the dependence of the political course on a constantly perpetuated conflict that does not approach resolution if Serbia truly chooses a European path. In this context, the key question is not which side Serbia will join in the future, but how long civil society can exist in a state-managed ambivalence, how long it can survive without the reforms it tries to grasp through protests. Bibliography: “Opinion Poll Report: Socio-political Views of Serbian Citizens in 2023.” WFD. Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), Serbia, 2023. https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/wfd_nws_2023_eng_final.pdf. “Defunding Disinformation in the Balkans. How International Brands Support Russia’s Agenda.” by BFMI & CRTA, n.d. https://crta.rs/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/CRTA_BFMI_Defunding_Disinformation_in_the_Balkans_Report.pdf. “Media Monitoring of Foreign Actors.” CRTA. https://crta.rs/en/media-monitoring-of-foreign-actors-november-2024/. B92. “Vučić: Neću Da Priznam Kosovo Da Bismo Ušli U EU; Postoji Mogućnost Da Otvorimo Klaster 3 Pre Kraja Godine.” B92.net, November 4, 2025. https://www.b92.net/info/politika/178701/vucic-necu-da-priznam-kosovo-da-bismo-usli-u-eu-postoji-mogucnost-da-otvorimo-klaster-3-pre-kraja-godine/vest РТС. “Vučić Za Veltvohe: Potrebno Kompromisno Rešenje Za KiM, a Ne Da Albanci Dobiju Sve, a Srbi Ništa,” n.d. https://www.rts.rs/lat/vesti/politika/5462184/vucic-za-veltvohe-potrebno-kompromisno-resenje-za-kim-a-ne-da-albanci-dobiju-sve-a-srbi-nista.html. Urednik. “Vučić Odgovorio Evropskom Diplomati: Kosovo Je Dio Srbije - Top Portal.” Top Portal, November 6, 2025. https://topportal.info/vucic-odgovorio-evropskom-diplomati-kosovo-je-dio-srbije/. Belgrade, N1. “EC Report Says Serbia Slow on Credible Reforms.” N1 Info RS, November 4, 2025. https://n1info.rs/english/news/ec-report-says-serbia-slow-on-credible-reforms/. Rakic, Snezana. “Why Is Serbia Still Waiting for EU Funds That Its Neighbours Have Received?” Serbian Monitor, May 23, 2025. https://www.serbianmonitor.com/en/why-is-serbia-still-waiting-for-eu-funds-that-its-neighbours-have-received/.
Functioning Is Not the Same as Being Well
Author: Stamena Kozić, a high school student from Serbia In the Balkans, mental health is often recognized only when it reaches an extreme. As long as a person continues to function-attending school, going to work, fulfilling responsibilities-this is treated as proof of stability. Functioning becomes evidence that everything is "fine", even when it's not. As a result, struggles such as anxiety, depression and burnout are rarely seen as legitimate unless they interfere with productivity. The ability to keep going is praised, while the cost of doing so remains invisible. Illustration photo. Retrieved from Pexels (www.pexels.com) However, data tells a different story. Research conducted in Serbia alone shows that approximately one-third of the population can be considered psychologically vulnerable. Around 15.6% of people report symptoms of depression, 7.2% experience symptoms of anxiety, and 1.6% are at high risk of suicide. These numbers exist alongside everyday functioning, challenging the idea that productivity equals well-being. Mental health in Balkan schools In the Balkans, seeing a psychologist is still not normalized within the school system and is often perceived as a last resort rather than a form of prevention or care. Students are typically referred to school psychologists only after being labeled as “problematic,” when their difficulties become visible through academic failure, behavioral issues, or a noticeable decline in productivity. These markers are treated as the primary indicators of distress, while emotional suffering does not necessarily disrupt performance and remains largely unaddressed. Well-performing students—those who maintain good grades, attend classes regularly, and meet institutional expectations—are rarely checked on or encouraged to seek support. This creates an environment in which psychological help is associated with dysfunction and punishment rather than well-being. As a result, schools unintentionally reinforce the idea that as long as a student continues to function, there is no need for help, even if that functioning comes at the cost of mental and emotional health. This mindset is especially dangerous because many mental health conditions do not immediately disrupt outward functioning. Disorders such as eating disorders often operate within this logic of "not being sick enough." Individuals may continue to perform well academically or socially, leading both themselves and others to believe there is no reason to seek help. This delay in recognition frequently allows the condition to worsen, increasing both psychological and physical risks. In extreme cases, the consequences of untreated mental illness can be fatal—underscoring the cost of a system that equates visible dysfunction with the legitimacy of suffering. Why Mental Health Remains a Taboo in the Balkans? Mental health continues to be a taboo in the Balkans largely because the region's recent history has been defined by survival rather than stability. Wars, political transitions, and prolonged economic insecurity have shaped societies in which endurance is valued more than emotional openness. In such environments, psychological distress was often viewed as luxury concern, something secondary to immediate survival. As a result suffering became normalized as an expected part of life, rather than recognized as a condition that deserves care and attention. Stigma surrounding professional mental health support further reinforces this mindset. Therapy and psychiatric care are frequently associated with severe illness or social failure, rather than prevention or self-understanding. As the aforementioned research shows, many people seek help only when their condition becomes unmanageable, if they seek it at all. This is compounded by structural barriers: mental health services across the region remain underfunded, unevenly distributed, and difficult to access, particularly for young people. Long waiting times, limited school-based support, and high costs in private care discourage early intervention. Over time, emotional restraint has been learned and passed down across generations. Parents and grandparents who endured hardship without psychological support often model silence as resilience. Phrases such as "others have it worse" or "you'll get over it" are commonly used, unintentionally minimizing emotional pain. Together, historical trauma, stigma, and systemic limitations have created a culture in which mental health struggles are only acknowledged when they become impossible to ignore- maintaining the same pattern of recognition through crisis rather than care. How Mental Health Is Approached in Other Countries? In many countries outside the Balkans, mental health is increasingly treated as an integral part of public conversation rather than a private issue. Discussions about anxiety, depression, and burnout are more visible in media, education, and policy, helping reduce sigma around seeking support. Asking for professional help is often framed as an act of responsibility and self-awareness, not weakness. Mental health education is frequently incorporated into school curricula, teaching students to recognize emotional distress early and encouraging them to seek help before problems escalate. Therapy is widely normalized, with school counselors and mental health professionals positioned as preventive resources rather than emergency responses. This emphasis on prevention- addressing mental health before it reaches a crisis point—stands in sharp contrast to systems that acknowledge psychological distress only after functioning begins to fall. How Can We Begin to Change This? Redefining strength is the first step: true resilience is not just endurance or silence, but the courage to acknowledge vulnerability and seek help when needed. Creating spaces for honest conversations—at home, in schools, and in public lifecan gradually break the stigma that has persisted for generations.
What Did the Student Protests Bring Us?
Author: Vladimir Stojkovic The student protests that followed the fall of the canopy are certainly not the first protests to take place in the modern history of Serbia. In many aspects, they resemble the protests of previous decades. However, what distinguishes these student protests is the level of general mobilization that is, the awakening of the broader community. This awakening did not occur only in urban centers, but also extended to rural areas, which had long been politically marginalized. Sourced from https://protesti.pics For months, now more than a year, students have been walking proudly along their path of freedom. Many had considered this generation to be completely lost and apolitical, yet the students proved the opposite through their actions. Beyond the powerful and inspiring slogans reminiscent of the protests of the 1990s, these demonstrations have played a crucial role in raising social awareness across various spheres of life. They addressed issues ranging from respect for individual and minority rights to the importance of independent state institutions. Of course, activists, party members, NGOs, and individuals had been pointing out social problems long before these protests, and their persistence deserves recognition. However, students managed to find a formula that reached a much wider audience, including the rural parts of the country that had often been overlooked. As students moved across Serbia, from cities, across fields and meadows, to the smallest villages, they awakened hope and initiated a form of social catharsis. They jolted people out of long-standing apathy and fear. Decades of injustice, particularly intensified over the past thirteen years, had accumulated within society. The arrival of students in remote villages helped dismantle that fear. They restored people’s pride, encouraged them to stand upright once again, and revived a sense of solidarity that had been sorely lacking. Under the influence of the student movement, citizens began participating more actively in public life. Public assemblies and discussions emerged, and people became increasingly interested in social and political issues. The students managed to wake society from a prolonged state of political passivity. The long-term effect of this awakening will be greater civic engagement, especially through participation in democratic processes such as elections, whether as observers, controllers, or candidates. What matters most is the realization that citizens hold power in their own hands. Students have faced attacks from various ideological positions. Some label them clerofascists, while others accuse them of being Eurofanatics. Such criticism ignores the fact that students represent a heterogeneous community, and total homogeneity would be both unrealistic and dangerous. Their diversity has not hindered dialogue; on the contrary, it has fostered tolerance and mutual respect. The authorities in Serbia, along with similarly minded political actors, fear scenes of unity, people of different religions embracing one another, or showing solidarity regardless of sexual orientation. Such moments represent a defeat for politics built on division and hatred. Ultimately, the most significant outcomes of the student protests include the disappearance of fear, increased interest in social affairs, and greater awareness of individual rights. The students also delivered a powerful lesson on corruption, helping citizens better understand its direct impact on their lives. The flame of the student protests has spread throughout Serbia, and it is clear that nothing will be the same again. The spirit of freedom has escaped the bottle, the waves of change have been set in motion, and it is now up to all of us to sustain that energy and work toward improving our society.
Falling Into the Underground: How Niš Youth Reclaims Culture Through Rebellion
While official cultural institutions in Serbia remain trapped in bureaucracy and underfunding, something else is growing beneath the surface — fragile, improvised, but stubbornly alive. In Niš, the country’s third-largest city, a generation of young artists and musicians is carving out its own spaces, reshaping culture beyond state control. Their most visible experiment is Underground, a music and art festival that, in just three years, has become a focal point for what many now call the “new new wave” of Niš rock and alternative culture. Photo by Strahinja Jovanovic From 2 to 5 October this year, Underground will take over the Niš Cultural Centre with twenty bands across four nights, ranging from punk and stoner rock to synth-pop. The program is eclectic but coherent, rooted in the belief that independent music is not just entertainment but a political gesture. The festival’s history reflects this stance: its first edition in 2023 was put together in just two weeks, without institutional support, sustained purely by community energy. Since then, it has grown — with compilations, benefit events, and a steadily expanding audience — while remaining true to its DIY roots. But what sets Underground apart is not only the sound. It is the image — quite literally. Each year, the festival develops a distinctive visual language designed by young artist Jelena Perić, who has become one of its central creative forces. Her posters are not promotional tools in the traditional sense; they are manifestos. “The visuals change every year, but I try to keep a recognisable identity — something people immediately associate with Underground,” Perić says. “It’s about reflecting the energy of the city and the scene into the artwork.” This year’s design depicts a young person in freefall. It is an unsettling but also strangely liberating image. For Perić, the fall is not about defeat. “It’s about descending into our underground — into a space of honesty, community, and resistance,” she explains. The poster overturns the usual meaning of falling: what might seem like a collapse becomes a deliberate choice to abandon the surface world of stagnation and enter a deeper, truer dimension. Underground poster The aesthetics carry unmistakable political undertones. Serbia’s cultural sector has been systematically neglected: for years, less than one percent of the national budget has been allocated to culture, leaving independent initiatives with little chance of survival. In this vacuum, the underground scene becomes more than a subculture — it is a necessity. The visual motif of falling into the underground crystallises that necessity: if official culture cannot sustain life, then life must create its own parallel ecosystem. The festival’s community-based financing reflects the same ethos. Underground relies on fundraising parties and donations, with local partners such as the Critical Education Centre providing support. This mode of survival is itself a form of critique — exposing the absence of public commitment to culture while demonstrating that art can thrive without state structures. “We don’t see Underground as a once-a-year event,” Perić notes. “It’s an ongoing process, a constant effort to hold space for something independent and real.” Jelena Perić, Underground promotion The atmosphere of rebellion also runs through the music. One of the most talked-about acts this year was Bunt — literally “Rebellion” — a young band that recently released Nisam sam (“I Am Not Alone”), a song inspired by student protests and blockades. Their presence on the festival stage directly links Underground to the wider social climate, where young people have turned cultural spaces like Belgrade’s Student Cultural Centre (SKC) into arenas of political and artistic expression. In such moments, art and activism cease to exist as separate spheres: a concert becomes a protest, and a poster becomes a call to action. Underground is therefore not merely a festival but a living archive of the struggles, hopes, and aesthetics of a generation. Its posters, music, and gatherings together form a counter-narrative to the dominant discourse that treats culture as expendable. The festival reveals that cultural production can still be a site of collective meaning, that rebellion can be joyful, and that falling into the underground is sometimes the only way to rise above the surface. To outsiders, Niš may not appear to be the capital of cultural innovation. Yet anyone who has witnessed a packed hall at Underground fest — where sound, image, and solidarity collide — understands that something more than a local festival is at stake. This is what culture looks like when it is reclaimed: messy, improvised, fragile, yet fiercely authentic! And in that authenticity lies its greatest strength.
The Green Extraction Illusion: Rio Tinto, Lithium, and the New Colonialism in Serbia
In recent years, the world has embraced a narrative of “green transition.” As the climate crisis accelerates, batteries and renewable technologies are widely promoted as a way out of fossil fuel dependency. Indeed, moving away from oil and gas is necessary and urgent. But the story of Rio Tinto’s planned lithium mining project in Serbia’s Jadar Valley shows that not every solution marketed as green is just, sustainable, or emancipatory. Source: https://protesti.pics/studenti The logic behind the project is straightforward: Europe wants to electrify transport, store renewable energy, and reduce emissions. Lithium, the essential component for batteries, is in high demand. Serbia, with one of the largest lithium deposits in Europe, has become a prime target for extraction. And Rio Tinto—an Anglo-Australian mining giant notorious for environmental and human rights scandals worldwide—is leading the charge. Yet, if we look more closely, this is not a break with the past. It is a continuation of the same colonial patterns that have governed the global economy for centuries: a wealthy industrial center exploiting a periphery, leaving behind toxic landscapes and broken communities. A Familiar Pattern: From Oil to Lithium While battery production is often framed as the opposite of oil—“clean,” “green,” “progressive”—the underlying dynamics are strikingly similar. During the petroleum boom of the 20th century, transnational corporations from richer states set up operations in poorer countries, promising prosperity. What they delivered was often environmental devastation, political corruption, and lasting social division. Today, lithium is marketed as a savior. But extraction projects like the Jadar mine threaten to poison rivers, destroy arable land, and displace communities, all in the name of sustainability. In reality, this is what the French authors Servigne and Stevens, in How Everything Can Collapse, describe as the “green growth illusion”—the idea that we can maintain endless consumption by simply swapping one resource for another. It is a convenient ideology that avoids the deeper reckoning with how overproduction and extractivism drive ecological collapse. Echoes of Bolivia: The Global Lithium Rush Serbia is not alone in this struggle. Bolivia’s experience shows how lithium extraction, if driven by foreign capital and export agendas, can reproduce dependency and injustice rather than build sovereignty or sustainability. In Bolivia, often called the “Saudi Arabia of lithium,” decades of neoliberal reforms and failed nationalization attempts have left the country struggling to secure fair terms for its own natural wealth. As Mašina reports, massive deposits in the Salar de Uyuni were meant to deliver prosperity to local communities. Instead, Bolivians have faced environmental damage, water depletion, and new forms of foreign dependence, despite initial promises of industrial development and ecological responsibility. This comparison matters because Serbia is being told the same story: that lithium will bring jobs, modernization, and geopolitical relevance. But if Bolivia teaches us anything, it is that “resource nationalism” without democratic participation and strong environmental protection is just another variant of extractive colonialism. Green Colonialism and Political Complicity Many students and activists in Serbia argue that Rio Tinto’s project is possible not despite Aleksandar Vučić’s autocratic rule, but because of it. Over the past year, students have protested corruption, attacks on independent institutions, and repeated violations of civil liberties. Yet the European Union has been largely silent. Why? According to many critics, it is because Brussels has a strategic interest in Serbia’s lithium deposits. For all its proclamations about democracy and rule of law, the EU is willing to look the other way when it comes to Vučić’s consolidation of power—so long as he remains a reliable supplier of raw materials. As one student protester put it: “The EU does not care about democracy if you can guarantee them cheap lithium.” This is precisely how colonial economies were justified in the past: sacrifice zones in less developed regions, a steady flow of raw materials to the industrial core, and local populations reduced to labor pools and collateral damage. The only novelty today is that the extraction is branded as “green.” What Future Are We Choosing? If climate collapse is the defining crisis of our time, it is vital that the solutions we pursue are not only technologically effective but also socially just. Extractive megaprojects imposed from above reproduce the same patterns that have already devastated ecosystems and disempowered communities. They deepen inequalities and accelerate the destruction of life-support systems in the name of “progress.” Rio Tinto’s project in Serbia is a case study in how the green transition can become a new front for exploitation, not an exit from it. To truly break with fossil fuel logics, we must reject both their material infrastructure and the ideological foundations that treat land and people as expendable. If Europe wants to build an energy transition worthy of the name, it must stop outsourcing environmental damage to the peripheries of the continent. It must support local self-determination, invest in circular economies, and abandon the dogma of endless growth that has led us to this brink. Anything less is not a solution—it is simply a new form of colonial extraction wearing a green mask.
Graffiti as a Battlefield: War, Memory, and Power on the Walls of Belgrade
We are thrilled to publish a new thought-provoking piece by Vladimir Petrović and Novak Vučo from the Innovation Center of the Institute for Contemporary History, University of Belgrade. Their article, “Belgrade Graffiti & Murals: Continuation of War by Other Means? – Traces of War in Yugoslavia and Ukraine in Belgrade Street Art: Reflections on Connections”, offers a gripping tour through Belgrade's streets, where right-wing nationalism, war nostalgia, and geopolitical tensions are fought out in paint, stencils, and slogans. From Ratko Mladić murals to the letter “Z” and graffiti wars over Kosovo and Ukraine — this text explores how political walls in Belgrade are covered in more than just paint, they’re layered with history, ideology, and unresolved conflict. The article has been positively peer-reviewed by Dr. Vjeran Pavlaković, one of the leading experts on graffiti, memory, and transitional justice in Southeast Europe. 👇 Download and read the full article in PDF: N.Vučo, V.Petrović - Belgrade Graffiti & MuralsDownload
