How the term “color revolution” is misused in Serbian pro-government media to delegitimize student protests Author: Luka Murišić, PhD student of History at the University of Belgrade Railway station incident in Novi Sad deeply influenced public discourse in Serbia. Question of responsibility very quickly emerged as priority topic in media and allegations for corruption and non-transparent construction deals resulted in public outcry for prosecution of all officials responsible for death of sixteen people. Students’ protests which are still ongoing since December 2024 showed that government and politicians are not willing to respond on public calls and to fulfill demands. The media as a unique image of one society at a specific time reveals the dichotomy in reports and attitudes towards the protests and its participants. Some media related to government officials tended to report on protests in an unprofessional manner, followed by various etiquettes of political and historical connotations. This paper will try to shed light on one aspect of the negative presentation in issue of the usage of the term “colored revolution”. This research is based on news articles containing term “color revolution” and academic articles addressing the topic of protests at the end of the second and the beginning of the third millennium. Also, I used the articles from media outlets with critical attitude towards the policy of Serbian Progressive party. Sourced from https://protesti.pics What Exactly Is a “Color Revolution”? This particular question ought to reveal what is actually a “color revolution” and what is the meaning of the term. Understanding original meaning and insight in academic papers dealing with various examples of civic protests is essential for analysis and this article in general. Political and social changes in former socialist countries produced various consequences, where one of them is political instability. Collapse of Soviet Union and socialist regimes did not mean immediate democratization of state apparatus and society in general but left enough space for rise of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. Democratization therefore was not an instant outcome of the processes at the end of the twentieth and at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Change of governments, followed by elections and non-violent protests which aim was a democratization of society are called “color revolutions”. Peculiar name does not refer to their outcome, but to the symbol or color protesters had used. As different articles show, the most referred examples of these “revolutions” are from Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004, 2014). Mentioned term also comprises events in other cases such as Slovakia (1998), Kyrgyzstan (2005) and unsuccessful examples in cases of Russia and Belarus. Key characteristic in all mentioned cases is a non-violent protests. Semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes, in which elections are marked with various scandals and breachment of laws, create setting for the adoption of “electoral model” of protests, where citizens tend to defend their victory on elections and protect the voting results. Nonetheless, this model is often seen as appropriate due to its non-violent character. However, the studies reveal that “revolutions” are not happening following the identical pattern, neither they must be successful. Various cases show that success of the protests lies in multiple factors which, even though they are similar in all cases, are not key for accomplishment. Factors such as unity of oppositional parties, massive and non-violent protests, participation of youth movements and elections may not be decisive. Scholars and protest experience emphasize the importance of country’s economic situation, its position in international relations, government reliance on coercion apparatus as equally important for outcome of the protests. Examples from Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia clearly show the importance of the mentioned factors. While in Serbian case difficult economic situation and losses in war campaigns gave impetus for protests, in case of Ukraine’s Orange revolution (2004) and Revolution of Dignity (2014) war and economic situation were not relevant factors. Still, the Georgian and Serbian case stress the importance of country's relations to its neighbors and attitude of important police and security officials towards the current government. Demonstrations against Shevardnadze and Milošević more relied on mass mobilization of citizens and united political opposition with common leader, while in Ukrainian examples the same cannot be confirmed. However, three cases have similarities regarding the participation of youth movements, financial and logistical support for protesters and civil society organizations, and the role of oppositional, independent media. Moreover, it is evident that protesters from different countries used similar methods, keeping in mind that they were empirically proven to be successful, and activists and organizations maintained their mutual international connections. Photo by Jana Krstic, editorial board of Balkan Talks How the Term “Color Revolution” Is Used in Serbian Media Various newspapers and media outlets took part in the media campaign of labelling the students as “foreign mercenaries” and their struggle as “colored revolution”, but despite that, it must be examined how media used the mentioned term and what eventually they wanted to emphasize. Moreover, it is important to see how pro-government politicians understand the term “colored revolution” and on what they are alluding to while using the term. For this purpose, I analyzed 64 news articles from two daily online newspapers with pro-government stances, Večernje Novosti and Kurir. Used articles can be found under tag “obojena revolucija” and they are posted in period between January to May 2025. In all of them, “color revolution” is mentioned in either title or text itself. The articles show that term is mentioned at least once, very often can be seen only in headlines. Government politicians, including most notable ones such as president, prime minister and ministers used this term to describe the events on the streets. Their statements are marked with a call for attention, in which they tend to label protests as something dangerous and destructive. The development of a specific attitude towards the “color revolution” during a period of time can be traced. During the selected period, the attitude in statements varied from acknowledging potential threat to expression of victory. Both statements could be seen during the same month or short time period. Moreover, statements about “color revolution” also come from foreign politicians and state officials. The given statements are different depending on the actual real-time context. Politicians insist in statements that every big gathering of citizens is an attempt of color revolution and consequently that it will not bring any change. That was the case with protest on 15th of March which was labeled as the attempt of “color revolution”. Articles from this period show some typical notions in the regime’s attitude towards the mentioned term. For government representatives, the color revolution is always sponsored by external factors, acting through non-governmental organizations such as USAID or NED. External factors finance the oppositional parties and non-governmental organizations, and sponsor professional media. Protests follow clear patterns which are practiced in countries where protests have already taken place. Methods of civil disobedience are trained with the assistance of civil society organizations, who are seen as elements of foreign influence. “Revolution”, as we can conclude from statements, cannot bring any positive change. Revolution has a negative connotation and directly implies negative consequences such as poverty, instability and loss of national sovereignty on society and state in general. Statements show that “color revolutions” lead countries into poverty and destabilization. The rhetorics of government officials often tends to picture protests as backlash to development of Serbian economy and society in general. For them, the only consequence of “revolution” is “weak Serbia on its knees”. Students and citizens therefore are being manipulated and tricked while taking part in the destruction of their country. The revolution implies the usage of violence. In particular, the relation between protests in Eastern Europe and the whole government narrative of “color revolutions” can be followed. As something completely negative, the same can be related for Orange revolution and Revolution of Dignity which happened in Ukraine. Through the lens of these articles, there is a monolithic, black-white image of these events. They are externally supported, they had only negative consequences on Ukraine, they were represented as unwanted scenario of the protests. Ukraine is seen as geopolitical playground and unstable country. Also, these events represent a pattern for protests which will be used in Serbian case. The Political Context in Serbia Protests are inseparable from the social and political context in which they took place. Context is marked with the rule of Serbian Progressive party and its impacts on Serbian society in general. The canopy disaster was a strong impetus for protests and wider expression of popular dissatisfaction with the regime. Experts and analysts very often refer to Serbia as stabilitocracy, where the country and society lay somewhere in between democracy and autocracy, and European Union and Russia. Specific political background is shaped by clientelism, suspension of ordinary politics, undermined system of separation of power, and permanent campaign mode of ruling party. The past decade since 2012 was marked with democratic backsliding which severely impacted professional journalism and media rights. Moreover, various individuals who criticized the politics of government and Serbian Progressive Party have been object of media campaign of disinformation and abuse. The rule of Serbian Progressive party was also marked with historical revisionism used for propaganda purposes. Regime officials and intellectuals tended to promote revised, black-white image of the past, especially of the twentieth century. Sourced from https://protesti.pics Media Spin and Delegitimization of Student Protests In context of protests, pro-government media developed various media spins in their reports on students’ protests. Journalists already identified more than ten different media spins used to put off responsibility from the government for railway station disaster and to legitimize their media campaign against protests. Having that in mind, it is not unusual to see that students’ protests are followed with accusations from pro-government media of ongoing “colored revolution”. News outlets and media in general became instruments of political struggle for power and repression. The mentioned term is used to discredit the students and civil protests, but also to drive other citizens away from protests and therefore to suppress any kind of dissonant voice. Ultimately, the idea of ongoing “color revolution” is nothing more than a product from pro-government media, who are prone to lead negative media campaigns against any political actor who seems oppositional. News articles referring to the “colored revolution” including statements of politicians and analysts reveal how members of the ruling party perceive civic protests in general and how the term itself reflects peculiar moral and ideological values. Labeled as threat, “revolution” is seen as negative, moreover, the statements reveal that “revolution” is an attack on personality of the president and in general an attack on the Serbian country and nation. Consequently, the politicians from regime have moral obligation to protect Serbia by suppressing the dissonant voices. The protests are nothing more than expression for need for power, while demands represent paravane. For regime which legitimacy is being questioned, the popular voice of dissent is expected to be named as “color revolution”. As it was explained earlier, this accusation is an attempt to regain support and evade responsibility for corruption. Is the Threat Real? Mass protests led by students cannot be understood as “color revolution” at all. Their length (the protests began in December 2024, and they are still ongoing), student’s call for parliamentary elections and mass gatherings in combination with small protests around Serbia very clearly stand out from all protests who can be described as “revolution”. Even the initial four demands are something different from the events which happened in Ukraine and Georgia. Also, the whole political setting in Serbia is different from the circumstances which have led to fall of Milošević in 2000. While there is a non-democratic regime, there is no united political opposition in the country and no common candidate to replace the current regime. Political parties are fragmented on a series of questions, where one of which is support and attitude for student protests. Simultaneously, the students are declining any offer for cooperation with political parties, at the same time introducing local assemblies (zborovi) as a new method of social organization. Ultimately, it is debatable whether there is any international support for protests. While Russian politicians perceive the protests in the same manner as the government, European officials, even though acknowledging the civic need for effective institutions and rule of law in Serbia, remain reluctant to openly place on either of two sides and therefore still give recognition to the current regime. Conclusion: A Manufactured Narrative To conclude, narrative on the ongoing “color revolution” is part of the regime’s media campaign to discredit the protests and preserve its status while pointing to the danger of the national interests. The mentioned term is used to create false narratives about protests and to completely discredit the students. Media reports filled with historical connotations also must provide moral and historical legitimacy for government’s actions. At the same time, students and young people are represented as manipulated and instrumentalized. Articles show that examples from recent Ukrainian history - Orange revolution (2004) and Revolution of Dignity (2014) are used as scarecrow to mobilize citizens against ongoing protests and discredit the leaders of oppositional parties and students. In that sense, colored revolution, no matter when and where it happened, is seen as danger for any country and society and brings violent change of government, infiltration of foreign elements and their intelligence activity and ultimately the collapse of society. Protests are always followed with activities of foreign intelligence services, which represent one-sided narrative on complex historical events. At the same time, students were labeled and connected with historical figures and events which have negative connotation in revised history of the twentieth century in Serbia. The diversity of politicians and public figures whose statements about ongoing revolution are used in research must provide a sense of genuity and warn public opinion on potential threats.

Compiled by Adriana Zaharijević & Jana Krstić In late 2024, a tragedy shook Serbia — the collapse of a newly renovated railway station in Novi Sad claimed 16 lives, exposing deep layers of state negligence for its citizens and soaring levels of corruption. What began as mourning soon transformed into one of the most widespread civic uprisings in Serbia’s recent history. Led by students, joined by educators, workers, and citizens across the country, the movement challenged not just a single government failure but the broader erosion of democratic institutions. This timeline offers a structured account of the unfolding events, focusing on the regime's violent retaliation against the Serbian educational system. Photo by Hristina Zdravkovic From Mourning to Mobilization Nov 22, 2024 – Silent vigils blocking the roads in honour of the Novi Sad victims. The vigils were announced to the authorities. In front of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts, those gathered were attacked by the passers-by, some of whom were identified as the officials of the ruling party, SNS. Nov 25, 2024 – The students of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts occupied the faculty building in protest, to be successively joined by four other faculties (University of Belgrade) and the Faculty of Philosophy (University of Novi Sad). Dec 25, 2024 – 84 public faculties and one private faculty are blocked (74% of all Serbian faculties). At the same time, 73 secondary schools, i.e. 14%, are occupied by their pupils. These numbers would grow. Mid-December – All public faculties (but one, Orthodox Theological Faculty) gave their public support to the four students’ demands. Dec 20, 2024 – The Ministry of Education abruptly shortened the first school semester in order to prevent the school teachers, already in legal strike, from joining the blockades. Pupils remained in schools until the end of term. Due to the Ministry’s executive order, the first semester was not graded. Student marshals at the protest, sourced from https://protesti.pics The Months of Uprising – January and February 2025 Jan 20, 2025 – The second school semester was supposed to begin. It didn’t. At the beginning of March, approximately 500 schools across Serbia were in blockade, while around 400 continued with legal strike (15,500 teachers in blockade, 9,000 in strike; 70–80% schools in some form of work stoppage). In parallel, various social sectors – medical and agricultural workers, the Bar Association and the Association of Engineers, post office workers, cab drivers, actors, and pensioners – joined the blockades or initiated strikes. Jan 21 – The Rector of the University of Belgrade addressed the parliamentary Committee for Education and Science and stated that "the University of Belgrade gives its full support to the students", citing the support of a huge majority of professors. Rebellious and Free University platforms of professors and researchers began to connect and organize. Teachers formed their informal associations – PULS, Udružena prosveta Srbije – and those platforms began to collaborate. Student marshals leading the protest, sourced from https://protesti.pics The Days Prior to the Sound Cannon (March 15) March 4 – The salary of education workers was reduced between 50 and 100 percent; in some cases, high school teachers were paid only 2,191 RSD (less than 20 EUR), in others 12,000 RSD. An informal group of IT experts invited citizens to join the "Solidarity for Education" network and donate to help educators. The network is still in operation. March 7 – A group of 30 young people, presenting themselves as ‘the students who want to study’ or ‘Students 2.0’, set up tents in front of the president’s office in Pioneers Park. In the following days leading to the major gathering on March 15, the ‘Students 2.0’ were joined by SNS members and affiliates, and then by suspicious characters, many of whom have an established criminal record. The park area was soon fully occupied, fenced, and additionally shielded by 150 tractors without licence plates. The encampment is still in place. March 9 – Commenting on the large protest scheduled for 15 March, the President said he expected the opposition to "organize great violence" at the rally in Belgrade and that "everyone who participates in it will be arrested". This marked the beginning of a long line of threats to participants and organizers – still labelled as the ‘opposition’ funded by foreign money, despite the fact that the students openly and consistently refrained from supporting opposition parties. March 13 – At a press conference two days earlier, the University of Belgrade rector emphasized that the students, who organized the gathering, want a peaceful and dignified protest, stressing that the conflicts, announced for days by government-controlled media, are not part of the students’ plans. March 15 – The largest gathering in the capital, with more than 300,000 people in the street. The gathering was interrupted by the alleged deployment of LRAD (long-range acoustic device) on peaceful protesters during 15 minutes of silence for the victims of the Novi Sad collapse. The Ministry of Internal Affairs denied the allegations despite footage of the incident, as did the President, who called for the prosecution of those ‘lying’ and ‘spreading disinformation’. Tractors in front of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, positioned ahead of the announced student protest on March 15. Sourced from https://protesti.pics Serbian Academia at the Helm of the "Coloured Revolution" Since December, the regime unsuccessfully sought to single out the ‘leaders’ of the students protests. Before March 15, the opposition was still defined as the main culprit behind the blockades. March 18 – In a TV interview, the President commented: "Faculty professors who do nothing, except participate in blockades, will get potatoes. Tomorrow, I think… They will get nothing." March 24 – The Ministry of Education of the technical government, caretaker government issued regulation 5/35, which effectively reduced the professors’ salaries to 12.5% of what they earned before. March 25 – The Ministry of Education has launched inspection supervision of faculties across Serbia, widely seen as yet another form of pressure on higher education institutions. March 28 – The rector of the University of Belgrade was turned into state enemy no. 1, ‘the face of evil’ (Minister in the technical government). March 31 – The dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš was stabbed by a passer-by at a protest. April 1 – The dean of the Faculty of Economy in Belgrade was summoned to the police. April 18 – The rector of the University of Belgrade was summoned to the police on charges of abuse of official authority (sued by the ‘Students 2.0’). The Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy welcomes students at the protest in Niš. Sourced from https://protesti.pics The Effects of Potato Regulation 5/35 University professors are no longer paid for 20 hours of teaching and 20 hours of research per week, since the ratio was changed to 35 to 5 in favour of teaching. As there are no classes, professors receive only 12.5 percent of their salary, or, according to some reports, about 20,000 dinars (170 EUR) per month. Financial Violence Against University Professors – The drastic cut in research hours has subjected university professors to severe financial hardship, endangering their basic livelihoods. Collapse of the Accreditation System – Scientific and artistic research is essential for accreditation and quality assurance of university programs. With the new decree, this capacity is undermined. Jeopardising Engagement in Projects – With only 5 hours allocated to research, professors are unable to participate in or apply for most European projects, severely limiting international academic cooperation. Weakening Career Prospects – The decree severely hinders career advancement, as promotions are based on research output now nearly impossible under these conditions. Student cyclists in France, sourced from https://protesti.pics (Unanswered) Appeals of the Serbian Academics March 4 – 80 researchers holding EU research grants in Serbia sent a joint letter to the European Commission calling on it to help tackle corruption in the country. The Commission acknowledged receiving the letter but has neither replied nor commented. March 20 – An Open Appeal for international academic support for Serbian students and professors was signed by around 4,500 academics in less than a week. March 26 – 470 deans, professors, assistants and other employees of the University of Belgrade submitted an initiative to the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of the Regulation. March 31 – The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts demanded the withdrawal of the Regulation. April 17 – The academic community appealed to the new Prime Minister, a professor of medicine, to withdraw the Regulation. And many more... Protest in Niš on March 1, sourced from https://protesti.pics Where Are We Now? Students’ demands remain unmet. Primary and then secondary schools gradually resumed classes in late April and May. The government’s ambition appears to be to quell the blockades without a clear plan for how or when the school year will end. Many teachers are threatened with dismissal – or already dismissed. The new Ministry of Education is dubbed the "Ministry of Revenge". Several faculties have entered legal strike; most remain in blockade; a few now teach asynchronously online. All faculties are exposed to non-payment of funds for material costs, fines, inspections, and reduced budgets. The illegal reduction of professors' salaries has entered its third month. There are frequent threats to cancel the funding of state universities. Strategy: divide et impera. At a rally in Niš on May 17, the president claimed young people were misled by social media and manipulative professors, to whom he said: "they will not get money until they start doing their work." A new Bill on Higher Education, announced recently, has sparked fears that it will further repress universities and significantly reduce academic autonomy. Protest in Belgrade on March 15, sourced from https://protesti.pics What Should We Do? This is a moment for concrete solidarity. The Serbian academic community now stands as the last bulwark against a rising wave of authoritarian repression. Colleagues around the world must use every platform – from faculty senates to social media – to denounce the crackdown. Academic associations should call on European and global bodies to condition funding on respect for university autonomy. In classrooms and at conferences, professors should spotlight Serbia’s struggle and keep it in the global conversation. Most importantly, we must stand with the students and professors who have placed themselves on the front lines of this fight. Their call for transparency, accountability, and independent education is not just Serbia’s cause – it is a defense of values cherished by academics everywhere. The world’s scholars cannot look away. The protection of knowledge and democracy depends on it.

Author: Vladyslava Oliinyk What do a child in Sarajevo in the 1990s and a child in Ukraine today have in common? A historian and student shares how moderating an exhibition at the Museum of War Childhood in Kyiv sparked a personal and academic journey into Balkan history, empathy, and the power of cultural memory. This blog reflects on how museums can connect past and present across borders—and how stories of childhood in wartime can bring people and nations closer together. Last summer, I had the unique opportunity to moderate a temporary exhibition at the Museum of War Childhood in Kyiv. Although the exhibition was managed by the museum’s Ukrainian branch, moderators like myself had to familiarize ourselves with the institution’s origins in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Museum of War Childhood is a relatively young institution—its permanent exhibition opened only in 2017—but its conceptual depth is striking. The idea behind the museum lies in the tension between the uniqueness and universality of growing up during wartime, as first explored in the book War Childhood by Bosnian entrepreneur and author Jasminko Halilović. Halilović transformed his personal experiences as a child during the Bosnian War (1992–1995) into a literary work and, eventually, a cultural institution. Photo by Oliinyk Vladyslava As a historian, I was familiar with the basic chronology and causes of the Bosnian War, but I had never examined the conflict on a micro level. During my undergraduate studies, my focus was on the history of visual art in Victorian Britain, and I gave little attention to Central or Eastern Europe. It wasn’t until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that I felt a personal urgency to understand the region’s post-Soviet transitions and the independence movements of neighboring countries. The complex and often painful recent history of the Balkans earned my deep respect, but at first, I struggled to see how our experiences were connected. Encountering the Museum of War Childhood changed that. I began to recognize parallels between the Russian-Ukrainian war and the Bosnian conflict—especially in how children navigate trauma, displacement, and interrupted childhoods during wartime. The museum made these connections tangible, offering a space where individual stories speak across national and temporal boundaries. Photo by Oliinyk Vladyslava In my growing curiosity about the Balkans, I chose to join a Central European University specifically because it offered a course on Balkan Studies. Ukrainian universities also offer Central and Eastern European studies, but I realized that to truly understand the region, I needed to learn from the people who live there. Who can speak more vividly about the intricacies of student protests in Serbia than those participating in them? Who can reflect more truthfully on the Bosnian war than those who lived through it? Through my studies and encounters, these questions are finding meaningful answers. My experience taught me how cultural institutions, like museums, can provide powerful tools for rethinking war, trauma, and identity. Today’s museums can connect the histories of different nations, revealing shared tragedies and common challenges—particularly for children navigating the chaos of war. This renewed focus on the experiences of minors has led me to new research interests and opened a new chapter of European history I had never expected to engage with so deeply. Museums, I’ve learned, can simultaneously build bridges and highlight difference—and in doing so, they provide a space where empathy, inquiry, and healing can coexist. Photo by Oliinyk Vladyslava Photo by Oliinyk Vladyslava

Protesters in Istanbul clash with riot police after the arrest of Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu in March 2025.Turkey is witnessing its largest wave of protests in over a decade. Demonstrations exploded across the country starting March 19, 2025, after Istanbul’s popular mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu – a leading opposition figure – was detained and arrested along with over 100 others. Crowds swiftly poured into the streets of Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir and nearly every major city, rallying against what they see as a politically motivated crackdown by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government. The protests began as a show of solidarity with İmamoğlu but have grown into a broader outcry over Turkey’s direction. We will try to answer the questions – who, what, where, when, why, and how – and paint a picture of a nation at a crossroads. A drone view shows people gathering during a rally to protest against the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu as part of a corruption investigation, in Istanbul, Turkey, March 29, 2025. (Reuters) What Sparked the Unrest in Turkey? Who is involved: The protests involve hundreds of thousands of ordinary Turks from all walks of life. Opposition political parties, led by İmamoğlu’s Republican People’s Party (CHP), quickly threw their support behind the movement. University students have been at the forefront, and people spanning the political spectrum – right-wing and left-wing – have united under national symbols like Turkish flags and images of Atatürk, Turkey’s founding father. Even some expatriate Turks have rallied in solidarity, with demonstrations reported in places like Northern Cyprus, Ireland and Western Europe. On the other side, the government and security forces have mobilized heavily to contain the unrest, indicating how seriously Erdoğan’s administration views the challenge. What and Where: The movement erupted nationwide, with massive protests in Istanbul (home to the largest crowds), the capital Ankara, the Aegean city İzmir, and dozens of other provinces. Within hours of İmamoğlu’s arrest on March 19, crowds gathered outside Istanbul’s police headquarters, and by the next day large demonstrations had spread to cities and towns across Turkey. Protesters chant slogans like “İmamoğlu, you are not alone!” and “Erdogan, dictator!”, voicing anger not only at the arrest but at years of eroding democratic norms. The timing (When): Starting March 19, 2025, protests have continued through the spring and into the summer, with major weekend rallies. For instance, a late-March weekend saw what the CHP claimed were over 2 million people rallying in Istanbul, an unprecedented turnout since the Gezi Park protests of 2013. As of July 2025, demonstrations are still ongoing in various forms, sustaining momentum for over three months. Why – causes and grievances: The immediate trigger was the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu, who is widely seen as Erdoğan’s chief political rival and a potential future presidential candidate. The arrest – on charges of corruption and even aiding terrorism – is viewed by protesters as politically motivated to sideline a democratic opponent. “The day the government decides its opponents is the day democracy dies,” warned İmamoğlu’s wife, Dilek İmamoğlu, urging citizens to raise their voices. Beyond İmamoğlu’s case, broader frustrations fuel the unrest. Turkey has been mired in an economic crisis with soaring inflation (over 40% annually by early 2025) and a sharply devalued lira, leaving many struggling with high prices and rents. Protesters decry what they call growing autocracy under Erdoğan – citing authoritarianism, corruption, and democratic backsliding as core issues. In essence, “We’re fighting not just for Ekrem, but for Turkey,” as Dilek İmamoğlu told one crowd. Many see this as a fight for the future of the republic itself, demanding justice, rule of law, and a voice in how the country is governed. How are the protests unfolding: Largely through peaceful mass rallies, marches, and civil disobedience – though tensions have occasionally flared. Protesters have organized huge demonstrations and even strikes and boycotts; for example, CHP called for boycotting businesses seen as pro-government. In the streets, a festive yet defiant atmosphere prevails: people wave national flags, sing the national anthem, and carry banners with quotes like “Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation”. University students and even pensioners march side by side, banging pots in cacerolazo protests and shining laser pointers – creative tactics to show dissent. Social media and messaging apps have been crucial for organizing, despite government efforts to restrict them. Notably, protests have cut across typical political divides – uniting secularists and conservatives, Turks and Kurds (flags of a pro-Kurdish party were seen in the crowds) – indicating widespread discontent beyond any one faction. Authorities Crack Down: Government Response and Public Reaction The Turkish authorities have responded with a mix of hardline measures and dismissive rhetoric. Erdoğan’s government moved quickly to ban public gatherings in Istanbul and later Ankara and Izmir, imposing a temporary prohibition on protests. Riot police with water cannon trucks and tear gas have been deployed in city centers. In Istanbul, police barricaded roads around the detention center holding İmamoğlu, and clashes erupted as officers used pepper spray on crowds outside institutions like Istanbul University. Over the first week of unrest, nearly 2,000 protesters were detained according to the Interior Ministry, including many students and even journalists (a visiting Swedish reporter and a BBC correspondent were briefly held). More than 300 students were reportedly arrested in nighttime raids on their homes for joining demonstrations or posting protest support online. While most have since been released pending trials, such tactics have been condemned by human rights observers as intimidation. Erdoğan has dismissed the protesters as “marginal groups” and accused the opposition of destabilizing Turkey. He even claimed the opposition was “sinking the economy” and vowed that “sabotage targeting the Turkish economy will be held accountable” – effectively blaming protesters for the country’s financial woes. This combative stance suggests the government is doubling down rather than yielding to protester demands. Thus far, key demands of the protesters include the release of Ekrem İmamoğlu, an end to what they call persecution of the opposition, and guarantees of free and fair elections in the future. Many are also boldly calling for the resignation of Erdoğan’s government (chants of “Hükümet istifa!” – “Government resign!” – echo at rallies). The CHP and allied opposition parties have shown rare unity, continuing to nominate İmamoğlu as their presidential candidate despite his imprisonment. Public reaction within Turkey is sharply divided. The protest movement enjoys broad support among urban populations, youth, and those frustrated with economic hardship and corruption. Crowds have remained energized even through Ramadan and into national holidays. On the other side, Erdoğan’s loyal base and pro-government media either minimize the protests or label them as unlawful. Major state-aligned TV channels have given scant coverage to the demonstrations, focusing instead on government events. In response, protesters have leveraged alternative channels – from independent news outlets to social media – to get their message out. (Notably, activists even staged a symbolic blockade of the state broadcaster’s offices to protest biased coverage) Internationally, Turkey’s turmoil has drawn concern: for example, U.S. and EU officials have cautiously urged respect for democratic rights. But Erdoğan, emboldened by a recent electoral win in 2023, has so far resisted any compromise, betting that his control over state institutions will outlast the street fury. Unrest in Serbia: A Parallel Wave of Protest Police detain a demonstrator during student-led road blockades in Belgrade, Serbia, July 3, 2025.Even as Turkey’s protests rage, a different but resonant movement has been unfolding in Serbia. For roughly eight months now, Serbians have held persistent anti-government protests, which intensified into 2025. The Serbian protests were sparked by tragedy: on November 1, 2024, a newly renovated train station canopy collapsed in the northern city of Novi Sad, killing 16 people. Public outrage erupted amid allegations that corruption and negligence were to blame for the disaster. By late November, students in Novi Sad began organizing silent vigils and class boycotts to honor the victims and demand accountability. This soon grew into a nationwide movement against what protesters call a culture of corruption, cronyism and authoritarian governance under President Aleksandar Vučić. Throughout late 2024 and into 2025, the Serbian protests gained momentum and spread to hundreds of towns and cities – over 400 locations by March 2025. This breadth is extraordinary for a country of Serbia’s size, reflecting deep frustration beyond the capital. The movement has been largely student-led and decentralized: university and high school students launched daily actions, including brief traffic blockades each day at the exact time of the Novi Sad collapse (11:52 a.m.), stopping traffic for 16 minutes in memory of the 16 lives lost. Over time, other segments of society joined in – teachers, professors, opposition activists, workers, even farmers. Major rallies in cities like Belgrade, Novi Sad, Niš, Kragujevac have drawn tens of thousands of people, sometimes in defiance of police roadblocks set up to prevent them from converging. An independent monitoring group estimated about 140,000 protesters gathered in Belgrade during a mid-March demonstration, making it one of the largest in recent Serbian history. The demands of Serbian protesters have evolved and broadened. Initially, they sought accountability for the Novi Sad tragedy – investigations and punishment for any officials or contractors whose corruption led to the collapse. When President Vučić’s government reshuffled but remained in power, protesters shifted focus to systemic change. They began calling for snap elections to be held well before the scheduled 2027 date, declaring Vučić’s regime “illegitimate”. To ensure any elections are truly democratic, they demand reforms: a cleanup of voter rolls, equal media access for opposition voices, and an end to alleged vote-buying. Students also insist on better funding and autonomy for universities, recognition of student bodies in decision-making, and education reforms after a decade of what they see as decline. In essence, Serbia’s protests target what they describe as authoritarian drift and state capture under Vučić – strikingly similar themes to those in Turkey’s unrest, albeit triggered by a different event. The response of Serbian authorities has grown increasingly forceful in recent weeks. For many months, weekly marches and campus sit-ins went peacefully, but by mid-2025 tensions escalated. In early July, riot police clashed with demonstrators in Belgrade and other cities, firing tear gas and pushing back crowds that had begun to blockade major intersections. During one large rally on July 1, scuffles broke out; by the next day, police detained 79 protesters in a crackdown, including students manning a blockade outside Belgrade’s law school. Officials reported dozens of injuries on both sides. President Vučić and his interior minister have taken a hard line – Vučić lashed out that protest organizers were “terrorists” trying to overthrow the state, and warned darkly of foreign instigators behind the unrest (though he offered no evidence). Pro-government media in Serbia have echoed this narrative, launching a smear campaign painting protesters as violent extremists or puppets of Western intelligence. These claims are strongly denied by protesters, who note that Serbians have a history of toppling strongmen (as they did with Slobodan Milošević in 2000) through people power. Human rights groups and the European Union have voiced concern over Belgrade’s heavy-handed tactics, with the U.N. human rights office urging Serbia to respect peaceful assembly after reports of “violence, harassment & arbitrary detention” of protesters. Parallels and Contrasts: Turkey’s Protests vs Serbia’s Protests Despite different spark points, the protest movements in Turkey and Serbia share notable similarities – and key differences – in their causes, organization, public reception, and media environments. Below is a breakdown: Causes and Triggers: Both uprisings began in response to a galvanizing incident that symbolized deeper grievances. In Turkey, the trigger was explicitly political – the jailing of an opposition leader (İmamoğlu) seen as a threat to an entrenched ruler. In Serbia, it was a deadly infrastructure failure – a collapsed station roof – viewed as a consequence of government corruption and incompetence. In both cases, what started as outrage over a specific event quickly evolved into a broader protest against the ruling regime’s misrule. Turks are decrying years of democratic backsliding, alleged politicization of the judiciary, and economic mismanagement. Serbians likewise are protesting corruption, lack of accountability, and what they see as authoritarian tendencies in Vučić’s 12-year rule. Essentially, demand for good governance and justice is at the heart of both movements, even if one was triggered by an opposition arrest and the other by a tragic accident. Organization and Leadership: The organizational dynamics differ. Turkey’s protests, while spontaneous in spirit, have the backing of established opposition parties and politicians – the CHP and other opposition parties actively mobilized supporters, and prominent figures like CHP leader Özgür Özel and Ankara’s mayor Mansur Yavaş have joined in or voiced support. A broad coalition of civil society groups, unions, and even rival political ideologies have united, using national unity symbols (e.g. portraits of Atatürk) to bridge divides. In Serbia, the protests have been notably grassroots and student-driven. There is no single charismatic leader; instead, student councils and ad-hoc committees have coordinated actions across universities. Opposition parties in Serbia did eventually lend support, but the momentum has largely come from young people and civic groups rather than top-down party rallies. Both countries’ movements have leveraged creative tactics (marches, road blockades, campus strikes), but Serbia’s are uniquely centered on academic institutions (many universities remain under student blockade as of April 2025), whereas Turkey’s are centered in city squares and municipal centers. In short, Turkey’s protests have visible leadership from opposition politicians, while Serbia’s are a more diffuse youth-led civic uprising. Public Response and Scale: Both movements have drawn massive turnouts, reflecting significant public backing. Turkey’s crowds reach into the hundreds of thousands nationally; at one Istanbul rally in late March, over 2 million people were claimed to be in attendance (opposition figures). Demonstrations have occurred in almost every province of Turkey, a scale not seen since at least 2013. Serbia’s protests, relative to its population, are similarly widespread – active in 400+ towns and cities by spring 2025. In Belgrade, independent estimates put recent crowds in the six figures, and even medium-sized cities have seen rallies of thousands. Both countries have seen multi-generational participation: young students and older citizens marching together, united by a feeling that the country is at a turning point. Notably, neither movement has been completely universal – the ruling parties still command a base that has largely stayed off the streets. But in both Turkey and Serbia, the protesting portion of the public is energized, creative, and sustained in a way that has clearly rattled those in power. The geographic spread (nationwide reach, not just capital-centric) and longevity of these protests mark a significant similarity. Media Coverage and Government Narrative: Both regimes have reacted by trying to control the narrative. In Turkey, where mainstream media is mostly pro-government, coverage of the protests has been limited or skewed – state TV largely echoed Erdoğan’s line that the protests are a “show” by marginal agitators. The government even temporarily restricted social media platforms like Twitter (X), YouTube, and Instagram to hamper protest organization and reporting. Independent Turkish journalists face intimidation; some foreign reporters were detained while covering rallies. Likewise in Serbia, state-friendly media have minimized the protests or depicted them as violent riots. President Vučić’s labeling of protesters as “terrorists” was amplified on certain TV channels, aiming to erode public sympathy. Protesters in Serbia have responded by directly challenging media bias – one dramatic act was the blockade of the national broadcaster RTS, disrupting its programming to demand fair reporting. International media, by contrast, have covered both Turkey’s and Serbia’s unrest extensively, framing them as battles for democracy. This external spotlight put pressure on authorities: for example, the UN and European officials criticized Serbia’s police crackdown and urged restraint, while Western diplomats quietly pressed Turkey to respect political pluralism. Overall, media freedom issues are central in both cases: protesters accuse their governments of propaganda and censorship, and in both countries independent journalism itself has become part of the story. In conclusion, Turkey and Serbia – though different in context, size, and political system – are experiencing converging currents of popular dissent. In both nations, citizens have been driven to the streets by a sense that their leaders have amassed too much power for too long, at the expense of accountability and everyday people’s well-being. The Turkish protests continue to demand a reversal of democratic backsliding and relief from economic pain, while Serbian protesters press for an end to corruption and a voice for the next generation in shaping the country’s future. How these movements unfold remains to be seen, but in both Istanbul and Belgrade the message ringing out is unmistakable: people have limits to their patience, and when those are crossed – whether by a political witch-hunt or a national tragedy – the public will stand up, speak out, and insist on change. Both Balkan and Anatolian streets now echo with calls for justice, proving that demands for democracy and accountability transcend borders in this turbulent moment for the region.

Author: Ivana Milićević, Research Assistant at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade On March 15, 2025, the largest protest in Serbia’s history was organised in Belgrade, seeking accountability for the collapse of the concrete canopy of the newly renovated railway station in Novi Sad, which killed 15 people. As illegalities and corruption in the reconstruction project started to reveal, this immense tragedy turned into a grim reminder that “the corruption kills”, leading to massive anti-corruption protests led by Serbian students. How did we get here? After the 15-minute silence in commemoration of the victims was broken by a physical assault on students in front of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade by people close to the ruling party, students across Serbia started blocking their faculties, with a seemingly simple demands for the rule of law and institutional response. What they ask for is transparency about the Novi Sad train station’s renovation, a dismissal of charges against activists arrested during the first anti-government protest in November, and criminal prosecution of those who attacked student protesters. Their demands have been supported by universities, teachers, lawyers, agriculture workers, artists and representatives of various industries. Around 80% of Serbian citizens supports most of the demands, while around third took part in the protests, which have been organised in more than 200 localities across Serbia. Having clearly distanced themselves from all political parties and consistently insisting on transparency and institutional accountability, it seems that the students succeeded in reaching an agreement on the fundamentals, which demonstrated a high potential for generating broader support for long-term political changes. As such, it seems that the demands deserve broad international support as well, particularly from the European Union, as they highly align with its fundamental values, insisting on democracy, rule of law and human rights protection. Where has the EU been along the way? So, why has then the EU remained so reluctant in addressing the protests, particularly as it claims to closely follow the current political situation in Serbia? While silence sometimes speaks the loudest, occasional statements from the Brussels spoke even louder in expressing its support to the government and lack of worry for the enlargement’s fundamentals. Gert Jan Koopman, the EU's Director-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) visiting Serbia in January 2025, failed to express his concerns regarding the lack of transparency and accountability for the collapse of the railway station canopy or any support to the peaceful protests which had already became historical. On the contrary, he noted Serbia’s “steady progress” towards the EU and was “eager to support Serbia in completing the necessary reforms”. It may come as no surprise if we remember that in October 2024, not long before the tragedy, in her visit to Serbia, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, praised Serbia’s progress and commitment to delivering on reforms, in particular on the fundamentals - rule of law and democracy. While von der Leyen has not hesitated to express support for “the Georgian people fighting for democracy", she has remained remarkably quiet about the events in Serbia. Indeed, the EU’s spokesperson Guillaume Mercier did express concerns about the reported attacks against protestors and called all key actors to engage in a constructive political dialogue. However, the EU failed to follow-up on the findings of its own progress reports which have for years urged Serbian authorities to step up their efforts to fight corruption, ensure the independence of the judiciary, and guarantee freedom of expression, even after it was confirmed that the European Public Prosecutor’s Office investigates the misuse of EU funds in the case of the railway station. The EU high representatives were addressed by Members of the European Parliament, Serbia’s professors and esteemed public figures from different spheres, scholars and expert groups, and EU research grantees, who all in their open letters asked for Union’s more active role and principled response to these events. The reaction of the European Commission was particularly expected looking ahead to the last protest in Belgrade, as the tensions ran high with contra-protesters supported by hooligans and war veterans gathered in front of the National Assembly and president Vučić using inflammatory rhetoric. The pro-EU citizens and organisations kept addressing it, to provoke its reaction to major protests in one of its candidate countries with a major democratic decline, but were mostly left without a proper response.   What does the European Union stand for (?) The Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos responded to the received letters of concern by an open letter as well, with an aim to “recall what the European Union stands for”. Successfully avoiding to mention students and their demands, Kos did tackle a very important issue stating that “Serbia's path towards the European Union offers solutions to many of the issues that are at the heart of discussion today“. She stated that the process, if properly implemented, strengthens the fight against corruption, ensures the independence of the judiciary and accountability of institutions. But what happens if the process is not being implemented properly, but hindered by the lack of credibility, contested political interests and disregarding of the principle “fundamentals first”? In that case, “the path” may lead to legitimising the regimes with growing authoritarian tendencies, at the cost of promised stability or commercial interests. In order for the accession process to restore its “transformative power” it would first need to restore the credibility of both conditionality policy and the perspective of membership. Currently lacking both, the EU risks to lose its relevance in the light of the changing political reality in Serbia. Its strong support to the lithium extraction project in the Jadar valley remained steady despite serious concerns on the lack of environmental standards and rule of law and continuous attacks on environmental and human rights defenders, some of whom were even targeted as “eco-terrorists”.  The EU praised the Memorandum of Understanding signed with Serbia on Strategic Partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles as a way to enhance integration process and “reaffirm Serbia’s EU path”. The former Minister of Traffic and Infrastructure Goran Vesić assessed that Serbia “essentially became an EU member” by the signing of the Memorandum. This has shown that there is a mutual understanding on both sides that the progress in the accession process is being evaluated somewhere far away from the prescribed conditions, progress reports and especially principles which prioritise fundamental reforms – democracy and the rule of law. This also shows that neither of the sides takes the integration process seriously, as they both agree to “take the most out of it” in the circumstances in which the enlargement “gained a new momentum" only nominally, and the old promises (of stability) seem to be enough. Experts and civil society have already expressed concerns about how this trend will affect the perception of the EU and citizens’ attitudes towards the enlargement. The support for the EU integration has lowered among youth in Serbia in the last five years, particularly among the youngest of the respondents, while, according to the Balkan Barometer, most of the Serbian citizens (35% of them) think that their country will never become a member of the EU. The same research shows a trend that youth of the region is becoming more uncertain or neutral about the EU accession. It is certain that this will also be the case with the youth in Serbia. The values that students stand for, although correspond to them, are not European values, but their own and they will firmly protect them regardless of the EU’s support, as they have for months now. This time, it is the EU that is on the test, to “step up and fulfil its self-proclaimed task of a democracy and rule of law promoter”. The “words of concern” and bureaucratic euphemisms may not be enough to restore not only the credibility of the accession process, but also its relevance among youth, who proved to be the guardians of its “core values”, without ever referring to it. In accordance with its own principles and enlargement methodology, the EU needs to systematically and clearly address the roots of the student’s demands, as their fulfilment may bring the reforms crucial for the integration process. But it cannot go the other way around. The EU should initiate a direct dialogue with Serbian citizens, including students, experts, workers, and civil society organisations, and provide unequivocal support to the fight for democracy and the rule of law, if it still has the ambition to act as a driver of reforms rather than a factor of status quo. After all, it seems that the EU is the one who should be reminded what it stands for.

On November 1st at exactly 11.52 a concrete canopy on Novi Sad railway station collapsed instantly murdering 14 persons, while 3 were seriously injured. The number of victims rose to 15 when a young woman died in the hospital due to her injuries. Two injured victims still remain under severe hospital supervision, almost three months after the collapse. This sunny, peaceful day was one of the darkest in recent Serbian history, especially for Novi Sad. This multicultural town is known for its peace and quiet, its people being extremely polite and kind. However, in the past three months, even this has changed.  Although government officials assured the public that all necessary measures will be taken and the responsible persons will be punished, the angry and hurt citizens did not believe the government whose corruption and lack of transparency have been an issue for several years. The citizens started spontaneously gathering on the streets at 11.52 almost every day, paying respect to the dead. At first, for 14 minutes of silence, and then 15, a minute for each life that was lost due to a corrupted reconstruction project of the railway station.  At one of these 15-minute gatherings, students of the Faculty of dramatic arts in Belgrade blocked the street in front of their Faculty in order to pay respects to the Novi Sad victims. They were physically attacked, by what at first seemed, passers-by. However, soon after the incident, the public identified the attackers - local government officials from Belgrade. The students were determined to seek justice for their hospitalized peers and set together in order to discuss the next steps. Their collective decision was the blockade of the faculty, the institution they see as their own, in order for other institutions to listen to them and start working according to the law, in their own capacities and competencies.  Soon after, in acts of solidarity and support, other faculties and universities across the country started their own blockades. From that moment on, each decision, including the decision about the blockade, was voted by the plenum (an assembly of all the members of a group or committee) organised by the students themselves. Now, four months after the tragic event in Novi Sad, more than 80 faculties (including Faculty of Theology in Belgrade and some private faculties) are in a blockade. The wave of violence spread towards the younger students, those who dared to raise voices in their highschools. But so did the wave of blockades and protests and the number of involved citizens increased. High school students started blocking the streets every day at exactly 11.52, university professors, high school teachers and principals stood behind their students and supported their requests. Soon the unions of miners, IT professionals, media and culture workers gave their support to the joint cause - requests for the institutions to prosecute the law breakers and protect the students during the peaceful protest.  Besides the direct democracy that the students practice everyday on their plenum meetings, they have shown incredible knowledge and capability to organise, communicate with the public, to stand in solidarity with other peers, but most importantly, they showed that knowledge and determination they have is beyond any textbook lesson. They have gone through the cracked and weakened educational system, acquiring the core knowledge for critical thinking, direct democratic participation and hands-on solidarity. They sacrificed their lectures, exams and grades in order to demonstrate that a common goal is above the personal results and successes. In a country without media freedom, they managed to communicate their message so clearly and efficiently, that it reached even the most distant of towns and villages in Serbia.  How did they succeed? On foot. This is not a metaphor—literally, on foot. It all started with a large gathering on February 1st in Novi Sad, marking 3 months from the tragedy. In order to pay their respects to the victims, students blocked 3 bridges together with the citizens. But what was even more moving and influential, was a two-day long march from Belgrade to Novi Sad when students walked through towns and villages carrying their message that justice must be met. Local people gathered, cooked meals for students and supplied them with anything they needed - from food and water to bandages and medical supplies. With tears in their eyes people of all ages greeted students like they were liberators.  The next large gathering was on February 15th in Kragujevac, as this is where the first Serbian constitution was signed on this day in 1835, a date Serbia still celebrates as its Statehood Day. Students set off on foot from different towns toward Kragujevac in groups, passing through smaller places to inform people about what was happening and break through the media blackout. Some groups walked as much as 150 kilometers in just three days. In Kragujevac, they announced another gathering in Niš 15 days later, where an even larger number of people attended, and once again, students and young people marched on foot. The latest research shows that around 80% of the population now supports the students' demands. From the very beginning of the blockades to these massive protests, marches, and demonstrations, the movement has consistently upheld the same four demands. The first demand is for full disclosure of all documentation related to the reconstruction of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad. The second is for all those who committed violence against students during the blockades to be arrested and prosecuted. The third is for the release of all activists who were detained for supporting the blockades. And the fourth demand is for a 20% increase in the state budget allocation for higher education. The next major gathering is scheduled for March 15th in Belgrade. According to student groups, this will be the final gathering, marking the end of all protests. On the other hand, these same student groups continue to unequivocally and persistently inform the public that they will not give up on the blockades until all four demands are met. In other words, students are confident that on March 15th in Belgrade, they will secure the fulfillment of their demands. How? Follow our portal on March 15th to find out. PUMP IT UP!