This year, on October 20th, Belgrade celebrated the 80th anniversary of its liberation from the fascist regime in World War II. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say, "Belgrade should have celebrated," as the local government of the capital of former Yugoslavia is actively promoting historical revisionism. Belgrade's Mayor Aleksandar Šapić has even discussed relocating the grave of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito from the city. His absurd proposals go so far that, ahead of this anniversary, he announced plans to repaint the city’s buses, which are in “socialist red” and “resemble a hot dog stand”, into blue, supposedly "the color of the Serbian Nemanjić dynasty". It's not just the graves and red buses that have come under fire from the city authorities, but also buildings that stand as symbols of this historical era. While factories and public enterprises were systematically privatized immediately after the fall of Yugoslavia, the buildings and bridges weren't demolished right away. They likely awaited some investors with good offers. Now, they are being systematically sold off at hefty discounts. Why "systematically"? Buildings of cultural significance from the Yugoslav era, such as the Beograđanka, the Genex Tower, and the Belgrade Fair, have been deliberately neglected for years. After being left uncared for, the passage of time has caused them to deteriorate, reducing their market value. Combine that with historical revisionism that denies their cultural importance, and these iconic structures are being handed over to investors who will tear them down in a matter of days and erect "fancy" luxury buildings, where apartments will be sold at exorbitant prices. A simple equation, really. Hotel Jugoslavija with a fence, photo by Vasilije Brojčin The latest target of the city authorities is the renowned Hotel Jugoslavija. In September 2024, the city government adopted a detailed regulation plan that anticipates the Hotel's demolition following its sale in March 2024 to Millennium Team, a company close to the ruling party. Although a demolition permit had not been issued at the time of writing, just days after the plan was approved, fences appeared around the Hotel, behind which bulldozers and machinery can be seen. However, one thing disrupted the city government's calculations—local activists. Led by an opposition party, the Green Left Front, they have gathered to resist not only the procedural violations but also the disregard for the Hotel's cultural and historical significance, as well as the potential environmental impact the construction of a new complex could have on residents of the Zemun and New Belgrade municipalities. Today, we speak with Vasilije Brojčin, activist who grew up in the neighborhood and have been actively involved in efforts to prevent the destruction of this landmark. They share their connection to the Hotel, the importance of preserving it, and the ongoing struggle to save it from demolition. Can you tell us about your connection to Hotel Jugoslavija and what that building means to you? Since I spent my whole childhood residing in this part of New Belgrade and Zemun, the Hotel reminds me of walks along the Danube quay with my parents and grandparents as a child, as it is a typical local milestone when going on a walk. "Are you going far? No, just to Jugoslavija and back" We still like to walk there; it's as relaxing as ever, but now, with the plans for demolition, that experience is in danger of being reduced to memories only. How did you first get involved in the fight to prevent the demolition of the Hotel? I began to participate in this cause as soon as the Green-Left Front (GLF) learned that the company that bought the Hotel plans to demolish it. I joined GLF back when it was Ne da(vi)mo Beograd (Do not let Belgrade d(r)own), a movement known for fighting capitalistic urbanism and gentrification, so it is already a niche of activism I have experience in. What is the historical and cultural significance of Hotel Jugoslavija for the local community and beyond? Its historical significance is undisputed, as it is a building that hosted many important people from many different backgrounds, from political figures to Hollywood actors and even astronauts from the Apollo 11 Moon landing mission. In the architectural sense, it's a prime example of socialist modernism. It fits in harmony with the architecture of neighboring housing blocks, so it never looked out of place, probably one of the reasons it was always accepted by the locals. Hotel Jugoslavija is a neighborhood landmark for the local community, including me. It symbolizes returning home after work or school, similar to the sight of Genex Tower when you're returning from a long trip. Photo: From the legacy of Stevan Kragujević (collection of the Museum of Yugoslavia) What are some of the critical arguments that activists have presented against the city's plan to demolish the Hotel? Aside from the building itself being of historical importance, we argue (and expert's opinions support) that its demolition and replacement with a complex consisting of a much bigger central building and the two 155m tall skyscrapers would have devastating consequences on its surroundings from putting additional pressure on traffic and parking infrastructure that would not be able to accommodate the influx of vehicles, to ecological destabilization of Danube river and protected ecosystem of its Great war island, home to many different species of birds. Of course, one of our major issues with this project, as leftists, is that it has precisely zero benefits to the local community and an average person. It includes no public amenities and is just another playground for the rich, one of the many popping up around Belgrade. How have the local authorities and city officials responded to the concerns raised by activists? Activists did not encounter understanding from the local or city officials; their reactions ranged from regularly denying all written complaints to being condescending to activists who attended the public debate at the Bureau of Urbanism. There have been reports of bulldozers arriving at the site despite the demolition permit not yet being issued. How did you and other activists react to this development? Yes, it's true. A fence has been built, and some construction equipment is on standby. We were outraged but not surprised as the company set to carry out the demolition and construction of the luxury complex is known to disregard laws regarding urban planning. What actions has the activist community taken so far to stop the demolition, and have any legal steps been initiated to prevent it? There were multiple campaigns to inform the locals about the plans for demolition, and a warning protest was also held with stands where attendees could sign a complaint form. Those complaints, the only legal procedure available, were labeled by city officials as unreasonable and driven solely by nostalgia, even though the experts in architecture and urbanism wrote those. What challenges have you faced during this campaign, and how do you and other activists stay motivated to continue fighting? The biggest challenge was and still is, to inform the public. Since all the biggest media companies are pro-ruling parties and won't report on any criticism of any of their projects, you have to do everything grassroots: hand out flyers, put up posters, go door to door, and talk to people in person. Previous successful local initiatives against capitalist urbanism and invasive construction projects motivate us to persist in our fight. We strive to replicate examples from New Belgrade's blocks 37 and 63, where the local community got together, defended their public spaces, and sent the investors back to where they came from. Many believe that the companies involved in the project are closely tied to Belgrade's political establishment. How does this influence the dynamics of the fight to save the Hotel? Yes, those same companies are involved in all of the construction projects of the current political establishment, from the notorious Belgrade Waterfront to Expo 2027, so there is no doubt that politicians in power have financial benefits from their operations. That doesn't affect the activists too much, except that disturbing knowledge that you are up against something potentially dangerous and much more significant than yourself, a mafia of sorts. Looking forward, what are your hopes for the future of Hotel Jugoslavija? What would be your ideal outcome for this building and the surrounding area? After the Hotel is defended, the most realistic outcome would be to become a hotel again since it's, unfortunately, private property. But if I'm talking ideally, like a dream outcome in the ideal society, it would be turned into student accommodation, and what a cool one it could be, considering its perfect location for recreational activities and good public transit connection to the rest of the city. Photo: From the legacy of Stevan Kragujević (collection of the Museum of Yugoslavia) For Vasilije and other residents of New Belgrade and Zemun, to continue to create memories within the public spaces surrounding the Hotel Jugoslavija, it is necessary that the local authorities once and for all hear their constituents and act in their best interest instead of only their own. It remains to be seen how much pressure from the activists and interested citizens will have to be directed towards the investors and local authorities in order to stop this kind of urban planning which neglect the public interest.

Author: Vladimir Stojković Florian Biber's book The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans is a handbook for understanding social conditions in the region. He points out in detail and precisely the similarities and differences in the unfolding of socio-political processes in the countries of this region. All social aspects and processes, such as media, corruption, reform, governance rights, etc., are covered. All the events that significantly influenced the emergence of authoritarianism are described in detail and chronologically framed. This book is written so that it can be understood even by people who know nothing about the situation in the Western Balkans. It gives them a complete picture of events and social oscillations in these countries. Its core consists of three chapters, which discuss the challenges of democratic consolidation, patterns of authoritarianism, and mechanisms of authoritarianism. Challenges of democratic consolidation This chapter primarily deals with the causes that led to the emergence of a semi-authoritarian regime throughout this region during the nineties. The beginning of these processes is linked to the fall of communist regimes throughout Central and Eastern Europe, first in Romania and Bulgaria and then in Yugoslavia and Albania. Interestingly, the Balkan countries lagged far behind Central European countries in deconstructing the communist regimes in their countries. This book segment also discusses the first multiparty elections in this part of Europe and the democratization process in these societies. However, multiparty politics marked the first years after the Union of Communists' monopoly, but without realized democracy. For the political parties that came to power after those elections, the priority wasn't the development of democracy and the democratization of society but the preservation of the monopoly over the management of the state apparatus. At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, there was a breakthrough and strengthening of democracy in these areas. That period didn't last long, but during 2002 and 2003, nationalist parties returned and took over power, primarily in Serbia and Bosnia. Unlike Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, which quickly established democratic regimes and moved on through European integration, the countries of the Western Balkans cackled with regimes that brought them only instability, troubles, and wars. Patterns of authoritarianism In this part of the book, Bieber describes the situation in each country of the region in detail. The author identifies all the different social factors that led to the decline of democracy and the slowing down of its processes. External influences, internal circumstances, and economic crises have all contributed to the strengthening of authoritarianism and the decline of democracy in the region's countries. In Montenegro, the dominant Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) evolved over the years and underwent different phases of ruling style. North Macedonia's direction towards authoritarianism was achieved after the conflict with Greece regarding the country's name and the failed attempt to enter the NATO alliance in 2008. After Kosovo declared independence, the ruling elite relied on external support. The external partners, in turn, ignored Kosovo's society's problems, primarily problems in the rule of law and anti-corruption. The external factor allowed this to secure consent to cooperation with Serbia. Authoritarianism returned to Serbia in 2012 with the coming to power of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and Aleksandar Vučić. Party clientelism reaches its peak. In Albania, the government of Salia Berisha is characterized as a stabilocracy. This term was first used in that context. After that, the socialist government of Edi Rama made progress in reforms, but the main characteristic of his rule was the remnants of the old system in the form of party clientelism. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the government was mainly composed of ethno-nationalist parties, which always aspired to absolute control over the state. In Croatia, the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) was passing through several phases. During the nineties, the Croatian regime went through two stages. In the first phase, which lasted until the end of the war in 1995, the ruling party encouraged a nationalist atmosphere, and after that, the regime led by Tudjman switched to a sultanist form of ruling. It's a political system in which he relied on the closest people around him. So, there is no single authoritarian model, but there are common circumstances that repeat and which, together, strengthened authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. Mechanisms of authoritarianism In the third part of this book, the author talks about the different ways authoritarian regimes led until the capture of the state. These are political crises, nationalism, weak opposition, media control, etc. This chapter also discusses the role of the external factor and its contribution to maintaining this regime, namely the so-called regimes of competitive authoritarianism. Given that democracy and European integration have been important goals for the region's countries in the last twenty years, open authoritarianism is not possible. Therefore, the rulers of these countries apply competitive authoritarianism, which implies a model of governance in which rulers use authoritarian forms of governance, mostly informal, to avoid formal rules of democracy. So, it is about the simultaneity of these two systems (democracy and authoritarianism) in the way regimes in the countries of the Western Balkans work. Conclusion Apart from individuals who usually deal with this topic and monitor socio-political processes in the Western Balkans, this book is very good for those who need to know more about this topic. Florian Biber clearly and objectively processes and explains the circumstances that led to certain socio-political events and changes. A gradual familiarization with the political history of each country, framed by a chronological framework for each of those events, provides us with an exact overview of all those events. In addition to getting to know the situation in these countries, the book can also serve as a guide it gives us direction to understand, in the best possible way, how certain political systems work. Also, as individuals, we can see the mistakes and the bad things and try to correct them in the following period so that similar negative processes are not repeated. That would be our contribution to the further development of democracy and improving the socio-political situation in the Western Balkans.

Author: MSC. Vasiljano Buba Prologue "A political leader should look back to see if the youth are following. If this is not happening, he will not be a political leader for long", said Bernard Baruch. This should serve as a wake-up call for future political leaders in Albania, where youth must become an integral part of their programs, not merely for political consumption, as is often the case, but as one of the main actors in society, serving as the driving force and reflecting the predispositions that the new generation will have in the future social structure. We will endeavor to approach the subject from a philosophical and anthropological perspective, given that the youth and their role in society are not merely a matter of predestined fate. They can shape the course of their lives not simply in a mechanical or mathematical manner, as the Stoics did[1], but as rational beings convinced that each of their steps should be the product of intellect rather than biology. Furthermore, they must be accountable for their actions or inactions in certain situations, and most importantly, they should face the consequences of their choices with dignity and pride. They should be convinced that while the outcome may not be what they desired, the only path to truth is through our mistakes. In our subconscious, when the word "youth" is mentioned, the first qualities that come to mind are dynamism, vitality, and carelessness, among other characteristics. These are not inherently negative, but we believe that these qualities are stigmatized as "bad" precisely because they are evident in a generation raised with the spirit of social caste hermetism and the suppression of Sapere Aude[2] from its inception. In reality, the youth's "battle" is not with the older generation but with themselves. The best embodiment of this idea is found in Socratic philosophy, which posits that the true struggle of a person is against selfishness and ignorance. Socrates believed that the more knowledgeable a person is, the more virtuous they become. He argued that no one is intentionally evil; rather, evil arises from ignorance[3]. This ignorance is the root of the mistaken differences perceived between generations. In reality, there should be no such divide if everyone has their defined role in society. If we examine closely the phrase "stability and change," which at first glance may seem contradictory to some, we find that the binding element between them is the word democracy. We choose democracy not because it guarantees a millennium of peace, but because it is the only dignified force where we can be fully responsible for ourselves[4]. Its fundamental importance lies in the fact that democracy allows us to remove the existing government without shedding blood, this is its most distinctive feature. In the classic antagonism between fossilized stability and the new innovations brought by the youth, countless articles and books have been written. This has often been framed as a "hostility", but this is nothing more than a cynical interpretation and a narrow-minded reading of reality. The experience of the older generation is a valuable asset that must be conserved and cultivated with the utmost respect, for the simple reason that it served as the moral and infrastructural foundation that the youth followed until they reached the maturity of their thought. Demonstrating that generational change does not mean elimination or exclusion, but rather synergy between them, ensures that a society progresses safely on the path of prosperity and maintains a healthy linear continuity. The intellectual and other synergies created by intertwining significant characteristics such as experience with dynamism undoubtedly produce admirable democratic stability. If history has taught us anything, it is that the misuse of the qualities that youth possess has led to wars and immense destruction, including in the civilized world. A retrospective examination of history reveals that before or after every war, the formation of the new generation is prioritized; this is not coincidental, but because in the reformation of society, nothing is more important than education[5]. This is due to the fact that their aforementioned qualities, when intertwined with totalitarian or non-totalitarian ideologies, cement their mentality, preparing them for the new era to come. Based on this fact, we believe that youth are capable of both destroying and building the societies to which they belong. The focus of international organizations such as the UN or the EU should not only be on supporting the youth, which has been done for years, especially in fragile and hybrid democracies like Albania, but the theoretical educational role should also be accompanied by other practical factors to ensure that the youth are immune to extreme nationalism and the ideologies of the far right or left. Aristotle's articulation is very significant; he believed that the citizen should be shaped to adapt to the form of government under which they live. Every government has a particular character that it formed at the beginning and maintains. The character of democracy creates democracy, while the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy[6]. Albania is certainly an example that illustrates this quote. The difficult years of the communist period attempted to forge a new youth without moral or religious backbone. Marx himself tried to shift from metaphysics to history by blaming, among other things, the democratic state and the capitalist system for the world's problems[7]. However, this ultimately resulted in the dramatic fall of non-democratic regimes and the mindset they sought to impose. But why do totalitarian regimes fail, while democracy, despite its issues, remains the best solution? To answer this question, we believe it is necessary to carefully analyze the analogy of the open society thesis that Popper articulates with admirable elegance in his book "The Open Society and Its Enemies". In Popper's articulation, he affirms that so-called closed societies (totalitarian systems in our case) are destined to self-destruct. He illustrates this with the biological state theory[8]. He also argued that in these societies, particularly during the dictatorship in our case, the community is everything and the individual is nothing. The opposite occurs in an open society. Individuality is not merely the opposite of community; if it were, it would be just a desperate yearning for what has been forbidden for years. Rather, it is an instrument for the liberation of knowledge and human capital, making a person not just flesh and bones, but a unique being with the ability to exploit their full potential[9]. This kind of autonomy, unlike the servitude of a closed society, has a positive impulse on the individual. By having the opportunity to choose from a diverse repertoire of options, individuals are naturally more motivated to give their best for themselves, which indirectly benefits the society they belong to[10]. The development of an ontology where a democratic, tolerant, and liberal society is preferred over an authoritarian and totalitarian one is not only a moral and ethical principle[11] but also a vital necessity for the cultural emancipation of the youth. This thesis is inextricably linked to the premise that young people need the necessary spaces and infrastructure to express their ideas and thoughts. They should not be marginalized from the rest of society, especially by political elites, under the pretext of a lack of experience or any other justification. If we aim to build an open society with values, we must first educate the new generation in the spirit of European valorization. As the author himself recounts, the book "The Open Society and Its Enemies" is a theory and defense of democracy against both new and old attacks from its adversaries[12]. We believe that the new attacks are the tendencies we touched on earlier—those movements or ideologies that seek to escalate in the opposite direction with grotesque slogans for absolute freedom or freedom without limits. Great thinkers have denied this principle because of the consequences that such freedom can bring, encapsulated in the phrase: "If I am free to do whatever I want, then I am free to take another's life". This idea has theological roots, reflected in the brilliant expression of Apostle Paul: "Everything is permissible, but not everything is beneficial". Regarding the former assaults, we contend that beyond endeavors aimed at the revival of neo-Nazi systems and the entirety of the political extreme spectrum, allusions extend to a caste of individuals who perceive the world as fraught with so many dark facets of existence within which we dwell, thereby condemning us to a purported "suffering" in a manner deemed sufficient. We posit, akin to Popper's assertion, that the dissemination of these fallacies constitutes the gravest crime of our era, for it menaces youth and endeavors to deprive them of the right to harbor hope and optimism[13], thereby stimulating, as Hegel articulated, "an anxiety that propels the creature beyond its center"[14]. Consequently, not only does a dearth of stability ensue, but democracy is also liable to converge merely in name, resembling dictatorships in essence, which may bear the label of democracy de jure but fail to embody any of its values de facto. Democracy thrives when society does likewise; this hinges not solely on the socio-economic condition but also on the approach and mindset in confronting the challenges brought forth by globalization. The dream of global unity is not novel[15]; rather, pan-European integration has been and remains a magnificent vision. The EU, which Albania aspires to integrate into, is a unique hybrid entity, neither a federal state like the United States nor an organization like the UN; it stands between them with a universal value system and a diverse array of currents. The European family should not be a utopia; integration is not merely a bureaucratic-economic process among states but much more. It encompasses the cultural, psychological, and religious spheres, among others, and this is preceded by a sound preparation in the mindset of each of us. Epilogue In conclusion, we wish to assert that the more youth are sidelined by politics and the integral societal structure, the deeper the chasm between the various realities will deepen, resulting in inevitable confrontation. Conversely, the opposite will occur, as evidenced in Western countries: if the youth become the vital cells of society, assuming their rightful role and place, this will not only guarantee stability but also strengthen democracy as a means to leave a better legacy than they found for the next generation they will bring forth. Additionally, it should not be forgotten that another benefit of this philosophy is that it would aid in consolidating a democratic tradition sorely lacking in Albania. [1] Maria K. Papathanassiou, "Stoic philosophy and modern cosmology", Hellenistic Philosphy, vol. II, Athinë, 1994, 140. [2] "Have the courage to use your own reason", the motto of the Enlightenment, which derives from Latin. [3] Θεοδόσιος Πελεγρίνης, Οι πέντε εποχές της φιλοσοφίας, (Athens: Πεδίο, 2015), 53. [4] Karl R. Popper, Mendime për Historinë dhe Politikën, (Tiranë: Plejad, 2015), 49. [5] Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Filozofia, Historia & Problemet, (Tiranë, Toena), 395. [6] Aristoteli, Politika, (Tiranë: Plejad, 2003), 204. [7] Chantal Millon-Delsol, Idetë politike në shekullin e XX-të, (Tiranë: Onufri, 2000), 12. [8] Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, (London: Routledge, 1995), 173-4. [9] Ibid, 190. [10] Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford University Press, 1986), 204. [11] Gianni Vattimo, Nihilizmi dhe Emancipimi, (Tiranë: Ipls&Dita2000), 31. [12] Popper, Mendime, 79. [13] Ibid, 117. [14] Hans-George Gadamer, Historia e Filozofisë, (Tiranë: Plejad, 2008), 288-289. [15] Anthony D. Smith, Kombet dhe Nacionalizmi në erën Globale, (Tiranë: Dudaj, 2008), 29.

Author: Vladimir Petrović I know this title sounds just like a grumpy lament, but it is not. It is an honest warning. To the best of my knowledge, all countries vanish. I know it is a difficult pill to swallow. Homo sapiens is good in many things, but dealing with finality is not our forte. Not many people think of their own death. Why bother? We all know we will die, so rubbing it in makes little sense and could actually be detrimental to whatever time we have left on this planet. We take solaces instead. Some turn to hedonism, some are convinced in afterlife. Others hope that they will leave something behind, that their families will outlive them, perhaps even cherish their memory. But whoever visited a graveyard knows that this is rarely the case. Most families disintegrate after a couple of generations, all tombstones fall into disrepair sooner or later – even the pyramids. Just remember the 1819 Ozymandias sonnet of Percy Shelley. In that respect, not much has changed. We will leave behind more or less embellished social network profiles, covered with a handful of obituaries. They will trickle and sooner or later fall into a digital dust. Percy Shelley, Ozymandias                       Stalin’s monument in Budapest If you are still with me, dear reader (and I don’t blame you if you are not), I would like to direct your attention toward a simple fact – this applies not only to individuals and families, but to entire groups of people, even collectives such as nations. Also, no matter how different we think nations are, I can assure you that late 19th century French peasant had more similarities with his Serbian contemporary then with a 21st century Frenchmen. No matter how inclined we are to think that nations are set in stone, they are actually in perpetual motion, reinviting themselves as they encounter historical and technological challenges. Those who manage, like Japanese, persist. Those who do not, fall into oblivion, like Ainu people whom they colonized. That instability applies to other human ventures too, from buildings and institutions to entire countries and even civilizations. Our elders had no doubts about that, as any reader of Polybius would know. Looking at the ruins of once might Carthage, side by side with Roman general Scipio who obliterated it so successfully that I had serious problems finding it in contemporary Tunis, he came up with his Histories.  They indicate the inevitability of rise and fall of all empires. He would probably not be surprised to hear that half a millennia later the same happened, not only to the Roman settlement which was built on the ruins of Carthage, but to Rome itself. Once might empire is reduced to a tourist destination. Est ubi gloria nunc Babylonia?, asks late medieval poet: “Where is now your glory, Babylon, where is now the terrible Nebuchadnezzar, and strong Darius and the famous Cyrus? Where is now Regulus, or where Romulus, or where Remus? The rose of yore is but a name, mere names are left to us.” This last sentence inspired Umberto Eco’s famous novel The Name of the Rose. You might choose to believe that those are some bygones, that temporary empires are more resilient, but nothing would be further from truth. Hitler’s “Thousand-year Reich” (fortunately) lasted only for twelve years, however producing an unparalleled catastrophe during its swift rise and fall. As everything speeds ups, so do the processes of spasmodic social change, of which we can read in Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and the Fall of Great Powers. Progress, which is actually our true secular religion is not assured at all as we are reminded by Ronald Wright’s short, but disturbing book on the issue. If anything, our civilization is more vulnerable than its predecessors, due to the interconnected nature of contemporary world.  Certainly, not all is lost. Even after collapse, what remains is a memory, but we all know how selective that can be, also distorted to serve the interests of the present and mostly geared to disable us to understand those simple truths. How do I know all that? Being a child of Enlightenment, disappointed but still a child, I wish I could say that I learned it from books, but the actual realization mostly came from experience. My grandmother Nada (the Hope) was born in 1912. She was a subject of the Ottoman Empire, Kingdom of Serbia, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslav kingdom, German occupied territory of Serbia, Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Parting in 1997, she outlived them all. Had she lived a couple of years more, she would also see, as I did, not only the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but also dissolution of and creation of Republic of Serbia. And all that without moving at all.   You might say, well Vlado, nothing against you and your granny, but these are just your experiences. Are you not from the Balkans? We feel for you, but what gives you the basis for those fearmongering generalizations? I wish you were right, and I admit I am prone to that but I am doing neither. Indeed, I am from the Balkans – borders there do change a lot. Actually, as of recent, according to the EU lingo, I am from Western Balkans However, I travelled extensively enough to notice an interesting regularity - whenever there is a coinage which mixes side of the world with politics, it is an unmistakable sign of troubles. Just think – Northern Cyprus, but also Northern Ireland. South Ossetia and Soth Sudan, West Bank and Western Sahara and East Timor. All regions of troubled past and uncertain future. But let’s not exoticize too much, my European friends. There also was Eastern Germany, also known as Democratic German Republic? Where is it now? Gone, annexed by Federal Republic of Germany, which retained the name but has changed completely in the process. It not only enlarged but also gave a lot of its sovereignty to European Union which over my lifetime I saw transformed from European Community, growing larger and deeper, and then territorially shrinking and structurally loosening. However, it is still in some kind of shape, especially compared to other unions I saw, such as Soviet Union, which vanished very quickly in 1991 despite the opening words of its mighty anthem which celebrated the Unbreakable Union of freeborn Republics. Its Cold War antagonist, the United States of America, emerged triumphant from this confrontation, but has soon ventured into an imperial overreach, squandering its unipolar momentum and entering its own structural crisis, announced already in 2000 by Morris Berman’s Twilight of American Culture. So, trust me, countries vanish. And this is not to spread fear, not even to sound the alarm, but rather to call for action. For they don’t vanish in the same way. Some crumble in chaos and warfare, like Yugoslavia. Some disintegrate seemingly less violently, like the USSR. But gates of hell recently opened by Putin’s Russia show that even disintegrations are not necessarily irreversible, as its deadly grasp hangs over Ukraine. Some vanish completely, like DDR, others retain the brand, like Federal Republic of Germany, but change completely, perhaps even for the better. Others, like Syria, might keep the name, but deteriorate completely from within, resembling a huge prison. Some vanish into dust, like Hitler’s Germany and imperial Japan. Others lose global supremacy and overseas possessions, wreaking havoc from India through Palestine to Cyprus, but still call themselves United Kingdom. Some dismantle their empires more discreetly, like the Netherlands, opting to focus on making profit silently. Others maintain that influence indirectly, concealing an empire under a humble name of United States of America. Yet they are all in perpetual motion, competing with each other, even progressing but actually inevitably decaying somewhere down the line. Therefore, the key question is not if an entity which we call a country, to which we feel attached to, which gives us a sense of stability and pervades our identity so much so that sometimes we are even ready to die for will disappear. It will. The question is when and how. Namely, the disappearance of the state is not necessarily a tragedy at all. After all, Nietzsche who was wrong about so many things called the state “the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly lieth it also; and this lie creepeth from its mouth: I, the state, am the people.” And indeed, we are told that the people created the state, as a kind of a social contract, to protect themselves and create conditions to live fruitful lives in relative freedom and safety. Sometimes that is actually the case. But the horror occurs when a state starts squandering the resources of generations, turns against its own citizens and starts engulfing them, destroying physical lives in tens of thousands and damaging wellbeing of millions. That is what occurred in Yugoslavia. As I have spent most of my professional life staring at that abys, I am offering some insights of my colleagues from Institute of Contemporary History Innovation Center of in modest hope that they might help averting agonies on much larger scale. Back in the days, while chaos was engulfing my country, the West was lulled in a Fukuyamian end of history pipedream. Many were relying on dubious theories such as Golden Arch Peace, basically asserting that there will never be war between countries which have MacDonalds. Conflict situations in the Balkans, Caucuses, Central Africa were discarded as historical incidents, international courts were set in motion to address them as the rest of the world seemed to move on to posthistory, cable television entertainment, rave parties and internet. It took a shock of September 11 to announce that history is back, with all its darker sides. War is back. Diseases are back. So are the famines. Actually, none of those ever left our planet, but they were concealed from the Western eye, contained in the global south. It took global economic crisis, climate change, mass migrations and war in Europe to let the message sink in. Deep down, we all know that the clock is ticking on us. However, such prospect is so harsh that too many people simply refuse to admit it. Why is that the case? Firstly, it is about comfort. Such realization would call for action, and that action would have to include a radical change of lifestyle. That would include deprivations, which could sound outlandish – imagine if somebody ordained that flights should be reduced to essential travels, for example, or half a day of mandatory unpaid public work on Saturdays. There would probably be riots. People are happier to reduce their “suffering” to recycling and occasional donations. But deep down we know that will not do. If we don’t make use of that knowledge, and fast, posterity will judge us harshly, but rightfully as a bunch of people who could get informed about everything but to no avail.

Last week, a group of European Green Youth activists protested in Brussels during the session of the European Parliament. Rebelling against fossil fuel subsidies, this group of people calmly unfurled a banner in the Parliament. However, this act did not receive a positive reaction from the authorities. On the contrary, some of the activists were arrested and held in custody until the end of the day. Among them was Andrej Zlatović, a young activist of the Green Youth of Serbia. We talked with Andrej about this stormy reaction, the general green idea, and what it means for reconciliation in the Balkans. Why do you think the police used such a repressive measure as arresting during a peaceful protest? How do you comment on that? What does it mean? If we try to look at it objectively, it's a mix of factors. One reason why we were detained is that we chose a day when a large Extinction Rebellion (XR) protest was taking place. The police was prepared to be especially cruel to climate protesters and even inspected the banner before deciding to detain us. As the Belgium and European elections are approaching the state is on alert for anything that could be considered to influence voters’ behavior. However, just a few weeks before, a banner-drop protest for climate justice took place in the European Parliament (EP). No one was detained there, so I have no clue why we were met with such manners. We didn't break any laws of the state of Belgium, nor did the police even claim we did. For someone looking for a more thorough understanding of why we were detained, it lies in the continued erosion of the right to protest all around Europe and the world. Look at the laws being passed in the UK regarding the right to protest; in the EP, a couple of days before, the right for a peaceful but disruptive protest was attacked. This is not something unique to Western Europe. However, in Serbia for example, we saw brutal protest repressions in December, although in the Balkans, we were often expected to look up at Western Europe and their freedom of speech, which I think a lot of people are now aware stands true more in theory than in reality. What is your assessment? Is there less freedom in the Western Balkans regarding civil disobedience? Have you ever had problems with the police in the countries of the Western Balkans? Here in the Western Balkans, our relationship to civil disobedience is different than in Western Europe. We traditionally feel more like pawns and targets for our systems, and people here don't have a long heritage of peaceful protest like in the West. That being said, we do feel that the police we have in the Balkans is the worst in all of Europe, barring maybe Belarus and Russia, which leads to people having more on the line when participating in civil disobedience. If it comes to this, they usually take the form of mass disruptive protests, which are street walks and blockades, which take place over a few hours, and everyone then returns to the status quo. Actions such as the ones we did, a banner drop and a speech disrupting a public event, are rare and lead to little outreach here, but they are more likely to result in criminal prosecution. Personally, as a Belgrade local, I often had issues with the police and dreaded whenever I had to call them or rely on them. Since the ability of police officers to stop and search anyone is regularly (ab)used, I have often been the target of searches lasting somewhere from 15 minutes to an hour, sometimes multiple times per week. This, while it does not constitute direct assault, is degrading and stressful. Crossing the border anytime is like a test of patience, where, despite having no criminal record, I must reiterate that I am not smuggling contraband, and I must state the reason for my travel. The result when someone is disproportionately targeted by law enforcement just because of how they style their hair, dress, or express themselves is that after a while, they start feeling guilty just for walking around the city like they are incapable of not looking suspicious or lawful. Additionally, acts of violence are something I have seen before, as also the mistreatment of detained individuals and disrespect of their rights. In one of the main streets in Belgrade, police regularly question people; these are usually citizens of Roma background or darker-skinned individuals. This showcases that even here, the police periodically resort to racial profiling, where precisely the stereotype that Roma people are thieves is permeated in society, which you can imagine takes a toll on their role in this same society. We see that despite all the difficulties and police brutality, you continue to fight for the green idea. Can you tell us something more about the idea? Does it concern only the preservation of the planet, or does it have a more comprehensive ideology? Usually, when we say green politics, people only think of ecology; however, it is equally in part inclusivity, democracy, and non-violence. To fully understand green values, we must also consider conflict aversion, reconciliation, and peacebuilding when conflict erupts. We must also achieve social justice to achieve climate justice, as our environment will be stable only in a peaceful world. These ideas are interlocked and cannot be unspooled from each other if we aim to truly achieve a better society. Specifically, our portal is interested in your movement's attitude towards reconciliation in the Western Balkans.Can reconciliation of the countries at war in the Western Balkans in the nineties be achieved through green ideas and politics? These topics are of immense importance for the Western Balkans, and we, as green activists, are the only ones who truly postulate these ideas in the region. It is no wonder that green movements are gaining traction in both Croatia and Belgrade. Having strong representation in capital cities in both countries is quintessential for us to work towards closer relationships amongst neighboring countries. Countries that fought a bloody war that left so many dead and displaced. To heal this period's wounds, we must build bridges and work on promoting reconciliation instead of stoking fears and tension as the right wing usually does. As a person of both Croatian and Serbian heritage who has faced widespread discrimination due to his background, I hold the peacebuilding aspect of green values quite dear and try to always keep it in mind when working as an activist. In the end, can you tell me what measures the Green Youth of Serbia takes or will take to fight for reconciliation in the Western Balkans? With the Green Youth of Serbia, we have solid plans to work on reconciliation. We are aware we cannot change Serbia's foreign policy. Still, we will take clear stances on questions of international politics in the region to cooperate and learn from our neighbors. When we work with people from the area in the Balkans, it carries a much different message than when let's say, a French and a Spanish person cooperate since their countries have had close ties for years because of the European Union. In that sense, it takes more effort than people outside our region know. We still have actions that have strengthened regional cooperation so far. Recently, our members went to Prizren to talk to young Kosovo Albanians about reconciliation and how civic initiatives can help build peace. Croatian and Bosnian organizations and NGOs are often at our side when doing projects, like the one we had about railways within the Western Balkans. This is an example of what I was talking about earlier: peacebuilding and ecological actions go hand in hand in green politics – we were talking about an idea for railways in Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia and how to connect these countries. These trains would not only work on reducing pollution but would further ease travel in the region, therefore empowering neighborly ties. The world is an interconnected system, and by employing one of our policies, we also find ways to support our other ideas. This is necessary to show people that the Western Balkans are equally a part of Europe, as right now, we are often discredited and seen as separated or isolated. We know that learning about yourself means learning about those that surround you, so we always have activists from the region meet and talk in a safe space. In the upcoming months, there will be a green academy in Montenegro that some of our members will support as organizers, and activists from the whole region will be there. Additionally, if it goes as planned, a camp in Serbia promoting green ideas will happen this summer, but we will have more information about that soon. If you want to stay updated about this, follow GYS and see us implement these ideas! Green Youth of Serbia web page Green Youth of Serbia Facebook Green Youth of Serbia Instagram

Presentation Language and Identity in the Balkans. Serbo-Croatian and its Disintegration is an book by Robert D. Greenberg, published in 2004 by Oxford University Press. Robert D. Greenberg is an academic specialised in Slavic Studies. This book is the result of several years' fieldworks and readings. The 190 pages (170 excluding the bibliography) of this work deal with Serbo-Croatian from its conception in the 19th century until the 4 languages that succeeded it after 1992 and their development up to 2004/2006: Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian. The author begins by looking at the history of the codification of a language common to Serbs and Croats despite their many dialects. He then looks at its existence, which has been punctuated by controversies. Finally, he looks at the codification after 1992 (when the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia began) of Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian, and the beginnings of Montenegrin. He organises his work into 7 parts (including an introduction and a conclusion), each divided into (sub-)sub-sections. Here they are summarised below with key points: I – Introduction Robert D. Greenberg begins his paper by presenting his inspiration, aim and method. The many works from different academic disciplines on the subject of Serbo-Croatian, its disintegration and the cultural and political issues of its successors often take sides. This is for this reason that he wants to publish a book that is not Serb-centric nor Croat-centric. He reminds us that in the 19th century, the romanticism, nationalism and independences achieved (or proclaimed) were to a very large extent led through language. Language proved to be a powerful symbol of identity, and this also affected the Balkans. Finally, using maps and clear explanations, the author explains the different dialects, pronunciations, similarities and combinations of Serbo-Croatian and the languages of the territories of the future South Slavic states. II – Serbo-Croatian: United or not, we fall This section provides an overview of the birth of Serbo-Croatian through 19th century. The author describes the literary and linguistic initiatives at the beginning of that century that later led to the codification of the language. The aim was to unify the peoples of the same region, despite their differences. This linguistic union was part of and also a starting point for a political union that would be realised through the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, just after the First World War. The author also presents Vuk Karadžić and Ljudevit Gaj, their grammar books and dictionaries and their efforts, challenges and choices that led to the codification of future Serbo-Croatian. It also details the three models of linguistic unity: centrally monitored unity, government-imposed unity, pluricentric unity. Serbo-Croatian went through the three of them in that order and followed the pluricentric unity model during socialist Yugoslavia (1944-1992). Finally, he quotes the linguist Bugarski, who defines Serbo-Croatian as having a weak internal identity within Yugoslavia. On the other hand, beyond the borders, this identity is strong and often claimed, because it shows the union of the different peoples and constituents of this State. This weakness can also be seen through the many controversies, tensions, the opposition and resistance that the language and its implementation have provoked, even before the socialist era. III – Serbian: Isn't my language yours too? This third section only deals with Serbian, i.e. the standard Serbian that replaced Serbo-Croatian from 1992 onwards in Serbia, and in Montenegro from 1992 to 2004. Robert D. Greenberg presents the two variants in use in these territories, and the beginnings of a voluntary distinction for a future Montenegrin. Once again, in both Serbia and Montenegro, debates between fractions of linguists, oppositions and controversies are numerous. They all are proof of the cultural, social, identity and political conflicts that contributed to the total disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia. One of the reasons for this is that Serbian speakers speak different variants and live in (at least) 3 different states: Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbian standard language is based on two dialects and two pronunciations and therefore it is more diverse as a standard language than standard Bosnian and Croatian. The author goes on to discuss the importance of institutions and academies in codifying and sanctioning the language. Writing, lexicon, orthography, pronunciation, religious and ethnic implications, among others, are examples of the responsibilities and guidelines of these Academies. IV – Montenegro: A mountain out of a molehill? In this fourth part, Robert D. Greenberg looks at Montenegrin and its slower development. Indeed, the ideas and desires to establish a standard Montenegrin language distinct from the others (Serbian and Croatian) do not date from the 1990s. Awareness of a different literature and language goes back much further in time. However, these ideas and desires were reinforced at a rather later moment, especially following the Croatian protest movements and demands, more precisely since the 1970s. At the start of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and just before independence in 2006, the demands were more and more vivid. Debates, controversies and oppositions followed. This book is published in 2004, therefore the author evokes the future of a Montenegrin language distinct from Serbian that is not official yet. The birth of a language concretised after the referendum on independence scheduled for 2006. I must add that in 2007, the proclaimed independence and the Constitution marked the beginning of the existence of a Montenegrin language with its own characteristics (pronunciation, lexicon, alphabetical characters). Here again, language is very closely linked to identity. Here too the author discusses the many difficulties involved in establishing and codifying this successor language of Serbo-Croat and distinct of Serbian. Which dialect(s) should be chosen? What should be done with a (large) part of the population claiming to be Serbian and speaking Serbian? The author concludes this section by asserting that the existence of Montenegrin as a distinct language is the final step in the dissolution of Serbo-Croatian. V – Croatian: We are separate but equal twins In this section focusing on the Croatian language, Robert D. Greenberg looks back to the 19th century and then at the specific characteristics of the Croatian language, which does everything it can to differentiate itself from Serbian. This desire to be different (because it is impossible to fundamentally opposed them) does not date from the 1990s. Croats have always claimed their own history, identity, language and dialects. The author looks back at these claims, these differences, these debates and these struggles for the recognition and establishment of a language distinct from Serbian, since the mid-nineteenth century, despite the standardisation of Serbo-Croatian. This section therefore looks back at the genesis of this unified language bearing a unifying objective but from the Croatian point of view. It also shows the codification of Croatian from 1992 onwards. This is an interesting aspect because we can see the often expressed desire to clearly distinguish Croatian from Serbian and the Serbs, accused of being imperialist. This rejection is not the first in their relations since in the previous century efforts were made to counter the magyarisation and germanisation of Croatian society and language. To this end, after socialist Yugoslavia, the Croatian language was purified of “serbisms” and “internationalisms”, partly by removing Serbian terms and creating new words based on "uniquely" Croatian characteristics, or using again forgotten words in modern Croatian. Everyday attitudes are also one of the manifestations of this rejection, since speakers of Serbian or users of words considered to be “Serbian” are seen in a bad way. This mainly concerns the lexicon since the grammars are almost identical. Despite this, debates, controversies and hesitations mark this process as much as other successors of Serbo-Croatian. VI – Bosnian: A camel with three humps? This last part concerns Bosnian and “Bosniac”. These two terms misused or serving identity goals show all the complexity of the linguistic question in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Bosnia-Herzegovina live Serbs, most of whom live in the Serbian entity Republika Srpska, and Croats, most of whom live in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The country's third constituent group and also the majority are the Bosniacs. This term refers to Muslim Bosnians, as being distinct from Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats. In theory, all of them are Bosnians since they all are citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina (and not all of them have a faith or practice it). In reality, since the war, the three have become more and more separated. While the term “Bosniac” refers specifically to Muslim Bosnians (sometimes more generally  to Muslim Slav), the term “Bosnian” can refer to the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina no matter their religion, and to the language of the country.  Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have languages and kin-states some tend to identify with: Serbia and Croatia. On the other hand, Bosniacs are attached to the term “bosanski”, “Bosnian”, for the language spoken by them and in the country in general because they feel attached to the region and this more global term. Bosnian Serbs can say they speak Serbian or Bosnian, and Bosnian Croats can say they speak Croatian or Bosnian. It usually depends on the identity, cultural, political implications the name of the language(s) bear. Some nationalists such as Serbs accuse Bosniacs of using the term “Bosnian” to deny the existence of Croats et Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But those nationalists also call the language “Bosniac” while they deny at the same time a language distinct from Serbian for Bosniacs. At the end of the day, the language is Bosnian and each one uses the name they want to use. Nonetheless, with time and the work of the Bosnian language’s codifiers since the 1990’s, Bosnian language tends to use more and more “Bosniac” elements. Understand: elements used especially by Bosniac and more linked to Muslim culture, as distinct form Serbian and Croatian. It means for example words borrowed from Ottoman Turkish and some pronunciation such as the use of the letter and sound “h”. Here once again we see that language is a strong marker of identity. VII – Conclusions This concluding section is much appreciated, as it sums up the most important points made throughout the book. The 19th century saw the codification of a unified language bearing a unifying purpose: Serbo-Croatian, or Croatian-Serbian, the language of the South Slavs who were united in 3 several states from 1918 to 1991 (and 2003 for Montenegro). As time went on each constituent republic and then state claimed its own uniqueness and distinction from its neighbours. This led in part to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Serbo-Croatian. This language has 4 standard languages successors: Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin. Since language is a symbol and marker of identity it is easy to understand why it is at the heart of cultural and political demands. It is also understandable that it has provoked many long-lasting debates, controversies and oppositions. The name in itself of these languages is a delicate issue. Every people and every state wants (or would like) its own language, different from those of its neighbours. And the process in 2004 is not yet complete since Montenegrin is not yet official and Bosnian is still evolving. Concluding remarks and recommendations If you are interested in Serbo-Croatian or its successor languages, then Language and Identity in the Balkans. Serbo-Croatian and its Disintegration is for you. In just a few pages given the density of the subject, Robert D. Greenberg succeeded in summarising and presenting clearly the evolution, the issues and the complexity of linguistic and political questions in former Yugoslavia. The book is divided into sections of 2 to 5 pages making it very accessible whether you want to find out more about it, expand your knowledge or deepen it. Content is organised and this helps us to see things even more clearly and to grasp and assimilate the information more easily. What's more, the maps, quotes, language extracts, tables and chronological timelines make it even easier to understand. Finally, the many names cited (of linguists, for example) help to broaden horizons by providing references to check. This book provides an insight into the linguistic, social, cultural and political aspects of Serbo-Croatian, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin. If you are interested in “naški”, “our language”, language and identity: read it.