Author: MSC. Vasiljano Buba Prologue "A political leader should look back to see if the youth are following. If this is not happening, he will not be a political leader for long", said Bernard Baruch. This should serve as a wake-up call for future political leaders in Albania, where youth must become an integral part of their programs, not merely for political consumption, as is often the case, but as one of the main actors in society, serving as the driving force and reflecting the predispositions that the new generation will have in the future social structure. We will endeavor to approach the subject from a philosophical and anthropological perspective, given that the youth and their role in society are not merely a matter of predestined fate. They can shape the course of their lives not simply in a mechanical or mathematical manner, as the Stoics did[1], but as rational beings convinced that each of their steps should be the product of intellect rather than biology. Furthermore, they must be accountable for their actions or inactions in certain situations, and most importantly, they should face the consequences of their choices with dignity and pride. They should be convinced that while the outcome may not be what they desired, the only path to truth is through our mistakes. In our subconscious, when the word "youth" is mentioned, the first qualities that come to mind are dynamism, vitality, and carelessness, among other characteristics. These are not inherently negative, but we believe that these qualities are stigmatized as "bad" precisely because they are evident in a generation raised with the spirit of social caste hermetism and the suppression of Sapere Aude[2] from its inception. In reality, the youth's "battle" is not with the older generation but with themselves. The best embodiment of this idea is found in Socratic philosophy, which posits that the true struggle of a person is against selfishness and ignorance. Socrates believed that the more knowledgeable a person is, the more virtuous they become. He argued that no one is intentionally evil; rather, evil arises from ignorance[3]. This ignorance is the root of the mistaken differences perceived between generations. In reality, there should be no such divide if everyone has their defined role in society. If we examine closely the phrase "stability and change," which at first glance may seem contradictory to some, we find that the binding element between them is the word democracy. We choose democracy not because it guarantees a millennium of peace, but because it is the only dignified force where we can be fully responsible for ourselves[4]. Its fundamental importance lies in the fact that democracy allows us to remove the existing government without shedding blood, this is its most distinctive feature. In the classic antagonism between fossilized stability and the new innovations brought by the youth, countless articles and books have been written. This has often been framed as a "hostility", but this is nothing more than a cynical interpretation and a narrow-minded reading of reality. The experience of the older generation is a valuable asset that must be conserved and cultivated with the utmost respect, for the simple reason that it served as the moral and infrastructural foundation that the youth followed until they reached the maturity of their thought. Demonstrating that generational change does not mean elimination or exclusion, but rather synergy between them, ensures that a society progresses safely on the path of prosperity and maintains a healthy linear continuity. The intellectual and other synergies created by intertwining significant characteristics such as experience with dynamism undoubtedly produce admirable democratic stability. If history has taught us anything, it is that the misuse of the qualities that youth possess has led to wars and immense destruction, including in the civilized world. A retrospective examination of history reveals that before or after every war, the formation of the new generation is prioritized; this is not coincidental, but because in the reformation of society, nothing is more important than education[5]. This is due to the fact that their aforementioned qualities, when intertwined with totalitarian or non-totalitarian ideologies, cement their mentality, preparing them for the new era to come. Based on this fact, we believe that youth are capable of both destroying and building the societies to which they belong. The focus of international organizations such as the UN or the EU should not only be on supporting the youth, which has been done for years, especially in fragile and hybrid democracies like Albania, but the theoretical educational role should also be accompanied by other practical factors to ensure that the youth are immune to extreme nationalism and the ideologies of the far right or left. Aristotle's articulation is very significant; he believed that the citizen should be shaped to adapt to the form of government under which they live. Every government has a particular character that it formed at the beginning and maintains. The character of democracy creates democracy, while the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy[6]. Albania is certainly an example that illustrates this quote. The difficult years of the communist period attempted to forge a new youth without moral or religious backbone. Marx himself tried to shift from metaphysics to history by blaming, among other things, the democratic state and the capitalist system for the world's problems[7]. However, this ultimately resulted in the dramatic fall of non-democratic regimes and the mindset they sought to impose. But why do totalitarian regimes fail, while democracy, despite its issues, remains the best solution? To answer this question, we believe it is necessary to carefully analyze the analogy of the open society thesis that Popper articulates with admirable elegance in his book "The Open Society and Its Enemies". In Popper's articulation, he affirms that so-called closed societies (totalitarian systems in our case) are destined to self-destruct. He illustrates this with the biological state theory[8]. He also argued that in these societies, particularly during the dictatorship in our case, the community is everything and the individual is nothing. The opposite occurs in an open society. Individuality is not merely the opposite of community; if it were, it would be just a desperate yearning for what has been forbidden for years. Rather, it is an instrument for the liberation of knowledge and human capital, making a person not just flesh and bones, but a unique being with the ability to exploit their full potential[9]. This kind of autonomy, unlike the servitude of a closed society, has a positive impulse on the individual. By having the opportunity to choose from a diverse repertoire of options, individuals are naturally more motivated to give their best for themselves, which indirectly benefits the society they belong to[10]. The development of an ontology where a democratic, tolerant, and liberal society is preferred over an authoritarian and totalitarian one is not only a moral and ethical principle[11] but also a vital necessity for the cultural emancipation of the youth. This thesis is inextricably linked to the premise that young people need the necessary spaces and infrastructure to express their ideas and thoughts. They should not be marginalized from the rest of society, especially by political elites, under the pretext of a lack of experience or any other justification. If we aim to build an open society with values, we must first educate the new generation in the spirit of European valorization. As the author himself recounts, the book "The Open Society and Its Enemies" is a theory and defense of democracy against both new and old attacks from its adversaries[12]. We believe that the new attacks are the tendencies we touched on earlier—those movements or ideologies that seek to escalate in the opposite direction with grotesque slogans for absolute freedom or freedom without limits. Great thinkers have denied this principle because of the consequences that such freedom can bring, encapsulated in the phrase: "If I am free to do whatever I want, then I am free to take another's life". This idea has theological roots, reflected in the brilliant expression of Apostle Paul: "Everything is permissible, but not everything is beneficial". Regarding the former assaults, we contend that beyond endeavors aimed at the revival of neo-Nazi systems and the entirety of the political extreme spectrum, allusions extend to a caste of individuals who perceive the world as fraught with so many dark facets of existence within which we dwell, thereby condemning us to a purported "suffering" in a manner deemed sufficient. We posit, akin to Popper's assertion, that the dissemination of these fallacies constitutes the gravest crime of our era, for it menaces youth and endeavors to deprive them of the right to harbor hope and optimism[13], thereby stimulating, as Hegel articulated, "an anxiety that propels the creature beyond its center"[14]. Consequently, not only does a dearth of stability ensue, but democracy is also liable to converge merely in name, resembling dictatorships in essence, which may bear the label of democracy de jure but fail to embody any of its values de facto. Democracy thrives when society does likewise; this hinges not solely on the socio-economic condition but also on the approach and mindset in confronting the challenges brought forth by globalization. The dream of global unity is not novel[15]; rather, pan-European integration has been and remains a magnificent vision. The EU, which Albania aspires to integrate into, is a unique hybrid entity, neither a federal state like the United States nor an organization like the UN; it stands between them with a universal value system and a diverse array of currents. The European family should not be a utopia; integration is not merely a bureaucratic-economic process among states but much more. It encompasses the cultural, psychological, and religious spheres, among others, and this is preceded by a sound preparation in the mindset of each of us. Epilogue In conclusion, we wish to assert that the more youth are sidelined by politics and the integral societal structure, the deeper the chasm between the various realities will deepen, resulting in inevitable confrontation. Conversely, the opposite will occur, as evidenced in Western countries: if the youth become the vital cells of society, assuming their rightful role and place, this will not only guarantee stability but also strengthen democracy as a means to leave a better legacy than they found for the next generation they will bring forth. Additionally, it should not be forgotten that another benefit of this philosophy is that it would aid in consolidating a democratic tradition sorely lacking in Albania. [1] Maria K. Papathanassiou, "Stoic philosophy and modern cosmology", Hellenistic Philosphy, vol. II, Athinë, 1994, 140. [2] "Have the courage to use your own reason", the motto of the Enlightenment, which derives from Latin. [3] Θεοδόσιος Πελεγρίνης, Οι πέντε εποχές της φιλοσοφίας, (Athens: Πεδίο, 2015), 53. [4] Karl R. Popper, Mendime për Historinë dhe Politikën, (Tiranë: Plejad, 2015), 49. [5] Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Filozofia, Historia & Problemet, (Tiranë, Toena), 395. [6] Aristoteli, Politika, (Tiranë: Plejad, 2003), 204. [7] Chantal Millon-Delsol, Idetë politike në shekullin e XX-të, (Tiranë: Onufri, 2000), 12. [8] Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, (London: Routledge, 1995), 173-4. [9] Ibid, 190. [10] Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford University Press, 1986), 204. [11] Gianni Vattimo, Nihilizmi dhe Emancipimi, (Tiranë: Ipls&Dita2000), 31. [12] Popper, Mendime, 79. [13] Ibid, 117. [14] Hans-George Gadamer, Historia e Filozofisë, (Tiranë: Plejad, 2008), 288-289. [15] Anthony D. Smith, Kombet dhe Nacionalizmi në erën Globale, (Tiranë: Dudaj, 2008), 29.

Author: Vladimir Petrović I know this title sounds just like a grumpy lament, but it is not. It is an honest warning. To the best of my knowledge, all countries vanish. I know it is a difficult pill to swallow. Homo sapiens is good in many things, but dealing with finality is not our forte. Not many people think of their own death. Why bother? We all know we will die, so rubbing it in makes little sense and could actually be detrimental to whatever time we have left on this planet. We take solaces instead. Some turn to hedonism, some are convinced in afterlife. Others hope that they will leave something behind, that their families will outlive them, perhaps even cherish their memory. But whoever visited a graveyard knows that this is rarely the case. Most families disintegrate after a couple of generations, all tombstones fall into disrepair sooner or later – even the pyramids. Just remember the 1819 Ozymandias sonnet of Percy Shelley. In that respect, not much has changed. We will leave behind more or less embellished social network profiles, covered with a handful of obituaries. They will trickle and sooner or later fall into a digital dust. Percy Shelley, Ozymandias                       Stalin’s monument in Budapest If you are still with me, dear reader (and I don’t blame you if you are not), I would like to direct your attention toward a simple fact – this applies not only to individuals and families, but to entire groups of people, even collectives such as nations. Also, no matter how different we think nations are, I can assure you that late 19th century French peasant had more similarities with his Serbian contemporary then with a 21st century Frenchmen. No matter how inclined we are to think that nations are set in stone, they are actually in perpetual motion, reinviting themselves as they encounter historical and technological challenges. Those who manage, like Japanese, persist. Those who do not, fall into oblivion, like Ainu people whom they colonized. That instability applies to other human ventures too, from buildings and institutions to entire countries and even civilizations. Our elders had no doubts about that, as any reader of Polybius would know. Looking at the ruins of once might Carthage, side by side with Roman general Scipio who obliterated it so successfully that I had serious problems finding it in contemporary Tunis, he came up with his Histories.  They indicate the inevitability of rise and fall of all empires. He would probably not be surprised to hear that half a millennia later the same happened, not only to the Roman settlement which was built on the ruins of Carthage, but to Rome itself. Once might empire is reduced to a tourist destination. Est ubi gloria nunc Babylonia?, asks late medieval poet: “Where is now your glory, Babylon, where is now the terrible Nebuchadnezzar, and strong Darius and the famous Cyrus? Where is now Regulus, or where Romulus, or where Remus? The rose of yore is but a name, mere names are left to us.” This last sentence inspired Umberto Eco’s famous novel The Name of the Rose. You might choose to believe that those are some bygones, that temporary empires are more resilient, but nothing would be further from truth. Hitler’s “Thousand-year Reich” (fortunately) lasted only for twelve years, however producing an unparalleled catastrophe during its swift rise and fall. As everything speeds ups, so do the processes of spasmodic social change, of which we can read in Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and the Fall of Great Powers. Progress, which is actually our true secular religion is not assured at all as we are reminded by Ronald Wright’s short, but disturbing book on the issue. If anything, our civilization is more vulnerable than its predecessors, due to the interconnected nature of contemporary world.  Certainly, not all is lost. Even after collapse, what remains is a memory, but we all know how selective that can be, also distorted to serve the interests of the present and mostly geared to disable us to understand those simple truths. How do I know all that? Being a child of Enlightenment, disappointed but still a child, I wish I could say that I learned it from books, but the actual realization mostly came from experience. My grandmother Nada (the Hope) was born in 1912. She was a subject of the Ottoman Empire, Kingdom of Serbia, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslav kingdom, German occupied territory of Serbia, Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Parting in 1997, she outlived them all. Had she lived a couple of years more, she would also see, as I did, not only the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but also dissolution of and creation of Republic of Serbia. And all that without moving at all.   You might say, well Vlado, nothing against you and your granny, but these are just your experiences. Are you not from the Balkans? We feel for you, but what gives you the basis for those fearmongering generalizations? I wish you were right, and I admit I am prone to that but I am doing neither. Indeed, I am from the Balkans – borders there do change a lot. Actually, as of recent, according to the EU lingo, I am from Western Balkans However, I travelled extensively enough to notice an interesting regularity - whenever there is a coinage which mixes side of the world with politics, it is an unmistakable sign of troubles. Just think – Northern Cyprus, but also Northern Ireland. South Ossetia and Soth Sudan, West Bank and Western Sahara and East Timor. All regions of troubled past and uncertain future. But let’s not exoticize too much, my European friends. There also was Eastern Germany, also known as Democratic German Republic? Where is it now? Gone, annexed by Federal Republic of Germany, which retained the name but has changed completely in the process. It not only enlarged but also gave a lot of its sovereignty to European Union which over my lifetime I saw transformed from European Community, growing larger and deeper, and then territorially shrinking and structurally loosening. However, it is still in some kind of shape, especially compared to other unions I saw, such as Soviet Union, which vanished very quickly in 1991 despite the opening words of its mighty anthem which celebrated the Unbreakable Union of freeborn Republics. Its Cold War antagonist, the United States of America, emerged triumphant from this confrontation, but has soon ventured into an imperial overreach, squandering its unipolar momentum and entering its own structural crisis, announced already in 2000 by Morris Berman’s Twilight of American Culture. So, trust me, countries vanish. And this is not to spread fear, not even to sound the alarm, but rather to call for action. For they don’t vanish in the same way. Some crumble in chaos and warfare, like Yugoslavia. Some disintegrate seemingly less violently, like the USSR. But gates of hell recently opened by Putin’s Russia show that even disintegrations are not necessarily irreversible, as its deadly grasp hangs over Ukraine. Some vanish completely, like DDR, others retain the brand, like Federal Republic of Germany, but change completely, perhaps even for the better. Others, like Syria, might keep the name, but deteriorate completely from within, resembling a huge prison. Some vanish into dust, like Hitler’s Germany and imperial Japan. Others lose global supremacy and overseas possessions, wreaking havoc from India through Palestine to Cyprus, but still call themselves United Kingdom. Some dismantle their empires more discreetly, like the Netherlands, opting to focus on making profit silently. Others maintain that influence indirectly, concealing an empire under a humble name of United States of America. Yet they are all in perpetual motion, competing with each other, even progressing but actually inevitably decaying somewhere down the line. Therefore, the key question is not if an entity which we call a country, to which we feel attached to, which gives us a sense of stability and pervades our identity so much so that sometimes we are even ready to die for will disappear. It will. The question is when and how. Namely, the disappearance of the state is not necessarily a tragedy at all. After all, Nietzsche who was wrong about so many things called the state “the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly lieth it also; and this lie creepeth from its mouth: I, the state, am the people.” And indeed, we are told that the people created the state, as a kind of a social contract, to protect themselves and create conditions to live fruitful lives in relative freedom and safety. Sometimes that is actually the case. But the horror occurs when a state starts squandering the resources of generations, turns against its own citizens and starts engulfing them, destroying physical lives in tens of thousands and damaging wellbeing of millions. That is what occurred in Yugoslavia. As I have spent most of my professional life staring at that abys, I am offering some insights of my colleagues from Institute of Contemporary History Innovation Center of in modest hope that they might help averting agonies on much larger scale. Back in the days, while chaos was engulfing my country, the West was lulled in a Fukuyamian end of history pipedream. Many were relying on dubious theories such as Golden Arch Peace, basically asserting that there will never be war between countries which have MacDonalds. Conflict situations in the Balkans, Caucuses, Central Africa were discarded as historical incidents, international courts were set in motion to address them as the rest of the world seemed to move on to posthistory, cable television entertainment, rave parties and internet. It took a shock of September 11 to announce that history is back, with all its darker sides. War is back. Diseases are back. So are the famines. Actually, none of those ever left our planet, but they were concealed from the Western eye, contained in the global south. It took global economic crisis, climate change, mass migrations and war in Europe to let the message sink in. Deep down, we all know that the clock is ticking on us. However, such prospect is so harsh that too many people simply refuse to admit it. Why is that the case? Firstly, it is about comfort. Such realization would call for action, and that action would have to include a radical change of lifestyle. That would include deprivations, which could sound outlandish – imagine if somebody ordained that flights should be reduced to essential travels, for example, or half a day of mandatory unpaid public work on Saturdays. There would probably be riots. People are happier to reduce their “suffering” to recycling and occasional donations. But deep down we know that will not do. If we don’t make use of that knowledge, and fast, posterity will judge us harshly, but rightfully as a bunch of people who could get informed about everything but to no avail.

From allies to enemies, the two states eventually reconciled. Context My aim here is to summarize the history and chronology of general Bulgarian-Serbian relations from the beginning of the 19th century. It is then a chronological overview. Why this period? It’s a very interesting period because in the span of 200 years, new states emerged with a lot of new expectations and ambitions. It is marked by cooperation, rivalry, betrayal, alliances, enmities, and reconciliation. This period is easier to study  and grasp those centuries since they are closer to us and more documented. Disclaimer: this article doesn’t claim to rival the works already done on this subject that I used and will be referencing. Introduction Bulgarian-Serbian relations do not date back to 1800, but almost 1000 years before that. They have always been turbulent, since the states have been neighbours and have had territorial, political and cultural claims that have opposed them. Since 1800, Bulgaria and Serbia, under their different names and political statuses (and there have been many!), have gone from being sisters united in the fight against the Ottoman Empire to enemies. Since the communist period, they added some water to their wine and now maintain cordial relations based on understanding and cooperation. The resistance and struggle of Bulgaria and Serbia against the Ottoman Empire: 19th century The Ottoman Empire was present in the territories of present-day Bulgaria from 1396 to 1878, i.e. for 500 years. For Serbia, between almost 500 years in the south and 150 years in the north, in Vojvodina. It was from the eighteenth century onwards and especially in the nineteenth century that Bulgarians and Serbs forged a national, cultural, linguistic and ethnic consciousness. The two peoples are Slav and Orthodox neighbours and speak two languages of the same family. And they were both under Ottoman rule (the "Ottoman yoke" as it is often referred in these territories). The Serbs rebelled against Ottoman rule on several occasions in the early 19th century. Bulgarians helped in the Serbian uprisings of 1804 and 1815. In the following decades, the Serbs then came to help the Bulgarians. They welcomed the Bulgarian rebels, offering them asylum, training and military support. Some of them, Bulgarian and Serbian, even had the idea of creating a common Balkan state, bringing together at least Serbia and Bulgaria. Liberation of the Balkans: 1877-1879 The Balkans were partially liberated and freed from Ottoman rule in 1877-1878. Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Romanians, Macedonians, Greeks and Russians all took part in the liberation of the region. As everyone had their own territorial claims, it was impossible to satisfy everyone. In 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano pleased many of them, especially Bulgaria, but not the Western powers. They signed the Treaty of Berlin a few months later. It canceled the formation of new autonomous Balkan states, such as Bulgaria, and cut back on those that had been newly formed, such as Serbia. It frustrated many and nourished feelings of revenge. The Principality of Serbia and the new Principality of Bulgaria gained their independence. The province of Eastern Rumelia (in the south of present-day Bulgaria) gained autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. Few were satisfied. Some had territorial ambitions, like Bulgaria and Serbia over the region of Macedonia. And territorial claims were and always would be a cause of tension and conflict between Bulgaria and Serbia. The end of the Bulgarian-Serbian entente in 1878 In the aftermath of the Treaty of Berlin, relations between Serbia and Bulgaria deteriorated as a result of a number of disputes. First of all, there was the question of Macedonia (today's North Macedonia): to whom did it "belong"? To the Serbs? Not to mention the Greeks, who were also eyeing this territory. Then, in 1882, the Principality of Serbia became the Kingdom of Serbia. In 1885, the Principality of Bulgaria and the province of Eastern Rumelia united to form the Principality of Bulgaria. In response to the reunification of the two Bulgarian entities, the Kingdom of Serbia declared war on the new Bulgarian Principality. This was the Serbo-Bulgarian War, which lasted from November 1885 to March 1886 and was won by the Bulgarians. It was seen on both sides of the border as "a stab in the back" and marked the end of almost a century of fraternal relations. Balkan Wars, 1912-1913: Bulgaria and Serbia allies, then enemies As often the case, military and political alliances changed according to the aspirations and interests of each side. And the question of Macedonia was always at the centre of the Balkan Wars. The territory of present-day North Macedonia was still part of the Ottoman Empire in 1912. Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks wanted a piece of it (or all of it). They all add arguments to justify their ambitions and future actions: Greece the argument of ancient history; Bulgaria the arguments of language, ethnicity and history; Serbia the argument of history. Following the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908, the Balkan neighbours felt that it would be a good idea to join forces against the big neighbouring empires. And also that it was time to put an end to the Ottoman presence in the Balkans, after more than 500 years. To do so, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece united against the Ottoman Empire. It was also an opportunity for Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece to take parts of Macedonia, in addition to other territorial conquests. The war ended in 1913 with the Treaty of London which satisfied no-one, especially in regards of the borders. Tensions centred on Macedonia, of course. Everyone waited, and eventually it was Bulgaria that attacked Serbia and started the Second Balkan War. Bulgaria accused Serbia of not respecting the border divisions agreed between the two states before the war. Serbia occupied more than it had been promised. Yesterday's friends became today's enemies for Bulgaria. Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, the Ottoman Empire and a newcomer, Romania, went to war against Bulgaria. Bulgaria lost the conflict and some of the territories it had acquired a few months earlier. The 1913 Treaty of Bucharest divided Macedonia between Serbia and Greece. It also marked the end of the Russo-Bulgarian alliance and made Serbia being the last Russia’s ally in the Balkans and during First World War. First World War Bulgaria's defeat, frustrations and desire for revenge partly led it to side with the Entente in 1915, after the Second Balkan War and the end of the alliance with Russia. Bulgaria claimed territories from Serbia, Greece and Romania. Serbia, as we know, was at war with Austria-Hungary and was an ally of Russia. Serbia and Bulgaria were once again on opposite sides, with Bulgaria on the side that lost the war. Second World War Once again, Bulgaria and Serbia followed opposite paths in this war, although they were less visible. Yugoslavia, the new South Slavic state whose Serbia was a constituent part, was invaded and then dismantled in 1941 by the Axis, including Bulgaria that just sided with Germany. However, Yugoslav Partisans of all nationalities fought against the occupiers and liberated the Yugoslav territories. Bulgaria, which had joined the Axis a few weeks before the invasion of Yugoslavia (and Greece), helped to dismember the Yugoslav Kingdom. In this process, it annexed almost all of Macedonia (and Dobrudja from Romania, Thrace and part of Greek Macedonia from Greece). It also occupied a large part of Serbia in the south. But for the third time in a row, Bulgaria was on the side that lost the war. The Red Army invaded Bulgaria which then declared war on the Axis, while the Partisans liberated Serbia from the occupying forces. This difference is an important point that would shape the post-war period. The post-war period and the opposite trajectories of Bulgaria and Serbia At the Moscow Conference in 1944 and the Yalta Conference in 1945, zones of influence were defined. Yugoslavia received half Western influence and half Soviet influence, while Bulgaria received respectively 1/4 and 3/4. Moreover, Josip Broz Tito, the leader of Socialist Yugoslavia, refused Yugoslavia's demands for obedience to the USSR and Stalin. In 1948, ties were cut between the two. The USSR excluded Yugoslavia from the Kominform and Tito turned towards the West, while maintaining a socialist regime in Yugoslavia. Bulgaria, which had been invaded and liberated by the Red Army in 1944, was ruled by a Soviet government from 1944 to 1945. In 1946, the monarchy was officially abolished and Bulgaria became the People's Republic of Bulgaria, a communist state and regime. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were then following opposite paths: Bulgaria turned towards the USSR and a strict communist regime, while Yugoslavia turned towards the West (even though it was a Non-Aligned country) while maintaining a relatively open communist regime. Cold War, communist Bulgaria and Serbia One was oriented towards the USSR, the other towards the West, and both were communist. One represses more than the other. Both were led by a man who remained in power for 35 years: Todor Zhivkov from 1954 to 1989 in Bulgaria, and Josip Broz Tito from 1944 to 1980. During these 50 years of socialism, the two states maintained limited relations due to their different ideologies and spheres of influence. However, they cooperated on cultural and scientific levels. Tito and Dimitrov, the first leader of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, signed the Bled agreements in 1947. These agreements envisaged the creation of a Balkan Federation, including Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. However, once again, the Macedonian question was the main reason for abandoning this project. Yugoslav wars, 1990s Bulgaria has been a capitalist, parliamentary republic since 1989. Yugoslavia remained communist for two more years. When Yugoslavia collapsed in 1991, Bulgaria supported the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Macedonia declared independence the same year, and Bulgaria was, despite everything and their history, the first state to recognise it. With the fall of communism in the Balkans, relations between Bulgaria and Serbia remained at odds as a result of the reversal of their international orientation. Serbia turned towards Russia, while Bulgaria turned towards the West. Kosovo 1998-1999, 2008 During the Kosovo-Serbian conflict, Bulgaria opened its airspace to NATO operations and bombing raids on Serbia. Bulgaria, or at least its government, did not support Serbia. Popular opinion in Bulgaria was less unanimous. Part of the population supported the Serbs, who was also of Orthodox faith. Another part of the popular opinion, pro-EU and pro-NATO, supported NATO and the West against Serbia. Kosovo declared its independence in 2008. Bulgaria recognised it, which strained tensions between Bulgaria and Serbia. At the time, relations between the two states were once again tense. Despite this, the two countries have been free of tension and conflict for many years. And what is the current state of relations between Bulgaria and Serbia? During my visits to Bulgaria and Serbia, in conversations with Serbs and Bulgarians, I observed a number of things. I have to say that, as I don't frequent the far right (nor the far left), I don't know what their supporters think. What I often hear is: "Yes, we're not the same, but we're still similar". In other words: Balkan, South Slav, Orthodox. Despite 150 years of tension and conflict, neither people nourish feelings of hatred, revenge or even straight negativity towards the other. Jokes are more often told with a "funny" tone, even if they may bear a bit of personal opinion for some of them. The most common joke, from both the Bulgarian and Serbian sides, was that "the other one stabbed us in the back", even though they were friends. This refers to the war of 1885-1886, the Second Balkan War and to the two world wars. And even to the 1990s and 2008. I more often hear worse comments or even hatred speech between Serbs and Croats, Bulgarians and Macedonians, Macedonians and Greeks, Turks and Greeks, than between Bulgarians and Serbs. The populations of both countries are divided: one part is pro-Western, the other pro-Russian, to put it (very) simply (and reductive). But I think that, basically, although their international situation is not similar, Bulgarians and Serbs share at least this: their countries are not considered free enough politically-wise and both have negative demographic growth rates and are losing population. Oh, and Bulgaria and Serbia also share this: a population that is more welcoming, more open and warmer than it is often portrayed, with rich history and nature. And plenty of surprises if you learn to discover and explore them. Conclusion Bulgarian-Serbian relations have always been turbulent and complex. From 1800 until 1878, they were very good because the two peoples were united in the fight against the Ottoman Empire. From 1878 onwards, following independence and because of the Macedonian question, foreign influences and the aspirations of both countries, relations became very tense and were punctuated by wars. For almost 100 years, despite numerous reversals of alliances and influences, Bulgaria and Serbia followed different paths. At every major event in the Balkans, they were opposite. But all is better now, and over the last 2-3 decades the two states have reconciled to the point where there are no longer any disputes troubling their relations. The two countries cooperate on the economy, trade, energy, culture and science. Summary in dates:  1800-1877: joint struggle and mutual support in the liberation of the Balkans from Ottoman rule. 1877-1878: armed struggle, Balkan and Russian coalition against the Ottoman Empire. (Partial) liberation of the Balkans. Treaty of San Stefano and Berlin Conference: disappointments, the Serbs feel betrayed by the Russian Empire, while the Bulgarians see it as their liberator. 1885-1886: reunification of the Principality of Bulgaria with the province of Eastern Rumelia. Serbo-Bulgarian war, Bulgarian victory. 1912-1913: First Balkan War. Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece push the Ottoman Empire back to Istanbul. Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece take territories from Macedonia. The Treaty of London’s partition satisfies no-one. 1913: Second Balkan War. Serbia, Greece, the Ottoman Empire, Montenegro and Romania join forces against Bulgaria, which has attacked its neighbours. Bulgaria loses the war and new borders are drawn. First World War: Serbia is on the side of the Entente while Bulgaria is part of the Alliance. Second World War: Bulgaria, though reluctant, is on the side of the Axis, while Yugoslavia/Serbia is on the side of the Allies. 1945-1991: Cold War, Serbia/Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are communist states. Bulgaria was the "16th Soviet Republic" and turned towards the USSR, while Yugoslavia/Serbia went its own way and opened up to the West. Cooperation. 1990s and the Yugoslav wars: the new Republic of Bulgaria gradually turns towards the West, while Serbia closes itself and turns towards Russia. 1998-2008: Kosovo. Bulgaria does not support Serbia in its conflict with Kosovo. NATO cooperates with Bulgaria against Serbia. Bulgaria recognises Kosovo's independence, proclaimed in 2008. European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Bulgaria joined NATO in 2003 and the EU in 2007. Serbia is not a member of either of them, but applied for EU membership in 2009. Since 2008: no major conflicts. Bulgaria and Serbia have normalised and calmed their relations. Cooperation. Bibliography CASTELLAN, Georges, Histoire des Balkans, XIXe-XXe siècle, Paris, Fayard, 1999 [1991]. CASTELLAN, Georges, VRINAT-NIKOLOV, Marie, Histoire de la Bulgarie : au pays des roses, Brest, Armeline, 2008. COX, Harold E., HUPCHICK, Dennis P., Les Balkans : atlas historique, economica, Paris, translated from English by Philippe RICALENS, 2001. МАНЧЕВ, Кръстьо, Сърбия и сръбско-българските отношения 1804-2010, Парадигма, 2014. MONOVA-GALTIER, Miladina, " Euro-atlantisme ou bon voisinage ; l'opinion publique bulgare face à la guerre de Kosovo ", in Les médias créateurs de leur image dans le Sud-est européen : la presse, Études Balkaniques, Éditions Association Pierre Belon, 2001, pp. 135-160. Article available on Cairn: https://www.cairn.info/revue-etudes-balkaniques-cahiers-pierre-belon-2001-1-page-135.htm?contenu=resume. PAPADRIANOS, Ioannis, "The First Balkan Alliance (1860-1868) and the Bulgarians", Balkan Studies, 42 (2001), pp. 15-20. Article available here: https://ojs.lib.uom.gr/index.php/BalkanStudies/article/view/3306. STOJANCEVIĆ, Vladimir, "Les relations entre la Serbie et la Bulgarie du traité de San-Stefano au traité de Berlin. Problèmes, controverses, prétentions réciproques", Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, tome 27 N°1, January-March 1980. Aspects de la crise d'Orient 1875-1878. pp. 60-67. Article available on Persée: https://www.persee.fr/doc/rhmc_0048-8003_1980_num_27_1_1079. VALTCHINOVA, Galia, "Guerre et paix - construction de la démocratie en 'pays de l'Est'. Leçons bulgares en marge de la guerre de Kosovo", in Les médias créateurs de leur image dans le Sud-est européen : la presse, Études Balkaniques, Éditions Association Pierre Belon, 2001, pp. 115-134. Article available on Cairn: https://www.cairn.info/revue-etudes-balkaniques-cahiers-pierre-belon-2001-1-page-115.htm?contenu=resume. ВОЙНИКОВ, Живко, Сръбско-българският антагонизъм 1878-1945, Еделвайс, 2020. VRINAT-NIKOLOV, Marie, "Bulgarie", Europe - Histoire, Nations, Identités, ed. Francine Rouby, Paris, Ellipses, 2013, pp. 507-529. Assessing the Perspectives of Bulgarian - Serbian Relations, Institute for Regional and International Studies, 2003. Article in English available here : http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00002439/.

In various European languages, the word Balkan means either a mountain in the singular or a peninsula in the plural. Also, its use is also present in the Balkans. In Bulgaria, it has a triple meaning: the mountain, the Stara planina massif and the Balkan region. The most important term derived from the word Balkan is "balkanization". It is most often used to denote the process of dismemberment of previous geographical and political entities on a national basis into new ones. The Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs: Print Collection, The New York Public Library. (1810). Mount Balkan Retrieved from https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47d9-60ec-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99 The term "Balkanization" appeared after the First World War: it was first mentioned in the New York Times on December 20, 1918. Under the title "Ratenau", the great industrialist predicts the "Balkanization of Europe". Ratenau used the term "Balkanization" to describe fears of an almost apocalyptic future. He does not mean anything definite by "Balkanization", except to imply that only a strong and powerful Germany could counterbalance that terrible prospect. After the First World War, the word "balkanize" was introduced with the meaning "to break into small, quarrelling political entities, similar to the Balkans after the First World War", which is absurd. The term "Balkanization" is retained and used even in the 60s of the 20th century, when African countries began their struggle for independence from France, and even when expressing dissatisfaction with internal conditions. In his criticism of Austrian institutions, Aleksandar Vodopivec says that the term "Balkan" as a synonym for corruption, lethargy and irresponsibility has been transferred beyond the geographical borders of this region. A similar use of this term is found even in the USA, where it acquires the meaning not only of fragmentation of states but also of a general dehumanization and destruction of civilization. Why was the adjective "Balkan" torn from its ontological basis and re-created as an abstract demon, despite the wealth of concepts, words, and sounds? Why has it been turned into a linguistic weed? This rhetorical question is based on the belief that the ontology of the Balkans cannot be identified with the idea that stems from the use of the adjective "Balkan" and the verb "balkanize" in the vocabulary of today's politics and culture. On the other hand, the complete decontextualization of this term and its upside-down application are the result of a rather simple pair of syllogical constructions. The first is of an extrapolative nature: the Balkans as a reality has acquired a reputation that is far from praiseworthy; there are many undesirable and tasteless phenomena that resemble patterns from the Balkan reality or, most often, constructed images of the Balkans. The second syllogism is essentially interpolative: the attribute "Balkan" is harmful. The word "Balkan" in many ways prefigures the nomen nudum (this term means "a name that does not yet have a legitimate place because it has come into use without first being described in detail in a way that and require the rules of botanical and zoological nomenclature). by Omer Merzić, MADobra knjiga

In the second half of the 19th century, "Balkan Peninsula" or simply "Balkan" was confirmed as a replacement for the term "European Turkey". In 1893 and again in 1909, the German geographer Theobald Fischer, intending to correct Zeune's error, as well as to point out new and accurate geographical facts regarding the Balkan Mountains, proposed to call the peninsula Sudosteuropa (SE Europe). The term "Sudosteuropäische Halbinsel" (Peninsula in the SE of Europe) was introduced in 1863 by the well-known expert on the Balkans, scientist, and diplomat Johann Georg von Hahn, but his initiative did not succeed, although Wilhelm Müller, most vehemently independently of him, used both terms- The Balkan Peninsula and SE Europe - as synonyms. Miller also referred to the countries on the peninsula as the "Middle East", considering them an apparently inseparable part of Europe, although he was aware of the habit of the inhabitants of the Balkans to refer to their trips to the West as "going to Europe". 1715 De L'Isle Map of the Eastern Roman Empire under Constantine (Asia Minor, Black Sea, Balkans) - Geographicus, Guillaume Delisle, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons At the beginning of the 20th century, the term Balkans increasingly acquired a political connotation. It was so widespread that in 1918, the Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijić, although he himself was aware of the inaccuracy of the term, used it in his influential work on this peninsula. After 1918, the term "Balkan Peninsula" was contested for some time due to its geographical inadequacy and due to numerous prejudices related to it. In 1929, the geographer Otto Maul once again argued for the use of the term "Southeastern Europe", considering it an adequate designation for this peninsula. In the words of Matthias Bernat, Südosteuropa was supposed to become "a neutral, non-political, non-ideological concept which, in addition, abolishes the existing historical-political dichotomy between the Danube Monarchy and the Ottoman Balkans, which had become irrelevant." Südosteuropa became significant in the geopolitical views of the Nazis. a clearly defined place in their world order as Wirtschaftsraum Grossdeutschland Südost, "naturally determined economic and political encirclement" of the German Reich in the southeast. The idea to replace the compromised category (the Balkans) with a neutral one (SE Europe) was accepted in the interwar period in the USA, and they use the terms Balkans and SE Europe as synonyms, emphasizing that "Balkans" and the derivative "Balkanization" have become derogatory terms. It is very likely that in the post-war period the term SE Europe became undesirable due to misuse by the Nazis. On the other hand, even though the name was compromised, a certain number of German scientists continued to use it, but without the connotations it acquired in the interwar period. The only difference in the interpretation of SE Europe and the Balkans can be found in the German language and literature and is a consequence of different criteria for definition, but even in that case the definition of these terms is neither comprehensive nor generally accepted. According to the broadest interpretation of the term SE Europe, given by Karl Kaiser and which is mainly based on a geographical approach, the boundaries of the region are defined by the Carpathian Mountains in the north, the Black Sea in the east, the Aegean Sea in the south, and the Ionian and Adriatic Seas in the west. SE Europe thus covers Slovakia (but not the Czech lands, even before the breakup of Czechoslovakia), Hungary, Romania, the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and the European part of Turkey. According to this interpretation, SE Europe is a comprehensive entity, and the Balkans is only its sub region. Definitions of SE Europe mostly diverge over the location of Hungary. In German reviews, Hungary is included in SE Europe, but omitted from the Balkans. In the most general terms, the definition of the Balkans is determined by a series of geographical, political, historical, cultural, ethnic, religious, and economic criteria, and most often by their combination. The standard approach of geographers distinguishes between a stricto sensu physical-geographical definition and a definition used for more practical purposes. The first accepts the undisputed eastern, southern, and western borders: the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara, the Aegean, the Mediterranean, the Ionian, and the Adriatic Sea. In the second approach, the history of Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, the former Yugoslavia, and Romania becomes the object of study. Although, with all the nuances, it is necessary to specify that some regions are more "Balkan" than others (in an epistemological and not a moral sense), in this book the Balkan peoples will be considered Albanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Romanians, and all former Yugoslavs. by Omer Merzić, MADobra knjiga

As befits the obsession of today's scientific circles in the West with language, the specter of the Balkans that does not escape from it is not a person but a name, a signifier. It is predictable that the signifier "Balkan" will separate from its original signified and all subsequent signifiers with which it enters a relationship. In fact, another process was taking place in parallel: while "Balkan" began to be accepted and widely used as a signifier in a geographical sense, it was slowly already beginning to acquire a social and cultural meaning that extended its signified beyond its immediate and concrete meaning. While the "Balkan" encompassed a complex historical phenomenon and began to signify it, some political aspects of this new signified were extrapolated and independently signified. 1738 Ratelband Map of the Balkans ( Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania ) - Geographicus, Daniel de Lafeuille, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons August Zeune, who named the peninsula, consistently held to his conviction in 1808: "The Balkan Peninsula is separated from the rest of Europe in the north by the long mountain range of the Balkan Mountains, or the former Albanus, Skradus, Hemus, which adjoins the Alps in the northwest via of the small Istrian peninsula, while towards the east it disappears into the Black Sea in two branches." Although the name Balkan was increasingly entering the vocabulary of observers and commentators, few of them knew its exact meaning. The word Balkan is associated with a mountain: in most Ottoman and Turkish dictionaries it has the meaning of a mountain or a mountain range, in some it is defined as a wooded mountain, and in others as a passage through densely wooded Rocky Mountains; the word balkanlik also means a densely forested and rugged zone. According to Halil Inalcik, the Ottoman Turks first used the word Balkan in Rumelia in its general meaning of mountain, using additional names or to define it geographically. Thus, the word Emine-Balkan denoted the easternmost slopes of the Balkan Range that descend towards the Black Sea. The combination Emine-Balkan is a literal Ottoman translation of the word "Hemus-Mountain": from the Byzantine "Aimos", "Emmon'' and "Emmona" the Ottoman Turks also derived the word "Emine". In the middle of the 19th century, many authors began to apply the name Balkan to the entire peninsula without any desire to challenge the primacy of earlier names that reminded of its ancient or medieval past: "Hellenic", "Illyrian", "Dardan"; "Roman", "Byzantine", "Thracian". Until the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the most common designations referred to the presence of the Ottoman Empire on the peninsula: "European Turkey", "Turkey in Europe", "European Ottoman Empire", "European Levant"; "Oriental Peninsula". Ethical labels were increasingly used: "Greek peninsula", "Slovenian-Greek peninsula", "South Slavic peninsula". And within that region itself, the “Balkans" was not the most common geographical self-determination. For the Ottoman rulers it was "Rum-eli", literally "the land of the Romans", i.e. the land of the Greeks, "Rumeli-i-sahane" (Imperial Rumelia), "Avrupa-i-Osmani" (Ottoman Europe). by Omer Merzić, MADobra knjiga