Author: Vladimir Stojković Florian Biber's book The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans is a handbook for understanding social conditions in the region. He points out in detail and precisely the similarities and differences in the unfolding of socio-political processes in the countries of this region. All social aspects and processes, such as media, corruption, reform, governance rights, etc., are covered. All the events that significantly influenced the emergence of authoritarianism are described in detail and chronologically framed. This book is written so that it can be understood even by people who know nothing about the situation in the Western Balkans. It gives them a complete picture of events and social oscillations in these countries. Its core consists of three chapters, which discuss the challenges of democratic consolidation, patterns of authoritarianism, and mechanisms of authoritarianism. Challenges of democratic consolidation This chapter primarily deals with the causes that led to the emergence of a semi-authoritarian regime throughout this region during the nineties. The beginning of these processes is linked to the fall of communist regimes throughout Central and Eastern Europe, first in Romania and Bulgaria and then in Yugoslavia and Albania. Interestingly, the Balkan countries lagged far behind Central European countries in deconstructing the communist regimes in their countries. This book segment also discusses the first multiparty elections in this part of Europe and the democratization process in these societies. However, multiparty politics marked the first years after the Union of Communists' monopoly, but without realized democracy. For the political parties that came to power after those elections, the priority wasn't the development of democracy and the democratization of society but the preservation of the monopoly over the management of the state apparatus. At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, there was a breakthrough and strengthening of democracy in these areas. That period didn't last long, but during 2002 and 2003, nationalist parties returned and took over power, primarily in Serbia and Bosnia. Unlike Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, which quickly established democratic regimes and moved on through European integration, the countries of the Western Balkans cackled with regimes that brought them only instability, troubles, and wars. Patterns of authoritarianism In this part of the book, Bieber describes the situation in each country of the region in detail. The author identifies all the different social factors that led to the decline of democracy and the slowing down of its processes. External influences, internal circumstances, and economic crises have all contributed to the strengthening of authoritarianism and the decline of democracy in the region's countries. In Montenegro, the dominant Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) evolved over the years and underwent different phases of ruling style. North Macedonia's direction towards authoritarianism was achieved after the conflict with Greece regarding the country's name and the failed attempt to enter the NATO alliance in 2008. After Kosovo declared independence, the ruling elite relied on external support. The external partners, in turn, ignored Kosovo's society's problems, primarily problems in the rule of law and anti-corruption. The external factor allowed this to secure consent to cooperation with Serbia. Authoritarianism returned to Serbia in 2012 with the coming to power of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and Aleksandar Vučić. Party clientelism reaches its peak. In Albania, the government of Salia Berisha is characterized as a stabilocracy. This term was first used in that context. After that, the socialist government of Edi Rama made progress in reforms, but the main characteristic of his rule was the remnants of the old system in the form of party clientelism. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the government was mainly composed of ethno-nationalist parties, which always aspired to absolute control over the state. In Croatia, the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) was passing through several phases. During the nineties, the Croatian regime went through two stages. In the first phase, which lasted until the end of the war in 1995, the ruling party encouraged a nationalist atmosphere, and after that, the regime led by Tudjman switched to a sultanist form of ruling. It's a political system in which he relied on the closest people around him. So, there is no single authoritarian model, but there are common circumstances that repeat and which, together, strengthened authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. Mechanisms of authoritarianism In the third part of this book, the author talks about the different ways authoritarian regimes led until the capture of the state. These are political crises, nationalism, weak opposition, media control, etc. This chapter also discusses the role of the external factor and its contribution to maintaining this regime, namely the so-called regimes of competitive authoritarianism. Given that democracy and European integration have been important goals for the region's countries in the last twenty years, open authoritarianism is not possible. Therefore, the rulers of these countries apply competitive authoritarianism, which implies a model of governance in which rulers use authoritarian forms of governance, mostly informal, to avoid formal rules of democracy. So, it is about the simultaneity of these two systems (democracy and authoritarianism) in the way regimes in the countries of the Western Balkans work. Conclusion Apart from individuals who usually deal with this topic and monitor socio-political processes in the Western Balkans, this book is very good for those who need to know more about this topic. Florian Biber clearly and objectively processes and explains the circumstances that led to certain socio-political events and changes. A gradual familiarization with the political history of each country, framed by a chronological framework for each of those events, provides us with an exact overview of all those events. In addition to getting to know the situation in these countries, the book can also serve as a guide it gives us direction to understand, in the best possible way, how certain political systems work. Also, as individuals, we can see the mistakes and the bad things and try to correct them in the following period so that similar negative processes are not repeated. That would be our contribution to the further development of democracy and improving the socio-political situation in the Western Balkans.

Presentation Language and Identity in the Balkans. Serbo-Croatian and its Disintegration is an book by Robert D. Greenberg, published in 2004 by Oxford University Press. Robert D. Greenberg is an academic specialised in Slavic Studies. This book is the result of several years' fieldworks and readings. The 190 pages (170 excluding the bibliography) of this work deal with Serbo-Croatian from its conception in the 19th century until the 4 languages that succeeded it after 1992 and their development up to 2004/2006: Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian. The author begins by looking at the history of the codification of a language common to Serbs and Croats despite their many dialects. He then looks at its existence, which has been punctuated by controversies. Finally, he looks at the codification after 1992 (when the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia began) of Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian, and the beginnings of Montenegrin. He organises his work into 7 parts (including an introduction and a conclusion), each divided into (sub-)sub-sections. Here they are summarised below with key points: I – Introduction Robert D. Greenberg begins his paper by presenting his inspiration, aim and method. The many works from different academic disciplines on the subject of Serbo-Croatian, its disintegration and the cultural and political issues of its successors often take sides. This is for this reason that he wants to publish a book that is not Serb-centric nor Croat-centric. He reminds us that in the 19th century, the romanticism, nationalism and independences achieved (or proclaimed) were to a very large extent led through language. Language proved to be a powerful symbol of identity, and this also affected the Balkans. Finally, using maps and clear explanations, the author explains the different dialects, pronunciations, similarities and combinations of Serbo-Croatian and the languages of the territories of the future South Slavic states. II – Serbo-Croatian: United or not, we fall This section provides an overview of the birth of Serbo-Croatian through 19th century. The author describes the literary and linguistic initiatives at the beginning of that century that later led to the codification of the language. The aim was to unify the peoples of the same region, despite their differences. This linguistic union was part of and also a starting point for a political union that would be realised through the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, just after the First World War. The author also presents Vuk Karadžić and Ljudevit Gaj, their grammar books and dictionaries and their efforts, challenges and choices that led to the codification of future Serbo-Croatian. It also details the three models of linguistic unity: centrally monitored unity, government-imposed unity, pluricentric unity. Serbo-Croatian went through the three of them in that order and followed the pluricentric unity model during socialist Yugoslavia (1944-1992). Finally, he quotes the linguist Bugarski, who defines Serbo-Croatian as having a weak internal identity within Yugoslavia. On the other hand, beyond the borders, this identity is strong and often claimed, because it shows the union of the different peoples and constituents of this State. This weakness can also be seen through the many controversies, tensions, the opposition and resistance that the language and its implementation have provoked, even before the socialist era. III – Serbian: Isn't my language yours too? This third section only deals with Serbian, i.e. the standard Serbian that replaced Serbo-Croatian from 1992 onwards in Serbia, and in Montenegro from 1992 to 2004. Robert D. Greenberg presents the two variants in use in these territories, and the beginnings of a voluntary distinction for a future Montenegrin. Once again, in both Serbia and Montenegro, debates between fractions of linguists, oppositions and controversies are numerous. They all are proof of the cultural, social, identity and political conflicts that contributed to the total disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia. One of the reasons for this is that Serbian speakers speak different variants and live in (at least) 3 different states: Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbian standard language is based on two dialects and two pronunciations and therefore it is more diverse as a standard language than standard Bosnian and Croatian. The author goes on to discuss the importance of institutions and academies in codifying and sanctioning the language. Writing, lexicon, orthography, pronunciation, religious and ethnic implications, among others, are examples of the responsibilities and guidelines of these Academies. IV – Montenegro: A mountain out of a molehill? In this fourth part, Robert D. Greenberg looks at Montenegrin and its slower development. Indeed, the ideas and desires to establish a standard Montenegrin language distinct from the others (Serbian and Croatian) do not date from the 1990s. Awareness of a different literature and language goes back much further in time. However, these ideas and desires were reinforced at a rather later moment, especially following the Croatian protest movements and demands, more precisely since the 1970s. At the start of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and just before independence in 2006, the demands were more and more vivid. Debates, controversies and oppositions followed. This book is published in 2004, therefore the author evokes the future of a Montenegrin language distinct from Serbian that is not official yet. The birth of a language concretised after the referendum on independence scheduled for 2006. I must add that in 2007, the proclaimed independence and the Constitution marked the beginning of the existence of a Montenegrin language with its own characteristics (pronunciation, lexicon, alphabetical characters). Here again, language is very closely linked to identity. Here too the author discusses the many difficulties involved in establishing and codifying this successor language of Serbo-Croat and distinct of Serbian. Which dialect(s) should be chosen? What should be done with a (large) part of the population claiming to be Serbian and speaking Serbian? The author concludes this section by asserting that the existence of Montenegrin as a distinct language is the final step in the dissolution of Serbo-Croatian. V – Croatian: We are separate but equal twins In this section focusing on the Croatian language, Robert D. Greenberg looks back to the 19th century and then at the specific characteristics of the Croatian language, which does everything it can to differentiate itself from Serbian. This desire to be different (because it is impossible to fundamentally opposed them) does not date from the 1990s. Croats have always claimed their own history, identity, language and dialects. The author looks back at these claims, these differences, these debates and these struggles for the recognition and establishment of a language distinct from Serbian, since the mid-nineteenth century, despite the standardisation of Serbo-Croatian. This section therefore looks back at the genesis of this unified language bearing a unifying objective but from the Croatian point of view. It also shows the codification of Croatian from 1992 onwards. This is an interesting aspect because we can see the often expressed desire to clearly distinguish Croatian from Serbian and the Serbs, accused of being imperialist. This rejection is not the first in their relations since in the previous century efforts were made to counter the magyarisation and germanisation of Croatian society and language. To this end, after socialist Yugoslavia, the Croatian language was purified of “serbisms” and “internationalisms”, partly by removing Serbian terms and creating new words based on "uniquely" Croatian characteristics, or using again forgotten words in modern Croatian. Everyday attitudes are also one of the manifestations of this rejection, since speakers of Serbian or users of words considered to be “Serbian” are seen in a bad way. This mainly concerns the lexicon since the grammars are almost identical. Despite this, debates, controversies and hesitations mark this process as much as other successors of Serbo-Croatian. VI – Bosnian: A camel with three humps? This last part concerns Bosnian and “Bosniac”. These two terms misused or serving identity goals show all the complexity of the linguistic question in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Bosnia-Herzegovina live Serbs, most of whom live in the Serbian entity Republika Srpska, and Croats, most of whom live in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The country's third constituent group and also the majority are the Bosniacs. This term refers to Muslim Bosnians, as being distinct from Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats. In theory, all of them are Bosnians since they all are citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina (and not all of them have a faith or practice it). In reality, since the war, the three have become more and more separated. While the term “Bosniac” refers specifically to Muslim Bosnians (sometimes more generally  to Muslim Slav), the term “Bosnian” can refer to the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina no matter their religion, and to the language of the country.  Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have languages and kin-states some tend to identify with: Serbia and Croatia. On the other hand, Bosniacs are attached to the term “bosanski”, “Bosnian”, for the language spoken by them and in the country in general because they feel attached to the region and this more global term. Bosnian Serbs can say they speak Serbian or Bosnian, and Bosnian Croats can say they speak Croatian or Bosnian. It usually depends on the identity, cultural, political implications the name of the language(s) bear. Some nationalists such as Serbs accuse Bosniacs of using the term “Bosnian” to deny the existence of Croats et Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But those nationalists also call the language “Bosniac” while they deny at the same time a language distinct from Serbian for Bosniacs. At the end of the day, the language is Bosnian and each one uses the name they want to use. Nonetheless, with time and the work of the Bosnian language’s codifiers since the 1990’s, Bosnian language tends to use more and more “Bosniac” elements. Understand: elements used especially by Bosniac and more linked to Muslim culture, as distinct form Serbian and Croatian. It means for example words borrowed from Ottoman Turkish and some pronunciation such as the use of the letter and sound “h”. Here once again we see that language is a strong marker of identity. VII – Conclusions This concluding section is much appreciated, as it sums up the most important points made throughout the book. The 19th century saw the codification of a unified language bearing a unifying purpose: Serbo-Croatian, or Croatian-Serbian, the language of the South Slavs who were united in 3 several states from 1918 to 1991 (and 2003 for Montenegro). As time went on each constituent republic and then state claimed its own uniqueness and distinction from its neighbours. This led in part to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Serbo-Croatian. This language has 4 standard languages successors: Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin. Since language is a symbol and marker of identity it is easy to understand why it is at the heart of cultural and political demands. It is also understandable that it has provoked many long-lasting debates, controversies and oppositions. The name in itself of these languages is a delicate issue. Every people and every state wants (or would like) its own language, different from those of its neighbours. And the process in 2004 is not yet complete since Montenegrin is not yet official and Bosnian is still evolving. Concluding remarks and recommendations If you are interested in Serbo-Croatian or its successor languages, then Language and Identity in the Balkans. Serbo-Croatian and its Disintegration is for you. In just a few pages given the density of the subject, Robert D. Greenberg succeeded in summarising and presenting clearly the evolution, the issues and the complexity of linguistic and political questions in former Yugoslavia. The book is divided into sections of 2 to 5 pages making it very accessible whether you want to find out more about it, expand your knowledge or deepen it. Content is organised and this helps us to see things even more clearly and to grasp and assimilate the information more easily. What's more, the maps, quotes, language extracts, tables and chronological timelines make it even easier to understand. Finally, the many names cited (of linguists, for example) help to broaden horizons by providing references to check. This book provides an insight into the linguistic, social, cultural and political aspects of Serbo-Croatian, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin. If you are interested in “naški”, “our language”, language and identity: read it.

Titostalgia. A Study of Nostalgia for Josip Broz, Mitja Velikonja, Mirovni Institut, Ljubljana, 2008. Available for free download and to buy here. Titostalgia. A Study of Nostalgia for Josip Broz is a book by Mitja Velikonja, a Slovenian academic working on memory, subcultures, and South-Eastern Europe. Published in 2008 by the Institute for Peace in Ljubljana, it only addresses what concerns the subject up to that year. Of about 150 pages, 120 excluding the bibliography, it deals with titostalgia, a contraction of the terms "nostalgia" and "Tito." Josip Broz, known as "Tito", was the leader of socialist Yugoslavia from 1944 until his death in 1980. Before that, during the Second World War, he led the Partisans who liberated pre-war and post-war Yugoslavia entities. He was, therefore, an important figure – the most important in socialist Yugoslavia, and is inherently associated with it even today. What Titostalgia addresses is nostalgia for Tito: How is he remembered today? How does the memory for Tito manifest? Where? In what objects? Moreover, what does it show about society? Mitja Velikonja has organized his work on titostalgia into three parts, plus an introduction and a conclusion. The following is a review of his study. Introduction The introduction shortly explains the notions that will be developed further: nostalgia, nostalgia for Tito, and yugonostalgia, nostalgia for socialist Yugoslavia. The two go together since Tito was a socialist Yugoslavia, and a socialist Yugoslavia would never have existed without him. We regret one while regretting the other. However, one of the two, titostalgia, is expressed more concretely and efficiently, since it concerns someone. This someone can be represented in objects, celebrated in places and events. Thus, we show what he embodied. However, firstly, a political figure, he is now (partly) a commercial tool. Nostalgia and Memory This part explains the notions of memory and nostalgia. Memory is formed during a given period – in this case, Tito's socialist Yugoslavia for titostalgia (1944-1980). It can also be formed after this period through more or less realistic memories and by the presence of this period in daily life under different forms. Nostalgic memories are proof of dissatisfaction in the present, disappointment with unmet promises, and the impossibility of projecting oneself into the future. In reaction, we turn to the past, which we know and idealize. There are two types of nostalgia: direct nostalgia, that is to say, nostalgia for a period that the individual has experienced, and indirect nostalgia, which is transmitted to an individual who did not experience this era. Nostalgia is, therefore, a regret for the past that we want for our future because we are unhappy with the present. Unfortunately, we know that this wish is unreachable, so we lose hope. The past no longer exists, and the future does not exist either. Nostalgia is a feeling, but it can also be used for commercial purposes, for example. The nostalgic feeling is cultivated by objects we purchase or get and by events in which we participate to remind us of the past and give ourselves a moment of enjoyment. The author Mitja Velikonja presents this to us here: titostalgia is used for commercial and tourist purposes. He describes how he proceeded to study this nostalgia. He noted the representations of Tito, their places, objects, their creators, and users/consumers. The Culture of Titostalgia In this part, Mitja examines the objects, places, and events where titostalgia is present. It can be found in all spheres: public and private spaces, hotels and restaurants, urban spaces, etc. Consumers good Here are some of the objects where we find Tito and which, therefore, illustrate and cultivate the titostalgic feeling: pens, cups, notebooks, clothes, accessories, statues, and statuettes. These everyday objects can be found and purchased and are sold everywhere, both in the countries of former Yugoslavia and beyond their borders, such as Germany, Russia, and China. Some of these objects have been produced since he died in 1980 and the breakup of socialist Yugoslavia in 1991 to use his image to sell more. Another part of these objects dates from when he ruled the State and continues circulating: stamps, cards, and medals. Other elements that cause and cultivate titostalgia are food, but especially drink: sandwiches, mineral water, and alcohol. Literature also fosters this nostalgia with realistic or sensational writings by authors who knew him. What are they talking about? They are talking about his diet, private life, and everything. Another field in which titostalgia manifests itself is tourism. Many places, hotels, restaurants, and cafes brag that Tito was once there to attract customers and tourists. However, his name is also in every day and non-commercial places: parks, squares, streets, schools, and factories. Places Therefore, places are full of elements that cultivate Tito's nostalgia. In his birthplace, Krumovec, in Croatia, a memorial and a park with his name have been erected. The village is even a pilgrimage site. At the House of Flowers, in Belgrade, Serbia, lies his tomb in the Museum of Yugoslavia History, which is, therefore, (and perhaps even above all) a Tito museum. Finally, events, culture, and the arts are also vectors of titostalgia: events, sports, movies, exhibitions, music groups, books, etc. The image and figure of Tito are, therefore, present in all areas and forms: in the public, in the private, in the collective, in the official, and in the individual spheres. Many of these elements are produced for commercial purposes by using his image to attract and sell. Titostalgic Culture Here, the author does not deal with "where" Tito is present but with "how" he is represented and what he embodies. This concerns both the elements mentioned in the above section and others. His portrait, evocation, and memory are comforting since they remind us of a time when "everything was better and easier." It also serves as a historical marker: "during Tito's time," "after Tito." Titostalgia is explained and justified: "We miss him, we love him. He was a humble man, close to the people, he beamed. He made Yugoslavia famous and respected globally and guaranteed security, prosperity, and progress." Therefore, His image is positive, reassuring, comforting, and representative of an era when everything was fine. Limits, Clarifications, and State of Society Mitja Velikonja presents and rejects this section's arguments about the material and immaterial titostalgia. He goes beyond received discourses and ideas, delving into them and sometimes debunking them. Moreover, he does so in 13 points: Tito's use 1– Tito's "return" is the consequence of the catastrophic events that followed his death (wars, crises, economic and political stagnation). It is logical because, in his time, everything was fine, and since then, everything has gone wrong. That is why we want him back with us. 2 and 3– Those who are nostalgic may sometimes be more nostalgic about their youth and the good old days than about Tito. For young people who did not even know Tito and Yugoslavia, their nostalgia is a kind of "neostalgia." Their nostalgia is transmitted by their environment, both alive and material, then internalized and "experienced." 4– Tito is a hero who defeated and outlasted all the villains of the 20th century. He was close to the people. However, (point 10), he led a luxurious life, met the jet set, and traveled a lot. 5– Of course, he was an original political figure. However, he carried on the pan-Yugoslavism that had already existed with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and pre-war Yugoslavia. So, he did not invent Yugoslavia, as many people think. 6– Tito sells well. He is deliberately used to increase sales and the number of visitors, even if sometimes the product has nothing to do with him at all. State of the society 7– The "rehabilitation" of Tito after his death is a concrete expression of regret for the past. It is only one among many. However, this one is easier to express because the man is not that far away in time, and he is someone, something tangible. These elements partly explain why he is the figure chosen to express and use one of the different nostalgias. 8– Titostalgia and its positive image exist among left-wingers, nationalists, and others. Some also fight and accuse each other of using Tito, while others would not be against returning to Yugoslavia (point 11). 9– Despite everything, not everyone is nostalgic or even blind. Some think this nostalgia is ridiculous and retrograde, trapping people and the country in a sort of inertia, feeding constant dissatisfaction and despair, and preventing or slowing down society's progress. It shows the condition of society, which lives in the past and is unable to project itself into the future because it is disappointed in the present. 12– So, overall, the image of Yugoslavia and Tito is (very) good. Moreover, the image of this socialist period is better in Yugoslavia than in other communist/socialist countries. This is partly due to the anti-propaganda in socialist Yugoslavia, which presented the country as much better and more open than other eastern countries. 13– Titostalgia is a rejection of the current political situation, which provokes discontent and despair. It is an indirect critique of the present, rejecting unfair globalization, capitalism, US/EU/NATO unilateralism, and militarization. Conclusion: "We are Tito's; Tito is ours." This concludes Mitja's study of titostalgia, which is part of yugonostalgia. It comes in different forms and different areas. As a whole, Tito's image is positive. Titostalgia concentrates on expressing feelings about today's society, which we would like to be closer to a socialist Yugoslavia. However, as nostalgically remembered and presented, this Yugoslavia and this Tito never existed: they are imagined and idealized, partly as some would have liked them to be or as the future they would have liked to see. On the one hand, this titostalgia can be found in everyday life and public places, for commercial purposes; on the other hand, it can be found at an individual level, as each person makes it their own. Concluding remarks Titostalgia. A Study of Nostalgia for Josip Broz by Mitja Velikonja is the perfect book if you want to learn about Tito's nostalgia 30 years after his death and 20 years after the breakup of socialist Yugoslavia. This study is evident and accessible, full of examples and images. Moreover, it includes a touch of humor and makes a difference between the modern countries of former Yugoslavia. Last but not least, it can be accessed for free online. It would be interesting to study titostalgia again, but the one from 2024, i.e., 15 years after Mitja. Where is it now? Is titostalgia less or more vivid? What does it show about society? Have things changed?

The course on the Western Balkans was a window to gain new knowledge in various areas of the Western Balkans, such as the history and future prospects of these countries. I have to admit that although I had read various articles on the events that have captured the Western Balkans or I had seen documentaries about them, in fact what I had read or heard was a little in relation to what I learned on my journey in this course . This is precisely thanks to your amazing project which did not remain just an idea but materialized and took a concrete form through discussions with colleagues from different parts of the world. I want to congratulate you for this wonderful project that I believe was successfully released and at the same time thank you for this golden opportunity that you gave me by making me part of this project. This course helped me learn about wars, state integration and different perceptions that the other Balkan citizens had for one-another and to see these differences in the locals’ eyes. I found the lecturers’ research papers very impressive and elaborative, and I would like to summarize one of lecturer’s presentations, which is Dejan Jovic. What was this lecture about ? In this lecture the professor Dejan Jovic talked about the Croatia War of Indipendence 1991-1995 between Croat forces loyal to the Government of Croatia, which had declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Serb controlled Yugoslav People's Army and local Serb forces. A majority of Croats wanted Croatia to leave Yugoslavia and become a sovereign country, while many ethnic Serbs living in Croatia, supported by Serbia,opposed the secession and wanted Serb-claimed lands to be in a common state with Serbia . Most Serbs sought a new Serb state within a Yugoslav federation, including areas of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with ethnic Serb majorities or significant minorities, and attempted to conquer as much of Croatia as possible. In January 1992, the first peace agreement between Croatia and Yugoslav forces was signed in Sarajevo, ending major hostilities in most of Croatia. At that time, Croatia had not been regognized  internationally. This agreement was in fact the precondition for the international recognition of Croatia, which followed on 15 January 1992. The county was still divided. This means that approximately 25% of its territory was not under the control of the central government, and this territory is mainly inhabited by ethnic Serbs. The political leadership at that time was interested in seceding from Croatia. This represented a significant challenge for Croatia in terms of declaring itself internationally independent, but not really in full control of its territory. In addition, what Croatia agreed to in 1992 as a precondition for recognition was that an international force, called the United Nations Force, would come to maintain the peace signed in Sarajevo on January 2, 1992. This force protected the areas as long as until the final compromise between the countries involved will not be signed . And since this did not happen for the next 3 years, we had a stalemate, which did not involve open hostilities or wars, but was characterized by ethnic engineering by force, rather than outright ethnic cleansing. We can use the concept of ethnic cleansing also with many people who were in an ethnic minority position in this particular case, being forced to leave these secessionist territories to other parts of Croatia. 600,000 people were internally displaced. Some of them became refugees in other countries. The situation was not normal even though the country was regognized. Many people moved, losing their home temporarily or permanently. Many houses were demolished. 12,000 Croats and 8,000 Serbs were dead, many of them civilian casualties, and about 140,000 homes and other industrial and other facilities were destroyed. The country's GDP fell by about 40% due to the war. The conflict ended in 1995 through a combination of military means and diplomacy, such as agreement with the remaining territory that was not fully integrated into Croatia through the Erdut agreement of November 1995. Another challenge that also has a long tail in contemporary Croatian history refers to the crimes committed during the war by both the secessionist Serbs and the Croatian army after the operation in 1995. And the Croatian had to deal somehow with the issue of transitional justice. The general amnesty was also a challenge, for rebellion, that is, anyone who had participated in the armed forces of the secessionist Serbs. The army would not be treated as legally responsible for this, but it did not refer to the major crimes and some of the war crimes committed during the war in Croatia, which was similar to the case in Bosnia, tried by The Hague International Criminal Tribunal for crimes in Yugoslavia, which in total indicated about 170 people. Later in the lecture, professor pointed out the fact that this war might might have been one possible option to gain indipendence, as when Croatia and Slovania declared indipendence in June 1991 there were nobody to regognze them. The international situation changed after the war, because they understood that the Yoguslavia could not secure peace and could not protect its citizens. It is true that the war end in battlefield but not in memory. The scars of it never heal. What were the most interesting remarks about this lecture in my opinion? This lecture was a perfect interweaving of several fields such as history, international law and politics. Although the professor in the lecture spoke extensively about the war, giving an objective overview of how events unfold, he also emphasized the role of international organizations in maintaining and establishing peace in the world, such as the United Nations organization that operates with peacekeeping missions for the mitigation of conflict and the creation of peace. During this lesson the professor also spoke about some other important topics such as: the concept of international recognition and its challenges in the international arena, illustrating it with a concrete case. how the ongoing struggle for territories could end in a bloody disaster consequences of the war and the ways to end it post-war justice as a viable concept in the international arena the role of political leadership in improving or worsening the war the role of international justice. As a law student it was important for me to highlight these topics because of the importance they have in international law. The fackt that the professor in one lecture perfectly dealt with such essencial topics was beyond of my expectactions.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia, far from being the basic outcome of national identities emergence after the fall of Communism as political practice and ideology in the USSR, originated from a complex intersection of processes and crisis developed both within and outside the Yugoslav State. The political and ideological Yugoslav system was indeed based on a positioning between the ‘West’ and the Soviet Union, and the aftermath of 1989 clearly marked a shift in the internal balance of the State. However, it is necessary to underline that this was not the only reason leading to the breakup of the State because the Yugoslav political system itself, as it emerged after Tito’s death and the 1974 constitution, created an environment conducive to growing instability. During the 1980s, nationalist ideals grew in a context of uncertainty about the future assets of the State. Many switched from being supporters of Yugoslav Communism to being supporters of new nationalist positions. This process has been identified as a sort of compensation, given the fact that nationalism offered a new sense of belonging for many supporters of the Yugoslav political project, which was gradually withering away.With regard to the causes of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, many arguments have been put forward, and Dejan Yovic extensively analyzed the major ones in order to elaborate a ‘Multi-factors subjective approach’ (to quote his definition), capable of merging together elements from each interpretation and exclude narrowing, one-sided perspectives. The collapse of Yugoslavia brought about the intervention of numerous actors both from inside the former republics (regular armies and paramilitary units) and outside (NATO, UN, EU, etc.). When the tensions between Serbia and, to a larger extent, the Yugoslav authorities and the republics of Slovenia and Croatia reached a non-returning point with the 14th Congress of the Yugoslav communist league in 1990, it became clear that a new asset involving the defection of this republics from Yugoslavia was about to be established. If Slovenia could prevent a prolonged and complex conflict with the JNA (Yugoslav National Army), it was only because of the support it received from the newly reunited Germany and, to a broader extent, from Western European countries. Moreover, being Slovenia a substantially ethnic pure state, Serbia and other republics couldn’t claim part of its territories under the justification of reuniting and protecting their ethnic kins. The situation was completely different in Croatia and, more importantly, in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the first hosted Serb communities in the regions of Slavonia and Krajina, and the latter was the most ethnically mixed among the republics with the majority of the population composed of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and a conspicuous presence of ethnic Serbs and Croats. The war initially broke out between the JNA (increasingly if not completely responsive to Serbian political projects) and Croatia just to expand to Bosnia between 1991 and 1992, after the establishment of the self-proclaimed community of Herceg Bosna by Bosnian Croats and the referendum for independence from Yugoslavia that took place in 1992, despite the strenuous opposition of Bosnian Serbs, whose president Radovan Karadzic played a significant role in the following steps of the conflict. The war was marked by systematic ethnic cleansing and widespread violence against civilians perpetrated by all the conflicting parties. Particularly remarkable was the deployment of paramilitary groups trained and sponsored by Belgrade to support both the military operations of the JNA and the VRS (army of self-proclaimed Republika Srpska), whose actions were marked by selective and brutal violence against civilians. The lack of volunteers applying for being recruited in the JNA, the general context of instability, and the widespread propaganda conveying the idea of ethnic Serb outside and inside Serbia(i.e., in Kosovo) being under threat, among other causes, made the creation and mobilization of paramilitary units an advantageous tool for Serbian nationalists’ political project embodied by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. The main aim of these units, as clearly demonstrated by a number of testimonies and investigations mainly carried out by the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), was to subdue territories in the disputed territories of Croatia and particularly of Bosnia and Herzegovina by means of violence and terror. More specifically, they were deployed in areas where the non-Serb population was determined to stay and, therefore, needed to be exposed to particularly violent displays and acts of terror in order to be forced into fleeing. Where this wasn’t possible, paramilitaries engaged in systematic killings and deliberate acts of cruelty reaching a genocidal level in some well-known and documented cases, such as the extermination of the male population in Srebrenica (in this case, the extermination was carried out by the VRS but paramilitaries played a significant role before the Genocide took place). These units usually acted along with the VRS and the JNA, but, in some cases, and especially when non-professionalized units were involved while proceeding with the goals of conquering land and seizing territories for the Serbs, they also engaged in looting, robbery, property destruction and particularly brutal acts of violence especially against non-Serb civilian population. Belgrade was behind the paramilitaries, fueling them with equipment and monetary rewards and providing them with strategic information to guarantee the success of their interventions. However, this link is not immediately identifiable through a cursory analysis since Serbian authorities made sure military operations and acts of violence carried out by these groups only took place outside national borders in order to construct plausible deniability. Moreover, a significant differentiation among armed groups is recognizable. The most notable difference is the level of professionalization (i.e., military capabilities, equipment, and the complexity of the chain of command), dividing this organization into at least two macro groups. Professionalized units such as the Red Berets and the Scorpions were closely linked to the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP), while the Serbian State Security played the role of chief organizer in various operations involving these groups. Non-professionalized units were usually the product of political parties supporting the cause of ethnic Serbs outside Serbia, such as the Vojislav Šešelj Serbian radical party. The recruitment process for the formation of these units appears to be significantly less scrupulous with regard to physical prowess and military capabilities, thus favoring the recruitment of individuals of dubious reliability and with a penchant for violence. Importantly, the different nature of units deployed on the ground led to different types of violence perpetrated against civilians. Both professionalized and non-professionalized units attacked villages and towns, engaged in racketeering, looting, explosions, beatings, rapings, and indiscriminate killings mainly against nonserbs, but the first were more likely to keep the violence secret, or at least not to engage in prolonged public displays of violence. This is understandable in light of the privileged status they benefitted from and the responsibilities associated with it. Non-professionalized units were, on the contrary, more often involved in both more expressive and public violent displays. As Fujii put forward in relation to the concepts described by Wikstrom and Triber of expressive and instrumental violence, this kind of action should be interpreted as <>. Engagement in violent acts by paramilitary groups served both as a way to show the new order imposed by their presence and to make the civilian population aware of what they would face in case of opposition to their will. However, especially when these acts were perpetrated by non-professionalized units, and particularly with regard to the Yellow Wasps in the Zvornik area, it often degenerated into sadistic and perverted shows aimed at inflicting not only physical pain to the victims but also emotional devastation for the victims before death and lasting psychological harm to those who survived or witnessed (who were most likely to be close relatives of the victims). Unlike professionalized units, which were often deployed distant from the place where they lived and thus didn’t engage in acts of personal violence against people they were familiar with before wartime, the violence enacted by non-professionalized units was significantly more driven by personal resentment since the deployment of these units was more likely to happen in areas the members were familiar with. Further reasons for enacting public expressive violence were the goal of humiliating the culture of the victims (especially in the case of Bosniaks) and the perpetrator’s desire to be known for the violence they displayed. With regard to this, Fujii underlines how <> which was usually not the main goal of professionalized units given their privileged status. Even if Serbs usually didn’t undergo the ordeals Bosniaks and non-Serbs in general experience, in the case of Serbian refugees who fled from the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska Krajina as a result of the Croat military operation (operation Storm), they were exposed to brutal treatment by Serbian forces and forcibly sent back to the region as fighters often without specific training. Other cases of violence against Serbs enacted by paramilitaries involved wealthy Serbs living in the disputed areas and Serbs who were accused of collaborating by any means with ethnic ‘enemies.’ After the NATO bombing, which targeted the armed forces deployed in Republika Srpska and the Dayton Agreement in 1995, professionalized units that were closely linked to Belgrade, such as the Red Berets, were integrated into the JSO, the Special Operation Unit. This, along with the half-hearted help provided by the regime to the ICTY investigations and the lack - exception made for some low-ranking paramilitary members involved in particularly efferent acts of violence against civilians- of serious investigations and prosecutions against the main actors behind the crimes against humanity perpetrated in Bosnia, clearly demonstrate that Belgrade strongly backed paramilitaries and shielded itself from being accused of direct involvement in the war. Researchers extensively discussed the nature of crimes committed during the Yugoslav wars. Calic analyzed the concept of Ethnic cleansing, trying to assess how this differs from the concept of Genocide. What is most remarkable about her research is that, instead of trying to establish whether Genocide was committed in one case or the other, she assesses the concept of ethnic cleansing as a scale stretching from intimidation and political projects aimed at discouraging people belonging to certain ethnic groups to reside in areas in which the majority of the population belongs to other ethnic groups to genocidal practices. The main advantage of depicting ethnic cleansing in this way is that, while differentiating based on the gravity and systematicity of the crimes committed, it allows the reader to see a series of what could be considered minor events as essential in creating an environment conducive to the enactment of more efferent crimes, even to the point of Genocide.