Author: Vilson Blloshmi           This paper advances a clear claim: successive emigration & youth emigration waves have  contributed to the increasing electoral support of Albania’s Socialist ruling party. The  mechanism runs through electorate composition (older at home), turnout depression in  youth-heavy areas, and selective mobilization of diaspora-origin voters. A key empirical  puzzle is why diaspora-origin voting appears to favour incumbents (~61%) despite exit  motives rooted in domestic shortcomings.   This study will examine how demographic change, especially youth emigration,  influences elections in Albania and why both resident voters and diaspora-origin voters  often support the ruling Socialist Party. Photo: pixabay/wal_172619 Context and Background   Albania’s age structure and migration balance have shifted markedly, while election  observation repeatedly flags barriers that disproportionately burden younger voters,  information gaps, procedural frictions, and low institutional trust. These trends intersect  with party organization and media environments to sustain large majorities alongside  uneven participation. Levitsky & Way use “competitive authoritarianism” to describe  regimes where formal democratic institutions exist and opposition can compete, but the  contest is systematically skewed because incumbents abuse state power, so elections are  real, yet not fully free and fair. Such regimes are competitive, in that democratic  institutions are not merely a façade: opposition parties use them to seriously contest for power; but they are authoritarian in that opposition forces are handicapped by a highly  uneven—and sometimes dangerous—playing field. Competition is thus real but unfair.1In their framework, the key test is an uneven playing field across major battles (elections,  media, and the state bureaucracy), where rules are applied selectively and public  resources are used to entrench the governing party.   Applied to Albania after the Socialist Party’s historic May 11, 2025 win (83/140 seats)  with 53.3% of the vote, the outcome alone doesn’t “prove” competitive authoritarianism  because landslides can happen in democracies too. But the conditions reported around the  election align with Levitsky & Way’s warning signs: international observers and major  outlets pointed to misuse of public resources, uneven media coverage, and allegations of  pressure and intimidation, all classic mechanisms that can keep elections competitive  while making them unfair.  OSCE&ODIHR stated that: The ruling party benefitted from  widespread use of administrative resources during the campaign, creating an undue  advantage of incumbency. There were also numerous allegations of pressure on voters,  especially public employees. Further, the electoral legislation and its narrow  interpretation by the election administration did not prevent abusive practices.2  So the strongest argument is that Albania shows competitive-authoritarian tendencies:  opposition parties exist and contest power, yet repeated dominant victories are reinforced  by a state environment where incumbents appear to enjoy structural advantages such as  resources, visibility or influence over institutions that weaken the possibility of genuine  alternation. If these patterns persist, especially around media pluralism, enforcement  against vote-buying and pressure, and institutional independence Levitsky & Way’s label  becomes more applicable, not because the opposition is banned, but because competition  remains meaningful while the field stays tilted.   Albanian Electoral System   The Parliament of the Republic of Albania consists of 140 members of parliament, who  are elected for a 4-year term. The electoral system for the Assembly is a proportional  representation system with multi-member electoral districts. For parliamentary elections,  each electoral district corresponds to the administrative-territorial division of the qark (county). The total number of electoral districts is 12, and the number of parliamentary  mandates per district ranges from 3 seats in Kukës County to 37 seats in Tirana County.  Local government elections are held to elect 61 mayors and 1,603 members of municipal  councils across the country. Mayors and municipal council members are directly elected  for a 4-year term.  For local elections, the electoral district corresponds to the administrative-territorial division of the municipality. Mayors are elected through a  majoritarian system, while municipal council members are elected through a proportional  system with closed lists. The number of municipal council seats in each municipality is  determined based on population and ranges from 15 to 61 mandates. Council mandates  are allocated among parties and coalitions using the d’Hondt method, while the  distribution of seats among parties within a coalition is done using the Saint-Lague  method.   Freedom of movement or running from a reality?   As of every time a government official, member of council of ministers, members of  parliament from the Socialist Party, or expert supporting the government argues why  Albanians are leaving the country at such massive and vast numbers they tend to reduce  the importance of such a topic. The Prime Minister Rama states several times that youth  emigration is a normal outcome of freedom of movement and individual choice, not a  national tragedy. He argues that people have the right to test life abroad, and that  portraying emigration as “the worst thing” is, in his view, an exaggerated political/media narrative.  He also claims emigration has brought benefits to Albania (skills, experience,  broader culture), and suggests the public debate becomes distorted because today  everything is amplified “online.” In meetings with young people, he doubles down on3 the idea that if someone believes there is no future in Albania, they should be free to try  leaving, but he insists that the “no future” claim is wrong, and that simple wage  comparisons ignore living costs abroad.  Rama argues that emigration should be treated 4 as a normal, long-running (“historical”) phenomenon tied to freedom of movement, and  says the public debate in Albania often turns into hyperbole rather than a calm discussion  based on facts.Rama even points to comparisons like 2017, when around 39,905 people  left Albania versus 50,000 from EU-member Croatia, to claim the narrative is often  exaggerated. From the other hand the emigration of youth and young people in the last5 decade are unimaginable. 1 milion Albanians have left the country during last 16 years according to Eurostat cited by Monitor.al6  From 2008 to 2024 about one million Albanian citizens received a first-time residence  permit in a European Union country, according to Eurostat data. This increase, from  around 97,780 permits in 2008 to nearly one million by 2024, shows a continuous and  accelerating wave of people leaving Albania for the EU. These emigrants now represent a  large share of the country’s working-age population, and the true number would be even  higher if Albanians who moved to non-EU destinations such as the United Kingdom, the  United States or Canada were also included. The figures point to a major demographic  shift that is slowly changing the profile of those who remain in the country.  Albania  showed the highest annual expatriation rate of nationals to OECD countries in 2023 (22  per 1 000 inhabitants). Romania (13), Bulgaria (12), Bosnia and Herzegovina (11) and  Cuba (11) were the other countries with two-digit figures. The reasons behind this trend 7 are linked to economic difficulties, limited job opportunities, high informality in the  labour market and the lack of long-term security for many young people. Family8 reunification and chances for better education also play an important role.  As emigration  becomes widespread, its effects on Albania’s social and political life are becoming more visible, including a shrinking workforce, loss of skilled professionals, an ageing  population and new electoral dynamics. The scale of the exodus shows that this is not  only a demographic issue but a deeper structural change with serious implications for the  country’s future.  Emigrant Share of Total Population, Albania second after Bulgaria with 41.9% and  projections show that the decline might go to 15.8% by the end of 2050.9  "Southeastern Europe is experiencing one of the sharpest depopulations in the world, led  by Bulgaria, whose population is projected to drop nearly one-quarter by 2050. The most  significant factor behind this trend is migration to Western Europe, which has remained  widespread since the post-communist and post-conflict transition periods of the 1990s  and 2000s. For example, half the total population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 42  percent in Albania reside abroad, often in Western Europe."10  The demographic picture may be bleakest in Bulgaria, which is on course to face the  world’s highest single-country depopulation rate over the next 30 years, according to the  United Nations Population Division. Yet Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,  Albania, and Romania are not far behind, each expecting declines of 15 percent or more  over the next three decades (see Projections). This phenomenon is occurring even as the  world’s population is expected to increase by 2 billion people, to 9.7 billion in 2050.11  Elections and turnout - is it a deadlock?   The Socialist Party won the general elections in coalition with another left wing party  "Socialist Movement for Integration on 2013 to never lose it up to date. After the first  term in coalition with SMI, on the 2017 elections and onwards the Socialist Party won  the elections and the majority in the Parliament as a sole party. In this section we will see  how the turnout percentages changed through years and if the voters taking part in the  general election declined or not.   Youth Voting trends   In Albania, the Youth Study points to a downward tendency in youth turnout. The share  of eligible young respondents who say they voted in the last parliamentary elections fell  from 76.8% in 2018 to 73.8% in 2024, while those who did not vote rose from 23.2% to  26.2%. The change is not dramatic, but it signals a clear direction: a gradual erosion of12 electoral participation among young Albanians, even as voting remains the most common  form of political involvement.   This decline looks even more significant when placed next to the broader engagement  profile. In other words, as youth turnout shows signs of slipping, there is not a strong  “backup” of other participation channels to compensate. The overall picture is of a  generation that is becoming more distant from politics beyond election day, which risks  turning a small drop in turnout today into deeper disengagement over time unless trust,  representation, and everyday relevance of politics improve.   General elections 25 april 2021   General elections of 2021 were held in a tense political climate as one person was  assassinated during the last days of electoral campaign The turnout resulted to be13 46.33%. The official turnout data from the 2021 Albanian general elections shows  significant variation across the twelve qarqe, with overall participation remaining  relatively low at the national level. Out of 3,588,869 registered voters, only 1,662,274  cast a ballot, producing a nationwide turnout of 46.33 percent. Female participation was  slightly lower, with 799,094 women voting out of 1,776,128 registered female voters, or  44.99 percent.   Tirana recorded the highest number of voters, with 484,769 people participating,  representing a turnout of 53.24 percent. Its female turnout rate was similarly strong at  52.01 percent. Dibër also stood above the national average with a participation rate of  52.68 percent, and women in this district voted at an even higher rate of 53.44 percent.  Other districts that approached or exceeded the 50 percent threshold include Kukës, with  49.25 percent turnout, and Korçë, which reached 46.14 percent.  By contrast, several regions displayed markedly lower participation. Vlorë recorded the weakest turnout in the  country at just 33.56 percent, with women voting at an even lower rate of 31.67 percent.  Gjirokastër also reported low engagement, with only 38.85 percent of voters and 37.31  percent of women casting ballots. Shkodër and Durrës likewise fell below the national  average, standing at 41.86 percent and 44.96 percent respectively. Most districts showed  turnout levels in the mid-40 percent range, such as Berat at 44.20 percent, Lezhë at 44.08  percent, Fier at 45.35 percent, and Elbasan at 47.86 percent. In nearly all regions, female  turnout lagged slightly behind male turnout, though the gap varied by district. Overall,  the 2021 elections confirmed persistent patterns of low participation, strong regional  disparities, and noticeable gender differences. These dynamics are essential for  understanding electoral behavior and for linking turnout patterns to broader demographic  shifts, including youth emigration and population decline.   The OSCE/ODIHR final report on the 2021 Albanian elections stated that voters were  offered a genuine choice of candidates, campaigns took place freely, and fundamental  rights were generally respected. However, the mission also identified several structural  issues that created an uneven playing field. The ruling party benefited from its influence  over local administrations and the misuse of state resources, while the overall campaign  environment was affected by widespread allegations of vote-buying. Media coverage14 was heavily unbalanced in favour of incumbents, with frequent overlap between  government activities and party messaging, which further strengthened the ruling party’s  advantage.   Despite the Central Election Commission administering the process in an organized and  transparent manner, long-standing systemic problems remained unresolved. These  included weak oversight of campaign financing, concerns about personal data protection,  and legislative gaps that allow continued political manipulation. In response to these  issues, OSCE/ODIHR issued twenty-three recommendations aimed at improving the  integrity of future elections, with emphasis on securing the secrecy of the vote,  strengthening investigations into vote-buying, protecting citizens’ data, and ensuring fair  and independent media conditions for all contestants.   Last General elections 2025 - an electoral anomaly?   The official turnout figures show that participation in the most recent elections varied  widely across Albania’s twelve districts. Out of more than 3.46 million registered voters  nationwide, around 1.46 million cast a ballot, giving a general turnout rate of 42.25  percent. Tirana recorded the highest number of voters, with more than 450,000 people  participating and a turnout rate of 49.29 percent.  Dibër also performed strongly with  49.07 percent turnout, followed by Kukës at 45.56 percent. In contrast, Vlorë had the  lowest participation in the country, where only 30.40 percent of registered voters took  part. Shkodër and Gjirokastër also reported lower engagement, at 36.81 percent and 35.81  percent respectively. Most other districts, including Berat, Lezhë, Korçë, Fier and  Elbasan, remained in the low-forties range.   A comparison of the two election cycles shows a noticeable decline in voter participation  across almost all districts. In the 2021 general elections, national turnout stood at 46.33  percent, with over 1.66 million voters participating. By contrast, in the later election the  nationwide turnout fell to 42.25 percent, with about 1.46 million voters casting a ballot.  This means participation dropped by more than four percentage points overall. Several  districts that performed strongly in 2021, such as Korçë, Elbasan, Fier and Lezhë,  recorded lower turnout in the more recent vote. Vlorë remained the weakest both times,  but its turnout decreased even further, moving from 33.56 percent in 2021 to only 30.40  percent. Shkodër and Gjirokastër also showed continued low engagement, confirming a  wider pattern of regional stagnation and decline.   Voting trends of Serbian diaspora   The dynamics of diaspora voting offer a revealing lens through which to examine how  formally competitive elections can be subtly re-engineered in favor of incumbents. In line  with Levitsky and Way’s framework, both Albania and Serbia illustrate how electoral  openness can coexist with increasingly uneven playing fields shaped by participation  patterns and organizational power. Dr. Dejan Bursać’s answers are useful because they  point to a shared pattern Albania and Serbia can display in Levitsky & Way’s terms:  elections remain formally open and opposition parties still run, yet incumbents can  steadily stack the odds in their favor by shaping participation and building durable  political machines. In Serbia, he recalls that 10–15 years ago diaspora voting was tiny  (around 10,000 voters) and the bulk of those votes tended to go to liberal, pro-European  parties. Later, once voting procedures became simpler and more accessible, diaspora  turnout reportedly rose (around 30,000 about a decade ago), and the balance shifted  today, he says, most diaspora votes go to the ruling party.   Bursać offers two explanations that map onto Levitsky & Way’s “uneven playing field”  logic. First, he links the new pro-government diaspora pattern to who participates:  working-class, older, and less-qualified emigrants are described as more likely to back  incumbents, often because they value stability, patronage, or tangible benefits. Second, he  highlights a transnational party infrastructure: the SNS’s organizational networks, he  argues, are well-funded and active even in neighboring countries and diaspora hubs,  which can mobilize turnout and preference formation at scale. The combination of  expanded access + targeted mobilization capacity can flip diaspora outcomes without needing to ban opponents, exactly the type of mechanism that keeps elections  “competitive” but structurally advantages incumbents.   Migration benefits the authorities Despite the clear decline in turnout between the two elections, the evidence shows that  demographic change itself is a key driver of lower participation and that this shift helps  explain the outcome. In the most recent election, the party secured 83 mandates and  53.29 percent of the vote, a level of dominance which is contradictory when facing huge  demographic drain. Youth emigration reduces the size of the most turnout-volatile  segment of the electorate and weakens the social networks that typically pull young  voters into politics. As a result, the electorate that remains is older, more settled, and  more likely to vote regularly. In other words, turnout falls not only because of “political  apathy,” but because the country’s demographic structure is changing: fewer young  people are physically present, and those who stay are a shrinking share of the voting-age  population.   The patterns in youth preferences and voting habits analyzed fit this logic: many young  citizens do not vote because they see limited personal payoff from participation, feel  underrepresented by party offerings, and increasingly treat migration as the main strategy  for improving life chances. "Exit” over “voice”. Among those who do vote, choices tend  to be shaped less by long-term partisan loyalty and more by short-term calculations like  stability, access, and perceived effectiveness, while clientelistic or mobilization networks  can further tilt participation toward groups that are easier to reach and motivate. Taken  together, youth emigration and youth disengagement do not just lower turnout; they  change who turns out by producing an electorate that is narrower and more predictable  and thus, making it easier for an incumbent with strong organizational reach to maintain  and even deepen dominance despite a shrinking overall voter pool.   For Albania, this creates a useful comparative hypothesis: the Socialist Party’s dominant  result can be interpreted not simply as popularity, but as potentially reinforced by  incumbent-friendly mobilization channels (party networks, patronage linkages,  messaging capacity, and administrative leverage) that operate at home and, possibly,  through diaspora voting procedures and outreach. The comparative punchline is not  “Albania = Serbia,” but that both cases may show how incumbents in hybrid regimes can  convert expanding participation (including diaspora voting) into dominance, while  maintaining the outward form of pluralist competition, one of Levitsky & Way’s core  signatures of competitive authoritarianism. 

Author: Emi Postoli Civil society is often considered to be the backbone of democracy, but in Albania, it feels more like a shaky, loose foundation. During its 30 years of democratic consolidation, Albania has failed to ensure the effectiveness of a successful civil society. Despite the high number of activists and NGOs in Albania, their effectiveness is hindered by a range of different historical, institutional, and political factors. Today, political participation and voluntary social action are two areas of civic engagement where Albania is struggling. What holds Albania back from building a strong civil society, and what can be done to overcome these challenges? The communist shadow The country’s long communist legacy is undeniably one of the main causes of its weak civil society nowadays. Civic engagement in Albania was not absent during the communist period, but it was tightly connected to the ideology and interests of the system. Citizens could not initiate any community-driven/voluntarism actions without the involvement of the state, so Albanians did not experience taking a proactive role in society. For instance, volunteerism today may sometimes take a negative connotation simply because of its reputation during communism. Additionally, the regime fostered a culture of spying among citizens leading to fear and mutual suspicion being always present, leading to a weak sense of community and social cohesion.[1] Thus it now appears difficult to build a vibrant civil society based on the experience of a negative collective memory regarding civic cooperation. The gap in implementation Today, while a legal framework exists to include NGOs in decision-making processes, its implementation often falls short. According to a report by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation, the majority of Albanian citizens almost never engage in civil society, and the data indicates that a low trust in the NGOs (compared to media for e.g.) are the main factor contributing to this occurrence.[2] Efforts to bridge the gap between the government and civil society, in terms of institutional mechanisms, have been inconsistent. Although the legal framework does provide space for the inclusion of organizations, proper implementation is usually lacking. Institutional mechanisms for facilitating the linkage and communication between state entities and NGOs are underdeveloped and there is no unified approach on the government’s side. The National Council for Civil Society was legally established in 2015 to facilitate the relation between civil society and the government, but it has produced very little outcome for advancing the dialogue between the two parties.[3] Involvement in the drafting of laws or policies relevant to the sector is almost inexistent. While the government has made efforts to engage with civil society, these initiatives lack practical support and fail to translate into meaningful institutional backing. Influence of politics The engagement of civil society is also heavily politicized at times. The lack of firmly established democratic principles undermines the development of a strong civil society by allowing political affiliations to dictate governmental support for NGOs. Civil society organizations frequently face pressure from political actors to align their activities with partisan agendas, limiting their ability to monitor government actions or hold policymakers accountable.[4] This creates power imbalances that may stop the organisations from achieving their goals. Consequently, civil society cannot perform its monitoring role and hold the government accountable for certain policies or lawmaking. According to UNDP, there is also a lack of transparent criteria with regard to the selection of organizations or associations involved in the decision-making process, allowing for assumptions of favoritism.[5] This dynamic not only weakens CSOs’ independence but also impedes Albania’s democratic progress. It turns out that organizations with more critical stances that do not align with the incumbent’s interests may be disfavored regarding their direct involvement. Decisions taken by government entities with regard to funding and partnership opportunities as well as different regulatory policies for civil society organizations are usually unclear and there is little consultation, leaving dissenting voices marginalized.[6] This kind of politicization directly impacts the sustainability of civil society practices in Albania as political interests are not fixed but short-term, while democratization should be a long-term process. As a result, many Albanians view CSOs as extensions of political parties rather than advocates for genuine social issues, undermining their credibility and public trust.[7] The belief that civil society is politically biased or self-serving makes citizens  reluctant to engage or participate in its initiatives. Lastly, internal factors also impact the effectiveness of civil society in Albania today. In terms of their organisation, civil society organisations sometimes struggle because of issues such as low financial capacities, and lack of professional staff, or limited capacities. [8] In addition, the civil society in Albania appears fragmented whereas the resources and opportunities are usually limited. Financial dependency forces many organizations to rely on funds coming from political entities or politically influenced sources, compromising their civic mission.[9] When external sources and donations appear limited, state support is the only way left for civil society organisations to survive. Is there hope? Despite the challenges faced, civil society has seen some notable efforts in recent years. In 2019, civil society organizations empowered workers to form unions, such as the Unified Miners of Bulqiza Union. Another example is that of 2018-2020 when there was a considerable degree of engagement against the demolition of the National Theatre. However, the case of civic mobilization against the dismantlement of Syria’s chemical weapons in Albania in 2013, remains one of the most successful victories. Protests stemmed from common civic environmentalist concerns engaging dozens of citizens as well as CSOs advocating for the protection of the environment. Initiatives regarding environmental problems have also been very active with regard to the power-plant construction in river banks or national protected parks, where CSOs have provided their legal support, expertise, activist power, and opportunities for media coverage in helping local communities. Yet there has been no shift in the government policy with regard to the construction of the hydro plants of Dragobi and Çeremi. These examples indicate an existing potential for citizen engagement in decision-making in Albania, yet one could argue that the defeats could act as hindrances for future civil society initiatives. Despite the challenges it faces, Albania’s civil society demonstrates the potential for meaningful change, especially with the right support and a more robust institutional framework. Efforts like environmental protests and workers' unionization show that collective action can make a difference. However, to truly strengthen its democracy, Albania must focus on building trust, transparency, and collaboration within its civic space. A strong civil society isn't just an ideal, but it’s essential to ensure that the voices of the people help shape the country's future. [1] Kotoni, M. (2011). CIVIL SOCIETY IN ALBANIA: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE FACTORS WHICH PREVENT ITS STRENGTHENING AND DEVELOPMENT. [2] IDM. “Citizens Engagement in Decision-Making.” Welcome to IDM, 17 Sept. 2020, idmalbania.org/new-projectwidening-the-democratic-space-through-citizens-engagement-in-decision-making/. [3] Agolli, Ariola, et al. Participation of citizens and civil society in decision making, Study on the legal and regulatory framework and practice in Albania. (2013) [4] Florian Cullhaj. (2016). Democratization from Within. Edizioni Nuova Cultura. [5] Albania Progress Report 2022 | United Nations in Albania. (2022). Albania.un.org. https://albania.un.org/en/224031-albania-progress-report-2022 [6] Florian Cullhaj. (2016). Democratization from Within. Edizioni Nuova Cultura. [7] Bino, B., Qirjazi, R., & Dafa, A. (2020). Civil society participation in decision-making in Albania. Institute for Democracy and Mediation for Westminster Foundation for Democracy. [8] Vurmo, G. (2010). CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX FOR ALBANIA IN SEARCH OF CITIZENS & IMPACT Albania World Alliance for Citizen Participation. [9] Bino, B., Qirjazi, R., & Dafa, A. (2020). Civil society participation in decision-making in Albania. Institute for Democracy and Mediation for Westminster Foundation for Democracy.

Author: MSC. Vasiljano Buba Prologue "A political leader should look back to see if the youth are following. If this is not happening, he will not be a political leader for long", said Bernard Baruch. This should serve as a wake-up call for future political leaders in Albania, where youth must become an integral part of their programs, not merely for political consumption, as is often the case, but as one of the main actors in society, serving as the driving force and reflecting the predispositions that the new generation will have in the future social structure. We will endeavor to approach the subject from a philosophical and anthropological perspective, given that the youth and their role in society are not merely a matter of predestined fate. They can shape the course of their lives not simply in a mechanical or mathematical manner, as the Stoics did[1], but as rational beings convinced that each of their steps should be the product of intellect rather than biology. Furthermore, they must be accountable for their actions or inactions in certain situations, and most importantly, they should face the consequences of their choices with dignity and pride. They should be convinced that while the outcome may not be what they desired, the only path to truth is through our mistakes. In our subconscious, when the word "youth" is mentioned, the first qualities that come to mind are dynamism, vitality, and carelessness, among other characteristics. These are not inherently negative, but we believe that these qualities are stigmatized as "bad" precisely because they are evident in a generation raised with the spirit of social caste hermetism and the suppression of Sapere Aude[2] from its inception. In reality, the youth's "battle" is not with the older generation but with themselves. The best embodiment of this idea is found in Socratic philosophy, which posits that the true struggle of a person is against selfishness and ignorance. Socrates believed that the more knowledgeable a person is, the more virtuous they become. He argued that no one is intentionally evil; rather, evil arises from ignorance[3]. This ignorance is the root of the mistaken differences perceived between generations. In reality, there should be no such divide if everyone has their defined role in society. If we examine closely the phrase "stability and change," which at first glance may seem contradictory to some, we find that the binding element between them is the word democracy. We choose democracy not because it guarantees a millennium of peace, but because it is the only dignified force where we can be fully responsible for ourselves[4]. Its fundamental importance lies in the fact that democracy allows us to remove the existing government without shedding blood, this is its most distinctive feature. In the classic antagonism between fossilized stability and the new innovations brought by the youth, countless articles and books have been written. This has often been framed as a "hostility", but this is nothing more than a cynical interpretation and a narrow-minded reading of reality. The experience of the older generation is a valuable asset that must be conserved and cultivated with the utmost respect, for the simple reason that it served as the moral and infrastructural foundation that the youth followed until they reached the maturity of their thought. Demonstrating that generational change does not mean elimination or exclusion, but rather synergy between them, ensures that a society progresses safely on the path of prosperity and maintains a healthy linear continuity. The intellectual and other synergies created by intertwining significant characteristics such as experience with dynamism undoubtedly produce admirable democratic stability. If history has taught us anything, it is that the misuse of the qualities that youth possess has led to wars and immense destruction, including in the civilized world. A retrospective examination of history reveals that before or after every war, the formation of the new generation is prioritized; this is not coincidental, but because in the reformation of society, nothing is more important than education[5]. This is due to the fact that their aforementioned qualities, when intertwined with totalitarian or non-totalitarian ideologies, cement their mentality, preparing them for the new era to come. Based on this fact, we believe that youth are capable of both destroying and building the societies to which they belong. The focus of international organizations such as the UN or the EU should not only be on supporting the youth, which has been done for years, especially in fragile and hybrid democracies like Albania, but the theoretical educational role should also be accompanied by other practical factors to ensure that the youth are immune to extreme nationalism and the ideologies of the far right or left. Aristotle's articulation is very significant; he believed that the citizen should be shaped to adapt to the form of government under which they live. Every government has a particular character that it formed at the beginning and maintains. The character of democracy creates democracy, while the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy[6]. Albania is certainly an example that illustrates this quote. The difficult years of the communist period attempted to forge a new youth without moral or religious backbone. Marx himself tried to shift from metaphysics to history by blaming, among other things, the democratic state and the capitalist system for the world's problems[7]. However, this ultimately resulted in the dramatic fall of non-democratic regimes and the mindset they sought to impose. But why do totalitarian regimes fail, while democracy, despite its issues, remains the best solution? To answer this question, we believe it is necessary to carefully analyze the analogy of the open society thesis that Popper articulates with admirable elegance in his book "The Open Society and Its Enemies". In Popper's articulation, he affirms that so-called closed societies (totalitarian systems in our case) are destined to self-destruct. He illustrates this with the biological state theory[8]. He also argued that in these societies, particularly during the dictatorship in our case, the community is everything and the individual is nothing. The opposite occurs in an open society. Individuality is not merely the opposite of community; if it were, it would be just a desperate yearning for what has been forbidden for years. Rather, it is an instrument for the liberation of knowledge and human capital, making a person not just flesh and bones, but a unique being with the ability to exploit their full potential[9]. This kind of autonomy, unlike the servitude of a closed society, has a positive impulse on the individual. By having the opportunity to choose from a diverse repertoire of options, individuals are naturally more motivated to give their best for themselves, which indirectly benefits the society they belong to[10]. The development of an ontology where a democratic, tolerant, and liberal society is preferred over an authoritarian and totalitarian one is not only a moral and ethical principle[11] but also a vital necessity for the cultural emancipation of the youth. This thesis is inextricably linked to the premise that young people need the necessary spaces and infrastructure to express their ideas and thoughts. They should not be marginalized from the rest of society, especially by political elites, under the pretext of a lack of experience or any other justification. If we aim to build an open society with values, we must first educate the new generation in the spirit of European valorization. As the author himself recounts, the book "The Open Society and Its Enemies" is a theory and defense of democracy against both new and old attacks from its adversaries[12]. We believe that the new attacks are the tendencies we touched on earlier—those movements or ideologies that seek to escalate in the opposite direction with grotesque slogans for absolute freedom or freedom without limits. Great thinkers have denied this principle because of the consequences that such freedom can bring, encapsulated in the phrase: "If I am free to do whatever I want, then I am free to take another's life". This idea has theological roots, reflected in the brilliant expression of Apostle Paul: "Everything is permissible, but not everything is beneficial". Regarding the former assaults, we contend that beyond endeavors aimed at the revival of neo-Nazi systems and the entirety of the political extreme spectrum, allusions extend to a caste of individuals who perceive the world as fraught with so many dark facets of existence within which we dwell, thereby condemning us to a purported "suffering" in a manner deemed sufficient. We posit, akin to Popper's assertion, that the dissemination of these fallacies constitutes the gravest crime of our era, for it menaces youth and endeavors to deprive them of the right to harbor hope and optimism[13], thereby stimulating, as Hegel articulated, "an anxiety that propels the creature beyond its center"[14]. Consequently, not only does a dearth of stability ensue, but democracy is also liable to converge merely in name, resembling dictatorships in essence, which may bear the label of democracy de jure but fail to embody any of its values de facto. Democracy thrives when society does likewise; this hinges not solely on the socio-economic condition but also on the approach and mindset in confronting the challenges brought forth by globalization. The dream of global unity is not novel[15]; rather, pan-European integration has been and remains a magnificent vision. The EU, which Albania aspires to integrate into, is a unique hybrid entity, neither a federal state like the United States nor an organization like the UN; it stands between them with a universal value system and a diverse array of currents. The European family should not be a utopia; integration is not merely a bureaucratic-economic process among states but much more. It encompasses the cultural, psychological, and religious spheres, among others, and this is preceded by a sound preparation in the mindset of each of us. Epilogue In conclusion, we wish to assert that the more youth are sidelined by politics and the integral societal structure, the deeper the chasm between the various realities will deepen, resulting in inevitable confrontation. Conversely, the opposite will occur, as evidenced in Western countries: if the youth become the vital cells of society, assuming their rightful role and place, this will not only guarantee stability but also strengthen democracy as a means to leave a better legacy than they found for the next generation they will bring forth. Additionally, it should not be forgotten that another benefit of this philosophy is that it would aid in consolidating a democratic tradition sorely lacking in Albania. [1] Maria K. Papathanassiou, "Stoic philosophy and modern cosmology", Hellenistic Philosphy, vol. II, Athinë, 1994, 140. [2] "Have the courage to use your own reason", the motto of the Enlightenment, which derives from Latin. [3] Θεοδόσιος Πελεγρίνης, Οι πέντε εποχές της φιλοσοφίας, (Athens: Πεδίο, 2015), 53. [4] Karl R. Popper, Mendime për Historinë dhe Politikën, (Tiranë: Plejad, 2015), 49. [5] Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Filozofia, Historia & Problemet, (Tiranë, Toena), 395. [6] Aristoteli, Politika, (Tiranë: Plejad, 2003), 204. [7] Chantal Millon-Delsol, Idetë politike në shekullin e XX-të, (Tiranë: Onufri, 2000), 12. [8] Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, (London: Routledge, 1995), 173-4. [9] Ibid, 190. [10] Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford University Press, 1986), 204. [11] Gianni Vattimo, Nihilizmi dhe Emancipimi, (Tiranë: Ipls&Dita2000), 31. [12] Popper, Mendime, 79. [13] Ibid, 117. [14] Hans-George Gadamer, Historia e Filozofisë, (Tiranë: Plejad, 2008), 288-289. [15] Anthony D. Smith, Kombet dhe Nacionalizmi në erën Globale, (Tiranë: Dudaj, 2008), 29.