Author: Iva Kojić  The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s was far more than a local tragedy; it tore apart an intricately linked society and economy overnight. As new borders rose and political agreements hardened, ordinary people were left stranded within fragile new economies, unable to compete with the wider world. For the truck driver waiting endless hours at the Batrovci border, or the student from Bitola whose diploma is worthless in Belgrade, the breakup replaced old certainties with lost futures. For more than two decades, influential academic and policy voices have described reintegration as a set of assignments dictated by the EU’s Berlin Process, treating the Western Balkans as passive recipients and ignoring the region’s powerful, internal need for a homegrown recovery. Illustration photo. Retrieved from Pexels (www.pexels.com) The Berlin Process offers a clear roadmap, while the Open Balkan Initiative appears, at least on paper, to be a more nimble, practical answer to real-life needs. Of course, both are complicated by local politicians' ambitions. In the end, the best way forward is to blend the strengths of both: keep the high standards of the Berlin Process, but add the local ownership and flexibility of Open Balkan, so that these projects actually make a difference for regular people living under their shadow Theoretical Framework and the Live Reality At the heart of the argument for regional integration lies David Mitrany’s functionalist theory. Mitrany posited that technical and social needs (energy distribution, transport logistics, public health) naturally ignore political borders and force cooperation out of sheer necessity (Alexandrescu, 2007, 29) . In the post-Yugoslav context, this theory suggests that the shared power grids, railways, and supply chains left behind by the common state act as a silent pull, drawing the successor states back into a web of international activities. But the real work of regionalism cannot just be explained by academic theories. Mitrany's ideas help set the stage, but when you look at what is actually happening in the Balkans, things are much messier. While functionalism suggests cooperation emerges from practical necessity, critics argue that it overlooks complex socio-political realities and power dynamics. The Open Balkan initiative, for example, is not just a response to practical needs. It is also shaped by the ambitions of political leaders. Many of these same leaders have, at home, let the rule of law slide and often put showmanship ahead of actually solving problems. Similarly, other integration theories, such as neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism, might offer insights into how political actors and state interests play crucial roles in integration efforts. Thus, although theories hold that working together on practical issues should lead to political peace, in reality, these efforts are often hijacked for political gain. There is a real grassroots desire for reintegration, but the tools used to get there are often twisted to serve political survival. To truly judge these efforts, we must examine how political leaders use (and sometimes misuse) these theories, sometimes helping people, sometimes just helping themselves. Academic models are helpful, but right now, it is the politicians at the wheel, steering through a landscape full of old tensions and personal power plays. The Berlin Process: The Outsourced Assignment Launched in 2014, the Berlin Process was intended to revitalize regional cooperation through high-level summits and the creation of a Common Regional Market. Its greatest strength and its most significant contribution to the lives of regular people is its inclusivity. It involves all six regional partners, ensuring regional integration remains aligned with the EU's strict standards and legal principles. This inclusivity is a vital democratic safeguard, as it prevents the “island” effect where certain states are left behind due to political exclusion. In practical terms, the Berlin Process has produced tangible, humanized successes that improve daily life, such as the “Roam Like at Home” agreement, which has significantly lowered communication costs for millions of people traveling for work or family across the divided region. By eliminating roaming charges, the process has moved the region one step closer to the standards of the EU’s internal market (Mitrovic 2025, 10). However, a deeper critique reveals that the Berlin Process often feels like an outsourced project managed by a distant bureaucracy. For the regular citizen, its results are often trapped in administrative stagnation or slowed by complex ratification processes across six different parliaments. As Kamberi (2021, 60) notes, the prospect of the EU joining now seems “too distant and uncertain”, leading to a loss of faith in reforms that feel like a never-ending series of homework assignments given by Brussels. The Open Balkan Initiative: Agility, Ego, and the Practical Reality In contrast, the Open Balkan initiative is a locally led project born of a perceived revolt against the status quo. Its greatest strength is its agility. By focusing on low-hanging fruit, it has achieved practical successes where the Berlin Process has historically struggled (Xhoxhaj 2024, 7). The 2024 Labor Market Access Agreement is the primary example of this practical work: it allows a citizen of North Macedonia to work in Serbia or Albania without the humiliating and expensive ordeal of obtaining a work permit (Mitrovic 2025, 8). This is a direct response to the brain drain crisis hollowing out the region. However, the Open Balkan initiative is also flawed, mainly because it excludes Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which risks further splitting the region. And, just like with other regional efforts, we cannot remain blind to the politicians in charge. Citizens worry that this initiative is a front, giving political leaders a bigger stage and more power, even as the rule of law back home deteriorates. Some critics even warn that it could end up putting Serbia at the forefront, mainly benefiting big companies and politicians instead of everyday people trying to get by. However, proponents of Open Balkan argue that the initiative prioritizes regional economic collaboration, aiming to bring tangible benefits quickly to those who need it the most. They assert that by simplifying labor mobility and reducing trade barriers, the initiative addresses real economic needs and can set a precedent for broader regional inclusion in the future. Bridging the Gap through Practical Reintegration The positive aspects inherent in both the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan initiative must be synthesized to move beyond political spectacle and toward a genuine improvement in the lives of regular people. Within the Berlin Process, the region must preserve the high standards of the EU acquis and ensure total regional inclusivity within the WB6. In the Open Balkan, the synthesis must foster a sense of regional ownership. The bridge between these two models lies in the Staged Accession model. This framework suggests the EU should stop treating the Balkans as a binary “in or out” choice and instead offer early, functional access to the Single Market as a reward for specific regional cooperation successes (Mitrovic 2025, 19). For the citizen, a synthesis of these models would move from grand declaration to practical work. For example, moving beyond simple roaming agreements to a unified regional energy grid and digital market might allow Balkan tech startups to scale regionally before competing globally, thereby fulfilling the need for a shared economic space that remains physically dependent on common infrastructure. Another example could be expanding the labor mobility protocols of the Open Balkan to the entire WB6 within the legitimate framework of the Berlin Process. This would ensure that a nurse from Sarajevo or a programmer from Pristina can move as easily as their counterparts in the Trio, while still benefiting from the legal protections and safety standards guaranteed by EU alignment. This is where the real work happens. It is not found in high-level summits but in regional harmonization that makes the border invisible to the person crossing it. By utilizing the political speed of the Open Balkan to fulfill the institutional promises of the Berlin Process, the region might finally begin to heal in a way that serves the people. Moving Beyond the Homework Assignment The reintegration of the post-Yugoslav space is a structural necessity- a response to the unsustainable fragmentations of the 1990s. While academic theories provide a useful map, they cannot account for the practical difficulty of navigating the political egos and catastrophic track records of regional elites who often use these platforms for domestic promotion. The disintegration of Yugoslavia created a rupture that cannot be healed by an outsourced project alone. It requires a reintegration that is both technically sound and locally owned. Ultimately, the promise of regional stability is in moving beyond the political theater of leaders and toward genuine technical cooperation that serves the citizens. Regionalism is not a homework assignment for Brussels. Rather, it is a survival strategy for the people of the Balkans. The promise of either model is hollow if it does not address the ten-hour wait at the border or the unrecognized diploma. By reclaiming regional ownership and synthesizing the practical successes of both models, the successor states can finally make the borders breathable again. Reintegration should not be a decision for politicians. Instead, it is a mandate dictated by geography and the shared needs of a population that refuses to be defined solely by its borders. Bibliography Alexandrescu, Mihai. 2007. “David Mitrany: From Federalism to Functionalism.” Transylvanian Review 16 (1): 19-33. Popoviciu, Adrian-Claudiu. 2010. “David Mitrany and Functionalism: The Beginnings of Functionalism”. Revista Romana de Geografie Politica 12, (1): 162-172 Jelisavac Trosic, Sanja, and Mitko Arnaudov. 2023. “What are the Realistic Capabilities of the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan Initiative?” Review of International Affairs 74 (1187): 59-85. Kamberi, Donika. 2021. “Open Balkan vs. Berlin Process- Same, Same but Different” Freedom: Journal for Peacebuilding and Transcultural Communication 2 (3/4): 60-71. Jelisavac Trošić, Sanja, and Mitko Arnaudov. "Open Balkans - Between Economic Opportunities and Political Reality." (2023). Mitrovic, Sava. 2025. Regional Cooperation Initiatives in the Western Balkans: Improving Countries’ Preparedness for Staged Accession to the European Union. Belgrade: European Policy Centre (CEP). Xhoxhaj, Veton. 2024. “Assessing Western Balkans Regional Integration Efforts: A Comparative Study of the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan Initiative". Multidisciplinary Science Journal 7: 2025248. Mitrany, David. 1975. The Functional Theory of Politics. London: Martin Robertson for the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Author: Ivana Milićević, Research Assistant at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade On March 15, 2025, the largest protest in Serbia’s history was organised in Belgrade, seeking accountability for the collapse of the concrete canopy of the newly renovated railway station in Novi Sad, which killed 15 people. As illegalities and corruption in the reconstruction project started to reveal, this immense tragedy turned into a grim reminder that “the corruption kills”, leading to massive anti-corruption protests led by Serbian students. How did we get here? After the 15-minute silence in commemoration of the victims was broken by a physical assault on students in front of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade by people close to the ruling party, students across Serbia started blocking their faculties, with a seemingly simple demands for the rule of law and institutional response. What they ask for is transparency about the Novi Sad train station’s renovation, a dismissal of charges against activists arrested during the first anti-government protest in November, and criminal prosecution of those who attacked student protesters. Their demands have been supported by universities, teachers, lawyers, agriculture workers, artists and representatives of various industries. Around 80% of Serbian citizens supports most of the demands, while around third took part in the protests, which have been organised in more than 200 localities across Serbia. Having clearly distanced themselves from all political parties and consistently insisting on transparency and institutional accountability, it seems that the students succeeded in reaching an agreement on the fundamentals, which demonstrated a high potential for generating broader support for long-term political changes. As such, it seems that the demands deserve broad international support as well, particularly from the European Union, as they highly align with its fundamental values, insisting on democracy, rule of law and human rights protection. Where has the EU been along the way? So, why has then the EU remained so reluctant in addressing the protests, particularly as it claims to closely follow the current political situation in Serbia? While silence sometimes speaks the loudest, occasional statements from the Brussels spoke even louder in expressing its support to the government and lack of worry for the enlargement’s fundamentals. Gert Jan Koopman, the EU's Director-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) visiting Serbia in January 2025, failed to express his concerns regarding the lack of transparency and accountability for the collapse of the railway station canopy or any support to the peaceful protests which had already became historical. On the contrary, he noted Serbia’s “steady progress” towards the EU and was “eager to support Serbia in completing the necessary reforms”. It may come as no surprise if we remember that in October 2024, not long before the tragedy, in her visit to Serbia, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, praised Serbia’s progress and commitment to delivering on reforms, in particular on the fundamentals - rule of law and democracy. While von der Leyen has not hesitated to express support for “the Georgian people fighting for democracy", she has remained remarkably quiet about the events in Serbia. Indeed, the EU’s spokesperson Guillaume Mercier did express concerns about the reported attacks against protestors and called all key actors to engage in a constructive political dialogue. However, the EU failed to follow-up on the findings of its own progress reports which have for years urged Serbian authorities to step up their efforts to fight corruption, ensure the independence of the judiciary, and guarantee freedom of expression, even after it was confirmed that the European Public Prosecutor’s Office investigates the misuse of EU funds in the case of the railway station. The EU high representatives were addressed by Members of the European Parliament, Serbia’s professors and esteemed public figures from different spheres, scholars and expert groups, and EU research grantees, who all in their open letters asked for Union’s more active role and principled response to these events. The reaction of the European Commission was particularly expected looking ahead to the last protest in Belgrade, as the tensions ran high with contra-protesters supported by hooligans and war veterans gathered in front of the National Assembly and president Vučić using inflammatory rhetoric. The pro-EU citizens and organisations kept addressing it, to provoke its reaction to major protests in one of its candidate countries with a major democratic decline, but were mostly left without a proper response.   What does the European Union stand for (?) The Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos responded to the received letters of concern by an open letter as well, with an aim to “recall what the European Union stands for”. Successfully avoiding to mention students and their demands, Kos did tackle a very important issue stating that “Serbia's path towards the European Union offers solutions to many of the issues that are at the heart of discussion today“. She stated that the process, if properly implemented, strengthens the fight against corruption, ensures the independence of the judiciary and accountability of institutions. But what happens if the process is not being implemented properly, but hindered by the lack of credibility, contested political interests and disregarding of the principle “fundamentals first”? In that case, “the path” may lead to legitimising the regimes with growing authoritarian tendencies, at the cost of promised stability or commercial interests. In order for the accession process to restore its “transformative power” it would first need to restore the credibility of both conditionality policy and the perspective of membership. Currently lacking both, the EU risks to lose its relevance in the light of the changing political reality in Serbia. Its strong support to the lithium extraction project in the Jadar valley remained steady despite serious concerns on the lack of environmental standards and rule of law and continuous attacks on environmental and human rights defenders, some of whom were even targeted as “eco-terrorists”.  The EU praised the Memorandum of Understanding signed with Serbia on Strategic Partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles as a way to enhance integration process and “reaffirm Serbia’s EU path”. The former Minister of Traffic and Infrastructure Goran Vesić assessed that Serbia “essentially became an EU member” by the signing of the Memorandum. This has shown that there is a mutual understanding on both sides that the progress in the accession process is being evaluated somewhere far away from the prescribed conditions, progress reports and especially principles which prioritise fundamental reforms – democracy and the rule of law. This also shows that neither of the sides takes the integration process seriously, as they both agree to “take the most out of it” in the circumstances in which the enlargement “gained a new momentum" only nominally, and the old promises (of stability) seem to be enough. Experts and civil society have already expressed concerns about how this trend will affect the perception of the EU and citizens’ attitudes towards the enlargement. The support for the EU integration has lowered among youth in Serbia in the last five years, particularly among the youngest of the respondents, while, according to the Balkan Barometer, most of the Serbian citizens (35% of them) think that their country will never become a member of the EU. The same research shows a trend that youth of the region is becoming more uncertain or neutral about the EU accession. It is certain that this will also be the case with the youth in Serbia. The values that students stand for, although correspond to them, are not European values, but their own and they will firmly protect them regardless of the EU’s support, as they have for months now. This time, it is the EU that is on the test, to “step up and fulfil its self-proclaimed task of a democracy and rule of law promoter”. The “words of concern” and bureaucratic euphemisms may not be enough to restore not only the credibility of the accession process, but also its relevance among youth, who proved to be the guardians of its “core values”, without ever referring to it. In accordance with its own principles and enlargement methodology, the EU needs to systematically and clearly address the roots of the student’s demands, as their fulfilment may bring the reforms crucial for the integration process. But it cannot go the other way around. The EU should initiate a direct dialogue with Serbian citizens, including students, experts, workers, and civil society organisations, and provide unequivocal support to the fight for democracy and the rule of law, if it still has the ambition to act as a driver of reforms rather than a factor of status quo. After all, it seems that the EU is the one who should be reminded what it stands for.