Šta se dešava kada država odluči kako istorija treba da izgleda? I kakvu budućnost to proizvodi? Ilustrativna fotografija. Preuzeto sa Pexelsa. Prethodnih meseci, rasprave o novim politikama udžbenika ponovo su otvorile jedno staro i neprijatno pitanje: ko kontroliše znanje i u koju svrhu? Iako su predstavljene kao administrativne ili obrazovne reforme, ove politike ne mogu biti neutralne. One često signaliziraju nešto dublje: pokušaj da se preoblikuju kolektivno sećanje i identitet, a samim tim i politička imaginacija jednog društva. Na prvi pogled, centralizovana kontrola nad udžbenicima može delovati kao pitanje efikasnosti ili osiguranja kvaliteta. Vlade tvrde da jedinstveni narativ obezbeđuje koherentnost obrazovnog sistema, ali nas istorija uči da budemo oprezni. Kada država monopolizuje proizvodnju znanja, obrazovanje prestaje da bude prostor kritičkog mišljenja i postaje sredstvo ideološke reprodukcije. I to nije nov fenomen. Čemu nas uči istorija? Tokom 20. veka, autoritarni i nacionalistički režimi više puta su se oslanjali na obrazovanje kao sredstvo konsolidacije moći. U nacističkoj Nemačkoj, udžbenici su sistematski prepravljani kako bi promovisali rasnu ideologiju i opravdali ekspanzionističku politiku. Slično tome, u Sovjetskom Savezu, istorijski narativi su kontinuirano revidirani kako bi se uskladili sa promenljivom političkom linijom vladajuće partije, često brišući "nepodobne" istine i pojedince iz javnog sećanja. U oba slučaja, obrazovanje nije bilo o učenju, već o poslušnosti. Bliže našem vremenu, slični obrasci pojavljuju se u delovima Evrope. Jedan od najrelevantnijih savremenih primera je Mađarska. Tokom poslednje decenije, Mađarska Vlada je uvela sve veću centralizaciju kontrole nad obrazovnim sadržajem, uključujući i nacionalizaciju udžbenika. Novi kurikulumi naglašavaju nacionalistička tumačenja istorije, sužavaju prostor za kritičke perspektive i promovišu homogenu viziju identiteta. Posledice nisu apstraktne. Istraživači/ce, prosvetni radnici i radnice i organizacije civilnog društva ukazuju da ove promene doprinose normalizaciji isključivih narativa. Istorijska složenost se pojednostavljuje, a perspektive manjina se marginalizuju ili brišu. A možda i najzabrinjavajuće, mladi se socijalizuju da svet posmatraju kroz prizmu „mi protiv njih“. Obrazovanje, u tom kontekstu, postaje suptilno, ali moćno sredstvo za proizvodnju nepoverenja, ogorčenosti, pa čak i neprijateljstva prema drugima. Zašto rasprava o udžbenicima nikada nije samo rasprava o udžbenicima? U društvima sa krhkim demokratskim institucijama, kontrola nad obrazovanjem lako može postati kontrola nad mišljenjem. Kada je dozvoljena samo jedna verzija istorije, kritičko promišljanje zamenjuje pasivno prihvatanje. Učenici i učenice se ne podstiču da postavljaju pitanja — učimo ih šta da misle. A kada se to dogodi, sama osnova demokratske kulture počinje da erodira. Zapadni Balkan, sa svojim složenim istorijama i nerazrešenim tenzijama, posebno je podložan takvim dinamikama. Iz iskustva znamo kako suprotstavljeni nacionalni narativi mogu podstaći podele i sukobe. Upravo zbog toga, obrazovanje bi trebalo da bude prostor u kojem se istražuju različite perspektive, postavljaju teška pitanja i razvija empatija. Uvođenje strogo kontrolisanih, državno odobrenih udžbenika koji favorizuju jedan narativ rizikuje da poništi ove napore. Rizikuje da reprodukuje upravo one obrasce koji su istorijski vodili ka isključenju, polarizaciji i nasilju. Ima li alternative? Nedavno uvođenje takozvanih „udžbenika od nacionalnog značaja“ u Srbiji izazvalo je ozbiljnu zabrinutost u stručnoj javnosti. Među njima, Centar za kritičko obrazovanje (CKO) podneo je sedam formalnih primedbi tokom procesa javne rasprave — primedbe koje na kraju nisu usvojene. Ovo nije samo proceduralno pitanje. Ovo je političko pitanje. U čemu je problem? U samoj srži reforme nalazi se jednostavna, ali opasna ideja: da određeni školski predmeti, posebno jezik, istorija i umetnost i kultura, treba da služe jačanju nacionalnog identiteta i kohezije. To je problematično samo po sebi, a u praksi još i više. CKO je u svojim primedbama upozorio da ovakav pristup predstavlja „sekuritizaciju obrazovanja“ — pomeranje u kojem se udžbenici više ne tretiraju kao pedagoški alati, već kao instrumenti nacionalne politike. Ovo formulisanje je važno, jer kada se obrazovanje poveže sa „nacionalnom bezbednošću“, postaje mnogo teže dovoditi ga u pitanje. Kritika se više ne posmatra kao deo demokratske debate, već kao pretnja. Na šta CKO upozorava?Primedbe CKO-a prevazilaze opšte zabrinutosti i ukazuju na vrlo konkretne rizike sadržane u samom zakonu: Politička kontrola nad proizvodnjom znanjaDajući prednost „nacionalnom interesu“ kao kriterijumu, zakon otvara prostor za izbor autora na osnovu ideološke podobnosti, a ne akademskog kvaliteta. Brisanje pluralnih perspektivaU predmetima poput istorije i kulture, jedan „zvanični“ narativ rizikuje da isključi glasove manjina i alternativna tumačenja. Slabljenje demokratskih proceduraČinjenica da primedbe podnete tokom javne rasprave nisu uvažene, niti je CKO dobio bilo kakav odgovor od nadležnih institucija, otvara ozbiljna pitanja o transparentnosti i participaciji. Ovo nisu apstraktni strahovi, već su utemeljeni u istorijskom iskustvu i u savremenim istraživanjima. Obrazovanje ili indoktrinacija?Ključno pitanje nije da li nacionalni identitet treba da bude deo obrazovanja, jer on to često i jeste, u nekom obliku. Pravo pitanje je: ko ga definiše i čiji se glasovi pritom isključuju? Intervencija CKO-a podseća nas da obrazovna politika nikada nije neutralna. Ona odražava političke izbore, a ti izbori oblikuju buduće generacije. Ignorisanje stručne i civilne javnosti nije samo loše upravljanje. To je upozorenje, jer kada obrazovanje postane zatvoren sistem, ono prestaje da stvara kritičke građane i počinje da proizvodi poslušne. Možete u celosti pročitati primedbe koje je CKO predao ovde.Rad koji su istraživačice CKO-a objavile o rizicima ovog zakona pročitajte ovde.

Author: Daria Vorobiova Serbia in the modern geopolitical situation is perceived as a country caught between two fires: the West and the East. Its indicative neutrality, not associating itself with any global organization and acting as a "third party," is telling. In reality, this political ambivalence has calculated mechanisms used by statesmen to preserve their political position and policy of "securing funding without additional obligations," while in return manipulating public opinion. Illustration photo. Retrieved from Pexels (www.pexels.com) Neither to the West, nor to the East Looking at survey results on the political preferences of Serbs reveals a deeply divided population: for instance, a telling example is the 2023 WFD survey. It showed that 43% of Serbs believe they should rely on Russia in international relations, and only 25.8% of respondents stated they should rely on the European Union. Also notable is the question of whether Serbia belongs to the West or the East: 42% of respondents answered that Serbia is not part of either, while the same proportion answered logically about belonging to the West or the East. Serbian society is extremely fragmented in its political preferences: this problem leads to a general instability of civic engagement in politics, as without consensus among the sides, it is impossible to exert strong civic influence on the political life of the state as a whole [1]. How much does the state influence the political preferences of Serbs? Following data from the same survey, it is evident that 59.2% of respondents note that they view political information about events in Serbia through television. The state exerts sufficient influence on television, considering channels like RTS, RTV Pink, Happy TV, which are known for publishing information deliberately portrayed in a light favorable to the state. Under such conditions, the question arises – if a large number of citizens receive such information, can their political preferences be genuinely logical and justified? [2] Also, television programs have been observed deliberately portraying the EU in a bad light, while Russia is presented in the moral image of a fraternal state. The key problem with this presentation of information is the excessive moralization of "good" Russia and "bad" European Union. Typically, this moral assessment is based solely on subjectivity, in no way appealing to rational reflections on the benefits of such "friendship" for Serbia [3]. And it is precisely the "moral" justification, as well as the "moral boundaries of the permissible," that allow Serbian politicians to maintain their position for as long as possible, instilling in citizens an unstable pluralism of opinions to weaken their civic stance. The problem of "moralizing" politics as a key factor of ambivalence This appeal to everything moral begins with historical origins and serves as the foundation for forming nationalist narratives. The narratives consist of three components: the "victim question," the "pride question," and the main unifying factor, the moral discursive veto point. By combining these components, it becomes possible to manipulate public opinion, set the boundaries of discourse to slow down potential civic activity, and at the necessary moment say: "here is the boundary you must not cross." The "victim question" is characterized by a moral appeal to grievance, primarily towards the West, which in the narratives is viewed as a military aggressor (following the events of 1999) protecting Kosovo (which is a sacred question of the origin of statehood), and also as an economic usurper (the European Union as an economic organization where, upon accession, Serbia would lose its informal independence). An image of an enemy is created, but also an image of a savior, a potential "fraternal state" that can selflessly help Serbia escape crude dependence on the "humiliating" West. Russia occupies this role, but in the case of investments and their positive influence, China can also be considered. The "pride question" is characterized by a centuries-long history of battles (for example, the Battle of Kosovo) and the preservation of the nation and its culture during long periods of statelessness. This factor is supposed to act as a unifying force ("we have only ourselves, and no one will help us except us") and one that reduces the factor of destabilization, since there are "enemies" against which Serbia must be ready to act as a united front in case of danger. The unifying factor is the Kosovo question – less as a territorial issue and more as a discursive veto point: it marks the limit beyond which reform, recognition, or alignment becomes politically illegible. Since many reforms for EU accession and funding require normalization of relations with Kosovo and its recognition as a separate state, Serbian politicians (for example, Aleksandar Vučić) support the aforementioned narratives precisely on this issue. A. Vučić's speech on 04.11.2025 in Brussels: «Neću da priznam Kosovo da bismo ušli u EU» ("I will not recognize Kosovo so that we enter the EU") [4]; In an address to the people of Kosovo: «ne postoji „dobro rešenje kosovskog problema za Srbe“ i da ga nikada neće biti» ("there is no 'good solution to the Kosovo problem for Serbs' and there never will be"), «Srbi bili najstradalniji narod na Kosovu» ("Serbs were the most suffering people in Kosovo") [5]; speech at the Palace of Serbia: «Vučić je rekao da je Kosovo (...) našom zemljom u skladu sa Ustavom Republike Srbije i Poveljom Ujedinjenih nacija i Rezolucijom 12.44» ("Vučić said that Kosovo (...) is our land in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and the Charter of the United Nations and Resolution 1244") [6]. These three factors help form a stable national narrative, which allows simultaneously maintaining the image of the EU as an "enemy" while preserving active economic relations. Naturally, it is assumed that when using this funding as outlined in the documentation, Serbia should join the European Union after meeting all conditions. Is such a policy feasible? Active neutrality Serbia's neutrality is not an absence of policy but its active form, maintained by state elites through media propaganda, fragmenting Serbian society and helping to brake at the right moments and shift the blame to the "enemy," not to Serbia. The European Commission has noted that Serbia is moving too slowly in implementing necessary reforms, especially those related to freedom of speech, eliminating corruption, and normalizing relations with Kosovo [7]. The question of slowness also became important in cases where the EU itself delayed necessary payments to Serbia, demanding additional guarantees that the funds would be spent in the intended direction [8]. Such neutrality helps Serbian political elites navigate relations with the European Union: maintaining the possibility of obtaining economic and political resources while keeping a political distance from it, simultaneously shifting responsibility for the stagnation of reforms onto "enemies" and unsolvable historical traumas inflicted by these same "enemies." The price of this strategy is the weakness of fragmented civic pressure, the slowdown of necessary reforms, and the dependence of the political course on a constantly perpetuated conflict that does not approach resolution if Serbia truly chooses a European path. In this context, the key question is not which side Serbia will join in the future, but how long civil society can exist in a state-managed ambivalence, how long it can survive without the reforms it tries to grasp through protests. Bibliography: “Opinion Poll Report: Socio-political Views of Serbian Citizens in 2023.” WFD. Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), Serbia, 2023. https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/wfd_nws_2023_eng_final.pdf. “Defunding Disinformation in the Balkans. How International Brands Support Russia’s Agenda.” by BFMI & CRTA, n.d. https://crta.rs/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/CRTA_BFMI_Defunding_Disinformation_in_the_Balkans_Report.pdf. “Media Monitoring of Foreign Actors.” CRTA. https://crta.rs/en/media-monitoring-of-foreign-actors-november-2024/. B92. “Vučić: Neću Da Priznam Kosovo Da Bismo Ušli U EU; Postoji Mogućnost Da Otvorimo Klaster 3 Pre Kraja Godine.” B92.net, November 4, 2025. https://www.b92.net/info/politika/178701/vucic-necu-da-priznam-kosovo-da-bismo-usli-u-eu-postoji-mogucnost-da-otvorimo-klaster-3-pre-kraja-godine/vest РТС. “Vučić Za Veltvohe: Potrebno Kompromisno Rešenje Za KiM, a Ne Da Albanci Dobiju Sve, a Srbi Ništa,” n.d. https://www.rts.rs/lat/vesti/politika/5462184/vucic-za-veltvohe-potrebno-kompromisno-resenje-za-kim-a-ne-da-albanci-dobiju-sve-a-srbi-nista.html. Urednik. “Vučić Odgovorio Evropskom Diplomati: Kosovo Je Dio Srbije - Top Portal.” Top Portal, November 6, 2025. https://topportal.info/vucic-odgovorio-evropskom-diplomati-kosovo-je-dio-srbije/. Belgrade, N1. “EC Report Says Serbia Slow on Credible Reforms.” N1 Info RS, November 4, 2025. https://n1info.rs/english/news/ec-report-says-serbia-slow-on-credible-reforms/. Rakic, Snezana. “Why Is Serbia Still Waiting for EU Funds That Its Neighbours Have Received?” Serbian Monitor, May 23, 2025. https://www.serbianmonitor.com/en/why-is-serbia-still-waiting-for-eu-funds-that-its-neighbours-have-received/.