Manuel Férez, Alberto Hurtado University, Chile Between 2020 and 2025, the Balkan region experienced an unprecedented wave of civil mobilisations: environmental protests against lithium mining in Serbia, anti-corruption demonstrations in Bosnia, social unrest in Albania, and student movements in Montenegro. These mobilisations, however, remain virtually invisible in Latin American academia, media, and cultural institutions—despite striking parallels with recent Latin American protests such as Chile's 2019 social explosion, the 2021 demonstrations in Argentina and Colombia, and ongoing citizen mobilisations in Mexico.  Photo: Unsplash/Bree Anne This article examines this intellectual and artistic gap through a dual analysis of two leading Latin American journals (Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica and Letras Libres) and Balkan-related exhibitions in museums across Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. By exposing how Latin American public discourse reduces the Balkans to either a frozen narrative of 1990s trauma or a nostalgic account of successful immigration, this study proposes concrete pathways for establishing a South–South dialogue that recognises contemporary Balkan civil agency as a mirror for Latin America's own struggles for environmental justice and democratic resilience. The research project focuses on analysing how Latin American academia has processed, researched and reflected on civil society mobilisations in the Balkan countries, using Chile, Argentina and Mexico as case studies for accessibility reasons, and how it has presented the Balkans to the general public. Part One: an analysis of two widely circulated specialist journals in which Latin American academics publish Why analyze Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica and Letras Libres? Although other popular science magazines focusing on international affairs are available in Spanish, I have chosen Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica and Letras Libres due to their extensive circulation throughout Latin America and Spain. These academic journals are widely consulted and cited by Latin American students and academics working on international issues. They publish exceptional academic articles written by scholars from institutions across Latin America. Therefore, analyzing the content of these publications will help us understand perspectives, themes, and voices concerning the Balkans. Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica (FAL) This academic journal is the result of a collaboration between the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). Since its inception in 2000 as Foreign Affairs en Español, the journal has provided a platform for discussing significant international issues, with a particular focus on Latin America. It has established itself as a leading forum for Ibero-American perspectives on global affairs, encouraging diverse approaches and the highest standards of critical thinking. The journal is published every three months and has a circulation of 5,000 copies, which are distributed throughout Latin America, the United States, and Spain. Letras Libres (LL) Founded in 1999, Letras Libres is a monthly magazine of criticism and creation and the heir to the tradition and spirit of Vuelta, the magazine founded by Octavio Paz. With editions in Mexico and Spain, Letras Libres brings together leading thinkers to address urgent global issues, while offering readers samples of the finest prose and poetry. The Letras Libres website has evolved to offer a wide range of content, catering to diverse interests, voices, and forms of expression. FAL Published on 10 October 2022, the article The Balkans Facing Enigmas and Interventions was the only piece dedicated exclusively to the Balkans published by FAL. This article provides an overview of the political situation in the Balkans, with a particular focus on foreign interventions. The author, Mauricio D. Aceves, holds a degree in International Relations from the University of the Valley of Mexico (UVM), as well as a master’s degree in public security and public policy from the IEXE School of Public Policy. However, he does not cite any specialised bibliography on the Balkans, nor does he demonstrate any formal study of the region. The topics that included references to the Balkans can be grouped into the following categories: international order and international organisations; European issues (mainly elections and security matters); NATO; and the wars in Gaza and Ukraine. Additionally, there was one article dedicated to the Coronavirus and another to MERCOSUR that mentioned Balkan countries. In the category of international order and international organisations, notable articles included Requiem for 1991: From Hope to Global Uncertainty (9 December 2021), The Paradox of Funding a Refugee Crisis without Refugees (13 July 2020), Why International Organisations and Multilateralism Matter (29 November 2021), Diplomatic Saints (3 July 2023), Recent Log of (Illegal) Politics (12 January 2023), Towards a New Global Model of Security and Defence (28 March 2022) and Central Asia: The Path to International Order (27 April 2022). An analysis of the content of these articles reveals that the Balkans and the countries that comprise it were only mentioned in passing and as examples of dynamics related to the international order and/or the actions of international organisations. In another section entitled 'European Issues', articles were compiled addressing European issues that also mentioned the Balkans in some way. Cyprus at the Schengen Crossroads (24 July 2025) mentions the Balkans as an area that could be affected by Cyprus's political dynamics, while The 2024 European Elections (20 June 2024), The Security of the European Union (19 August 2020), Euroscepticism isn't shining, but it's not slowing down either (11 July 2024) and Eurovision 2025: Anxiety, Hatred and Resilience (29 May 2025) mention countries such as Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Serbia as part of the debate on the European defence system, the European Parliament elections and the growth of Euroscepticism among young Europeans. Initially, it was thought that it would be interesting to compare the media coverage of Gaza and Ukraine with that of the Balkans. However, throughout the entire analysed period, only three articles were found in Foreign Affairs that did so: Russia: A Challenge for the West' (11 May 2020), From Gaza to Kyiv (8 January 2024) and Ukraine and International Law (1 March 2022). The first article mentions the Balkans as one of the early challenges to the European order and its relationship with Russia. The other two articles focus on aspects of international law in Gaza and Ukraine, set against the backdrop of the history of the Balkans during and after the breakup of Yugoslavia. The other two articles focus on aspects of international law in Gaza and Ukraine, set against the backdrop of the history of the Balkans during and after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Three other general topics addressed or mentioned the Balkans. The first was NATO, with the article NATO's Role in the Conflict Between Russia and Ukraine (7 December 2022), which focuses on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and mentions the Balkans as a historical reference for NATO's political and military action.  The Political Repercussions of the Coronavirus Pandemic Worldwide (13 May 2020) references Bulgaria and the impact of the virus in the country. Finally, Ratification of the Agreement between the European Union and Mercosur (22 January 2024) specifically mentions Macedonia in the context of the rapprochement between the European Union and Mercosur. LL - 16 articles Unlike the journal FAL, which focuses almost exclusively on the analysis of international conflicts and dynamics, LL adopted a more diverse approach to the Balkans, covering literature, culture, music and history. Two articles published before 2020 are included in LL's count. These articles offer expert perspectives on the Balkans and are therefore included. Five articles dedicated to the Balkans were found in LL (two of which were published before 2020), as well as a further 16 articles that indirectly addressed topics related to the Balkans with a different central theme. The two articles published before 2020 were I Don't Want Serbia to Be the Russian Gibraltar in the Balkans: Interview with Dragan Velikić (June 30, 2017) and The Balkans: Aftermath of War (March 31, 2002). The first article is an interview with Velikić, who expresses concern that Serbia will become a Russian Gibraltar. The second article, written by David Rieff, discusses his experience as a journalist during the siege of Sarajevo and the main forms of entertainment there (alcohol, tobacco, sex, and conversation). Three articles focused on the Balkans during the analyzed period: In The Political Thriller of Serbia (1991–2025), Javier González-Cotta discusses the history of Serbia as if it were a political thriller. The article describes the power struggles in the streets of Serbia and how they defined the social character of the Serbian people and influenced national audiovisual production. In A Manual for Killing Flies (March 19, 2025), Carlos Hortelano examines the work of Croatian writer Slavenka Drakulić. Drakulić was present in The Hague in 2003 to attend the trials following the Balkan Wars, and she captured her experience there in her book They Wouldn't Kill a Fly. In his July 3, 2024, publication, A Brief Dictionary of Kadare, Mauricio Montiel Figueiras discusses the work of Albanian writer Ismail Kadare. These three articles are noteworthy because they offer readers reflections on the works of Balkan authors and those of a journalist who was present during the Yugoslavian war. However, they do not address the current situation in the region. The 16 articles published in LL that mentioned the Balkans or countries within it were divided into two categories: culture (literature, visual arts) and political situation. Articles like A Journey Through Greece and Albania with a Child and a Reflection on the Ubiquity of War, Guided by Homer and Ismail Kadare by Iván Hurtado, y Zülfü Livaneli Revisits History in a Novel by Jean Meyer (August 1, 2025) in which he discusses Livaneli's book “Riding the Tiger”, which focuses on Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II; and Precise Literary Mechanism by Gonzalo Gragera (April 28, 2022) in which he discusses the Spanish publication of “The Poisonous Mirrors”, a collection of unpublished stories by Serbian writer Milorad Pavic (1929–2009) exemplify Letras Libres' literary approach to the Balkans The second category of articles focuses on political issues. Authoritarians are winning the game. Interview with David Rieff by León Krauze (April 1, 2025); Doubling Down: A Western Strategy for Ukraine and Itself by various authors (March 7, 2025) and War, the epidemic we don't see coming by Daniel Delisau (July 1, 2024) are examples of articles published by LL that included the Balkans in contemporary topics such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the emergence of armed conflicts. In Populism Through the Looking Glass, Christopher Dominguez Michael (September 1, 2024) finds similarities between López Obrador's style of governing in Mexico and that of leaders such as Narendra Modi (India), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Turkey), and Viktor Orbán (Hungary), while Ibsen Martínez, in Petkoff, Bulgaria, and the Weapons of Algiers (August 1, 2024), reflects on Petkoff and his political transformations from a Latin American perspective. These two articles aim to find similarities and political affinities between countries such as Hungary and Bulgaria and Latin America. Special attention should be given to Branko Milanovic's articles published in LL. These articles were translated into Spanish because they had previously been published elsewhere. Milanovic, a regular contributor to LL, authorizes the magazine to publish Spanish versions of his contributions to other media outlets. Before the police arrive: bookstores on Saturdays (February 25, 2024); Democracy of Convenience, Not by Choice: Why Eastern Europe Is Different (February 1, 2022) and A Communist Party in a Turbulent Era and a Difficult Country (April 23, 2020) showcase Milanovic's reflections on topics ranging from the literature he read as a child in his home country to thoughts on the future of Eastern Europe and the adaptations of communism worldwide. Milanovic is a notable Balkan author whose columns are regularly published in LL. The Transformation of War Journalism (July 1, 2024), in which Marga Zambrana reflects on changes in the journalism industry dedicated to armed conflicts; Global Sepharad (October 1, 2021) by Ricardo Dudda, in which recounts the history of the Levy family, Balkan Jews, and their experiences at the beginning of the 20th century; The Maturity of Balkan Literature in Spanish (April 22, 2021) in which Miguel Roán discusses the increase in the number of books in Spanish published by authors from the Balkans; and Madrid-Pristina Connection: The Spanish Passion of the Kosovars (July 8, 2020) by Juan Manuel Montoro, who reflects on Spain's non-recognition of Kosovo's independence, complete the list of LL articles that address the Balkans to some extent. Analysis of the FAL and the LL Taken overall the two sources' primary similarity is their limited focus on contemporary events and the social, political, cultural, and economic dynamics of Balkan countries. Although LL, with its broader scope, included articles that addressed contemporary Balkan affairs to some extent, the lack of intellectual attention struck me given to current social trends in the Balkans by both sources. It should be noted that the Balkans are not a central theme for either publication. One possible reason for this marginal interest is the absence of Latin American specialists in the region and Balkan diaspora communities in Latin America.  Another similarity is the focus of the articles in both publications. A perspective on international relations and history takes precedence, with social issues relegated to a secondary role. While LL tries to showcase the region's cultural and artistic aspects, its political analyses tend to focus on Yugoslavia or the Balkan countries' relationships with the European Union, Russia, or the U.S. rather than on internal social tensions within each country. The limited attention that FAL pays to the Balkans, and to its constituent countries in particular, was surprising. Before this research, I had assumed I would find more articles on the subject, given that FAL is the Spanish-language magazine in Latin America that focuses the most on international issues. All of the authors in FAL are Latin American and come from academic fields including international relations, history, Latin American studies, international security studies, international law, and political science. The articles did not cite any specialized bibliography on the Balkans, and none of the authors appeared to have undertaken specialized studies on the region. Meanwhile, LL has the advantage of featuring Branko Milanovic, a Serbian-American economist from the Balkans who provides historical and economic insights on the region. Milanovic authored three articles in which Yugoslavia and its economic and political contradictions were central themes. Javier González-Cotta's article, The Political Thriller of Serbia (1991–2025) (June 2, 2025), was the only one to address the current social unrest in Serbia and its connection to cultural expressions, such as audiovisual production. The absence of academic references in the FAL articles, which offered general reflections on the political positions of Balkan countries, was notable. This lack of specialized academic literature was especially apparent in a journal that promotes academic thought and research, making it worth considering the reasons for this absence, which will be addressed in the second part of this research. LL's contribution to the cultural sphere was valuable and noteworthy. Two articles discussed the work of Croatian writer Slavenka Drakulić, and another examined Balkan literature translated into Spanish. These articles demonstrate that it is possible to publish content about the Balkans that engage readers and goes beyond topics related to international politics. LL frequently addressed topics such as Kosovo, the war in the former Yugoslavia, democratization processes, and the emergence of authoritarian leaders; in contrast, FAL tended to focus its publications on international issues, incorporating some mentions of the Balkans into these dynamics. _________________________________________________________________________ Part Two: The presence of the topic in museums in Chile, Argentina and Mexico Chile: Museum of Croatian Immigration in Magallanes (Punta Arenas): permanent exhibition exclusively on Croatian immigration (19(th)-20(th) centuries), emphasising their economic and social contributions to Patagonia. Regional Museum of Magallanes – secondary mention in the immigrants' hall. Argentina: Muntref Museum of Immigration (Buenos Aires): archival and bibliographic references to Croatian and Yugoslavian immigration. Mitre Museum: temporary exhibition “Serbia 1914: The Female Face of the Great War”. Mexico: Museum of Memory and Tolerance in Mexico City has a permanent exhibition called 'Former Yugoslavia', featuring maps, photographs of Sarajevo, and testimonies of the Bosnian genocide (1992–1995). Findings and analysis As with the publications of FAL and LL, museums present a rigid historical narrative that freezes the Balkans at two specific points in time: the early Balkanic (Croatian) immigration of the 19th and 20th centuries, and the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.  This curatorial choice reflects both the lack of Latin American specialists in Balkan studies and the limited influence of the contemporary Balkan diaspora. While museums commemorating other tragedies often maintain educational programmes that connect the past with the present, the Balkans are reduced to static display cases. Consequently, the Latin American public is presented with a fossilised image of the region: either as a place of successful immigrants to Latin America or as a distant tragedy, but never as a living space of civic agency. The case of the Croatian diaspora in Chile is paradigmatic in understanding how the presence of an influential migrant community can paradoxically contribute to the 'freezing' of the image of its region of origin in the recipient's imagination.  According to Marinkovic Contreras's (2018) research, this community has historically exerted significant pressure and influence to secure state recognition and legitimise its national identity within Chile. This narrative of success and recognition, centred on integration and contribution to national development, is reflected in a regional museum exhibition which highlights the epic story of migration and the milestones of the 20th century.  However, by adopting the 'geographical perspective' defined by Kraser et al. (2016) as being rooted in the history of socio-spatial conflicts and fragmentation, these institutions reduce the complexity of Southeastern Europe to a static territory of origin. Consequently, while contemporary cultural production attempts to process traces of the post-war period up to the present day, public narratives in the Southern Cone and Mexico remain fixated on the nostalgia of migration or the trauma of the 1990s wars.  This phenomenon renders the political agency and civil mobilisations of the 2020–2025 period invisible, presenting the Balkans as a region whose history appears to have ended with the consolidation of its diaspora or the signing of international peace treaties. Latin American museums of memory, such as the Museum of Memory and Tolerance in Mexico and the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Chile, operate according to a logic of 'trauma pedagogy'. While this is necessary, it ultimately freezes the region's image in the 1990s. In these spaces, the Balkans are almost exclusively presented through the lens of Yugoslav disintegration and mass human rights violations.  This institutional narrative reflects an academic trend that reduces the region to its historical and legal evolution. Interest in this trend is confined to analysing the legitimacy of external military interventions or the complex processes of international recognition of new entities, such as the Republic of Kosovo. This topic is present in both FAL and LL, but is approached from the perspective of international law and international relations.  As previously mentioned, by focusing their curatorial approach on ethnic conflict and the response of international organisations, these museums adopt a perspective centred on the socio-spatial dynamics of historical fragmentation, as described by several analysts. This results in a disconnect from the current reality in the Balkans: while recent intellectual and literary output processes the aftermath of the war up to 2023, the Latin American museographic discourse concludes with the genocide. Moreover, there is a clear chronological gap. While academia and comparative literature are already addressing the period 1990–2023, museography seems to have come to a standstill in 1995. This failure to keep up to date is largely a consequence of the shortage of local specialists mentioned in the previous section.  Without researchers to connect the history to the 2020–2025 protests, museums can only reproduce the traditional narrative of the conflict and the post-war period. Critical curation proposal To overcome this 'stagnation', we need to transition from 'curation of nostalgia' or 'curation of horror' to 'curation of resistance'. Although temporary exhibitions such as 'Serbia 1914' at the Mitre Museum demonstrate an attempt to broaden the perspective, they remain anchored to war-related anniversaries.  One alternative would be to organise exhibitions that link extractivism in the Balkans with socio-environmental conflicts in Latin America, thereby fostering a South–South dialogue. A concrete example is the mass protests in Serbia (2021–2024) against the “Jadar” lithium project by Rio Tinto. These protests were not just about the environment; they also denounced the lack of transparency and the influence of corporate interests on the state. This conflict reflects the same 'extractive imperative' that sparks waves of protests in Latin America, where local communities challenge mining projects in defence of water and territorial autonomy.  The protests against Rio Tinto in Serbia (2021–2022) achieved a historic victory by forcing the government to temporarily revoke the mining licences. This demonstrates that the protests were not just a ‘protest’, but an effective display of political action by citizens. This development bears a direct resemblance to the movements in Chile and Panama that succeeded in halting similar extractive projects. In both the Balkans and Latin America, the struggle is ecological and concerns sovereignty over resources in the face of transnational corporations – an aspect that has received little analysis or visibility to date.  The link between resistance movements in the Balkans and Latin America is evident in the context of lithium mining. While the debate in the Lithium Triangle centres on the global energy transition, the 'Kreni-Promeni' movement and the 'Ecological Uprising' in Serbia have demonstrated that civil mobilisation can directly challenge giants such as Rio Tinto. This has been achieved through street protests, resulting in the cancellation of projects. Latin American museums overlook this 'agency of victory' by focusing solely on past trauma and ignoring the fact that Balkan citizens are today at the forefront of defending their territory, just like socio-environmental movements in our region.  Museums could create a gallery on the 'Geopolitics of Dispossession', displaying posters from the Belgrade protests alongside records of struggles against mega-mining in Colombia or Panama. This would position the Balkans as a contemporary ally in environmental resistance. Another example is civil resilience in the face of authoritarianism. The 'Serbia Against Violence' movement (2023–2024) and protests against 'competitive authoritarian' regimes in the Western Balkans have given rise to forms of 'active citizenship' that aim to democratise institutions from the ground up. These developments are similar to the processes of democratic backsliding currently occurring in countries such as Mexico, Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua.  Memorial museums could showcase these 'shared struggles', challenging the perception of the Balkans as a 'failed state' and presenting them as a laboratory for democratic innovation instead. Demonstrating that these protests in both the Balkans and Latin America are not just directed against 'corruption' in general, but against systems where democratic institutions exist in name only yet are undermined by executive control of the media and judiciary, allows us to establish a shared analytical framework for both regions. This helps Latin American academics and museum specialists to view the Balkan conflict as a political phenomenon with which they are familiar, rather than as something 'ethnically alien'. Conclusion: Towards a Thaw in the Latin American Perspective on the Balkans The invisibility of Balkan civil protests (2020–2025) in Latin America's public and academic spheres is not accidental, but the consequence of dual hermeneutic closures—both academic and institutional. This study has demonstrated that Latin American discourse on the Balkans operates through two dominant yet limiting frameworks: an academic focus on historical and legal development, and a museographic approach that petrifies the region either in migratory nostalgia or the pedagogy of trauma. Both perspectives adopt a geographical outlook centred on fragmentation and static origins, thereby rendering contemporary political agency and mobilisations for environmental or anti-corruption causes invisible. The analysis of Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica and Letras Libres revealed a striking pattern: Balkan countries appear primarily as peripheral references in discussions of international order, European security, or historical conflicts, with minimal attention to current social dynamics. While Letras Libres offers valuable cultural contributions through literary and artistic coverage, neither journal engages systematically with the region's contemporary civil society. Similarly, museums in Chile, Argentina, and Mexico present a fossilised image of the Balkans—either as a place of successful immigrants or as a distant tragedy—never as a living space of civic agency. This chronological gap, where museography appears to have stalled in 1995 while Balkan intellectual production processes the post-war period up to the present, reflects a broader shortage of Latin American specialists in the region. To break this cycle, three concrete pathways are proposed: 1. Reform academic cooperation models: Expand existing Jean Monnet Chairs at leading Latin American universities beyond their traditional focus on EU–Mercosur trade relations to include specific modules on the Western Balkans. These modules should analyse 'bottom-up' democratisation processes and current citizen mobilisations, moving away from post-war paradigms. 2. Institutionalise specialised training: Establish regional summer schools on Balkan studies offering transferable academic credits to train a new generation of specialists in international relations, sociology, and geography. These programmes should prioritise contemporary social dynamics over historical conflict narratives. The establishment of regional summer schools specialising in Balkan studies is a structural response to the shortage of specialists identified in this study. The absence of Latin American academics specialising in the region is not due to a lack of interest, but rather a systemic failure to fund fields of study considered 'non-traditional' at universities in Chile, Mexico and Argentina. Postgraduate programmes in international relations and sociology tend to prioritise a focus on global powers or hemispheric regional integration, which leaves the Balkans on the intellectual periphery.  To break this cycle, summer schools should offer transferable academic credits that enable undergraduate and postgraduate students to specialise in the region while remaining in their home programmes. Furthermore, these programmes must incorporate direct engagement with activists, journalists, and academics from the Balkans to avoid the Eurocentric mediation that has dominated knowledge production about the region. By establishing South–South collaborative networks, these schools could train a new generation of researchers who would be able to analyse the Balkans not as a case study of ethnic conflicts or international interventions, but as a contemporary laboratory of civil resistance, democratic innovation, and the struggle for environmental justice — issues that resonate deeply with Latin American realities. 3. Transform curatorial practices: Develop temporary exhibitions in Latin American museums that offer perspectives on contemporary Balkan society and its similarities with Latin American struggles. Exhibitions such as a 'Geopolitics of Dispossession' gallery—linking Serbian protests against the Jadar lithium project with socio-environmental conflicts in Colombia or Panama—would foster South–South dialogue and position the Balkans as a contemporary ally in environmental resistance. Only through the institutionalisation of dedicated spaces for study and a curatorial approach that restores political agency to Balkan citizens will the region cease to be a 'grey area' on the Latin American intellectual map. The Balkans should become not merely a case study for international law or a repository of historical trauma, but a mirror in which Latin America can recognise its own struggles for environmental transparency, democratic resilience, and social justice. This thaw in perspective is not merely an academic exercise—it is a necessary step toward building genuine transregional solidarity in an era of shared global challenges. References (Soto, 2022). Análisis de la intervención militar efectuada por la Otan en Kosovo… [Tesis de pregrado, Universidad de Chile]. Recuperado el 28 de febrero de 2026 de https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/186317 Bilić, J. B., Cúneo, P., & Franić, I. (2023). El croata como lengua de herencia en Argentina. Íkala, 28(1), 86–104. Recuperado el 28 de febrero de 2026 de https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2550/255076325006/html Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica. (s.f.). Recuperado el 28 de febrero de 2026 de https://revistafal.com Letras Libres. (s.f.). Recuperado el 28 de febrero de 2026 de https://letraslibres.com/  (Contreras, 2018). Croatas en Chile: presiones e influencias para el reconocimiento de un Estado [Tesis de magíster, Universidad de Chile]. Recuperado el 28 de febrero de 2026 de https://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/167835 Museo de la Inmigración Croata en Magallanes. (s.f.). Recuperado el 28 de febrero de 2026 de https://www.registromuseoschile.cl/663/w3-article-120369.html  Museo Memoria y Tolerancia. (s.f.). Ex Yugoslavia. Recuperado el 28 de febrero de 2026 de https://www.myt.org.mx/memoria/ex-yugoslavia  Museo Mitre. (s.f.). Recuperado el 28 de febrero de 2026 de https://museomitre.cultura.gob.ar Museo Regional de Magallanes. (s.f.). 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Historically speaking, the Roma population has been one of the most marginalised and discriminated groups in the Western Balkans. During the middle and new ages, Roma people were slaves to the other nations in the Balkans, with Roma slavery being officially abolished only in 1856 in Romania. Estimates say that up to half a million Roma people were killed during the Second World War by Nazi Germany and its fascist collaborators. According to data from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, tens of thousands of Roma in the territory of the former Yugoslavia under German occupation were sent to concentration camps such as Sajmište and Jasenovac. The Roma population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was nearly decimated (Post-conflict Research Center, 2018, 4). A Roma child stands in front of the "Eternal Flame" in downtown Sarajevo. The plaque does not mention the casualties of Sarajevan minorities. Image by Jasmin Brutos. Bosnia, July 2008. Taken from: https://pulitzercenter.org According to the last available population census from 2013, Roma population in B&H amounts to 12,583 or 0,36% of the total population (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2019, 27), which makes them the biggest national minority in B&H an the fourth nationality. However, these figures do not depict the real situation for many reasons, two of them most important in the regard of this article. (1) Data collection like population census is carried out from door to door of households and this is the main obstacle since Roma people very often do not have a household in a usual sense of the word and reside in informal settlements where it is very challenging to keep track of the recorded households and their members. (2) Those who do take part in the data collection are hesitant to declare themselves as Roma due to the systemic and individual discrimination they have been experiencing for their whole lives. Instead, they either use their constitutionally guaranteed right not to declare their ethnicity/nationality or say that they are Bosniacs, Serbs or Croats.  According to the report by the Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina the estimation of the real number of Roma population in B&H is around 50.000 in total (Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2014, 23). Data shows that 71% of Roma households in Eastern Europe live in absolute poverty, a concept used to describe the living conditions in which people do not have enough resources to meet basic needs such as food, water, clothing and shelter (Singer, 1993, 218). The Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman claims that the Roma people do not exercise their human rights. Between 50% and 70% of Roma in B&H live in substandard housing, most often consisting of one room and no sanitary facilities. As far as 30% of Roma who participated in UNICEF research did not have a kitchen, while 17% lived without electricity (UNICEF, 2013, 24).  When it comes to the legislative of the B&H, it is important to stress that “the Constitution of B&H does not recognize Roma and other minority groups as citizens with rights equal to those of their Bosniak, Croat, and Serb counterparts” (Post-conflict Research Center, 2018, 6-7). This gradually enables institutional discrimination and exclusion of Roma people, despite the ratification of international agreements that oblige B&H to fight against this kind of discrimination.  Socio-economic status of Roma in B&H (Employment, healthcare, and education) Comprehensive, detailed and up to date data on socio-economic status of Roma in B&H is missing, but different reports and research results show that Roma in B&H is an especially vulnerable population. According to these findings, Roma people in Bosnia and Herzegovina face the highest level of discrimination in terms of employment opportunities and are almost completely absent from the workforce, which means that they have little choice but to find unregistered work in the informal sector (“grey economy”) or remain without an income. The unemployment rate among Roma is 56%, which is among the highest in the Western Balkan region and twice as high as that of non-Roma (European Commission, 2019, 55). Roma youth from Kakanj, a town 40 km northwest of Sarajevo, pose for a portrait. Image by Jasmin Brutos. Bosnia, September 2009. Taken from: https://pulitzercenter.org Main cause for the high unemployment rate among Roma is the inaccessibility of the labour market. This comes as a consequence of either being undocumented, living in informal settlements away and separated from the urban areas where the job offer rate is higher or the sheer lack of education, skills and required work experience (Civil Rights Defenders, 2018, 10-11).  These deep systemic problems require intervention from the government, on all institutional levels. Qualitative analysis of the public policies which should result in a more satisfactory level of inclusion of Roma in B&H shows that the strategies only mention Roma briefly as one of the vulnerable groups and only few envisage Roma specific activities (Sarajlic, 2020). Most recent report of the European Commission points out that there is no significant progress in this area. Roma children are particularly vulnerable to the worst forms of child labour (European Commission, 2024, 41).  Although Bosnia and Herzegovina’s healthcare system is formally based on principles of solidarity, inclusiveness, and accessibility, significant disparities between declared aspirations and real life persist. Unequal access to healthcare, poor service quality, financial opacity, outdated technology, and insufficient investment in new equipment remain key challenges. Vulnerable groups are often treated as homogeneous in policy documents, overlooking their diverse needs. Roma, in particular, face persistent barriers to healthcare, primarily due to a lack of personal identification documents and residence registration. Without these, they cannot access services like healthcare, social security, or education. The situation is even more challenging for those in rural areas, where healthcare services are less accessible (Sarajlic, 2020, 29-31). According to the results of the 2013 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, more than 30% of Roma children of school age in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not attend primary school. Additionally, less than half complete primary education on time - 46% of boys and only 34% of girls (CAHROM, 2016, 17-19). Since the end of the war in 1995, 294 Roma children have dropped out of primary school in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, despite support measures implemented by the relevant ministries (Civil Rights Defenders, 2018, 14). Given the importance of education, especially for children from vulnerable families, it is alarming that only 1.5% of Roma children attend preschool. In addition to the poor living conditions faced by the Roma population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, another contributing factor to high dropout rates and low preschool attendance may be the lack of recognition of Roma culture within the education system. The European Commission's 2016 Progress Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina highlights that the Roma language is not offered as an optional subject in any school in the country, nor are there alternative opportunities to learn it. Not only is education in the Roma language nonexistent, but it is also neither mentioned as a requirement nor considered a possibility in any official reports (European Commission, 2016). Roma in the Wars of the 1990s and as Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina As a result of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, tens of thousands of Roma from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia were forced to leave their homes. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, hundreds of Roma were killed, but Roma were never recognised as victims of the war (Rorke, 2016). There is very little information about the exact number of Roma victims during these wars. Additionally, there is a lack of information about war crimes committed against Roma. According to a 2021 study by the Forum of Roma in Serbia, Roma over the age of 65 in Serbia testified that every twelfth elderly person had lost someone in the wars of the 1990s, and nearly the same proportion reported that a close family member had been wounded (Autonomija, 2024). Addressing war crimes is a problem that exists at the national level in BiH. War crimes researchers from non-governmental organizations have stated that Roma people were victims of all sides during the war, despite not being involved in starting the conflict. On top of that, unlike other ethnic groups, there were no paramilitary groups to protect Roma people. (DWP, 2024). To this day, only one case involving crimes against Roma has been prosecuted. The Skočić case involves members of the Simini Chetniks unit, who in July 1992 destroyed a mosque in the village of Skočić near Zvornik and killed 27 Roma civilians. They raped three Roma women, then took all the captured individuals in a truck to the village of Malešić, where the three women were singled out and taken to a house, where they were detained for several months. They were kept as slaves, raped, beaten, and forced to serve the members of the unit. One of them was 13 years old, and the other was 15. The remaining Roma men were taken to a pit in the village of Hamzići, where they were individually pulled out of the vehicle, killed with knives or firearms, and their bodies thrown into the pit. A bomb was then thrown into the pit. For these crimes, two members of the unit were sentenced to eight years, and one to five years, for the following acts: inhumane treatment, bodily harm, sexual humiliation, and rape. For example, one of the two sentenced to eight years, Zoran Djurdjević, committed the crime of raping a Bosniak woman a month before this crime, for which he was sentenced to 13 years (Nikolic, 2010). The Humanitarian Law Center points out that no one has been convicted for the murder of 27 Roma men, and that sentences for the prolonged sexual violence and rape of Roma women were significantly lighter than those for similar crimes against women of other nationalities. Based on this, the Center believes that Serbian institutions responsible for prosecuting war crimes are indifferent to investigating and prosecuting crimes against Roma during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. This lack of action, coupled with a clear absence of empathy for the victims, reveals a discriminatory attitude toward Roma within these institutions. (Humanitarian Law Center, 2019). The fact that cases of war crimes committed against Roma are rarely even initiated, and when they are, they result in lenient sentences, is alarming enough. Even more concerning is the fact that many accused and even convicted war criminals move freely and work across the former Yugoslavia, making the region highly unsafe for vulnerable groups such as the Roma people. As we have already noted, a large number of proceedings have yet to be initiated or are still in their early stages, and the Humanitarian Law Center has repeatedly warned about the potential dangers posed by the absence of lustration for war criminals. For example, a war criminal who was sentenced to 22 years in prison for the most serious crimes against the Muslim population was, with the approval of a primary school principal and the support of the mayor, allowed to give a lecture to children in a school in Novi Sad last year - on the topic of "heroism" (Bursać, 2023). Similarly, in the most recent elections held in Serbia, Vojislav Šešelj, who was convicted by the Hague Tribunal for hate speech, participated in the elections and is currently part of the ruling coalition in the country's capital (N1, 2023). Thus, individuals who participated in or supported war crimes remain embedded in the structures of power today. Given that Bosnia and Herzegovina has a three-member presidency, with each member representing one of the three constituent peoples, it is also worth noting that the party representing Serbs was founded by Radovan Karadžić, a convicted war criminal sentenced to life imprisonment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (United Nations, 2016). The circumstances are even more challenging for Roma who left for foreign countries during the war and returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina afterward. The post-war political and social structures often excluded them, leaving many without access to housing, healthcare, or education. A large number of Roma lack proper identification documents, preventing them from obtaining refugee status or state assistance. Furthermore, the destruction of their homes and displacement disrupted their traditional ways of life, pushing many into extreme poverty. Reports from organizations such as the United Nations and Human Rights Watch have documented cases of discrimination against Roma in the post-war period. The United Nations even declared Roma as a Category of Persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina who are in Continued Need of International Protection after the war (UNHCR, 1999).  Many Roma settlements were destroyed during the conflict, and those who attempted to return often faced hostility from local communities. For these reasons, the EU signed an agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina, obligating the country to reintegrate all Roma who were deported from the European Union back to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Efendic & Ferré, 2023). To achieve this goal, national governments developed “reintegration policies.” However, these policies do not always take into account the specific situation of Romani returnees, particularly the discrimination and other forms of anti-Gypsyism they face. More concretely, they fail to address the lack of adequate housing and the limited access to the labor market that Roma experience due to their ethnicity. Moreover, the “reintegration policies” do not always acknowledge the different circumstances of returnees. For instance, Roma banished in the aftermath of the war in Kosovo who spent more than 15 years in Western Europe face a different situation upon return compared to Roma who left their home countries only a few years ago. Additionally, the measures outlined in these “reintegration policies” are not fully implemented, primarily due to a lack of financial resources (Civil Rights Defenders, 2018, 26). Thus, even when bound by an agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina fails to provide adequate protection for returning Roma. The situation is significantly worse when Roma return from countries that are not EU members, as there is no regulation obligating Bosnia and Herzegovina to reintegrate them into society. Exclusion as a post-war reality The Roma population in Bosnia and Herzegovina faces deep-rooted systemic discrimination, socio-economic exclusion, and political marginalization. Despite being the largest national minority, Roma remain largely invisible in official policies, lacking fundamental rights such as access to education, employment, healthcare, and legal recognition. Their historical and contemporary suffering, including the atrocities committed against them during the wars of the 1990s, remains unacknowledged, perpetuating cycles of marginalization. The lack of institutional commitment to justice and inclusion, coupled with rising nationalist rhetoric, further exacerbates their vulnerability. Non-governmental organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as international human rights organizations, often describe the position of Roma in BiH as a "vicious cycle." There is no doubt that Roma are excluded from society, and their integration requires a chain reaction that the government and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina show no willingness to initiate. Roma in Bosnia and Herzegovina are, above all, unsafe, exposed to violence that goes unpunished, and their frequent lack of access to healthcare makes them even more vulnerable. References Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2019). Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. https://www.popis.gov.ba/popis2013/doc/Knjiga2/K2_S_E.pdf Autonomija. (2024, August 31). MARKO MILOSAVLJEVIĆ: Romske žrtve jugoslovenskih ratova ostale marginalizovane i nepriznate. Portal građanske Vojvodine, Autonomija. https://autonomija.info/marko-milosavljevic-romske-zrtve-jugoslovenskih-ratova-ostale-marginalizovane-i-nepriznate/ Bursać, D. (2023, May 17). Bursać: Tišina tamo, ratni zločinac djeci drži čas! ALJAZEERA. https://balkans.aljazeera.net/opinions/2023/5/17/bursac-tisina-tamo-ratni-zlocinac-djeci-drzi-cas CAHROM. (2016). THEMATIC REPORT BY THE GROUP OF EXPERTS ON VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR ROMA. Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Roma and Traveller Issues. https://rm.coe.int/16806a9332 Chileva, A., Clarke-Habib, S., & Kut, G. (2021). A Manual for Trainers in the Western Balkans: Youth peer education for peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Regional Youth Cooperation Office. https://www.rycowb.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Y-Peer_PB_Manual_English_web.pdf Civil Rights Defenders. (2018). The Wall of Anti-Gypsyism: Roma in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Civil Rights Defenders. https://crd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/The-Wall-of-Anti-Gypsyism-–-Roma-in-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-BiH.pdf DWP. (2024, Jun 22). Zločini nad Romima na području bivše Jugoslavije nikad nisu procesuirani. Dealing with the past. https://dwp-balkan.org/bs/zlocini-nad-romima-na-podrucju-bivse-jugoslavije-nikad-nisu-procesuirani/ Efendic, A., & Ferré, C. (2023). ASSESSMENT OF POLICY, INSTITUTIONAL AND SERVICE GAPS RELATED TO SUSTAINABLE SOCIO-ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION OF RETURNEES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. UNDP. https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2024-10/returnee_assessment_bih_report_final.pdf European Commission. (2016). Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016 Report. Europian Commission. European Commission. (2019). Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union. European Commission. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019SC0222 European Commission. (2024). Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024 Report. European Commission. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/451db011-6779-40ea-b34b-a0eeda451746_en?filename=Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina%20Report%202024.pdf Humanitarian Law Center. (2019, March 11). Sentences for rape of Roma women from Skočić too mild. Humanitarian Law Center. http://www.hlc-rdc.org/?p=36418&lang=de Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2014). Special report on the status of Roma in Bosnia and Herzegovina. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/a/110495.pdf International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, United Nations. (2023, September 23). THE ICTY INDICTED 161 INDIVIDUALS for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. ICTY. https://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases Kulkova, M. (2019). From Negative to Positive Peace in Western Balkans. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 13(3), 26-47. https://cejiss.org/images/issue_articles/2019-volume-13-issue-3/02-kulkova.pdf N1. (2023, November 1). Šešelj: Radikali u koaliciji sa SNS na beogradskim i lokalnim izborima. Danas. https://www.danas.rs/vesti/politika/seselj-radikali-u-koaliciji-sa-sns-na-beogradskim-i-lokalnim-izborima/ Nikolic, M. (2010, February 1). Prvi proces za zločine nad Romima. Radio Slobodna Evropa. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/skocic_romi_zlocin/1944992.html Perviz, I. (2023, April 16). Dosije Stava: Sud BiH osudio najviše ratnih zločinaca u historiji. stav.ba. https://stav.ba/vijest/dosje-stava-sud-bih-osudio-najvise-ratnih-zlocinaca-u-historiji/ Post-conflict Research Center. (2018). Roma on the Margins. OSCE Mission to BiH. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/2/406001.pdf Rorke, B. (2016, July 20). 25 Years after Yugoslavia: Roma Exclusion (Part 1). European Roma Rights Centre. https://www.errc.org/news/25-years-after-yugoslavia-roma-exclusion-part-1 Sarajlic, A. (2020). Analysis of mainstream policies targeting Roma integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regional Cooperation Council Roma Integration Action team. https://www.rcc.int/romaintegration2020/files/admin/docs/246777234263684e42c5e9739dfcbdab.pdf Singer, P. (1993). Practical ethics (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. Tokača, M. (2012). The Bosnian Book of the Dead. Istraživačko dokumentacioni centar. https://exyugenealogy.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/bosanska-knjiga-mrtvih_tom-i.pdf Trepanic, A. (2023, January 11). U BiH 172 potjernice za licima koja izbjegavaju pravdu u vezi ratnih zločina. BIRN. https://balkaninsight.com/sr/2023/01/11/u-bih-172-potjernice-za-licima-koja-izbjegavaju-pravdu-u-vezi-ratnih-zlocina/ UNHCR. (1999, May 1). Update of UNHCR's Position on Categories of Persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina who are in Continued Need of International Protection. UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/news/update-unhcrs-position-categories-persons-bosnia-and-herzegovina-who-are-continued-need UNICEF. (2013). Položaj Romske djece i porodica u Bosni i Hercegovini. UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/bih/media/436/file/Položaj%20romske%20djece%20i%20porodica%20u%20Bosni%20i%20Hercegovini.pdf United Nations. (2016, March 24). Karadžić (IT-95-5/18). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. https://www.icty.org/en/case/karadzic War Crimes Database. (n.d.). WAR CRIMES TRIALS DATABASE AT A GLANCE. Retrieved February 2, 2025, from https://www.warcrimesdatabase.net Zatega, E. (2025, January 28). Hiljade ratnih zločina u BiH vjerovatno nikad neće biti sudski procesuirano. Slobodna Evropa. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ratni-zlocini-bih-sudovi/33290353.html

Author: Iva Kojić  The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s was far more than a local tragedy; it tore apart an intricately linked society and economy overnight. As new borders rose and political agreements hardened, ordinary people were left stranded within fragile new economies, unable to compete with the wider world. For the truck driver waiting endless hours at the Batrovci border, or the student from Bitola whose diploma is worthless in Belgrade, the breakup replaced old certainties with lost futures. For more than two decades, influential academic and policy voices have described reintegration as a set of assignments dictated by the EU’s Berlin Process, treating the Western Balkans as passive recipients and ignoring the region’s powerful, internal need for a homegrown recovery. Illustration photo. Retrieved from Pexels (www.pexels.com) The Berlin Process offers a clear roadmap, while the Open Balkan Initiative appears, at least on paper, to be a more nimble, practical answer to real-life needs. Of course, both are complicated by local politicians' ambitions. In the end, the best way forward is to blend the strengths of both: keep the high standards of the Berlin Process, but add the local ownership and flexibility of Open Balkan, so that these projects actually make a difference for regular people living under their shadow Theoretical Framework and the Live Reality At the heart of the argument for regional integration lies David Mitrany’s functionalist theory. Mitrany posited that technical and social needs (energy distribution, transport logistics, public health) naturally ignore political borders and force cooperation out of sheer necessity (Alexandrescu, 2007, 29) . In the post-Yugoslav context, this theory suggests that the shared power grids, railways, and supply chains left behind by the common state act as a silent pull, drawing the successor states back into a web of international activities. But the real work of regionalism cannot just be explained by academic theories. Mitrany's ideas help set the stage, but when you look at what is actually happening in the Balkans, things are much messier. While functionalism suggests cooperation emerges from practical necessity, critics argue that it overlooks complex socio-political realities and power dynamics. The Open Balkan initiative, for example, is not just a response to practical needs. It is also shaped by the ambitions of political leaders. Many of these same leaders have, at home, let the rule of law slide and often put showmanship ahead of actually solving problems. Similarly, other integration theories, such as neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism, might offer insights into how political actors and state interests play crucial roles in integration efforts. Thus, although theories hold that working together on practical issues should lead to political peace, in reality, these efforts are often hijacked for political gain. There is a real grassroots desire for reintegration, but the tools used to get there are often twisted to serve political survival. To truly judge these efforts, we must examine how political leaders use (and sometimes misuse) these theories, sometimes helping people, sometimes just helping themselves. Academic models are helpful, but right now, it is the politicians at the wheel, steering through a landscape full of old tensions and personal power plays. The Berlin Process: The Outsourced Assignment Launched in 2014, the Berlin Process was intended to revitalize regional cooperation through high-level summits and the creation of a Common Regional Market. Its greatest strength and its most significant contribution to the lives of regular people is its inclusivity. It involves all six regional partners, ensuring regional integration remains aligned with the EU's strict standards and legal principles. This inclusivity is a vital democratic safeguard, as it prevents the “island” effect where certain states are left behind due to political exclusion. In practical terms, the Berlin Process has produced tangible, humanized successes that improve daily life, such as the “Roam Like at Home” agreement, which has significantly lowered communication costs for millions of people traveling for work or family across the divided region. By eliminating roaming charges, the process has moved the region one step closer to the standards of the EU’s internal market (Mitrovic 2025, 10). However, a deeper critique reveals that the Berlin Process often feels like an outsourced project managed by a distant bureaucracy. For the regular citizen, its results are often trapped in administrative stagnation or slowed by complex ratification processes across six different parliaments. As Kamberi (2021, 60) notes, the prospect of the EU joining now seems “too distant and uncertain”, leading to a loss of faith in reforms that feel like a never-ending series of homework assignments given by Brussels. The Open Balkan Initiative: Agility, Ego, and the Practical Reality In contrast, the Open Balkan initiative is a locally led project born of a perceived revolt against the status quo. Its greatest strength is its agility. By focusing on low-hanging fruit, it has achieved practical successes where the Berlin Process has historically struggled (Xhoxhaj 2024, 7). The 2024 Labor Market Access Agreement is the primary example of this practical work: it allows a citizen of North Macedonia to work in Serbia or Albania without the humiliating and expensive ordeal of obtaining a work permit (Mitrovic 2025, 8). This is a direct response to the brain drain crisis hollowing out the region. However, the Open Balkan initiative is also flawed, mainly because it excludes Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which risks further splitting the region. And, just like with other regional efforts, we cannot remain blind to the politicians in charge. Citizens worry that this initiative is a front, giving political leaders a bigger stage and more power, even as the rule of law back home deteriorates. Some critics even warn that it could end up putting Serbia at the forefront, mainly benefiting big companies and politicians instead of everyday people trying to get by. However, proponents of Open Balkan argue that the initiative prioritizes regional economic collaboration, aiming to bring tangible benefits quickly to those who need it the most. They assert that by simplifying labor mobility and reducing trade barriers, the initiative addresses real economic needs and can set a precedent for broader regional inclusion in the future. Bridging the Gap through Practical Reintegration The positive aspects inherent in both the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan initiative must be synthesized to move beyond political spectacle and toward a genuine improvement in the lives of regular people. Within the Berlin Process, the region must preserve the high standards of the EU acquis and ensure total regional inclusivity within the WB6. In the Open Balkan, the synthesis must foster a sense of regional ownership. The bridge between these two models lies in the Staged Accession model. This framework suggests the EU should stop treating the Balkans as a binary “in or out” choice and instead offer early, functional access to the Single Market as a reward for specific regional cooperation successes (Mitrovic 2025, 19). For the citizen, a synthesis of these models would move from grand declaration to practical work. For example, moving beyond simple roaming agreements to a unified regional energy grid and digital market might allow Balkan tech startups to scale regionally before competing globally, thereby fulfilling the need for a shared economic space that remains physically dependent on common infrastructure. Another example could be expanding the labor mobility protocols of the Open Balkan to the entire WB6 within the legitimate framework of the Berlin Process. This would ensure that a nurse from Sarajevo or a programmer from Pristina can move as easily as their counterparts in the Trio, while still benefiting from the legal protections and safety standards guaranteed by EU alignment. This is where the real work happens. It is not found in high-level summits but in regional harmonization that makes the border invisible to the person crossing it. By utilizing the political speed of the Open Balkan to fulfill the institutional promises of the Berlin Process, the region might finally begin to heal in a way that serves the people. Moving Beyond the Homework Assignment The reintegration of the post-Yugoslav space is a structural necessity- a response to the unsustainable fragmentations of the 1990s. While academic theories provide a useful map, they cannot account for the practical difficulty of navigating the political egos and catastrophic track records of regional elites who often use these platforms for domestic promotion. The disintegration of Yugoslavia created a rupture that cannot be healed by an outsourced project alone. It requires a reintegration that is both technically sound and locally owned. Ultimately, the promise of regional stability is in moving beyond the political theater of leaders and toward genuine technical cooperation that serves the citizens. Regionalism is not a homework assignment for Brussels. Rather, it is a survival strategy for the people of the Balkans. The promise of either model is hollow if it does not address the ten-hour wait at the border or the unrecognized diploma. By reclaiming regional ownership and synthesizing the practical successes of both models, the successor states can finally make the borders breathable again. Reintegration should not be a decision for politicians. Instead, it is a mandate dictated by geography and the shared needs of a population that refuses to be defined solely by its borders. Bibliography Alexandrescu, Mihai. 2007. “David Mitrany: From Federalism to Functionalism.” Transylvanian Review 16 (1): 19-33. Popoviciu, Adrian-Claudiu. 2010. “David Mitrany and Functionalism: The Beginnings of Functionalism”. Revista Romana de Geografie Politica 12, (1): 162-172 Jelisavac Trosic, Sanja, and Mitko Arnaudov. 2023. “What are the Realistic Capabilities of the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan Initiative?” Review of International Affairs 74 (1187): 59-85. Kamberi, Donika. 2021. “Open Balkan vs. Berlin Process- Same, Same but Different” Freedom: Journal for Peacebuilding and Transcultural Communication 2 (3/4): 60-71. Jelisavac Trošić, Sanja, and Mitko Arnaudov. "Open Balkans - Between Economic Opportunities and Political Reality." (2023). Mitrovic, Sava. 2025. Regional Cooperation Initiatives in the Western Balkans: Improving Countries’ Preparedness for Staged Accession to the European Union. Belgrade: European Policy Centre (CEP). Xhoxhaj, Veton. 2024. “Assessing Western Balkans Regional Integration Efforts: A Comparative Study of the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan Initiative". Multidisciplinary Science Journal 7: 2025248. Mitrany, David. 1975. The Functional Theory of Politics. London: Martin Robertson for the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Author: Vladimir Stojković Although I am someone who was very small when the breakup of Yugoslavia began, I became aware of the importance of the idea of ​​such a federation. The very idea of ​​such a community was significantly progressive and went beyond the primitive narrow ethnic views of a multicultural society. In the idea of ​​Yugoslavia, I saw at least an attempt at the formation of nations that happened after the French Revolution throughout Europe. It meant connecting people from different regions and different cultures. Like say in France and Italy. People created and adopted their new common identity over time. This is how societies of free people were formed, who voluntarily took part in such a community. However, something like that in the Balkans, i.e. former Yugoslavia was not possible. In other words, Yugoslavia was an attempt to achieve something like this here as well, but the nationalism of the ethnic groups interrupted that good idea. Mostar, city in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Author: Marcel Dominic, pixabay.com This is the climate of societies that base their existence on mythology. This constant need for societies to compete in who has a "richer" national history, etc. they cannot lead to progress and the survival of a social community. The aim of such "histories" is to glorify ethnic virtues and to somehow develop a sense of uniqueness of a certain ethnic group and supremacy in relation to its neighbors in the region. It is especially interesting to see this in the area of ​​the former Yugoslavia, where peoples who speak the same language live and who are much closer to each other in terms of mentality than, say, Italians from southern and northern Italy. The wars of the 1990s on the territory of the former Yugoslavia set a lot of things back. People argue over territories and drawing borders. The dominance of a certain ethnic group and the suppression of minority groups is one of the main characteristics of such societies. That way of functioning of a society has been absolutely surpassed and reminds of some medieval times and the age of feudalism. It is difficult to expect the restoration of Yugoslavia as we knew it in the near future, but the idea of ​​association and federalism certainly exists and that is what we should strive for. Perhaps the peoples of this area can once again be in some form of a common federation. The political and security situation in Europe and the world is such that the entry of all the countries of the former Yugoslavia, and the Balkans as a whole, into the EU would be a rational step forward. In this way, the idea of ​​uniting into one union would be realized. It would be a stimulating injection for the Balkan countries, which would definitely push our societies into much more progressive trends in order to try to cross paths with the ghosts of the past.

We are thrilled to publish a new thought-provoking piece by Vladimir Petrović and Novak Vučo from the Innovation Center of the Institute for Contemporary History, University of Belgrade. Their article, “Belgrade Graffiti & Murals: Continuation of War by Other Means? – Traces of War in Yugoslavia and Ukraine in Belgrade Street Art: Reflections on Connections”, offers a gripping tour through Belgrade's streets, where right-wing nationalism, war nostalgia, and geopolitical tensions are fought out in paint, stencils, and slogans. From Ratko Mladić murals to the letter “Z” and graffiti wars over Kosovo and Ukraine — this text explores how political walls in Belgrade are covered in more than just paint, they’re layered with history, ideology, and unresolved conflict. The article has been positively peer-reviewed by Dr. Vjeran Pavlaković, one of the leading experts on graffiti, memory, and transitional justice in Southeast Europe. 👇 Download and read the full article in PDF: N.Vučo, V.Petrović - Belgrade Graffiti & MuralsDownload

Author: Vladyslava Oliinyk What do a child in Sarajevo in the 1990s and a child in Ukraine today have in common? A historian and student shares how moderating an exhibition at the Museum of War Childhood in Kyiv sparked a personal and academic journey into Balkan history, empathy, and the power of cultural memory. This blog reflects on how museums can connect past and present across borders—and how stories of childhood in wartime can bring people and nations closer together. Last summer, I had the unique opportunity to moderate a temporary exhibition at the Museum of War Childhood in Kyiv. Although the exhibition was managed by the museum’s Ukrainian branch, moderators like myself had to familiarize ourselves with the institution’s origins in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Museum of War Childhood is a relatively young institution—its permanent exhibition opened only in 2017—but its conceptual depth is striking. The idea behind the museum lies in the tension between the uniqueness and universality of growing up during wartime, as first explored in the book War Childhood by Bosnian entrepreneur and author Jasminko Halilović. Halilović transformed his personal experiences as a child during the Bosnian War (1992–1995) into a literary work and, eventually, a cultural institution. Photo by Oliinyk Vladyslava As a historian, I was familiar with the basic chronology and causes of the Bosnian War, but I had never examined the conflict on a micro level. During my undergraduate studies, my focus was on the history of visual art in Victorian Britain, and I gave little attention to Central or Eastern Europe. It wasn’t until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that I felt a personal urgency to understand the region’s post-Soviet transitions and the independence movements of neighboring countries. The complex and often painful recent history of the Balkans earned my deep respect, but at first, I struggled to see how our experiences were connected. Encountering the Museum of War Childhood changed that. I began to recognize parallels between the Russian-Ukrainian war and the Bosnian conflict—especially in how children navigate trauma, displacement, and interrupted childhoods during wartime. The museum made these connections tangible, offering a space where individual stories speak across national and temporal boundaries. Photo by Oliinyk Vladyslava In my growing curiosity about the Balkans, I chose to join a Central European University specifically because it offered a course on Balkan Studies. Ukrainian universities also offer Central and Eastern European studies, but I realized that to truly understand the region, I needed to learn from the people who live there. Who can speak more vividly about the intricacies of student protests in Serbia than those participating in them? Who can reflect more truthfully on the Bosnian war than those who lived through it? Through my studies and encounters, these questions are finding meaningful answers. My experience taught me how cultural institutions, like museums, can provide powerful tools for rethinking war, trauma, and identity. Today’s museums can connect the histories of different nations, revealing shared tragedies and common challenges—particularly for children navigating the chaos of war. This renewed focus on the experiences of minors has led me to new research interests and opened a new chapter of European history I had never expected to engage with so deeply. Museums, I’ve learned, can simultaneously build bridges and highlight difference—and in doing so, they provide a space where empathy, inquiry, and healing can coexist. Photo by Oliinyk Vladyslava Photo by Oliinyk Vladyslava