Author: Daria Vorobiova Serbia in the modern geopolitical situation is perceived as a country caught between two fires: the West and the East. Its indicative neutrality, not associating itself with any global organization and acting as a "third party," is telling. In reality, this political ambivalence has calculated mechanisms used by statesmen to preserve their political position and policy of "securing funding without additional obligations," while in return manipulating public opinion. Illustration photo. Retrieved from Pexels (www.pexels.com) Neither to the West, nor to the East Looking at survey results on the political preferences of Serbs reveals a deeply divided population: for instance, a telling example is the 2023 WFD survey. It showed that 43% of Serbs believe they should rely on Russia in international relations, and only 25.8% of respondents stated they should rely on the European Union. Also notable is the question of whether Serbia belongs to the West or the East: 42% of respondents answered that Serbia is not part of either, while the same proportion answered logically about belonging to the West or the East. Serbian society is extremely fragmented in its political preferences: this problem leads to a general instability of civic engagement in politics, as without consensus among the sides, it is impossible to exert strong civic influence on the political life of the state as a whole [1]. How much does the state influence the political preferences of Serbs? Following data from the same survey, it is evident that 59.2% of respondents note that they view political information about events in Serbia through television. The state exerts sufficient influence on television, considering channels like RTS, RTV Pink, Happy TV, which are known for publishing information deliberately portrayed in a light favorable to the state. Under such conditions, the question arises – if a large number of citizens receive such information, can their political preferences be genuinely logical and justified? [2] Also, television programs have been observed deliberately portraying the EU in a bad light, while Russia is presented in the moral image of a fraternal state. The key problem with this presentation of information is the excessive moralization of "good" Russia and "bad" European Union. Typically, this moral assessment is based solely on subjectivity, in no way appealing to rational reflections on the benefits of such "friendship" for Serbia [3]. And it is precisely the "moral" justification, as well as the "moral boundaries of the permissible," that allow Serbian politicians to maintain their position for as long as possible, instilling in citizens an unstable pluralism of opinions to weaken their civic stance. The problem of "moralizing" politics as a key factor of ambivalence This appeal to everything moral begins with historical origins and serves as the foundation for forming nationalist narratives. The narratives consist of three components: the "victim question," the "pride question," and the main unifying factor, the moral discursive veto point. By combining these components, it becomes possible to manipulate public opinion, set the boundaries of discourse to slow down potential civic activity, and at the necessary moment say: "here is the boundary you must not cross." The "victim question" is characterized by a moral appeal to grievance, primarily towards the West, which in the narratives is viewed as a military aggressor (following the events of 1999) protecting Kosovo (which is a sacred question of the origin of statehood), and also as an economic usurper (the European Union as an economic organization where, upon accession, Serbia would lose its informal independence). An image of an enemy is created, but also an image of a savior, a potential "fraternal state" that can selflessly help Serbia escape crude dependence on the "humiliating" West. Russia occupies this role, but in the case of investments and their positive influence, China can also be considered. The "pride question" is characterized by a centuries-long history of battles (for example, the Battle of Kosovo) and the preservation of the nation and its culture during long periods of statelessness. This factor is supposed to act as a unifying force ("we have only ourselves, and no one will help us except us") and one that reduces the factor of destabilization, since there are "enemies" against which Serbia must be ready to act as a united front in case of danger. The unifying factor is the Kosovo question – less as a territorial issue and more as a discursive veto point: it marks the limit beyond which reform, recognition, or alignment becomes politically illegible. Since many reforms for EU accession and funding require normalization of relations with Kosovo and its recognition as a separate state, Serbian politicians (for example, Aleksandar Vučić) support the aforementioned narratives precisely on this issue. A. Vučić's speech on 04.11.2025 in Brussels: «Neću da priznam Kosovo da bismo ušli u EU» ("I will not recognize Kosovo so that we enter the EU") [4]; In an address to the people of Kosovo: «ne postoji „dobro rešenje kosovskog problema za Srbe“ i da ga nikada neće biti» ("there is no 'good solution to the Kosovo problem for Serbs' and there never will be"), «Srbi bili najstradalniji narod na Kosovu» ("Serbs were the most suffering people in Kosovo") [5]; speech at the Palace of Serbia: «Vučić je rekao da je Kosovo (...) našom zemljom u skladu sa Ustavom Republike Srbije i Poveljom Ujedinjenih nacija i Rezolucijom 12.44» ("Vučić said that Kosovo (...) is our land in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and the Charter of the United Nations and Resolution 1244") [6]. These three factors help form a stable national narrative, which allows simultaneously maintaining the image of the EU as an "enemy" while preserving active economic relations. Naturally, it is assumed that when using this funding as outlined in the documentation, Serbia should join the European Union after meeting all conditions. Is such a policy feasible? Active neutrality Serbia's neutrality is not an absence of policy but its active form, maintained by state elites through media propaganda, fragmenting Serbian society and helping to brake at the right moments and shift the blame to the "enemy," not to Serbia. The European Commission has noted that Serbia is moving too slowly in implementing necessary reforms, especially those related to freedom of speech, eliminating corruption, and normalizing relations with Kosovo [7]. The question of slowness also became important in cases where the EU itself delayed necessary payments to Serbia, demanding additional guarantees that the funds would be spent in the intended direction [8]. Such neutrality helps Serbian political elites navigate relations with the European Union: maintaining the possibility of obtaining economic and political resources while keeping a political distance from it, simultaneously shifting responsibility for the stagnation of reforms onto "enemies" and unsolvable historical traumas inflicted by these same "enemies." The price of this strategy is the weakness of fragmented civic pressure, the slowdown of necessary reforms, and the dependence of the political course on a constantly perpetuated conflict that does not approach resolution if Serbia truly chooses a European path. In this context, the key question is not which side Serbia will join in the future, but how long civil society can exist in a state-managed ambivalence, how long it can survive without the reforms it tries to grasp through protests. Bibliography: “Opinion Poll Report: Socio-political Views of Serbian Citizens in 2023.” WFD. Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), Serbia, 2023. https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/wfd_nws_2023_eng_final.pdf. “Defunding Disinformation in the Balkans. How International Brands Support Russia’s Agenda.” by BFMI & CRTA, n.d. https://crta.rs/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/CRTA_BFMI_Defunding_Disinformation_in_the_Balkans_Report.pdf. “Media Monitoring of Foreign Actors.” CRTA. https://crta.rs/en/media-monitoring-of-foreign-actors-november-2024/. B92. “Vučić: Neću Da Priznam Kosovo Da Bismo Ušli U EU; Postoji Mogućnost Da Otvorimo Klaster 3 Pre Kraja Godine.” B92.net, November 4, 2025. https://www.b92.net/info/politika/178701/vucic-necu-da-priznam-kosovo-da-bismo-usli-u-eu-postoji-mogucnost-da-otvorimo-klaster-3-pre-kraja-godine/vest РТС. “Vučić Za Veltvohe: Potrebno Kompromisno Rešenje Za KiM, a Ne Da Albanci Dobiju Sve, a Srbi Ništa,” n.d. https://www.rts.rs/lat/vesti/politika/5462184/vucic-za-veltvohe-potrebno-kompromisno-resenje-za-kim-a-ne-da-albanci-dobiju-sve-a-srbi-nista.html. Urednik. “Vučić Odgovorio Evropskom Diplomati: Kosovo Je Dio Srbije - Top Portal.” Top Portal, November 6, 2025. https://topportal.info/vucic-odgovorio-evropskom-diplomati-kosovo-je-dio-srbije/. Belgrade, N1. “EC Report Says Serbia Slow on Credible Reforms.” N1 Info RS, November 4, 2025. https://n1info.rs/english/news/ec-report-says-serbia-slow-on-credible-reforms/. Rakic, Snezana. “Why Is Serbia Still Waiting for EU Funds That Its Neighbours Have Received?” Serbian Monitor, May 23, 2025. https://www.serbianmonitor.com/en/why-is-serbia-still-waiting-for-eu-funds-that-its-neighbours-have-received/.

Author: Vladimir Stojković Florian Biber's book The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans is a handbook for understanding social conditions in the region. He points out in detail and precisely the similarities and differences in the unfolding of socio-political processes in the countries of this region. All social aspects and processes, such as media, corruption, reform, governance rights, etc., are covered. All the events that significantly influenced the emergence of authoritarianism are described in detail and chronologically framed. This book is written so that it can be understood even by people who know nothing about the situation in the Western Balkans. It gives them a complete picture of events and social oscillations in these countries. Its core consists of three chapters, which discuss the challenges of democratic consolidation, patterns of authoritarianism, and mechanisms of authoritarianism. Challenges of democratic consolidation This chapter primarily deals with the causes that led to the emergence of a semi-authoritarian regime throughout this region during the nineties. The beginning of these processes is linked to the fall of communist regimes throughout Central and Eastern Europe, first in Romania and Bulgaria and then in Yugoslavia and Albania. Interestingly, the Balkan countries lagged far behind Central European countries in deconstructing the communist regimes in their countries. This book segment also discusses the first multiparty elections in this part of Europe and the democratization process in these societies. However, multiparty politics marked the first years after the Union of Communists' monopoly, but without realized democracy. For the political parties that came to power after those elections, the priority wasn't the development of democracy and the democratization of society but the preservation of the monopoly over the management of the state apparatus. At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, there was a breakthrough and strengthening of democracy in these areas. That period didn't last long, but during 2002 and 2003, nationalist parties returned and took over power, primarily in Serbia and Bosnia. Unlike Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, which quickly established democratic regimes and moved on through European integration, the countries of the Western Balkans cackled with regimes that brought them only instability, troubles, and wars. Patterns of authoritarianism In this part of the book, Bieber describes the situation in each country of the region in detail. The author identifies all the different social factors that led to the decline of democracy and the slowing down of its processes. External influences, internal circumstances, and economic crises have all contributed to the strengthening of authoritarianism and the decline of democracy in the region's countries. In Montenegro, the dominant Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) evolved over the years and underwent different phases of ruling style. North Macedonia's direction towards authoritarianism was achieved after the conflict with Greece regarding the country's name and the failed attempt to enter the NATO alliance in 2008. After Kosovo declared independence, the ruling elite relied on external support. The external partners, in turn, ignored Kosovo's society's problems, primarily problems in the rule of law and anti-corruption. The external factor allowed this to secure consent to cooperation with Serbia. Authoritarianism returned to Serbia in 2012 with the coming to power of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and Aleksandar Vučić. Party clientelism reaches its peak. In Albania, the government of Salia Berisha is characterized as a stabilocracy. This term was first used in that context. After that, the socialist government of Edi Rama made progress in reforms, but the main characteristic of his rule was the remnants of the old system in the form of party clientelism. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the government was mainly composed of ethno-nationalist parties, which always aspired to absolute control over the state. In Croatia, the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) was passing through several phases. During the nineties, the Croatian regime went through two stages. In the first phase, which lasted until the end of the war in 1995, the ruling party encouraged a nationalist atmosphere, and after that, the regime led by Tudjman switched to a sultanist form of ruling. It's a political system in which he relied on the closest people around him. So, there is no single authoritarian model, but there are common circumstances that repeat and which, together, strengthened authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. Mechanisms of authoritarianism In the third part of this book, the author talks about the different ways authoritarian regimes led until the capture of the state. These are political crises, nationalism, weak opposition, media control, etc. This chapter also discusses the role of the external factor and its contribution to maintaining this regime, namely the so-called regimes of competitive authoritarianism. Given that democracy and European integration have been important goals for the region's countries in the last twenty years, open authoritarianism is not possible. Therefore, the rulers of these countries apply competitive authoritarianism, which implies a model of governance in which rulers use authoritarian forms of governance, mostly informal, to avoid formal rules of democracy. So, it is about the simultaneity of these two systems (democracy and authoritarianism) in the way regimes in the countries of the Western Balkans work. Conclusion Apart from individuals who usually deal with this topic and monitor socio-political processes in the Western Balkans, this book is very good for those who need to know more about this topic. Florian Biber clearly and objectively processes and explains the circumstances that led to certain socio-political events and changes. A gradual familiarization with the political history of each country, framed by a chronological framework for each of those events, provides us with an exact overview of all those events. In addition to getting to know the situation in these countries, the book can also serve as a guide it gives us direction to understand, in the best possible way, how certain political systems work. Also, as individuals, we can see the mistakes and the bad things and try to correct them in the following period so that similar negative processes are not repeated. That would be our contribution to the further development of democracy and improving the socio-political situation in the Western Balkans.