Jana Krstic

Historically speaking, the Roma population has been one of the most marginalised and discriminated groups in the Western Balkans. During the middle and new ages, Roma people were slaves to the other nations in the Balkans, with Roma slavery being officially abolished only in 1856 in Romania. Estimates say that up to half a million Roma people were killed during the Second World War by Nazi Germany and its fascist collaborators. According to data from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, tens of thousands of Roma in the territory of the former Yugoslavia under German occupation were sent to concentration camps such as Sajmište and Jasenovac. The Roma population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was nearly decimated (Post-conflict Research Center, 2018, 4). A Roma child stands in front of the "Eternal Flame" in downtown Sarajevo. The plaque does not mention the casualties of Sarajevan minorities. Image by Jasmin Brutos. Bosnia, July 2008. Taken from: https://pulitzercenter.org According to the last available population census from 2013, Roma population in B&H amounts to 12,583 or 0,36% of the total population (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2019, 27), which makes them the biggest national minority in B&H an the fourth nationality. However, these figures do not depict the real situation for many reasons, two of them most important in the regard of this article. (1) Data collection like population census is carried out from door to door of households and this is the main obstacle since Roma people very often do not have a household in a usual sense of the word and reside in informal settlements where it is very challenging to keep track of the recorded households and their members. (2) Those who do take part in the data collection are hesitant to declare themselves as Roma due to the systemic and individual discrimination they have been experiencing for their whole lives. Instead, they either use their constitutionally guaranteed right not to declare their ethnicity/nationality or say that they are Bosniacs, Serbs or Croats.  According to the report by the Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina the estimation of the real number of Roma population in B&H is around 50.000 in total (Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2014, 23). Data shows that 71% of Roma households in Eastern Europe live in absolute poverty, a concept used to describe the living conditions in which people do not have enough resources to meet basic needs such as food, water, clothing and shelter (Singer, 1993, 218). The Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman claims that the Roma people do not exercise their human rights. Between 50% and 70% of Roma in B&H live in substandard housing, most often consisting of one room and no sanitary facilities. As far as 30% of Roma who participated in UNICEF research did not have a kitchen, while 17% lived without electricity (UNICEF, 2013, 24).  When it comes to the legislative of the B&H, it is important to stress that “the Constitution of B&H does not recognize Roma and other minority groups as citizens with rights equal to those of their Bosniak, Croat, and Serb counterparts” (Post-conflict Research Center, 2018, 6-7). This gradually enables institutional discrimination and exclusion of Roma people, despite the ratification of international agreements that oblige B&H to fight against this kind of discrimination.  Socio-economic status of Roma in B&H (Employment, healthcare, and education) Comprehensive, detailed and up to date data on socio-economic status of Roma in B&H is missing, but different reports and research results show that Roma in B&H is an especially vulnerable population. According to these findings, Roma people in Bosnia and Herzegovina face the highest level of discrimination in terms of employment opportunities and are almost completely absent from the workforce, which means that they have little choice but to find unregistered work in the informal sector (“grey economy”) or remain without an income. The unemployment rate among Roma is 56%, which is among the highest in the Western Balkan region and twice as high as that of non-Roma (European Commission, 2019, 55). Roma youth from Kakanj, a town 40 km northwest of Sarajevo, pose for a portrait. Image by Jasmin Brutos. Bosnia, September 2009. Taken from: https://pulitzercenter.org Main cause for the high unemployment rate among Roma is the inaccessibility of the labour market. This comes as a consequence of either being undocumented, living in informal settlements away and separated from the urban areas where the job offer rate is higher or the sheer lack of education, skills and required work experience (Civil Rights Defenders, 2018, 10-11).  These deep systemic problems require intervention from the government, on all institutional levels. Qualitative analysis of the public policies which should result in a more satisfactory level of inclusion of Roma in B&H shows that the strategies only mention Roma briefly as one of the vulnerable groups and only few envisage Roma specific activities (Sarajlic, 2020). Most recent report of the European Commission points out that there is no significant progress in this area. Roma children are particularly vulnerable to the worst forms of child labour (European Commission, 2024, 41).  Although Bosnia and Herzegovina’s healthcare system is formally based on principles of solidarity, inclusiveness, and accessibility, significant disparities between declared aspirations and real life persist. Unequal access to healthcare, poor service quality, financial opacity, outdated technology, and insufficient investment in new equipment remain key challenges. Vulnerable groups are often treated as homogeneous in policy documents, overlooking their diverse needs. Roma, in particular, face persistent barriers to healthcare, primarily due to a lack of personal identification documents and residence registration. Without these, they cannot access services like healthcare, social security, or education. The situation is even more challenging for those in rural areas, where healthcare services are less accessible (Sarajlic, 2020, 29-31). According to the results of the 2013 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, more than 30% of Roma children of school age in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not attend primary school. Additionally, less than half complete primary education on time - 46% of boys and only 34% of girls (CAHROM, 2016, 17-19). Since the end of the war in 1995, 294 Roma children have dropped out of primary school in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, despite support measures implemented by the relevant ministries (Civil Rights Defenders, 2018, 14). Given the importance of education, especially for children from vulnerable families, it is alarming that only 1.5% of Roma children attend preschool. In addition to the poor living conditions faced by the Roma population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, another contributing factor to high dropout rates and low preschool attendance may be the lack of recognition of Roma culture within the education system. The European Commission's 2016 Progress Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina highlights that the Roma language is not offered as an optional subject in any school in the country, nor are there alternative opportunities to learn it. Not only is education in the Roma language nonexistent, but it is also neither mentioned as a requirement nor considered a possibility in any official reports (European Commission, 2016). Roma in the Wars of the 1990s and as Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina As a result of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, tens of thousands of Roma from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia were forced to leave their homes. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, hundreds of Roma were killed, but Roma were never recognised as victims of the war (Rorke, 2016). There is very little information about the exact number of Roma victims during these wars. Additionally, there is a lack of information about war crimes committed against Roma. According to a 2021 study by the Forum of Roma in Serbia, Roma over the age of 65 in Serbia testified that every twelfth elderly person had lost someone in the wars of the 1990s, and nearly the same proportion reported that a close family member had been wounded (Autonomija, 2024). Addressing war crimes is a problem that exists at the national level in BiH. War crimes researchers from non-governmental organizations have stated that Roma people were victims of all sides during the war, despite not being involved in starting the conflict. On top of that, unlike other ethnic groups, there were no paramilitary groups to protect Roma people. (DWP, 2024). To this day, only one case involving crimes against Roma has been prosecuted. The Skočić case involves members of the Simini Chetniks unit, who in July 1992 destroyed a mosque in the village of Skočić near Zvornik and killed 27 Roma civilians. They raped three Roma women, then took all the captured individuals in a truck to the village of Malešić, where the three women were singled out and taken to a house, where they were detained for several months. They were kept as slaves, raped, beaten, and forced to serve the members of the unit. One of them was 13 years old, and the other was 15. The remaining Roma men were taken to a pit in the village of Hamzići, where they were individually pulled out of the vehicle, killed with knives or firearms, and their bodies thrown into the pit. A bomb was then thrown into the pit. For these crimes, two members of the unit were sentenced to eight years, and one to five years, for the following acts: inhumane treatment, bodily harm, sexual humiliation, and rape. For example, one of the two sentenced to eight years, Zoran Djurdjević, committed the crime of raping a Bosniak woman a month before this crime, for which he was sentenced to 13 years (Nikolic, 2010). The Humanitarian Law Center points out that no one has been convicted for the murder of 27 Roma men, and that sentences for the prolonged sexual violence and rape of Roma women were significantly lighter than those for similar crimes against women of other nationalities. Based on this, the Center believes that Serbian institutions responsible for prosecuting war crimes are indifferent to investigating and prosecuting crimes against Roma during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. This lack of action, coupled with a clear absence of empathy for the victims, reveals a discriminatory attitude toward Roma within these institutions. (Humanitarian Law Center, 2019). The fact that cases of war crimes committed against Roma are rarely even initiated, and when they are, they result in lenient sentences, is alarming enough. Even more concerning is the fact that many accused and even convicted war criminals move freely and work across the former Yugoslavia, making the region highly unsafe for vulnerable groups such as the Roma people. As we have already noted, a large number of proceedings have yet to be initiated or are still in their early stages, and the Humanitarian Law Center has repeatedly warned about the potential dangers posed by the absence of lustration for war criminals. For example, a war criminal who was sentenced to 22 years in prison for the most serious crimes against the Muslim population was, with the approval of a primary school principal and the support of the mayor, allowed to give a lecture to children in a school in Novi Sad last year - on the topic of "heroism" (Bursać, 2023). Similarly, in the most recent elections held in Serbia, Vojislav Šešelj, who was convicted by the Hague Tribunal for hate speech, participated in the elections and is currently part of the ruling coalition in the country's capital (N1, 2023). Thus, individuals who participated in or supported war crimes remain embedded in the structures of power today. Given that Bosnia and Herzegovina has a three-member presidency, with each member representing one of the three constituent peoples, it is also worth noting that the party representing Serbs was founded by Radovan Karadžić, a convicted war criminal sentenced to life imprisonment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (United Nations, 2016). The circumstances are even more challenging for Roma who left for foreign countries during the war and returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina afterward. The post-war political and social structures often excluded them, leaving many without access to housing, healthcare, or education. A large number of Roma lack proper identification documents, preventing them from obtaining refugee status or state assistance. Furthermore, the destruction of their homes and displacement disrupted their traditional ways of life, pushing many into extreme poverty. Reports from organizations such as the United Nations and Human Rights Watch have documented cases of discrimination against Roma in the post-war period. The United Nations even declared Roma as a Category of Persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina who are in Continued Need of International Protection after the war (UNHCR, 1999).  Many Roma settlements were destroyed during the conflict, and those who attempted to return often faced hostility from local communities. For these reasons, the EU signed an agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina, obligating the country to reintegrate all Roma who were deported from the European Union back to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Efendic & Ferré, 2023). To achieve this goal, national governments developed “reintegration policies.” However, these policies do not always take into account the specific situation of Romani returnees, particularly the discrimination and other forms of anti-Gypsyism they face. More concretely, they fail to address the lack of adequate housing and the limited access to the labor market that Roma experience due to their ethnicity. Moreover, the “reintegration policies” do not always acknowledge the different circumstances of returnees. For instance, Roma banished in the aftermath of the war in Kosovo who spent more than 15 years in Western Europe face a different situation upon return compared to Roma who left their home countries only a few years ago. Additionally, the measures outlined in these “reintegration policies” are not fully implemented, primarily due to a lack of financial resources (Civil Rights Defenders, 2018, 26). Thus, even when bound by an agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina fails to provide adequate protection for returning Roma. The situation is significantly worse when Roma return from countries that are not EU members, as there is no regulation obligating Bosnia and Herzegovina to reintegrate them into society. Exclusion as a post-war reality The Roma population in Bosnia and Herzegovina faces deep-rooted systemic discrimination, socio-economic exclusion, and political marginalization. Despite being the largest national minority, Roma remain largely invisible in official policies, lacking fundamental rights such as access to education, employment, healthcare, and legal recognition. Their historical and contemporary suffering, including the atrocities committed against them during the wars of the 1990s, remains unacknowledged, perpetuating cycles of marginalization. The lack of institutional commitment to justice and inclusion, coupled with rising nationalist rhetoric, further exacerbates their vulnerability. Non-governmental organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as international human rights organizations, often describe the position of Roma in BiH as a "vicious cycle." There is no doubt that Roma are excluded from society, and their integration requires a chain reaction that the government and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina show no willingness to initiate. Roma in Bosnia and Herzegovina are, above all, unsafe, exposed to violence that goes unpunished, and their frequent lack of access to healthcare makes them even more vulnerable. References Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2019). 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A Manual for Trainers in the Western Balkans: Youth peer education for peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Regional Youth Cooperation Office. https://www.rycowb.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Y-Peer_PB_Manual_English_web.pdf Civil Rights Defenders. (2018). The Wall of Anti-Gypsyism: Roma in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Civil Rights Defenders. https://crd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/The-Wall-of-Anti-Gypsyism-–-Roma-in-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-BiH.pdf DWP. (2024, Jun 22). Zločini nad Romima na području bivše Jugoslavije nikad nisu procesuirani. Dealing with the past. https://dwp-balkan.org/bs/zlocini-nad-romima-na-podrucju-bivse-jugoslavije-nikad-nisu-procesuirani/ Efendic, A., & Ferré, C. (2023). ASSESSMENT OF POLICY, INSTITUTIONAL AND SERVICE GAPS RELATED TO SUSTAINABLE SOCIO-ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION OF RETURNEES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. UNDP. https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2024-10/returnee_assessment_bih_report_final.pdf European Commission. (2016). Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016 Report. Europian Commission. European Commission. (2019). Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union. European Commission. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019SC0222 European Commission. (2024). Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024 Report. European Commission. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/451db011-6779-40ea-b34b-a0eeda451746_en?filename=Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina%20Report%202024.pdf Humanitarian Law Center. (2019, March 11). Sentences for rape of Roma women from Skočić too mild. Humanitarian Law Center. http://www.hlc-rdc.org/?p=36418&lang=de Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2014). Special report on the status of Roma in Bosnia and Herzegovina. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/a/110495.pdf International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, United Nations. (2023, September 23). THE ICTY INDICTED 161 INDIVIDUALS for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. ICTY. https://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases Kulkova, M. (2019). From Negative to Positive Peace in Western Balkans. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 13(3), 26-47. https://cejiss.org/images/issue_articles/2019-volume-13-issue-3/02-kulkova.pdf N1. (2023, November 1). Šešelj: Radikali u koaliciji sa SNS na beogradskim i lokalnim izborima. Danas. https://www.danas.rs/vesti/politika/seselj-radikali-u-koaliciji-sa-sns-na-beogradskim-i-lokalnim-izborima/ Nikolic, M. (2010, February 1). Prvi proces za zločine nad Romima. Radio Slobodna Evropa. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/skocic_romi_zlocin/1944992.html Perviz, I. (2023, April 16). Dosije Stava: Sud BiH osudio najviše ratnih zločinaca u historiji. stav.ba. https://stav.ba/vijest/dosje-stava-sud-bih-osudio-najvise-ratnih-zlocinaca-u-historiji/ Post-conflict Research Center. (2018). Roma on the Margins. OSCE Mission to BiH. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/2/406001.pdf Rorke, B. (2016, July 20). 25 Years after Yugoslavia: Roma Exclusion (Part 1). European Roma Rights Centre. https://www.errc.org/news/25-years-after-yugoslavia-roma-exclusion-part-1 Sarajlic, A. (2020). Analysis of mainstream policies targeting Roma integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regional Cooperation Council Roma Integration Action team. https://www.rcc.int/romaintegration2020/files/admin/docs/246777234263684e42c5e9739dfcbdab.pdf Singer, P. (1993). Practical ethics (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. Tokača, M. (2012). The Bosnian Book of the Dead. Istraživačko dokumentacioni centar. https://exyugenealogy.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/bosanska-knjiga-mrtvih_tom-i.pdf Trepanic, A. (2023, January 11). U BiH 172 potjernice za licima koja izbjegavaju pravdu u vezi ratnih zločina. BIRN. https://balkaninsight.com/sr/2023/01/11/u-bih-172-potjernice-za-licima-koja-izbjegavaju-pravdu-u-vezi-ratnih-zlocina/ UNHCR. (1999, May 1). Update of UNHCR's Position on Categories of Persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina who are in Continued Need of International Protection. UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/news/update-unhcrs-position-categories-persons-bosnia-and-herzegovina-who-are-continued-need UNICEF. (2013). Položaj Romske djece i porodica u Bosni i Hercegovini. UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/bih/media/436/file/Položaj%20romske%20djece%20i%20porodica%20u%20Bosni%20i%20Hercegovini.pdf United Nations. (2016, March 24). Karadžić (IT-95-5/18). International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. https://www.icty.org/en/case/karadzic War Crimes Database. (n.d.). WAR CRIMES TRIALS DATABASE AT A GLANCE. Retrieved February 2, 2025, from https://www.warcrimesdatabase.net Zatega, E. (2025, January 28). Hiljade ratnih zločina u BiH vjerovatno nikad neće biti sudski procesuirano. Slobodna Evropa. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ratni-zlocini-bih-sudovi/33290353.html

Author: Iva Kojić  The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s was far more than a local tragedy; it tore apart an intricately linked society and economy overnight. As new borders rose and political agreements hardened, ordinary people were left stranded within fragile new economies, unable to compete with the wider world. For the truck driver waiting endless hours at the Batrovci border, or the student from Bitola whose diploma is worthless in Belgrade, the breakup replaced old certainties with lost futures. For more than two decades, influential academic and policy voices have described reintegration as a set of assignments dictated by the EU’s Berlin Process, treating the Western Balkans as passive recipients and ignoring the region’s powerful, internal need for a homegrown recovery. Illustration photo. Retrieved from Pexels (www.pexels.com) The Berlin Process offers a clear roadmap, while the Open Balkan Initiative appears, at least on paper, to be a more nimble, practical answer to real-life needs. Of course, both are complicated by local politicians' ambitions. In the end, the best way forward is to blend the strengths of both: keep the high standards of the Berlin Process, but add the local ownership and flexibility of Open Balkan, so that these projects actually make a difference for regular people living under their shadow Theoretical Framework and the Live Reality At the heart of the argument for regional integration lies David Mitrany’s functionalist theory. Mitrany posited that technical and social needs (energy distribution, transport logistics, public health) naturally ignore political borders and force cooperation out of sheer necessity (Alexandrescu, 2007, 29) . In the post-Yugoslav context, this theory suggests that the shared power grids, railways, and supply chains left behind by the common state act as a silent pull, drawing the successor states back into a web of international activities. But the real work of regionalism cannot just be explained by academic theories. Mitrany's ideas help set the stage, but when you look at what is actually happening in the Balkans, things are much messier. While functionalism suggests cooperation emerges from practical necessity, critics argue that it overlooks complex socio-political realities and power dynamics. The Open Balkan initiative, for example, is not just a response to practical needs. It is also shaped by the ambitions of political leaders. Many of these same leaders have, at home, let the rule of law slide and often put showmanship ahead of actually solving problems. Similarly, other integration theories, such as neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism, might offer insights into how political actors and state interests play crucial roles in integration efforts. Thus, although theories hold that working together on practical issues should lead to political peace, in reality, these efforts are often hijacked for political gain. There is a real grassroots desire for reintegration, but the tools used to get there are often twisted to serve political survival. To truly judge these efforts, we must examine how political leaders use (and sometimes misuse) these theories, sometimes helping people, sometimes just helping themselves. Academic models are helpful, but right now, it is the politicians at the wheel, steering through a landscape full of old tensions and personal power plays. The Berlin Process: The Outsourced Assignment Launched in 2014, the Berlin Process was intended to revitalize regional cooperation through high-level summits and the creation of a Common Regional Market. Its greatest strength and its most significant contribution to the lives of regular people is its inclusivity. It involves all six regional partners, ensuring regional integration remains aligned with the EU's strict standards and legal principles. This inclusivity is a vital democratic safeguard, as it prevents the “island” effect where certain states are left behind due to political exclusion. In practical terms, the Berlin Process has produced tangible, humanized successes that improve daily life, such as the “Roam Like at Home” agreement, which has significantly lowered communication costs for millions of people traveling for work or family across the divided region. By eliminating roaming charges, the process has moved the region one step closer to the standards of the EU’s internal market (Mitrovic 2025, 10). However, a deeper critique reveals that the Berlin Process often feels like an outsourced project managed by a distant bureaucracy. For the regular citizen, its results are often trapped in administrative stagnation or slowed by complex ratification processes across six different parliaments. As Kamberi (2021, 60) notes, the prospect of the EU joining now seems “too distant and uncertain”, leading to a loss of faith in reforms that feel like a never-ending series of homework assignments given by Brussels. The Open Balkan Initiative: Agility, Ego, and the Practical Reality In contrast, the Open Balkan initiative is a locally led project born of a perceived revolt against the status quo. Its greatest strength is its agility. By focusing on low-hanging fruit, it has achieved practical successes where the Berlin Process has historically struggled (Xhoxhaj 2024, 7). The 2024 Labor Market Access Agreement is the primary example of this practical work: it allows a citizen of North Macedonia to work in Serbia or Albania without the humiliating and expensive ordeal of obtaining a work permit (Mitrovic 2025, 8). This is a direct response to the brain drain crisis hollowing out the region. However, the Open Balkan initiative is also flawed, mainly because it excludes Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which risks further splitting the region. And, just like with other regional efforts, we cannot remain blind to the politicians in charge. Citizens worry that this initiative is a front, giving political leaders a bigger stage and more power, even as the rule of law back home deteriorates. Some critics even warn that it could end up putting Serbia at the forefront, mainly benefiting big companies and politicians instead of everyday people trying to get by. However, proponents of Open Balkan argue that the initiative prioritizes regional economic collaboration, aiming to bring tangible benefits quickly to those who need it the most. They assert that by simplifying labor mobility and reducing trade barriers, the initiative addresses real economic needs and can set a precedent for broader regional inclusion in the future. Bridging the Gap through Practical Reintegration The positive aspects inherent in both the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan initiative must be synthesized to move beyond political spectacle and toward a genuine improvement in the lives of regular people. Within the Berlin Process, the region must preserve the high standards of the EU acquis and ensure total regional inclusivity within the WB6. In the Open Balkan, the synthesis must foster a sense of regional ownership. The bridge between these two models lies in the Staged Accession model. This framework suggests the EU should stop treating the Balkans as a binary “in or out” choice and instead offer early, functional access to the Single Market as a reward for specific regional cooperation successes (Mitrovic 2025, 19). For the citizen, a synthesis of these models would move from grand declaration to practical work. For example, moving beyond simple roaming agreements to a unified regional energy grid and digital market might allow Balkan tech startups to scale regionally before competing globally, thereby fulfilling the need for a shared economic space that remains physically dependent on common infrastructure. Another example could be expanding the labor mobility protocols of the Open Balkan to the entire WB6 within the legitimate framework of the Berlin Process. This would ensure that a nurse from Sarajevo or a programmer from Pristina can move as easily as their counterparts in the Trio, while still benefiting from the legal protections and safety standards guaranteed by EU alignment. This is where the real work happens. It is not found in high-level summits but in regional harmonization that makes the border invisible to the person crossing it. By utilizing the political speed of the Open Balkan to fulfill the institutional promises of the Berlin Process, the region might finally begin to heal in a way that serves the people. Moving Beyond the Homework Assignment The reintegration of the post-Yugoslav space is a structural necessity- a response to the unsustainable fragmentations of the 1990s. While academic theories provide a useful map, they cannot account for the practical difficulty of navigating the political egos and catastrophic track records of regional elites who often use these platforms for domestic promotion. The disintegration of Yugoslavia created a rupture that cannot be healed by an outsourced project alone. It requires a reintegration that is both technically sound and locally owned. Ultimately, the promise of regional stability is in moving beyond the political theater of leaders and toward genuine technical cooperation that serves the citizens. Regionalism is not a homework assignment for Brussels. Rather, it is a survival strategy for the people of the Balkans. The promise of either model is hollow if it does not address the ten-hour wait at the border or the unrecognized diploma. By reclaiming regional ownership and synthesizing the practical successes of both models, the successor states can finally make the borders breathable again. Reintegration should not be a decision for politicians. Instead, it is a mandate dictated by geography and the shared needs of a population that refuses to be defined solely by its borders. Bibliography Alexandrescu, Mihai. 2007. “David Mitrany: From Federalism to Functionalism.” Transylvanian Review 16 (1): 19-33. Popoviciu, Adrian-Claudiu. 2010. “David Mitrany and Functionalism: The Beginnings of Functionalism”. Revista Romana de Geografie Politica 12, (1): 162-172 Jelisavac Trosic, Sanja, and Mitko Arnaudov. 2023. “What are the Realistic Capabilities of the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan Initiative?” Review of International Affairs 74 (1187): 59-85. Kamberi, Donika. 2021. “Open Balkan vs. Berlin Process- Same, Same but Different” Freedom: Journal for Peacebuilding and Transcultural Communication 2 (3/4): 60-71. Jelisavac Trošić, Sanja, and Mitko Arnaudov. "Open Balkans - Between Economic Opportunities and Political Reality." (2023). Mitrovic, Sava. 2025. Regional Cooperation Initiatives in the Western Balkans: Improving Countries’ Preparedness for Staged Accession to the European Union. Belgrade: European Policy Centre (CEP). Xhoxhaj, Veton. 2024. “Assessing Western Balkans Regional Integration Efforts: A Comparative Study of the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan Initiative". Multidisciplinary Science Journal 7: 2025248. Mitrany, David. 1975. The Functional Theory of Politics. London: Martin Robertson for the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Šta se dešava kada država odluči kako istorija treba da izgleda? I kakvu budućnost to proizvodi? Ilustrativna fotografija. Preuzeto sa Pexelsa. Prethodnih meseci, rasprave o novim politikama udžbenika ponovo su otvorile jedno staro i neprijatno pitanje: ko kontroliše znanje i u koju svrhu? Iako su predstavljene kao administrativne ili obrazovne reforme, ove politike ne mogu biti neutralne. One često signaliziraju nešto dublje: pokušaj da se preoblikuju kolektivno sećanje i identitet, a samim tim i politička imaginacija jednog društva. Na prvi pogled, centralizovana kontrola nad udžbenicima može delovati kao pitanje efikasnosti ili osiguranja kvaliteta. Vlade tvrde da jedinstveni narativ obezbeđuje koherentnost obrazovnog sistema, ali nas istorija uči da budemo oprezni. Kada država monopolizuje proizvodnju znanja, obrazovanje prestaje da bude prostor kritičkog mišljenja i postaje sredstvo ideološke reprodukcije. I to nije nov fenomen. Čemu nas uči istorija? Tokom 20. veka, autoritarni i nacionalistički režimi više puta su se oslanjali na obrazovanje kao sredstvo konsolidacije moći. U nacističkoj Nemačkoj, udžbenici su sistematski prepravljani kako bi promovisali rasnu ideologiju i opravdali ekspanzionističku politiku. Slično tome, u Sovjetskom Savezu, istorijski narativi su kontinuirano revidirani kako bi se uskladili sa promenljivom političkom linijom vladajuće partije, često brišući "nepodobne" istine i pojedince iz javnog sećanja. U oba slučaja, obrazovanje nije bilo o učenju, već o poslušnosti. Bliže našem vremenu, slični obrasci pojavljuju se u delovima Evrope. Jedan od najrelevantnijih savremenih primera je Mađarska. Tokom poslednje decenije, Mađarska Vlada je uvela sve veću centralizaciju kontrole nad obrazovnim sadržajem, uključujući i nacionalizaciju udžbenika. Novi kurikulumi naglašavaju nacionalistička tumačenja istorije, sužavaju prostor za kritičke perspektive i promovišu homogenu viziju identiteta. Posledice nisu apstraktne. Istraživači/ce, prosvetni radnici i radnice i organizacije civilnog društva ukazuju da ove promene doprinose normalizaciji isključivih narativa. Istorijska složenost se pojednostavljuje, a perspektive manjina se marginalizuju ili brišu. A možda i najzabrinjavajuće, mladi se socijalizuju da svet posmatraju kroz prizmu „mi protiv njih“. Obrazovanje, u tom kontekstu, postaje suptilno, ali moćno sredstvo za proizvodnju nepoverenja, ogorčenosti, pa čak i neprijateljstva prema drugima. Zašto rasprava o udžbenicima nikada nije samo rasprava o udžbenicima? U društvima sa krhkim demokratskim institucijama, kontrola nad obrazovanjem lako može postati kontrola nad mišljenjem. Kada je dozvoljena samo jedna verzija istorije, kritičko promišljanje zamenjuje pasivno prihvatanje. Učenici i učenice se ne podstiču da postavljaju pitanja — učimo ih šta da misle. A kada se to dogodi, sama osnova demokratske kulture počinje da erodira. Zapadni Balkan, sa svojim složenim istorijama i nerazrešenim tenzijama, posebno je podložan takvim dinamikama. Iz iskustva znamo kako suprotstavljeni nacionalni narativi mogu podstaći podele i sukobe. Upravo zbog toga, obrazovanje bi trebalo da bude prostor u kojem se istražuju različite perspektive, postavljaju teška pitanja i razvija empatija. Uvođenje strogo kontrolisanih, državno odobrenih udžbenika koji favorizuju jedan narativ rizikuje da poništi ove napore. Rizikuje da reprodukuje upravo one obrasce koji su istorijski vodili ka isključenju, polarizaciji i nasilju. Ima li alternative? Nedavno uvođenje takozvanih „udžbenika od nacionalnog značaja“ u Srbiji izazvalo je ozbiljnu zabrinutost u stručnoj javnosti. Među njima, Centar za kritičko obrazovanje (CKO) podneo je sedam formalnih primedbi tokom procesa javne rasprave — primedbe koje na kraju nisu usvojene. Ovo nije samo proceduralno pitanje. Ovo je političko pitanje. U čemu je problem? U samoj srži reforme nalazi se jednostavna, ali opasna ideja: da određeni školski predmeti, posebno jezik, istorija i umetnost i kultura, treba da služe jačanju nacionalnog identiteta i kohezije. To je problematično samo po sebi, a u praksi još i više. CKO je u svojim primedbama upozorio da ovakav pristup predstavlja „sekuritizaciju obrazovanja“ — pomeranje u kojem se udžbenici više ne tretiraju kao pedagoški alati, već kao instrumenti nacionalne politike. Ovo formulisanje je važno, jer kada se obrazovanje poveže sa „nacionalnom bezbednošću“, postaje mnogo teže dovoditi ga u pitanje. Kritika se više ne posmatra kao deo demokratske debate, već kao pretnja. Na šta CKO upozorava?Primedbe CKO-a prevazilaze opšte zabrinutosti i ukazuju na vrlo konkretne rizike sadržane u samom zakonu: Politička kontrola nad proizvodnjom znanjaDajući prednost „nacionalnom interesu“ kao kriterijumu, zakon otvara prostor za izbor autora na osnovu ideološke podobnosti, a ne akademskog kvaliteta. Brisanje pluralnih perspektivaU predmetima poput istorije i kulture, jedan „zvanični“ narativ rizikuje da isključi glasove manjina i alternativna tumačenja. Slabljenje demokratskih proceduraČinjenica da primedbe podnete tokom javne rasprave nisu uvažene, niti je CKO dobio bilo kakav odgovor od nadležnih institucija, otvara ozbiljna pitanja o transparentnosti i participaciji. Ovo nisu apstraktni strahovi, već su utemeljeni u istorijskom iskustvu i u savremenim istraživanjima. Obrazovanje ili indoktrinacija?Ključno pitanje nije da li nacionalni identitet treba da bude deo obrazovanja, jer on to često i jeste, u nekom obliku. Pravo pitanje je: ko ga definiše i čiji se glasovi pritom isključuju? Intervencija CKO-a podseća nas da obrazovna politika nikada nije neutralna. Ona odražava političke izbore, a ti izbori oblikuju buduće generacije. Ignorisanje stručne i civilne javnosti nije samo loše upravljanje. To je upozorenje, jer kada obrazovanje postane zatvoren sistem, ono prestaje da stvara kritičke građane i počinje da proizvodi poslušne. Možete u celosti pročitati primedbe koje je CKO predao ovde.Rad koji su istraživačice CKO-a objavile o rizicima ovog zakona pročitajte ovde.

Članak možeš pročitati na srpskom jeziku ovde. What happens when the state decides what history should look like? And what kind of future does that produce? Illustration photo. Retrieved from Pexels (www.pexels.com) In recent months, debates around new textbook policies have once again opened an old and uncomfortable question: who controls knowledge, and with what purpose? While presented as administrative or educational reforms, these policies are rarely neutral. They often signal something deeper: an attempt to reshape collective memory and identity, and ultimately, the political imagination of a society. At first glance, centralized control over textbooks might seem like a matter of efficiency or quality assurance. Governments argue that a unified narrative ensures coherence in education systems. But history teaches us to be cautious. When states monopolize the production of knowledge, education stops being a space for critical thinking and becomes a tool for ideological reproduction. And this is not a new phenomenon. What Does History Teach Us? Throughout the 20th century, authoritarian and nationalist regimes have repeatedly turned to education as a means of consolidating power. In Nazi Germany, textbooks were systematically rewritten to promote racial ideology and justify expansionist politics. Similarly, in the Soviet Union, historical narratives were continuously revised to align with the ruling party’s shifting political line, often erasing inconvenient truths and individuals from public memory. In both cases, education was not about learning, it was about obedience. Closer to our own time, we see similar patterns emerging in parts of Europe. One of the most relevant contemporary examples is Hungary. Over the past decade, the Hungarian government has introduced increasingly centralized control over educational content, including the nationalization of textbook publishing. New curricula have emphasized nationalist interpretations of history, reduced space for critical perspectives, and promoted a homogeneous vision of identity. The consequences are not abstract. Researchers, educators, and civil society organizations have pointed out that these changes contribute to the normalization of exclusionary narratives. Historical complexity is flattened. Minority perspectives are marginalized or erased. And perhaps most concerningly, young people are socialized into seeing the world through a lens of “us versus them.” Education, in this context, becomes a subtle but powerful vehicle for producing distrust, resentment, and even hostility toward others. Why the Debate on Textbooks Is Never Just About Textbooks? In societies with fragile democratic institutions, control over education can easily become control over thought. When only one version of history is allowed, critical engagement is replaced by passive acceptance. Students are not encouraged to ask questions, they are taught what to think. And once that happens, the very foundation of democratic culture begins to erode. The Western Balkans, with its complex histories and unresolved tensions, is particularly vulnerable to such dynamics. We know from experience how competing national narratives can fuel division and conflict. Precisely because of this, education should be the space where multiple perspectives are explored, where difficult questions are asked, and where empathy is cultivated. Introducing tightly controlled, state-approved textbooks that privilege a single narrative risks undoing these efforts. It risks reproducing the very patterns that have historically led to exclusion, polarization, and violence. Is There an Alternative? The recent introduction of so-called “nationally significant textbooks” in Serbia has sparked serious concern among educators, researchers, and civil society organizations. Among them, the Critical Education Centre (CKO) has submitted a set of formal objections during the public consultation process — objections that were ultimately not accepted. This is not just a procedural issue. It is a political one. What is the problem? At the core of the reform is a simple but dangerous idea: that certain school subjects, especially language, history, and arts and culture, should serve the purpose of strengthening national identity and cohesion. This idea is veery troubling as a concept, but even more so in practice. CKO, in its official submission, warned that this approach represents a “securitization of education”, a shift in which textbooks are no longer treated as pedagogical tools, but as instruments of national policy. This framing matters, because once education becomes tied to “national security,” it becomes much harder to question it. Criticism is no longer seen as part of democratic debate, but as a (national) threat. What CKO is Warning About? CKO’s objections go beyond general concerns. They point to very concrete risks embedded in the law itself: Political control over knowledge productionBy privileging “national interest” as a criterion, the law opens space for selecting authors based on ideological alignment rather than academic quality. Erasure of plural perspectivesIn subjects like history and culture, a single “official” narrative risks excluding minority voices and alternative interpretations. Weakening of democratic procedureThe fact that objections submitted during public consultation were not meaningfully incorporated raises serious questions about transparency and participation. These are not abstract fears. They are grounded in both historical experience and contemporary research. Education or indoctrination? The key question is not whether national identity should be part of education. It always is, in some form. The real question is: who defines this identity, and whose voices are excluded in the process? CKO’s intervention reminds us that education policy is never neutral. It reflects political choices and those choices shape future generations. Ignoring expert and civil society input is not just bad governance. It is a warning sign. Because once education becomes a closed system, controlled from the top, it stops producing critical citizens — and starts producing obedient ones. You can read the full set of comments submitted by CKO here.You can read the paper published by CKO researchers on the risks of this law here.

Autorka: Ana Milosavljević Na godišnjicu NATO bombardovanja Srbije — pogled na to šta javni diskurs pamti, a šta briše. Transparent ispred Skupštine Srbije koji osuđuje ubijanje dece od strane NATO-a. Svake godine 24. marta, isti narativ dominira javnim diskursom u Srbiji: više od 2.000 civila ubijenih u ilegalnoj, neosnovanoj NATO agresiji pod izgovorom spasavanja kosovskih Albanaca. Političari, mediji, i nažalost, mnogi iz takozvane levice u Srbiji fokusiraju se na vrlo konkretnu štetu koju je bombardovanje nanelo, ali to čine bez ikakvog priznanja onoga što je srpska vlast radila na Kosovu u godinama koje su prethodile bombardovanju. Razgovarala sam sa dvoje kosovskih Albanaca i jednom kosovskom Srpkinjom o njihovom tumačenju današnjeg obeležavanja, njihovim stavovima o NATO-u i nasilju srpske vlasti, i o tome šta je potrebno da bi se Srbi i Albanci ujedinili u zajedničkoj borbi. Danas političari i mediji (i režimski i opozicioni) predstavljaju događaje od pre 27 godina kao situaciju u kojoj je Srbija bila jedina žrtva. Često prikazuju stradanje Albanaca od strane Srbije kao zaveru koju je Zapad osmislio kako bi opravdao intervenciju. Činjenice govore sasvim drugačiju priču. NATO bombardovanje Novog Sada, Srbija, 1999. godine. Između 1998. i 1999. godine, srpske snage su nasilno proterale oko 850.000 Albanaca iz njihovih domova na Kosovu. Do kraja rata, ubijeno je više od 10.000 Albanaca, a hiljade su silovane ili mučene. Masovne grobnice Albanaca kasnije su pronađene na više lokacija u Srbiji, sa gotovo 1.000 tela koja su prebačena i tajno sahranjena. Mnogi se i danas vode kao nestali. Svedočenja vojnika se takođe zanemaruju u srpskom javnom diskursu. Jedan komandant tenkovske jedinice zabeležen je kako kaže: „Za sve vreme dok sam bio na Kosovu, nikada nisam video nijednog neprijateljskog vojnika i moja jedinica nijednom nije gađala vojne ciljeve. Tenkovi koji koštaju 2,5 miliona dolara korišćeni su za masakriranje albanske dece… Stid me je.“ Povodom sistematskog izostavljanja ovih istorijskih činjenica iz današnjeg diskursa, razgovarala sam sa kosovskim Albancima: sa Leom1, koja živi u Prištini, i Arberom, koji je deo kosovsko-albanske dijaspore u Londonu. Lea je primetila da način na koji se predstavlja NATO bombardovanje, bez ikakvog priznanja kroz šta su Albanci prošli, u njoj izaziva osećaj da je „izluđena“ i „dehumanizovana“. „To nije polazna tačka sa koje možemo da razgovaramo, posebno imajući u vidu da je sa naše strane uložen značajan trud da se priznaju i srpske žrtve rata“, dodaje ona. Arber je slično komentarisao da on takav narativ doživljava kao „šamar u lice“, navodeći da takav narativ odražava širi trend brisanja iskustava kroz koja su Albanci na Kosovu prolazili, ne samo tokom 1998–1999, već kroz čitav 20. vek. To brisanje nije počelo 1999. godine. Za Albance, ono predstavlja dužu istoriju represije, od jugoslovenskih kolonizacionih kampanja početkom 20. veka do institucionalne diskriminacije i nasilja tokom 1990-ih. Mapa iz 20. veka koja prikazuje jugoslovensku kolonizaciju na Kosovu i u Severnoj Makedoniji. Ovaj diskurs ne kritikuju samo Albanci. Marija Savić iz Gnjilana opisala je dominantni srpski prikaz bombardovanja kao primer „selektivnog sećanja“ koje „služi reprodukciji nacionalističkog narativa“. „Fokus je isključivo na Srbiji kao žrtvi spoljne agresije, dok ne postoji sistemsko suočavanje sa kontinuiranom represijom albanskog naroda na Kosovu: od kolonijalnih politika i nasilja početkom 20. veka, preko institucionalne diskriminacije u Jugoslaviji, do otvorenog sistema aparthejda i represije nad Albancima tokom 1990-ih“, rekla je. Upravo taj kontekst pomaže da se razume zašto su mnogi kosovski Albanci podržali NATO intervenciju, koja je okončala srpsku kontrolu nad Kosovom. Kako Lea objašnjava: „Intervencija 1999. zaustavila je rat i omogućila nam da se vratimo svojim životima, domovima, institucijama. Može biti istina da je intervencija bila kolonijalne prirode i da je izazvala civilne žrtve i druge negativne posledice, ali je takođe istina da je period nakon rata i nakon proglašenja nezavisnosti 2008. doneo mnogo nade mnogim ljudima ovde, koji su samo deceniju ranije živeli svakodnevni život u stalnom strahu.“ Arber je slično opisao svoja kontradiktorna osećanja prema NATO-u: „Iako priznajem da je NATO prisustvo na Kosovu uklonilo Srbiju, koja je bila regionalni kolonizator naše zajednice, takođe priznajem i probleme NATO-a kao upravljačkog tela… Neću do kraja života osećati dug njima, niti ću dozvoliti da budem moralno manipulisán od strane NATO-a kako bih izbrisao realnosti i problematične stvari koje rade kao institucija.“ Kosovske novine koje izveštavaju o proglašenju nezavisnosti Kosova 17. februara 2008. godine. Marija je takođe naglasila da je neophodno kritički sagledati i NATO i srpsku državu, te da te dve stvari nisu međusobno isključive. „Diskurs u Srbiji o ovom pitanju je potpuno binaran; ako kritikujete ulogu Srbije, označeni ste kao izdajnik iz nevladinog sektora, dok ako kritikujete NATO agresiju, označeni ste kao srpski nacionalista — a nijedno od toga nije tačno. NATO i srpska vlast su vrlo slični u svojim represivnim i kolonijalnim politikama.“ Izjave američkih zvaničnika dodatno potkrepljuju argument da NATO intervencija nije bila humanitarne prirode. Kako je napisao Stroub Talbot, zamenik američkog državnog sekretara od 1994. do 2001: „Otpor Jugoslavije širim trendovima političkih i ekonomskih reformi — a ne sudbina kosovskih Albanaca — najbolje objašnjava NATO rat.“ Lea i Arber su oboje izrazili spremnost da kritički preispitaju ulogu NATO-a na Kosovu — pod uslovom da se srpsko društvo suoči sa sopstvenim revizionističkim narativima. „Spremna sam da učestvujem u svakom razgovoru koji kritikuje postojanje NATO-a, ali osećam odgovornost da se prvo suočimo sa predrasudama koje nas sprečavaju da budemo ravnopravni učesnici u tim razgovorima“, rekla je Lea. Kako Arber kaže, „na osnovnom nivou, ne možeš biti u solidarnosti sa ljudima koji ne žele da imaš jednaka prava kao oni.“ Percepcija da Srbi ne žele da žive u jednakosti sa Albancima može se videti u brojnim primerima, a najskorije u upotrebi pogrdnog naziva za Albance u skandiranjima protiv predsednika Srbije Aleksandra Vučića na protestima tokom protekle godine. Marija opisuje sopstveni put suočavanja sa tim realnostima: „Bilo je potrebno mnogo odvikavanja da bih se oslobodila anti-albanskog sentimenta i nacionalizma… Verujem da su internacionalizam i klasno jedinstvo u borbi protiv kapitalizma jedini put ka oslobođenju svih balkanskih naroda.“ Nedostatak informacija o represivnoj ulozi srpske vlasti nad Albancima otežava prevazilaženje ovih predrasuda. Nakon što je video da mnogi Srbi ne znaju osnovne istorijske činjenice o Kosovu, Arber je 2020. osnovao edukativno-kulturnu platformu „Balkanism”. Balkanism teži dekonstrukciji etnonacionalističkih narativa širom regiona kroz slavljenje sličnosti i razlika, uz priznanje istorijske represije različitih zajednica. „Razumem da smo u okviru nacionalnih država svi sebe povezali sa državom kao produžetkom sebe. Ali mislim da onog trenutka kada počnemo to da dekonstruišemo i da sebe vidimo više kao nosioce kulture, istorije i identiteta koji se preklapaju, možemo da komuniciramo na mnogo humaniji način“, kaže on. Naslovna strana prvog broja časopisa „Balkanism“, objavljenog u septembru 2024. godine. Dok je Marija kroz obrazovanje i suočavanje sa sopstvenim predrasudama doživela transformaciju, smatra da se stvarna promena ne može svesti na pojedinca. „Anti-albanski sentiment i odbijanje suočavanja sa prošlošću duboko su ukorenjeni u ideološkim aparatima srpske države.“ Da bi se srpsko društvo adekvatno transformisalo, potrebno je promeniti njegove političke i ekonomske sisteme, kaže ona. Za nju to podrazumeva klasnu analizu koja prepoznaje da radnici u Srbiji i na Kosovu imaju zajedničke interese protiv vladajuće kapitalističke elite u obe zemlje. Smatra da pristup treba da bude dvostruk: Srbi bi trebalo bezuslovno da priznaju pravo Kosova na samoopredeljenje, razgrade mit o Kosovu kao „srcu Srbije“, i obnove klasnu politiku i internacionalizam. S druge strane, radnička klasa na Kosovu treba da odbaci sopstvenu vladajuću elitu i radi na proterivanju imperijalističkih sila sa svoje teritorije. Da li je takvo jedinstvo moguće — Lea i Arber se razilaze. „S obzirom na duboko nepoverenje koje postoji, toliko bola i nedostatka odgovornosti, teško je zamisliti kako se to može prevazići. I vidimo kako se Albanci tretiraju u Srbiji 2026. godine, kroz iredentističke grafite o Kosovu i anti-albanske povike, da se ništa nije promenilo. Sa naše strane takođe postoji mnogo neprijateljstva koje deluje nepremostivo. Zbog toga kako su rat i naša politička situacija oblikovali mene, deo mene se već neko vreme mentalno priprema za novi rat. I to mi daje motivaciju da se uključim u ovu diskusiju“, rekla je Lea. Za Arbera, rad na zajedničkoj budućnosti počinje građenjem stvarnih veza preko etničkih linija. „Ja sam veoma optimistična osoba. Deo moje životne prakse je izgradnja odnosa sa zajednicama sa takozvane ‘druge strane’. To je suštinski deo mog života. Vidim to kao ispravljanje istorijskih nepravdi i poništavanje kolonijalnog nasilja koje je nametnuto Kosovu, kao i uspostavljanje odnosa sa zajednicama sa kojima delimo mnogo toga istorijski i kulturno“, kaže on. U različitim kontekstima, istorija se prikazuje kao da počinje u politički pogodnom trenutku. U Palestini, zapadni mejnstrim mediji i političke elite žele da verujete da istorija počinje 7. oktobra 2023. U Srbiji, slični akteri tvrde da istorija počinje 24. marta 1999, čineći sve što je prethodilo nevažnim. Ovakav pristup instrumentalizuje nedostatak obrazovanja kako bi opravdao sistemske predrasude koje u konačnici ne služe interesima običnih ljudi. Kao što razgovori u ovom tekstu sugerišu, suočavanje sa ovim narativima zahteva više od samih informacija. Potrebna je spremnost da se sluša, da se preispituju nasleđene pretpostavke i da se suočimo sa neprijatnim istinama. Put ka trajnom miru na Balkanu ne uključuje selektivno sećanje, već se zasniva na iskrenom i objektivnom pogledu na prošlost — onom koji ostavlja prostor za sve čija su iskustva dugo bila negirana. Ovaj članak je u originalu objavljen na autorkinom blogu Substack, gde možete čitati još njenih članaka.

If you would like to read this article in Serbian, click here. Author: Ana Milosavljević On the anniversary of NATO’s bombing of Serbia, a look at what public discourse remembers — and what it erases. A banner outside the Serbian parliament condemning NATO’s killing of children Every year on March 24, the same narrative dominates public discourse in Serbia: over 2,000 civilians killed in an illegal, unprovoked NATO aggression under the pretext of saving Kosovar Albanians. Politicians, the media, and unfortunately, many part of the so-called left in Serbia focus on the very real damage that the bombing inflicted, but do so without any recognition of what the Serbian state was doing in Kosovo in the years preceding the bombing. I spoke with two Albanian Kosovars and one Kosovar Serb about their interpretation of today’s commemoration, their thoughts on NATO and Serbian state violence, and what it will take for Serbs and Albanians to unite in a common struggle. Today, politicians and media outlets (both regime and opposition) frame the events of 27 years ago as one wherein Serbia was the sole victim. They frequently convey Albanian suffering at the hands of the Serbian state as a conspiracy conjured up by the West in order to justify intervention. The facts tell a very different story. NATO bombing of Novi Sad, Serbia in 1999 Between 1998 and 1999, Serbian forces displaced around 850,000 Albanians from their homes in Kosovo. By the end of the war, over 10,000 Albanians were killed and thousands were raped or tortured. Mass graves of Albanians were later found in multiple locations in Serbia, with nearly 1,000 bodies transferred and buried in secret. Many people are still missing to this day. Soldier testimonies are similarly disregarded in Serbian public discourse. One Serbian commander of a tank unit was recorded stating, “For the entire time I was in Kosovo, I never saw a single enemy soldier and my unit was never once involved in firing at military targets. The tanks which cost $2.5 million each were used to slaughter Albanian children… I am ashamed.” Regarding the systematic exclusion of these historical realities from today’s discourse, I spoke with Kosovar Albanians: Lea1, living in Prishtina, and Arbër, part of the Kosovar Albanian diaspora in London. Lea remarked that the presentation of the NATO bombing without any recognition of the suffering Albanians went through leaves her feeling “gaslit” and “dehumanized.” “It’s not a starting point that we can engage with…Because on our side there has also been a lot of work done to recognize victims of the war who were Serbs” she adds. Arbër similarly commented that “it feels like a slap in the face in many ways,” saying that such a narrative reflects a broader trend of erasure of the experiences Albanians in Kosovo have faced, not only during 1998–1999, but throughout the 20th century. This erasure did not begin in 1999. For Albanians, it reflects a longer history of repression, from early 20th century Yugoslav colonization campaigns to institutional discrimination and violence in the 1990s. A map from the 20th century that reads “Post-war colonization in southern Serbia” and includes Kosovo and North Macedonia. It’s not only Albanians who criticize this discourse. Marija Savić, from Gnjilana, Kosovo described the Serbian mainstream portrayal of the bombing as one of “selective memory” which “serves to reproduce a nationalist narrative.” “The focus is exclusively on Serbia as a victim of external aggression, while there is no systemic reckoning with the continuous repression of the Albanian people in Kosovo: from colonial policies and violence in the early 20th century, through institutional discrimination in Yugoslavia, to the open system of apartheid and repression against Albanians during the 1990s,” she said. It is precisely that context which helps explain why many Kosovar Albanians welcomed NATO’s intervention, which brought an end to Serbian rule in Kosovo. As Lea explains: “The intervention in 1999 stopped the war and enabled us to go back to our lives, homes, institutions. It can be true that the intervention was colonial in nature and caused civilian casualties and had other negative effects, and also that the period after the war and after the declaration of independence in 2008 brought a lot of hope to a lot of people here, who just a decade before were living their everyday lives in constant fear.” Arbër similarly described his own contradictory feelings about NATO: “Although I acknowledge NATO’s presence in Kosovo removed Serbia, which was a regional colonizer of us as a community, I also acknowledge the problems of NATO as a governing body as well… I’m not going to feel indebted for the rest of my life, and I’m not going to be morally manipulated by NATO as a governing body to erase the realities and the problematic things that they do as an institution.” Newspapers in Kosovo reporting the declaration of Kosovo Independence on February 17, 2008. Marija similarly stressed that it was necessary to critically assess both NATO and the Serbian state and that the two are not mutually exclusive. “The discourse in Serbia on this issue is entirely binary; if you criticize the role of the Serbian state, you are labeled an NGO traitor, while if you criticize NATO aggression, you are labeled a Serbian nationalist - yet neither of these is true. NATO and the Serbian state are very similar in their repressive and colonial policies.” Statements by US officials reinforce the argument that NATO’s intervention was not humanitarian in nature. As Strobe Talbott, US Deputy Secretary of State from 1994 to 2001, wrote: “It was Yugoslavia’s resistance to the broader trends of political and economic reform — not the plight of Kosovar Albanians — that best explains NATO’s war.” Lea and Arbër both expressed a willingness to critically examine NATO’s role in Kosovo — on the condition that Serbian society confronts its own revisionist narratives. “I’m open to participating in any conversation that critiques the existence of NATO, but I feel a responsibility to first contend with the prejudices that prevent us from being equal participants in such conversations,” Lea said. As Arbër puts it, “on a fundamental basis, you can’t be in solidarity with people who don’t want you to have the same level of equality that they do.” The perception that Serbs do not want to live in equality with Albanians can be seen in many instances, most recently with the use of the pejorative word for Albanian used in chants against Serbian President Vučić at anti-government protests in the past year. Marija describes her own journey in confronting these realities: “It took a great deal of unlearning to free myself from anti-Albanian sentiment and nationalism… I believe that internationalism and class unity in the struggle against capitalism are the only path to the liberation of all Balkan peoples.” A lack of information about the oppressive role of the Serbian state against Albanians makes overcoming such biases difficult. After witnessing Serb after Serb not know basic historical facts about Kosovo, Arbër founded the educational and cultural platform Balkanism in 2020. Balkanism strives to deconstruct ethno-nationalist narratives from across the region through celebrating similarities and differences, while acknowledging historical oppression of various communities. “I understand that within a nation-state framework, all of us have associated ourselves with our state as an extension of ourselves. But I feel like the moment we start deconstructing that and see ourselves more as vessels of culture, history, and identity that overlap, we’re able to communicate in a way that feels much more human-centered” he says. Cover of Balkanism magazine’s first issue, published in September 2024. While Marija transformed through education and a reckoning of her own anti-Albanian biases, she believes that meaningful transformation cannot be reduced to the individual. “Anti-Albanian sentiment and the refusal to confront the past are deeply rooted in the ideological apparatuses of the Serbian state.” To adequately transform Serbian society, its political and economic systems must be changed, she says. For her, that necessitates a class-based analysis which sees that workers in Serbia and Kosovo have common interests against the ruling capitalist elite in both countries. She believes the approach should be two-fold: Serbians should unconditionally recognize Kosovo’s right to self-determination, dismantle the myth of Kosovo as the “heart of Serbia”, and rebuild class politics and internationalism. On the other end, the working class in Kosovo should reject their own ruling elite and work to expel imperialist forces from its territory, she says. Whether such unity is possible, Lea and Arbër are split. “Considering the deep distrust that exists, and so much pain and lack of accountability, it is hard to imagine how that can be overcome. And we see with how Albanians are being treated in Serbia in 2026, the irredentist Kosovo graffiti and anti-Albanian chants, that nothing has changed. On our side there is a lot of what feels like insurmountable enmity as well. Due to how the war and our political situation shaped me, there’s a part of me that for a while now has been mentally preparing for another war. And that is what gives me urgency to get involved with this conversation” Lea revealed. For Arbër, working towards a common future begins with forging genuine connections across ethnic lines. “I’m a very hopeful individual. A part of my own practice in my life is all about forging relations with communities from supposedly “the other side.” This has been a core aspect of my life and my practice. I see it as righting historical wrongs and undoing the colonial violence that was imposed on Kosovo, and establishing relations with communities that we share so much with historically and culturally,” he said. In various contexts, history is presented as beginning at a politically convenient moment. In Palestine, Western mainstream media and political elites would have you believe history began on October 7, 2023. In Serbia, a similar establishment class claims history began on March 24, 1999, rendering what came before irrelevant. This approach weaponizes a lack of education to justify systemic prejudices that ultimately do not serve the interests of ordinary people. As the conversations in this piece suggest, confronting these narratives requires more than information alone. It demands a willingness to listen, to question inherited assumptions, and to engage with uncomfortable truths. The path towards lasting peace in the Balkans does not include selective memory, but is instead based on an honest, objective look at the past: one which makes space for all those whose experiences have long been denied. This article was originally published on author's Substack, where more of her critical writing is available.