Jana Krstic

Authors: Ana Milosavljević Every year on July 11, Western ambassadors and dignitaries alike flock to the Potočari memorial center in eastern Bosnia to commemorate the Srebrenica genocide of 1995. 31 years ago, Bosnian Serb paramilitaries murdered more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys en masse over the course of eight to ten days. In May 2024, the United Nations declared a day of remembrance for the victims of the Srebrenica genocide. But this year, more than any, the emptiness of the West’s “condemnation” of the Bosnian genocide was on full display, given its current support of Israel’s genocide of Palestinians in Gaza. However, the West’s hypocrisy regarding the Srebrenica genocide is much deeper than meets the eye. In fact, it was the US, Britain, and France that handed over the Srebrenica “safe zone” to its Bosnian Serb butchers in order to justify further intervention in the Balkan region. White gravestones at Srebrenica Memorial Cemetery, symbolizing remembrance and history. Photo by: Fatih Kopcal In 2005, the American diplomat Richard Holbrooke, who brokered the Dayton Accords to officially end the war, told Bosnian Hayat TV: “I was under initial instructions to sacrifice Srebrenica, Goražde and Žepa.” And that’s exactly what he did. Over the course of the three-year-long war, Bosniaks were ethnically cleansed from their villages by predominantly Serb paramilitaries but also Croat ones, to a lesser extent. Serbian President Milošević and Croatian President Tudjman had met before the war to devise a plan to partition the country for themselves. Bosniak refugees were funneled into what were assured to be the so-called “safe zones” of Srebrenica, Goražde, and Žepa. Once they arrived, they were disarmed completely and left with a meager Dutch peacekeeping force that was recently found guilty of willingly handing over many Bosniaks to their death. The US itself had intelligence and satellite imagery monitoring not only Serb troop movements in the lead-up to July 11 but throughout the duration of the massacre itself. Satellite imagery showed the bodies piling up in the killing fields, but no one did anything. But this year, more than any, the emptiness of the West’s “condemnation” of the Bosnian genocide was on full display, given its current support of Israel’s genocide of Palestinians in Gaza. In the wake of the massacre, the US garnered international support for its campaign to bomb Serb positions in Bosnia and lead the post-war process. This was the first time the so-called “defensive” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched an aggressive military campaign. As part of the so-called peace process, the Dayton Accords partitioned the country according to ethnicity: the Serb autonomous Republika Srpska and the Bosniak and Croat majority Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within that agreement, NATO troops were to be deployed to Bosnia, the first ever troop deployment outside of NATO member states. What was previously a nominally socialist, multi-ethnic country has since turned into a cesspool of neoliberalism, including austerity cuts, privatization of state-owned assets, environmental degradation, and misery for the masses of people. Now, Bosnia and all Balkan countries are encircled by the vultures of the world, including the US, China, and Russia, who are happy to profit from the bloodshed. That’s not to say that the Bosnian war was solely a Western creation, far from it. Yugoslavia’s internal divisions and inequality between nations laid the groundwork for armed conflict that was fostered, promoted, and waged by the ruling elite from the wealthiest republics. Yugoslavia’s History of Unity and Divisions In the decades since the wars related to the break-up of Yugoslavia ended, many have asked, perplexed: how could a country where various nations lived in relative peace end in such bloodshed—a country that was formed in the wake of and due to multi-national resistance to the Nazi occupation during World War II? The answer lies at the crossroads of economics and history. As Serbian forces took Srebrenica, the war criminal Ratko Mladić told cameras that “the time has come to take revenge on the Turks in this region.” The Turks he was supposedly referring to were Bosniaks, who he was intent on exterminating from the area to support Serbia’s territorial claims in Bosnia. During the 500+ year-long rule of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, both voluntary and involuntary conversion of the native populations to Islam was facilitated, including Christians, Catholics, and the Bogomils. Due to this history, Serbs and Croats both claim Bosniaks as belonging to their respective nation. Along this line of reasoning, many insist that Bosniaks simply do not exist as a separate nation. However, this logic ignores the historical development of nations and how they evolved over the transitory period between feudalism and capitalism. It is true that during Ottoman rule, Muslims enjoyed greater privileges than non-Muslims. Bosniak landowners were part and parcel of the Ottoman’s crushing rule in Bosnia, which oppressed not only poor Serb and Croat peasants but also Bosniaks. Multiple times, peasants of all these backgrounds rebelled against the empire of the day. From 1831 until 1875, poor peasants of all religions and backgrounds launched five different armed uprisings against the Ottoman Empire. With each rebellion, Bosniaks separated their national identity more and more from the ruling Turkish elite. In 1882, Serbs and Bosniaks also rebelled against the Habsburg military recruitment law, which would have conscripted young men. While Bosniak landowners were generally loyal to the Ottomans, peasants of all stripes had more in common with one another than the landowners. During the Habsburg rule in Bosnia, Bosniak landowners lost the political and economic power they had during the Ottoman Empire. Catholic and Orthodox landowners were seen as more reliable bulwarks against the Ottomans; thus, the feudal power dynamic was flipped on its head. The development of the Serbian nation was nurtured by the Russian Tsar, using Pan-Slavism as a smokescreen to extend its own influence in the region while the Catholic Habsburg empire coopted the Croatian national movement in an effort to defeat Hungarian pro-independence forces. In doing so, these powers helped develop the capitalist classes of both the Serbian and Croatian nations which both sought to convert and claim Bosniaks as their own. The oppression of Bosniaks further solidified under the First Yugoslavia from 1918 until 1941. At the beginning of the Yugoslavia monarchy, 2,000 Bosniaks were killed by Serb and Croatian paramilitaries in just two years. In 1919, land reforms nationalized eight million acres of Bosniak land, leaving 10% of Bosniak peasants without any means of production. Capitalist Yugoslavia with Socialist Trimmings Nazi Germany took advantage of this division in 1943 and promised Bosniaks a Muslim state if they cooperated. As such, a battalion of 21,000 Bosniak soldiers was formed to fortify the German occupation. The battalion was commanded by the SS officer, Himmler. Despite German support, the Bosniaks were still under attack from the other fascist forces of the region, including Serbian Chetniks and Croatian Ustasha. This caused many Bosniaks to join the multi-national Partisans led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Under the motto of “Brotherhood and Unity,” Yugoslavia made some surface-level efforts to address the national oppression of Bosniaks. In 1963, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognized a “Muslim nation” (referring to Bosniaks) as a constituent nation. Secularism was widely promoted; however, there was not a concerted campaign to break down reactionary ideologies that claimed Bosniaks as “merely” Islamized Serbs or Croats. In particular, chauvinism reigned supreme and reinforced economic inequalities between the wealthier nations (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians) as compared with the poorer ones, including the Muslim Bosniak and Kosovar-Albanian populations. During the lifespan of Yugoslavia, there was an economic inequality between republics and nations that ultimately helped bring about the country’s demise. From 1953 to 1989, Bosnia’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita decreased by 20 percent while GDP either remained the same or grew in the three wealthiest republics: Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia. Statistical Yearbook, Belgrade, 1991. Institute of Economics – Zagreb, Center for Economic Informatics and Statistics. The impoverishment of oppressed nationalities like Bosniaks was further facilitated through the divisions in production. Raw materials were largely extracted from poorer republics and transported to wealthier ones to be refined. While many on the left still laud “Tito’s socialism,” a few additional facts illuminate the fact that Yugoslavia was simply a state-capitalist society with more social welfare programs. Over the lifetime of Yugoslavia, wage inequality increased instead of decreased; early on, wages between managers and workers were 1:3.5. By 1967, the ratio was 1:20. This was facilitated by so-called workers self-management councils, which bestowed managers, engineers, and white-collar workers with more power than the workers performing manual labor. As such, the Yugoslav “socialist” system, in effect, reproduced capitalist relations. Between 1972 and 1982, Yugoslavia’s foreign debt increased ninefold from $2.4 billion to $20.3 billion. In the 1980s, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) used this debt to propose structural adjustment loans meant to privatize as much of Yugoslavia’s economy as possible. The austerity program was initially struggled against by a movement that crossed ethnic lines but was ultimately exploited by the reactionary nationalist elite. Throughout the late eighties and early nineties, half a million people took part in labor strikes against wage freezes, layoffs, increases in food and fuel prices, and the decadence of the ruling class. Reports about a strike in Slovenia noted that in addition to the economic demands, “The workers also demanded that the government slash the number of factory administrators, limit the number of limousines used by factory executives, and restrict their business travel.” Due to the corruption of the self-management committees and the bankruptcy of the Communist Party, workers became disillusioned with the establishment leadership. And thus, an opportunity emerged for reactionary nationalist groups to pit various ethnic groups against each other instead of blaming the multi-national, capitalist elite. For example, the right-wing Croatian Democratic Union political party blamed Serbs for the strikes in Croatia. The local party chapter said of one CEO that “he and other Serbs were to blame for the bad condition the company is in.” The Serbian elite claimed the “Serbs wanted to work, while the Croats didn’t.” At a session of the workers’ council, a female worker ominously warned against the strategy of the ruling elite, asking, “Will we swallow the bait of such tricks and misguided information, used by the most lazy among us to create divisions, when all of us will be equally hungry tomorrow: Croats, Serbs and Muslims alike!” Foreign Involvement in Bosnia Such was the reactionary nationalism that ultimately led to the state-supported Serb forces pillaging, looting, and exterminating Bosniak villages in Bosnia. Such was the reactionary nationalism that led to the Croatian government forcibly displacing its Serbian population at gunpoint, leading to the ethnic cleansing of 200,000 Serbs from eastern Croatia. The main reason why the West did not support Serbia’s attempts to keep the union together at will was to expel Russian influence from the region. It would be easier for the US to counter Russian influence if it was sequestered to Serbia as opposed to spread across six republics. In addition to representing the Ottoman Empire, the Serbian and Croat ruling classes justified their territorial ambitions as fighting “radical Islam.” They characterize Bosniaks as Islamic fundamentalists who sought to implement sharia law and oppress non-Muslims in an Islamic state. Bosniaks are generally secular, but there were members of their own ruling elite who promoted such ideology. For example, Alia Izetbegović, who became a member of the Presidency of Bosnia, had in the 1970s written an Islamic Declaration with hopes for Bosnia’s future as an Islamic state, which stated, “There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political institutions.” During the war in Bosnia, Saudi Arabia and Iran both sent mujahideen to fight on behalf of Bosniaks. While Serb and Croat-led paramilitaries did most of the plunder of Bosnia, it is reported that these fighters and Bosniak war criminals participated in ethnically cleansing Serbs and Croats in central Bosnia as well. In addition, Saudi-funded Wahhabi groups have funded mosques throughout the country and recruited members of the poor working-class youth to advance Wahhabism. In short, as the US Army War College paper says: “Bosnian Serbs and Croats may exaggerate the threat of Islamism or potential Islamic dominance, but the Bosniak leadership certainly provides them with plenty of ammunition.” In addition to Saudi Arabian Wahhabi forces, Turkey uses its historical and religious ties with Bosniaks to disguise its own self-interest in the region. In the 1990s, Turkey became part of the UN wartime peacekeeping mission. After the end of the war, it joined the NATO occupation of the country and had the second-largest number of troops in Bosnia. Turkey’s economic ambitions in the country became clear in a speech by Turkish politician Davutoğlu in Sarajevo in 2009. At an event titled “Ottoman Heritage and Muslim Communities in the Balkans Today,” he proclaimed, “Now is the time for reunification” by “reestablishing ownership in the region, through reestablishing multicultural coexistence, and through establishing a new economic zone.” Since then, Turkey has steadily increased its influence in Bosnia via investments in telecommunication, energy, transportation, health, tourism, construction, and banking. Today, Bosniaks see Turkey as their most significant and reliable ally. The most surprising player during the Bosnian war, however, is Israel. During the wars of the 1990s, Israel exported arms to the Serbian army, which were almost certainly used in the Bosnian genocide. In 2016, Israel’s State Attorney deemed that disclosure of Israel’s role in the Bosnian genocide posed a threat to Israel’s national security and foreign relations: a de facto admission of guilt. The butcher of Srebrenica and Bosnia, Ratko Mladić, wrote in his journal, “From Israel – they proposed joint struggle against Islamist extremists. They offered to train our men in Greece and a free supply of sniper rifles.” More recently, Israel abstained from a United Nations vote designating July 11 as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica. Bosnian War Repercussions When all was said and done, more than 200,000 people were killed in Bosnia, the vast majority (160,000) Bosniaks, 30,000 Croats, and 25,000 Serbs. 20,000 Bosniak women and children were raped in concentration camps while villages were looted and plundered by Serb and Croat forces. Two million people, mostly Bosniaks, were driven from their ancestral homes, and the economic cost of the war is estimated to be approximately $80 billion. Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina (along with other Balkan countries) ranks amongst the highest in terms of poverty and emigration in Europe. While the war has ended, the ideas and tensions that gave rise to it live on. Most Serbs do not recognize the systematic killing in Srebrenica as a genocide, as they are convinced by their own ruling elite that admission of this massacre makes Serbs a “genocidal nation.” In this way, the ruling elites of the Balkan countries continue the tradition of masking class differences with reactionary nationalist fervor. They do this skillfully to avoid scrutiny of their own exploitation of the masses and to divert attention from their culpability in war crimes of the 1990s. Such is the case with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who in the 1990s famously proclaimed, “For every Serb you kill, we will kill 100 Muslims.” In the West, US intervention in Bosnia is widely seen as a successful “humanitarian mission.” For those on the left, it can be regarded as an effective way to bring a disobedient country to its knees. As soon as the Soviet Union collapsed, the US used its position as the most powerful imperialist to allow for and then coopt the massacre of Bosniaks for its own geopolitical interests. The US was happy to carve up the region for itself. However, it cannot be seen as the sole reason for Yugoslavia’s demise. In order to divide and conquer, there must be divisions to exploit. Until the people of the Balkans come to terms with this, the US, Turkey, Russia, and now China will continue to steal the wealth of the masses of each and every country in the Balkans, paying no mind to their religion or ethnicity.This article written by Ana Milosavljevic was first published in July 22, 2024 on red.media.

The editorial team of Balkan Talks stands in full solidarity with our colleague and friend Jona Cenameri, who has become the target of a smear campaign by Serbian pro-government tabloids. We strongly condemn the actions of Informer and other regime-aligned media outlets that continue to target young people from Serbia and across the Western Balkans who are working to build peace, regional cooperation, and democratic societies. These campaigns do not simply attack individuals; they seek to intimidate an entire generation determined to imagine a different future for our region. Photo: Jona Cenameri, private archive Jona is a journalist at Faktoje.al, one of the leading fact-checking media organizations in Albania and the Western Balkans. Her commitment to evidence-based journalism, accountability, and public interest reporting is precisely what makes her a target for media that thrive on disinformation and political polarization. Over the past few days, Jona participated in the Youth Summit in Novi Pazar, organized by the Youth Initiative for Human Rights, together with students and young activists from across the region. Speaking to Balkan Talks, Jona questioned why media reports attacking the summit featured images of Albin Kurti when he had neither attended nor been mentioned during the event. Her remark illustrates how quickly facts can give way to manufactured narratives whenever independent voices challenge the stories that certain media seek to promote. Unfortunately, this kind of targeting has become increasingly common in Serbia. Since the beginning of the student protests, pro-government tabloids have repeatedly attempted to portray students, journalists, academics, and activists as enemies rather than citizens exercising their democratic rights. Such campaigns foster hostility, encourage harassment, and place real people at risk. What stands out in this latest wave of attacks is the attempt to link the Serbian student movement with Albania's Flamingo Revolution as though regional solidarity itself were something suspicious. In reality, these movements emerged independently, responding to different local circumstances. Yet they share many of the same democratic aspirations: demanding transparency, accountability, protection of public goods, and institutions that serve citizens rather than political elites. They also reflect a generation that refuses to accept corruption, state capture, and the privatization of resources that belong to everyone. Across the region, young people have increasingly recognized that many of the challenges they face are interconnected. Debates around public land, urban development, environmental protection, democratic participation, and the influence of powerful political and business interests do not stop at national borders. Whether discussing the Albanian coastline or public assets in Serbia, these conversations are rooted in a broader struggle over who has the right to shape the future of their communities. This growing regional dialogue is precisely what makes initiatives such as the Youth Summit in Novi Pazar so important. They create spaces where young people from different countries can meet not as enemies defined by the past, but as partners committed to justice, democracy, and a more peaceful future. At Balkan Talks, we witness this every single day. Our platform exists because young people throughout the Western Balkans want dialogue instead of hatred, cooperation instead of nationalism, and reconciliation instead of division. Every article we publish, every conversation we host, and every story we amplify demonstrates that another Balkans is not only possible, but it is already being built by those who refuse to inherit old conflicts. Attempts to divide us through fear, smear campaigns, and media harassment will not succeed. To those who spread hatred, we answer with solidarity. To those who try to isolate courageous young voices, we answer by standing closer together. And to Jona, as well as to every young journalist, student, activist, and researcher who faces intimidation for speaking the truth: you are not standing alone. Balkan Talks stands with Jona Cenameri. Today and always.

Avtorica: Nina Anžič To vprašanje je morda provokativno, a vendar ključno, če želimo, da države Zahodnega Balkana sploh kdaj postanejo članice Evropske unije. Za začetek bom izpostavila dejstvo, da je Marta Kos komisarka, pristojna za širitev v Evropski komisiji pod vodstvom Ursule von der Leyen v mandatu 2024–2029. Komisarska kandidatka za širitev Marta Kos na potrditvenem zaslišanju v Evropskem parlamentu (7. november 2024). Vir: newunionpost.eu Komisarka Kos je bila rojena še v času Jugoslavije, kar pomeni, da zelo dobro razume mentaliteto, kulturo in ne nazadnje tudi jezik med nekoč bratskimi državami. Dejstvo je, da je Slovenija leta 1991 – takrat še Socialistična republika Slovenija – prva zapustila Jugoslavijo. Sledila nam je Hrvaška in takrat se je začela krvava vojna na področju nekoč bratskih republik. Slovenija je takrat s štirinajstdnevno vojno za samostojno državo odnesla najbolje, če to sploh lahko merimo v tistem krvavem času med nekoč bratskimi narodi v bivši socialistični federativni Jugoslaviji. Slovenija je prva postala članica Evropske unije leta 2004, Hrvaška pa ji je sledila leta 2013. Vendar pa se je Slovenija ves čas, ne glede na levo ali desno vlado, v svoji zunanji politiki krčevito zavzemala za stabilen Zahodni Balkan in članstvo teh držav v Evropski uniji. Vendar, kje se je zalomilo pri državah, kot so Srbija, Bosna in Hercegovina ter Severna Makedonija? Zadnja država, ki sem jo omenila, si je uradnemu imenu celo dodala besedo "Severna", pa to še kar ni dovolj za članstvo v Evropski uniji? Srbija ter Bosna in Hercegovina se s svojim procesom približevanja še kar ne premakneta z rdeče luči na semaforju evrointegracij. Obe državi bosta morali nujno spremeniti stanje demokracije, svobode govora, vladavine prava in predvsem stopnjo korupcije.A vendar v Srbiji vidimo prihodnost v študentih, ki se ne dajo in ostajajo v blokadi z jasnimi zahtevami do oblasti. Zakaj ta ista politika ni sposobna prisluhniti svojemu največjemu potencialu, ki ga ima v državi? Če v Srbiji mladi sploh še dajejo upanje po spremembah, pa tega žal ne vidimo v Bosni in Hercegovini. Ali so v Bosni in Hercegovini že vsi mladi upi te države odšli v tujino in postali diaspora, ki se vrača domov le še ob praznikih? A vendar, vrnimo se nazaj na pot Evropske unije in komisarke Kos. Slednja je na svojem uradnem obisku srečala tako oblast kot tudi študente v blokadi. Torej EU jasno vidi prizadevanja mladih v Srbiji, v to sploh ne dvomim. Aktivni so tudi evropski poslanci – pri tem lahko zopet izpostavim slovensko poslanko Ireno Jovevo, pa tudi hrvaškega evropskega poslanca Gordana Bosanca. Prav tako države Zahodnega Balkana že danes aktivno sodelujejo v mehanizmu EU na področju civilne zaščite. Ko smo imeli v Sloveniji najhujše poplave v zgodovini samostojne države, so nam prav vse države Zahodnega Balkana takoj priskočile na pomoč. Ob tem se človek vpraša: ali je sodelovanje pri reševanju življenj in premoženja edina stična točka držav nekdanje Jugoslavije in Evropske unije?Če te priložnosti ne izkoristimo, bo mandat Marte Kos izgubljen mandat – predvsem za prej omenjene države Zahodnega Balkana. Močno namreč dvomim, da bo na to funkcijo še kdaj imenovan Slovenec ali Slovenka; nekdo, ki to regijo dejansko pozna in jo razume mogoče celo bolje kot nacionalna politika teh držav sama. Prav v tem razumevanju se skriva ključ, imenovan komisarka Marta Kos.

Author: Nina Anžič Članek v slovenskem jeziku je na voljo tukaj. This question may be provocative, but it is crucial if we want the Western Balkan countries to ever become members of the European Union. To begin with, I will highlight the fact that Marta Kos is the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement in the European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen for the 2024–2029 term. Commissioner-designate for Enlargement Marta Kos at the confirmation hearing in the European Parliament (7 November 2024). Source: newunionpost.eu Commissioner Kos was born during the Yugoslav era, which means she has a deep understanding of the mentality, culture, and, not least, the language shared by the once-brotherly nations. The fact is that in 1991—then still the Socialist Republic of Slovenia—Slovenia was the first to leave Yugoslavia. Croatia followed, and that is when a bloody war began among the once-brotherly republics. Slovenia fared best at the time with its fourteen-day war for an independent state, if one can even measure such a thing during that bloody period among the once-brotherly nations of the former Socialist Federal Yugoslavia. Slovenia was the first to become a member of the European Union in 2004, with Croatia following in 2013. However, regardless of whether the government was left-wing or right-wing, Slovenia has consistently and vigorously advocated in its foreign policy for a stable Western Balkans and the membership of these countries in the European Union. But where did things go wrong for countries like Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia? The last country I mentioned even added the word “North” to its official name, yet is that still not enough for membership in the European Union? Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with their ongoing integration processes, still haven’t moved past the red light on the European integration traffic light. Both countries will urgently need to improve the state of democracy, freedom of speech, the rule of law, and, above all, the level of corruption. Yet in Serbia, we see a future in the students who refuse to give up and remain in the blockade with clear demands for the authorities. Why is this same political establishment unable to listen to its greatest potential, which lies within the country? While young people in Serbia still offer hope for change, we unfortunately do not see this in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Have all the young hopes of Bosnia and Herzegovina already left the country to become part of a diaspora that returns home only on holidays? Yet, let us return to the path of the European Union and Commissioner Kos. During her official visit, she met with both the authorities and the students at the blockade. So the EU clearly sees the efforts of young people in Serbia; I have no doubt about that at all. Members of the European Parliament are also active—here I can again highlight Slovenian MEP Irena Joveva, as well as Croatian MEP Gordan Bosanac. Likewise, the countries of the Western Balkans are already actively participating in the EU’s civil protection mechanism. When we experienced the worst floods in the history of independent Slovenia, every single country in the Western Balkans immediately came to our aid. This raises the question: is cooperation in saving lives and property the only common ground between the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the European Union? If we do not seize this opportunity, Marta Kos’s term will be a wasted one—especially for the aforementioned Western Balkan countries. I seriously doubt that a Slovenian—someone who actually knows and understands this region, perhaps even better than the national policies of these countries themselves—will ever be appointed to this position again. It is precisely in this understanding that the key lies: Commissioner Marta Kos.

Author: Almin Šemić Ovaj članak možete pročitati na naškom ovde. On the wall of a building near the Glass Bank in Mostar, behind the Croatian National Theatre, in Knez Domagoj Street, there is a graffiti piece shown in the cover photograph that testifies to the long-standing presence of various messages in Mostar’s public space. Photo sourced from the Bljesak.info news portal As can be observed, the wall surface had previously been used for different inscriptions, including football supporter markings and other messages, indicating that this space functions as an open surface for informal visual communication. At the centre of attention is the graffiti bearing the message “Death to Fascism, Freedom to the People,” over which the symbol of the Ustasha “U” has been drawn. This creates a direct and clear ideological contrast within the same visual field between the anti-fascist slogan and a symbol that carries an opposing historical and political meaning. Furthermore, the message represents both a contrast and a reflection of Mostar’s society, where individuals express their affiliation with one ideology or multiple ideologies through such graffiti. On the same wall, there is also the inscription “There Is a Western Mostar,” which can be interpreted as a form of narrative concerning the division of Mostar. Such messages do not function merely as individual expressions but as recurring discourses that shape perceptions of the city and its boundaries in a symbolic sense. As Joseph Goebbels once stated, “A lie repeated a hundred times becomes the truth.” Just imagine how many times such a message, along with similar messages, had to be repeated in order to become normalized. In the context of children and propaganda, within ten years, sustained propagandistic influence may result in people no longer knowing whether Mostar was an anti-fascist city. Consider also how many times the phrase “Mostar Gymnasium” had to be repeated in order to erase the name of Aleksa Šantić. On a road in the suburban Mostar settlement of Vrapčići, near Mikulića Mahala, a graffiti inscription containing a message directed at a particular ethnic group was written. The inscription was sprayed in black paint directly onto the asphalt, without any additional visual elements, suggesting a rapid and informal intervention in public space. This is characteristic of graffiti intended to communicate a message quickly and directly. Photo sourced from the Večernji list news portal According to media reports, specifically from Raport and Večernji List, the graffiti was noticed in the early morning hours, after which the case was reported to the competent authorities, who conducted an investigation. Available information further suggests that similar inscriptions had previously been recorded in this area, indicating a continuity in the use of public surfaces for messages carrying political and identity-related connotations. Unlike graffiti that relies on symbolism or indirect messages, this inscription is characterized by its explicit and unambiguous formulation. What distinguishes it from the graffiti discussed in the previous section of this article is precisely the directness and explicitness of its message, which does not rely on symbolic conflict but instead communicates its content openly and unequivocally. Whereas the previous graffiti functioned through the overlapping of signs and the creation of ideological conflict within the same visual space, this one relies on a clear verbal formulation that requires no additional interpretation. From an analytical perspective, as previously noted, the message of the graffiti is clearly directed toward a specific ethnic group, as evidenced by the wording itself. Its structure and choice of words indicate an attempt at direct communication with a clearly defined “other,” while public space is used as a channel for transmitting such a message. At the same time, although it is impossible to determine with certainty who was responsible for creating the graffiti, the manner in which it is formulated points to a pattern characteristic of anonymous actors operating outside institutional frameworks. It is precisely this anonymity that allows the message to exist without the assumption of responsibility, while its public visibility ensures the dissemination of the message without intermediaries. In this context, the graffiti may be interpreted as a form of expression that does not seek dialogue but rather a one-sided assertion of presence and attitude within a particular space. Its function is not informative but performative: it does not merely communicate content, but also establishes a particular relationship toward the space and the community in which it appears. It is also possible to identify elements of propaganda within this graffiti, although it does not operate through an organized or institutional form. The message is formulated directly and without symbolic complexity, which is one of the fundamental characteristics of propaganda: clarity and ease of understanding without the need for additional interpretation. It is directed toward a specific group and employs emotionally charged language, thereby attracting attention and potentially influencing both the perceptions and emotions of passers-by. Although the identity of the author remains unknown, the manner in which the graffiti was created suggests an attempt to transmit a particular viewpoint through public space and reinforce the presence of that narrative, placing it within the broader framework of informal and decentralized propaganda. One may therefore consider how many times such a propagandistic message would need to be repeated before it becomes perceived as reality. On the wall of a residential building in Mostar, a graffiti inscription containing multiple messages written in black and red spray paint can be observed. The upper section consists of a sentence referring to territorial expansion and a historical context, accompanied by a symbol and a year, while the lower section contains the inscription “Ustaše Mostar: Fascism Lives!”. Photo sourced from the Mostarski.ba news portal The use of different colours and the arrangement of the messages suggest that the graffiti was not created at a single moment but rather represents a layered intervention produced by multiple authors or during different stages. The inclusion of geographical references and ideological terminology indicates an attempt to symbolically define the space and connect it with particular historical interpretations. The upper section of the graffiti, referring to historical context and territorial boundaries, demonstrates an awareness of historical narratives and their role in contemporary public discourse. From the perspective of propaganda studies, this graffiti illustrates how public space can become a site of competing messages that seek to influence the perceptions of passers-by. The upper inscription employs historical references and territorial allusions to suggest a particular political and identity-based framework, relying on recognizable symbols and narratives that already possess emotional and ideological significance within Mostar. Such an approach corresponds to several basic principles of propaganda, including the simplification of messages, reliance on familiar symbols, and attempts to associate a specific space with a particular collective identity. Furthermore, repetition represents one of the fundamental mechanisms of propaganda. Through the repeated appearance of similar messages and symbols in public space, certain narratives may gradually become normalized and integrated into collective perceptions. This raises broader questions regarding institutional responses to such messages and the extent to which public authorities address their presence within the urban environment. If viewed alongside recent incidents, such as attempts to remove graffiti depicting Slobodan Praljak in Ortiješ, as well as acts involving the placement of Ustaša stickers and symbols on monuments in Baćevići, the graffiti may be interpreted within a wider pattern of symbolic and ideological contestation in public space. In the context of propaganda, the graffiti can also be understood as an affirmation of a particular ideological narrative that relies on historical references and symbols associated with the legacy of fascism. Such messages do not operate in isolation. Rather, they often build upon existing social and political tensions, particularly in communities such as Mostar, where public space continues to bear the legacy of the conflicts of the 1990s. In this sense, the graffiti may be connected to narratives emerging from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the conflict between Bosniaks and Croats, with symbols and messages serving as mechanisms for the reinterpretation or preservation of specific forms of collective memory. Although the territorial divisions established during the war may no longer exist in a formal sense, symbolic boundaries continue to shape public discourse and spatial perceptions within the city. The repeated appearance of ideologically charged symbols, attacks on memorial sites, and disputes over historical narratives demonstrate how public space remains a field in which competing interpretations of the past are expressed and contested. The emotional dimension of propaganda is also evident in such messages, as they seek not only to communicate information but also to provoke emotional responses and influence attitudes toward coexistence, identity, and collective belonging. On an information board located in front of a building associated with the religious and cultural institutions of the Serbian community in Mostar, specifically in front of the Bishop’s Residence, a graffiti inscription was written in purple spray paint containing the markings “1981” and “4th Corps.” Photo sourced from the Top Portal news portal These references may be linked to local identity-based and historical contexts. The number “1981” is commonly associated with the Red Army (Football club Velež Mostar) supporters’ group, while “4th Corps” refers to a formation of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that operated in this area during the Bosnian War. The choice of location itself—an information board identifying a museum and religious site—further emphasizes the symbolic dimension of the intervention within this space. From an analytical perspective, the graffiti can be understood as a form of symbolic marking of space, through which a particular identity framework is communicated by means of brief and recognizable references. Such messages do not necessarily require explicit verbal formulations in order to be understood by the local community, as their meaning is constructed through existing social and historical references. In this context, the graffiti may function as a signal of the presence of a particular group or narrative within a given space, especially when it is displayed at a location associated with another community. Consequently, the message may be recognizable not only to members of the local community but also to a wider audience familiar with the historical and social significance of these references. Within the framework of propaganda studies, this graffiti may be viewed as a form of symbolic and identity-based territorial marking that relies not on direct statements but on recognizable signs embedded within the local context. The inscriptions “4th Corps” and “1981” evoke wartime and supporter-group symbolism, and through the combination of these references communicate a particular identity narrative. Their meaning is further shaped by the location, given that the graffiti appears on a board situated in front of a building associated with institutions of the Serbian community in Mostar, thereby giving the message a more specific and targeted dimension. In this sense, the graffiti may be interpreted as a signal of the presence of a particular social or ideological group within a space symbolically associated with another community. Similar inscriptions containing the same references have previously been documented at this and related locations, suggesting a pattern of repetition and the use of public space for the transmission of coded messages, a characteristic feature of informal forms of propagandistic communication. At first glance, the graffiti reading “KILL THE BALIJA” at the Bunica picnic site may appear to be just another act of vandalism in public space. However, its message extends beyond ordinary graffiti and enters the sphere of hate propaganda, ethnic intolerance, and symbolic violence. The location itself further amplifies the significance of the message. A natural recreational area, which should represent a space of leisure, social interaction, and escape from societal tensions, is transformed into a site of intimidation and a reminder of wartime narratives that have not completely disappeared from the public sphere of Bosnia and Herzegovina, even decades after the conflict. Photo sourced from the Blagaj Info Facebook page The message of the graffiti is direct, aggressive, and leaves little room for interpretation. The use of the term “balija,” which is employed within nationalist discourse as a derogatory label for Bosniaks, demonstrates a clear intention to dehumanize a particular ethnic group. Dehumanization has historically been one of the central elements of hate propaganda, involving the portrayal of the “other” as inferior, dangerous, or undesirable. When such language is combined with the imperative “kill,” the graffiti moves beyond hate speech and becomes an explicit call for violence. Visually, the graffiti is not artistically complex, yet its propagandistic power lies precisely in its brutal simplicity. The black lettering, roughly painted on a concrete surface, conveys a sense of urgency and raw aggression. There is no aesthetic ambition and no symbolism intended to obscure its meaning; the objective is not artistic expression but rather the dissemination of fear and the provocation of a reaction. Graffiti of this kind often functions as a territorial marker, representing an attempt to symbolically claim space through a nationalist message. It is particularly important to consider the context of Mostar and Herzegovina, regions that continue to bear the legacy of wartime divisions. Within such an environment, graffiti can serve as a means of prolonging conflict in symbolic form. Their impact extends beyond the individual reader, influencing the broader social atmosphere by creating feelings of insecurity and reinforcing distrust between communities. In this case, the propaganda does not seek to persuade through rational argumentation but through emotions, primarily hatred, fear, and anger. Such graffiti also performs a function of normalizing extremist discourse. When messages that advocate violence remain visible in public space for extended periods without a response from institutions or the wider community, they may create the impression of social tolerance toward such expressions. In this way, the graffiti becomes more than an isolated incident; it becomes part of a broader culture of silence and passivity regarding nationalist violence. From a propaganda perspective, the graffiti employs several key mechanisms: simplification of the message, identification of an “enemy,” emotional manipulation, and public visibility. For this reason, its influence can be particularly significant among younger generations who grow up surrounded by symbols of division. Rather than encouraging dialogue and shared public space, messages of this kind contribute to an atmosphere of conflict and serve as a reminder that public space in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to function as a site of political and identity-based struggle.

Autor: Almin Šemić Na zidu zgrade u blizini Staklene banke u Mostaru, iza Hrvatskog narodnog kazališta, u ulici Kneza Domagoja, nalazi se grafit iz naslovne fotografije koji svjedoči o dugotrajnoj prisutnosti različitih poruka u javnom prostoru Mostara. Fotografija preuzeta sa portala Bljesak.info Kako uočavamo, površina zida već je ranije korištena za ispisivanje raznih natpisa, uključujući navijačke oznake i druge poruke, što ukazuje na to da ovaj prostor funkcionira kao otvorena površina za neformalnu vizualnu komunikaciju. U središtu pažnje nalazi se grafit sa porukom „Smrt fašizmu, sloboda narodu“, preko koje je iscrtana simbolika ustaškog U. Time se unutar istog vizualnog polja uspostavlja direktan i jasan ideološki kontrast između antifašističke parole i simbola koji nosi suprotno historijsko i političko značenje. Osim toga, poruka je svojevrsni kontrast ali i ogledalo mostarskog društva, koje putem ovakvih grafita, izražavaju pripadnost jednoj ideologiji ili ideologijama. Na istom zidu nalazi se i natpis „Postoji zapadni Mostar“, koji se može čitati kao oblik narativa o podijeljenosti Mostara. Ovakve poruke ne funkcionišu samo kao individualni izrazi, već kao ponavljajući diskursi koji oblikuju percepciju grada i njegovih granica u simboličkom smislu. Kako i Joseph Goebbels kaže “svaka laž ponovljena stotinu puta, postaje istina”. Zamislite samo, koliko se puta morala ponoviti ovakva poruka kao i njoj slične poruke da postane normalna. U kontekstu djece i propagande, za desetak godina, propagandnim djelovanjem se više neće znati ni je li Mostar bio antifašistički grad. Zamislite i koliko se puta morala ponoviti začkoljica Gimnazija Mostar, kako bi se iskorijenilo ime Alekse Šantića. Na cesti u mostarskom prigradskom naselju Vrapčići, u blizini Mikulića mahale ispisan je grafit koji sadrži poruku usmjerenu prema jednoj etničkoj grupi. Natpis je napisan crnim sprejem direktno na asfaltu, bez dodatnih vizualnih elemenata, što upućuje na brzu neformalnu intervenciju u javnom prostoru. Kao što je to slučaj i kod svakog grafita kojim se želi nešto brzo poručiti. Fotografija preuzeta sa portala Večernji list Prema medijskim navodima, konkretno Raporta i Večernjeg lista, grafit je primijećen u jutarnjim satima, nakon čega je slučaj prijavljen nadležnim institucijama koje su izvršile uviđaj. Iz dostupnih informacija proizlazi da su slični natpisi i ranije zabilježeni na ovom području, što ukazuje na kontinuitet korištenja javnih površina za ispisivanje poruka sa političkim i identitetskim konotacijama. Za razliku od grafita koji koriste simboliku ili indirektne poruke, ovaj natpis karakterizira eksplicitna i nedvosmislena formulacija. Ono što ga razdvaja od grafita iz prethodne analize jeste direktnost i eksplicitnost poruke, koja ne koristi simbolički sukob već otvoreno i nedvosmisleno komunicira sadržaj. Dok je prethodni grafit funkcionirao kroz preklapanje znakova i stvaranje ideološkog konflikta unutar istog vizualnog prostora, ovaj se oslanja na jasnu verbalnu formulaciju bez potrebe za dodatnim tumačenjem. U analitičkom smislu, kao što smo već pomenuli, poruka grafita je jasno usmjerena prema konkretnoj etničkoj grupi, što proizlazi iz same formulacije teksta. Njena struktura i izbor riječi ukazuju na pokušaj direktne komunikacije sa jasno definiranim drugim i drugačijim, pri čemu se javni prostor koristi kao kanal za prenošenje takve poruke. Istovremeno, iako nije moguće sa sigurnošću utvrditi tko stoji iza ispisivanja grafita, način na koji je formuliran upućuje na obrazac karakterističan za anonimne aktere koji djeluju izvan institucionalnih okvira. Upravo ta anonimnost omogućava poruci da postoji bez preuzimanja bilo kakve odgovornosti, dok njena javna vidljivost osigurava širenje poruke bez posrednika. U navedenom kontekstu, grafit se može interpretirati kao oblik poruke koja ne teži dijalogu već jednostranom iskazu prisutnosti i stava u prostoru. Da prostite, kao kad lav izmokri teritoriju da je označi, tako slično možemo posmatrati i ovaj grafit. Njegova funkcija nije informativna, već performativna, on ne samo da prenosi sadržaj, nego i uspostavlja određeni odnos prema prostoru i zajednici u kojoj se pojavljuje. U ovom grafitu moguće je prepoznati i elemente propagandnog djelovanja, iako on ne djeluje kroz organiziranu ili institucionalnu formu. Poruka je formulirana direktno i bez simboličke složenosti, što je jedna od osnovnih karakteristika propagande, jasnoća i lakoća razumijevanja bez potrebe za dodatnim tumačenjem. Usmjerena je prema konkretnoj grupi i koristi snažan, emocionalno nabijen jezik čime se postiže efekt privlačenja pažnje i potencijalnog uticaja na percepciju prolaznika, ali i na samu emociju. Iako nije poznato tko stoji iza pisanja ovakvog grafita, način na koji je izvedena ukazuje na pokušaj da se kroz javni prostor prenese određeni stav i učvrsti prisutnost tog narativa, što grafit svrstava u širi okvir neformalne, decentralizirane propagande. A zamislite samo, koliko se puta ovakva propagandna poruka morala ponoviti da bi postala stvarnost. Na zidu stambene zgrade u Mostaru, ispisan je grafit koji sadrži više poruka pisanih crnim i crvenim sprejem. Gornji dio čini rečenica koja referira na teritorijalno širenje i historijski kontekst, uz dodatak simbola i godine, dok se u donjem dijelu nalazi natpis “Ustaše Mostar: fašizam živi!”. Fotografija preuzeta sa portala Mostarski.ba Različite boje i raspored sugeriraju da grafit nije nastao u jednom trenutku, već kao slojevita intervencija više autora ili u različitim fazama. Svakako da, spominjanje geografskih referenci i ideoloških termina ukazuje na pokušaj da se prostor simbolički definira i poveže sa određenim historijskim interpretacijama. Gornji dio grafita, onaj o povijenom kontekstu odnosno granicama, jasno prikazuje svijest okoline o proučavanju povijesti. Sto puta ponovljena laž je istina, a upravo tim putem se nastoji ići kroz pisanje ovakvih grafita, alaudirajući da je NDH tekovina još uvijek prisutna u Mostaru. Ona ista NDH koja svojata granice do Drine i zaziva crna odijela. Ako posmatramo kroz prizmu propagande, ovaj grafit pokazuje kako javni prostor može postati mjesto konkurentskih poruka koje nastoje oblikovati percepciju prolaznika. Gornji natpis koristi povijesne reference i teritorijalne aluzije kako bi sugerirao određeni politički i identitetski okvir, oslanjajući se na prepoznatljive simbole i narative koji već imaju emocionalno i ideološko značenje u Mostaru. Takav pristup odgovara osnovnim principima propagande, pojednostavljivanje poruke, oslanjanje na poznate simbole i pokušaj povezivanja prostora sa određenim kolektivnim identitetom. Nadalje, jedan od osnovnih principa propagande jest ponavljanje poruke, u ovom primjeru, poruke fašizma koja zapravo i već dugo odzvanja Mostarom. Pitanje ostaje, kako ovakve poruke ne bude akciju u predstavnicima vlasti u Mostaru? Da li su i oni taoci ovakvih politika? Ukoliko posmatramo nedavni pokušaj brisanja grafita Slobodana Praljka iz naselja Ortiješ, te upade u mjesto Baćevići gdje živi pretežno srpsko stanovništvo (slučaj lijepljenja ustaških stikera i pisanje ustaških simbola na spomeniku NOBa), onda dolazimo do svjesnog propagandnog djelovanja koje svoje utemeljenje pronalazi duboko u prošlosti. U kontekstu propagande, ovaj grafit može se i interpretirati kao oblik afirmacije ideološkog narativa koji se oslanja na historijske reference i simbole povezane s fašističkim nasljeđem. Odnosno, prihvatanje jedne ideologije. Takve poruke ne djeluju izolirano, već se često nadovezuju na postojeće društvene i političke tenzije, posebno u sredinama poput Mostara gdje je javni prostor i dalje obilježen posljedicama ratnih sukoba iz 1990ih. U tom smislu, grafit se može povezati s narativima koji proizlaze iz rata u Bosni i Hercegovini, uključujući i sukobe između Bošnjaka i Hrvata, pri čemu simboli i poruke služe kao način reinterpretacije ili održavanja određenih kolektivnih sjećanja. Drugim riječima, ratne granice su možda i pobrisane, no one teritorijalne nisu. Danas se u Mostaru fašizam slavi kao Nova godina. Svjedočili smo skrnavljenju Partizanskog spomen groblja i lupanju ploča. Osim toga, prisutan je i emocionalni princip djelovanja, pogotovo u dijelu suživota, gdje se emocionalnim putem nastoji postići akcija. Na informativnoj tabli ispred objekta povezanog sa vjerskim i kulturnim institucijama srpske zajednice u Mostaru, točnije ispred Vladičanskog dvora, ispisan je grafit ljubičastim sprejem koji uključuje oznake “1981” i “4. Korpus”. Fotografija preuzeta sa portala Top Portal Ove reference mogu se dovesti u vezu sa lokalnim identitetskim i historijskim kontekstom, “1981” se često povezuje sa navijačkom grupom Red Army, dok “4. Korpus” upućuje na formaciju Armije BiH koja je djelovala na ovom području tokom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini. Sam izbor lokacije, tabla koja označava muzej i vjerski objekt, dodatno naglašava simboličku dimenziju intervencije u ovom prostoru. U analitičkom smislu, grafit se može posmatrati kao oblik simboličkog označavanja prostora, gdje se kroz kratke i prepoznatljive oznake prenosi određeni identitetski okvir. Takve poruke ne moraju nužno imati eksplicitnu verbalnu formulaciju da bi bile razumljive lokalnoj zajednici, jer se njihovo značenje gradi kroz postojeće društvene i historijske reference. U tom kontekstu, grafit može djelovati kao signal prisutnosti jedne grupe ili narativa u prostoru, posebno kada je ispisan na mjestu koje se povezuje s drugom zajednicom. Dakle, poruka može biti poznata samo lokalnoj ili široj zajednici, a u ovom kontekstu poznata je i široj i lokalnoj zajednici. U okviru propagande, ovaj grafit može se posmatrati kao oblik simboličkog i identitetskog označavanja prostora, koji ne koristi direktne poruke, već prepoznatljive oznake unutar lokalnog konteksta. Natpisi “4. Korpus” i “1981” upućuju na ratnu i navijačku simboliku, čime se kroz kombinaciju tih referenci prenosi određeni identitetski okvir. Njegovo značenje dodatno se oblikuje kroz lokaciju, s obzirom na to da je ispisan na tabli ispred objekta povezanog s institucijama srpske zajednice u Mostar, čime poruka dobija konkretnu ciljanu dimenziju. U tom smislu, grafit se može interpretirati kao signal prisutnosti jedne društvene ili ideološke skupine u prostoru koji se simbolički povezuje s drugom. Slični natpisi sa istim oznakama već su ranije zabilježeni na ovom i srodnim lokalitetima, što ukazuje na obrazac ponavljanja i korištenja javnog prostora za prenošenje kodiranih poruka, karakterističan za neformalne oblike propagandnog djelovanja. Na prvi pogled, grafit “UBIJ BALIJU” na izletištu u Bunica djeluje kao još jedan čin vandalizma u javnom prostoru. Međutim, njegova poruka prevazilazi obični grafit i ulazi u sferu propagande mržnje, etničke netrpeljivosti i simboličkog nasilja. Sama lokacija dodatno pojačava težinu poruke – prirodno izletište koje bi trebalo predstavljati prostor odmora, zajedništva i bijega od društvenih tenzija pretvara se u mjesto zastrašivanja i podsjećanja na ratne narative koji ni decenijama nakon sukoba nisu u potpunosti nestali iz javnog prostora Bosne i Hercegovine. Fotografija preuzeta sa Facebook stranice Blagaj Info Poruka grafita je direktna, agresivna i ne ostavlja prostor za interpretaciju. Korištenje riječi “balija”, koja se u nacionalističkom diskursu koristi kao pogrdan naziv za Bošnjake, pokazuje jasnu namjeru dehumanizacije određene etničke skupine. Upravo je dehumanizacija jedan od ključnih elemenata propagande mržnje kroz historiju – stvaranje slike “drugog” kao manje vrijednog, opasnog ili nepoželjnog. Kada se takva poruka spoji s imperativom “ubij”, grafit prelazi iz govora mržnje u otvoreni poziv na nasilje. Vizualno, grafit nije umjetnički kompleksan, ali njegova propagandna snaga leži upravo u brutalnoj jednostavnosti. Crna boja slova, grubo ispisana na betonskoj površini, ostavlja dojam hitnosti i sirove agresije. Nema estetske ambicije, nema simbolike koja bi prikrivala značenje – cilj nije umjetnički izraz nego širenje straha i provociranje reakcije. Takvi grafiti često služe kao teritorijalne oznake, odnosno pokušaj simboličkog “prisvajanja” prostora kroz nacionalističku poruku. Posebno je značajno analizirati kontekst Mostara i Hercegovine, prostora koji i dalje nose snažno naslijeđe ratnih podjela. U takvom ambijentu grafiti postaju sredstvo produžavanja konflikta u simboličkoj formi. Oni ne djeluju samo na pojedinca koji ih pročita, već utiču i na kolektivnu atmosferu, stvarajući osjećaj nesigurnosti i produbljujući nepovjerenje među zajednicama. Propaganda u ovom slučaju ne pokušava uvjeriti argumentima, nego emocijama – prvenstveno mržnjom, strahom i bijesom. Ovakvi grafiti također imaju funkciju normalizacije ekstremnog govora. Kada poruke koje pozivaju na nasilje ostaju dugo prisutne u javnom prostoru bez reakcije institucija ili zajednice, stvara se utisak društvene tolerancije prema njima. Time grafit postaje više od pojedinačnog ispada; on postaje dio šire kulture šutnje i pasivnosti prema nacionalističkom nasilju. U propagandnom smislu, grafit koristi nekoliko ključnih mehanizama: pojednostavljivanje poruke, identifikaciju “neprijatelja”, emocionalnu manipulaciju i javnu vidljivost. Upravo zbog toga njegov uticaj može biti snažan, posebno među mlađim generacijama koje svakodnevno odrastaju okružene simbolima podjela. Umjesto dijaloga i zajedničkog prostora, ovakve poruke proizvode atmosferu konflikta i podsjećaju koliko je javni prostor u Bosni i Hercegovini i dalje mjesto političke i identitetske borbe.