Author: Janka Júlia Csepregi
A review of the rich scholarly literature on the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars of the 1990s published over the past few decades shows that the so-called “Kosovo question” often appears as a framing element in interpretations that, rightly so, approach the process of dissolution from a transnational and holistic perspective. Namely, the situation of Kosovo is typically discussed in the introductory sections where different scholars outline the dire situation unfolding from the complex crisis of the 1980s in Yugoslavia and the nationalist mobilization fueled by Milošević, which first escalated in Kosovo. As accounts follow the course of events and the development of armed conflicts and wars in the independent republics, it is not until 1998 that Kosovo returns to the narrative, as the „last in the line of conflicts” to be solved following the dissolution (see e.g. Baker 2015; Sundhaussen 2014).
Nevertheless, the marginalization of the question of Kosovo in the 1990s is not only a phenomenon in scholarly interpretations. In fact, the situation in Kosovo was sidelined and largely neglected for a period in contemporary international discourse concerning developments in Yugoslavia, too. Although the human rights issue in Kosovo was in the center of both domestic and international attention during the economic and political crisis unfolding in the 1980s in Yugoslavia, armed conflict first escalated in the breakaway republics claiming independence, and the question of Kosovo remained marginalized until the late 1990s.
Reason for the collapse of Yugoslavia
Scholarly explanations of the dissolution of Yugoslavia can be broadly grouped into several strands that emerged from the early 1990s onward (Dragović-Soso 2007). The first body of arguments focused on longue durée causes of ethnic conflict. Be it the essentialist vision of “ancient hatred” among the “Balkan people,” promoted already during the Balkan Wars in the West, the highly contested theory of the clash of civilizations, or approaches of historical geography depicting Yugoslavia as a peripheral space shaped by former multinational empires, these explanations view the multinational and multiconfessional character of Yugoslavia as the main source of therefore unavoidable conflict.
Similarly, another group of historians highlights the failure of the ideology of “Yugoslavism” to integrate inherently incompatible identities, most notably those of the two biggest state-building nations, the Serbs and the Croats. Whether attributed to Serbian hegemonism or Croatian and Slovenian separatism, interpretations focusing on the legacy of the first Yugoslav state portray the multinational state as an impossible idea doomed to failure.
Shifting the focus from the roots of violence to the process of disintegration, a third body of scholarship examines the evolution of socialist Yugoslavia, with particular attention to the 1974 Constitution and the confederalization of the constitutional system. These institutionalist explanations emphasize how deep economic and political crises contested the socialist legacy and eventually led to state collapse, while leaving unanswered the question of whether political reinvention could have prevented it. More recent and now widespread approaches reject the predetermined nature of the collapse and instead stress the responsibility and agency of political and intellectual elites in promoting tensions and inducing fear, primarily through state controlled media.
Without denying the significance of the systemic crisis that delegitimized socialism, scholars argue that it was the active dissemination of nationalist ideologies and hatred by elites that made disintegration inevitable, generating influential debates on elite-led versus grassroots dynamics and the processes of national mobilization. In contrast with these perspectives, scholars have also turned toward international factors, such as the role of international financial institutions or Western recognition policies in the early 1990s, with debates over the timing, extent, and moral value of international intervention continuing to shape both academic interpretations and the legacy of the 1990s wars.
Methodological nationalism and transitional perspective
In the past few years, the academic scholarship on Yugoslavia’s dissolution has increasingly been accused of essentializing the Yugoslav case and „reading history backwards”. This phenomenon does not only concern the „nationalizing” historiography of post-Yugoslav nation states that tendentially relies on a research agenda aimed at normalizing the successor states „backwards” and projecting its current reality back in history (called methodological nationalism).
On the contrary, this methodological bias is also characteristic of international scholarship that until the present day has viewed the country’s dissolution „shaped by its end”, focusing on developments in Socialist Yugoslavia leading to its failure while neglecting evidence that suggests the opposite. In fact, this is also reflected in the general direction of this research, namely in the large number of works that focus on the ethnic nature of the conflict, in contrast to the common Yugoslav topoi that characterized historiography before the breakup (Bieber 2016:1–3). This approach therefore suggests a turn in new research directions such as e.g. a shift from political history to the Yugoslav Lebenswelt or a focus on the ’havenots’ rather than the ’haves’ of Yugoslav society in order to understand the existing social inequalities that could play a role in inidividuals’ response to nationalist mobilization (Archer 2016; Galijaš 2016).
By applying a transnational perspective, the essay understands developments in Kosovo as an integral part of the broader process of Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the unfolding armed conflicts, which are treated as neither predetermined nor inevitable. Consequently, in order to avoid the trap of “reading history backwards,” the discussion concentrates on the initial phase of the conflict rather than on its more frequently analyzed escalation.
The evolution of the international attitude towards the Kosovo issue
Although Kosovo was initially perceived as a fundamental issue in the context of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, after the recognition of the Western republics it was excluded from the peace process and viewed as an internal matter of Serbia by the international community. How can one explain the neglection of the Kosovo issue in the early 1990s? In the following I will argue that the international assessment and handling of the Kosovo issue was overshadowed by the unfolding conflict in the Western republics and was therefore primarily dependent on the intentions concerning Yugoslavia’s survival.
Firstly, observing the evolution of the international attitude towards the Kosovo question, it seems that it was only in the foreground of international attention as long as Western powers were insisting on the preservation of Yugoslavia. Early American and European initiatives, including sanctions imposed on the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia (such as the arms embargo), formed part of a broader strategy aimed at preserving Yugoslavia and treating Kosovo as a core issue to be resolved within the framework of the Yugoslav state (Bellamy 2002:18).
However, the realisation that Yugoslavia could not be held together eventually led to the recognition of the member republics that declared their independence and therefore worked as a self-fulfilling prophecy, giving international legitimation for the breakup. Consequently, as Kosovo did not gain such recognition, it was no longer treated as a constituent part of Yugoslavia but an internal matter for Serbia, thus losing legal grounds for international engagement and what is more, becoming a victim of sanctions imposed at Serbia (Bellamy 2002:13, 16). In this way, with the abandonment of Yugoslavia’s survival, the settlement of the Kosovo issue was also removed from the agenda, which is well symbolized by the fact that Rugova’s 1991 letter to Lord Carrington advocating Kosovo’s independence remained completely unanswered (Bellamy 2002:26).
Secondly, when it comes to the handling of the Kosovo issue, namely the marginalization and delayed involvement in the resolution of the situation of Kosovo Albanians, was significantly influenced by the development of conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This can be observed at different stages of the process of Yugoslavia’s dissolution. First of all, this interrelation already played a role in the non-recognition of Kosovo.
Delayed escalation of the conflict
Even though until 1989 it was a constituent part of the SFRY with legally defined borders layed down in the constitution, Kosovo did not gain international recognition together with other republics, one of the main reason of which was the Western powers’ fear of creating a precedent and thus legitimizing the claims of Serbs in Croatia and BiH (Bellamy 2002:24–26). However, this was not the only occasion when the issue in Kosovo was neglected in favor of the resolution of other, seemingly larger-scale conflicts.
After a short period of limited international engagement in Kosovo characterised by the presence of the CSCE Mission of Long Duration and the ICFY, in their efforts to win Milosević over to Bosnia’s cause, the international powers withdrew even this low level of their presence from Kosovo, thereby handing it over to Serbian autocracy (Bellamy 2002:65). Although peace in Bosnia was ultimately achieved and appears to have been worth the cost, it remains uncertain whether “sacrificing” Kosovo—and thereby postponing its resolution on the international agenda—ultimately contributed to the strengthening of the radical wing of the Albanian movement and to the delayed escalation of the conflict.
In the context of the Kosovo conflict, both academic literature and public discourse often mention that a key factor in the involvement of international forces on such a scale (NATO airstrike) was the ’Bosnia syndrome’, i.e. the ‘never again’ conviction following the traumatic experience of the Bosnian war (Bellamy 2002:69).
However, as can be seen from the above, even in the early stages of the conflict, the international handling of the Kosovo issue depended largely on events in other member states, rather than on internal political power relations and the extent of Serbian political repression. As we shall see below, this considerably limited the scope of the Albanian movement and greatly influenced the form and dynamics of the resistance.
The dynamics of the resistance in Kosovo
The multifaceted crisis that unfolded in Yugoslavia following Tito’s death first erupted in Kosovo, where the malfunctions of the socio-economic system had already led to protests as early as in 1981. Although the protests can be interpreted as manifestations of the particularly acute consequences of economic and demographic transformation in Kosovo – then the poorest and most underdeveloped region in Yugoslavia –, by this time the unequal political and economic representation of ethnic groups had led to growing tensions and thus the 1981 riots were framed around the discourse of nationality policy and constitutional reform (Pula 2004:801–803). This trend continued to strengthen throughout the 1980s, so that by the 1989 two completely separate and isolated political blocs had emerged in Kosovo, divided along ethnic lines at both the institutional and social levels: the Serbian nationalizing regime, which mobilized against the ‘Albanization’ of Kosovo, and the Albanian national secessionist movement organizing against Serbian repression (Pula 2004:807).
In the wake of the dissolution of the federal state, despite the particularly dire political and economic situation of Kosovo, Kosovo Albanians opted for non-violent resistance and started to build a parallel state rather than opening a new front against Serbia following the example of the Western republics. Even though the claim to independence was articulated as early as in 1991, it was only after the wars in BiH and Croatia ended that the UÇK and the support for armed resistance gained momentum in Kosovo, leading to armed conflict and the contested NATO intervention in 1998–1999. The first half of the 1990s in Kosovo was thus marked by the formation of a grassroots nonviolent resistance movement and the emergence of a parallel system, which received less attention in academic literature in light of the bloodshed that followed.
It is assumed that both the social and institutional frame of the conflict and the emerging Albanian resistance can be rooted in the institutional structures and political identities inherited from the Yugoslav system (Pula 2004:797–798, 818). The segregated political and social frameworks that characterized the relation between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo throughout the 1990s were results of the institutionalization of political repression organized by the state, excluding Albanians from the decision-making process and thereby forcing them to develop parallel structures.
In addition, the educational and cultural institutions together with the public service system that was established and coordinated by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) parallel to the one provided by the state were all in a sense, sucessors of the earlier existing autonomy-era institutions being resilient to political repression.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the relative success of the Albanian movement was largely thanks to the political opportunities created by the international environment, primarily through the liberalization following the collapse of state socialist systems in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, similarly to the political transformation in Eastern bloc countries, the dynamics and chances of political movements were tied to international support, regardless of internal potential and the extent of popular support. It seems therefore that it was partly the lack of international recognition that led to the failure of non-violent resistance. In the following I argue that the marginalization of the Kosovo question by the international community limited the chances of a peaceful resolution and in the long run contributed to violent escalation.
Parallel state
As I argued above, the international recognition of the Western republics led to the marginalization of the Kosovo issue in the international discourse, treated as an internal matter of the Serbian republic. However, in the long term, the recognition of the newly independent republics and Kosovo’s marginalization actually strengthened the separatist aspirations of the Kosovo Albanians rather than consolidating them.
Even though the Albanian delegates of the provincial assembly in Kosovo already proclamied their claim for sovereignty in July 1990, this was not yet a shared initiative with the leading organization of the Albanian movement (LDK) at the time. It was only later and due to the growing political opression by the Serb state that the formal institutions in Kosovo and the Albanian movement joined forces and set the common goal of independence. In fact, the main demand of the Albanian movement in Kosovo even as late as May 1991 was only the republician status and the reversal of Serbia’s constitutional reforms. Yet by the summer of 1991, with the breakup of Yugoslavia becoming a realistic scenario, the LDK made the independence of Kosovo as its main political objective, which gained popular legitimation by the referendum held in September 1991 (Pula 2004:806).
The Kosovar Albanians’ claim for self-determination was then engraved in the Kaçanik constitution amended in October 1991 by the regional Assembly, laying down the groundwork for the legitimate claim of independence and the basis of the parallel state of the 1990s. This process was further escalated and in a sense concluded with the EC and later US recognition of the independent republics, setting off an irreversible domino effect whereby the Albanian movement, fearing even greater Serbian oppression without the constitutional framework of Yugoslavia and counting on Western intervention, could no longer back down from its demand for independence (Pula 2004:816).
Recognising of Kosovo
Although the demand for independence was no longer challenged, the non-violent movement organized under Rugova’s leadership in the 1990s nevertheless prevented violent escalation and maintained the possibility of a peaceful resolution, a chance that was dismissed by the international community. In other words, the lack of international (both political and economic) support for the parallel state and the missed opportunity to negotiate with Rugova eventually undermined the LDK’s legitimacy and reduced the popularity of its strategy of nonviolent resistance, contributing to the rise of the UÇK. On one hand, the sanctions imposed on Kosovo through Serbia, along with Kosovo’s exclusion from the negotiations, further intensified tensions between local Serbian and Albanian communities amid the ongoing economic and political crisis (Bellamy 2002:24–26).
Furthermore, the region’s economic decline further increased dissatisfaction, thereby boosting support for more radical forces. On the other hand, it seems that the international community missed a core opportunity for a peaceful settlement by failing to use their diplomatic leverage to negotiate and reach an agreement with the more consolidated wing of the Albanian movement led by Rugova.
The nonviolent resistance led by the LDK operated on the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence, which, in addition to monitoring and documenting cases of human rights violations, paid particular attention to preventing and sanctioning radical and violent forms of Albanian resistance, avoiding confrontations with the Serbian police. Even though the early 1990s were marked by public demonstrations, strikes, and guerrilla attacks in Kosovo, by 1992 the parallel state had taken institutional shape and gained broad popular support, marginalizing the position of clandestine groups and therefore the public support for armed resistance.
In any case, the earlier disbandment of Kosovo’s Territorial Defense force and the removal of ethnic Albanians from the police units have heavily hampered the organization of a full-blown armed resistance, which, even more so in the absence of Rugova’s political will to establish a defense force, remained off the agenda. Although Rugova’s system was subject to criticism both within the LDK and among its opponents, e.g. within the student movement, partly learning from the political culture of peaceful transitions in Central Eastern Europe and partly in recognition of the given circumstances, the system of non-violent resistance enjoyed widespread support and was reinforced by the 1992 elections, completing the institutional framework of the parallel state (Pula 2004:808–812, 816–817; Hetemi 2020:212–214.)
Although Rugova’s parallel system was firmly institutionalised and rooted in broad popular support, its credibility was gradually eroded by the absence of progress concerning Kosovo’s independent status and its international recognition, especially in light of the peace negotiations in Dayton.
The international society missed the opportunity to engage with or include Rugova in diplomatic processes, which weakened the appeal of his nonviolent strategy among Kosovo Albanians and had led to his growing political marginalisation after 1995. This sustained non engagement, coupled with the implicit acceptance of Serbia’s claim over Kosovo, created space for more radical actors such as the UÇK to gain popular support after Dayton (Bellamy 2002:65–66; Sundhaussen 2014:368–369). Consequently, the emergence of armed resistance was not simply the result of internal dynamics but was closely linked to international policies reshaping the political landscape in Kosovo.
Missed opportunity
Even though it is clear that the escalation of conflict in Kosovo in 1998–1999 was not solely determined by international factors, in my essay I attempted to show how the prospects for a peaceful resolution were profoundly altered by the broader context of Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the selective recognition policies of the early 1990s. The international community’s marginalization of the Kosovo issue—its delayed engagement and failure to negotiate with the more consolidated and nonviolent wing of the Albanian movement led by Rugova—represents a critical missed opportunity to prevent escalation on the diplomatic level.
By turning away from Kosovo, international powers did not resolve the conflict but merely postponed it, reducing the likelihood of a peaceful resolution and indirectly contributing to the later rise of armed resistance.
As shown, the developments in Kosovo were deeply intertwined with both the dynamics of the Yugoslav wars in Croatia and Bosnia and the international handling of those crises and the Kosovo issue was subordinated to wider regional calculations rather than addressed on its own terms. Just as the “Bosnia syndrome” prompted NATO intervention during the escalation in Kosovo, the hope of securing peace in Dayton had earlier shaped the international approach to the Kosovo issue, and it was precisely this, i.e. Kosovo’s exclusion from the peace negotiations that undermined Rugova’s legitimacy and contributed to the radicalization of the Albanian movement. This interdependence underscores the necessity of analyzing the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the related conflicts as a single, interrelated process.
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